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ABSTRACT 
Anglo-American Relations and the Vietnam War, 1964-68 
It is over thirty years since the U. S. became embroiled in the Vietnam war. 
Only recently, however, have scholars begun to assess how that involvement in 
South East Asia affected America's relations with other countries. This thesis 
examines the impact of the Vietnam war on the relationship between the United 
States and one of its key allies, Great Britain, during the height of the conflict. It 
assesses how far Vietnam was a factor in the cooling of transatlantic relations during 
the mid to late 1960s. 
Scholars have long noted the decline in importance of Anglo-American 
relations during the 1960s. It is the contention of this thesis that the Johnson 
administration's preoccupation with events in South East Asia made the inevitable 
loosening of ties between the two countries strained and uncomfortable. Although it 
was not the only problematic issue troubling Anglo-American relations during this 
period, Vietnam was the one area where there was clear and open conflict. Whereas 
tensions over sterling and the decision by the British Government to remove its 
troops from East of Suez prompted feelings of disappointment, sadness and 
frustration, Vietnam provoked disagreement, misunderstandings, annoyance and 
accusations of betrayal. 
At the beginning of their period in office, the British Labour Government 
desired a `closer' relationship with the United States but by 1968 it was apparent that 
the Johnson Administration was not amenable to this. This was partly because 
Britain was now, just one of a number of close allies in Europe; partly because the 
111 
American President did not develop a personal friendship with the British Prime 
Minister; but also because the Vietnam conflict had proved an issue - important 
enough and emotive enough - to cause open and deep disagreement between the two 
countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will examine three major themes. Firstly, it seeks to further 
understanding of the Vietnam War by focussing on the bilateral relationship between 
the United States of America and one of its close allies, the United Kingdom, during 
the key years of the war. Over the last decade, many scholars of American foreign 
relations have recognised the need to adopt an international perspective in their 
studies. ' The New Diplomatic History has promised to make redundant the criticism 
that the history of American Foreign Relations is too parochial and instead `seeks to 
write a global American History' .2 As Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman recently pointed 
out, this new paradigm `shows the United States as an incredibly powerful 
participant in a world that is nonetheless not easily malleable to its touch'. 3 A study 
of Anglo-American relations during the Vietnam War highlights America's 
difficulties in persuading Great Britain to cooperate on this issue. As such, this 
monograph will continue the process of providing a broader context to the study of 
the war in particular, and of American foreign relations in general. 
The Vietnam War has attracted much scholarly attention. However, most of 
the scholarship on the decision-making process has been based largely on American 
sources and concentrated primarily on American domestic considerations, 
particularly President Johnson's plans for a `Great Society'. Relatively little 
attention has been paid to the international environment in which the United States 
made its decisions, or to the impact of its policies on the wider world. Yet external 
I Michael J. I Logan, 'State of the Art: An Introduction' in Michael J. Hogan (Ed. ), America in the World: The 
Historiography ofAmerican Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
2Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, 'Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Towards a Global American History', 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Fall 1997), p. 500 
3 Ibid 
2 
factors as well as internal ones clearly shaped American policy on Vietnam. Despite 
its weakening economic and military position, Britain was still an important and 
respected actor on the world scene; even President Johnson referred to the country, 
however disingenuously at times, as America's most important ally. The American 
public agreed with their President's assessment. A Gallup Opinion Poll of March 
1965 found that Britain was judged the US' most reliable ally and ranked it as the 
fourth most important country in the world after the United States, the USSR and 
China. 4 This study will assess the extent to which the Johnson administration's 
increasing preoccupation with events in South East Asia affected its conduct of 
foreign affairs in relation to one of its key European allies. 
It is in this context that one must examine Clive Ponting's claim in Breach of 
Promise that 1965 saw President Johnson and Harold Wilson negotiate a series of 
`understandings' which tied American financial support to a British commitment not 
to devalue the pound and to retain a military presence East of Suez. This claim is 
now widely supported by scholars in the field. 5 Ponting also claimed that by the 
spring of 1965 Wilson and Johnson had come to a `general understanding' on the 
part the UK should play in Vietnam. The British would provide no direct assistance 
to the United States but would support American action in Vietnam; the Americans 
committed themselves to keeping their transatlantic ally well-informed of their policy 
in Vietnam and `reluctantly accepted' that Britain should use its role as Co-Chair of 
4 C. J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship'. A Political History in Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London: 
Longman, 1992), p. 109 
5 Clive Ponting, Breach ofProntise: Labour in Power 1964-1970 (London: Penguin, 1990). Ponting's views are 
supported by scholars of Anglo-American relations, and the Labour government, such as Alan P. Dobson, Anglo- 
American Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1995); C. J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: ,4 
Political History ofAnglo-American Relations since 1945 (London: Longman, 1992); Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson 
(London: HarperCollins, 1992); Philip Zeigler. Wilson: The Authorized Life of Lord Wilson ofRietiaulx (London: 
\Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993); John Dumbrell, 'The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government: 
Vietnam, The Pound and East of Suez, ' Journal of American Studies, Vol. 30, Pt. 2 (August 1996). 
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the 1954 Geneva Conference to seek peace. 6 This thesis will show how and why 
Wilson and Johnson came to this agreement; moreover it will consider what part 
Vietnam played in the later controversial understanding that linked American support 
for sterling with the maintenance of Britain's worldwide role. This idea of a 
understanding was, in one form or another, in common circulation at the time.? 
Some Labour members, especially Foreign Secretary George Brown, believed 
Wilson came to some sort of an agreement with Johnson during his December 1964 
visit to Washington. Barbara Castle records in her diary that Brown, not too drunk, 
complained that: 
`We've got to break with America, devalue and go into Europe' 
but `He [Wilson] can't budge ... Because he is too deeply committed 
to Johnson. God knows what he said to him. Back in 1964 he 
stopped me going to Washington. He went himself. What did he 
pledge? I don't know: that we wouldn't devalue and full support 
in the Far East? But both those have got to go. We've got to turn 
down their money and pull out the troops: all of them ... I want 
them out of East of Suez. This is the decision we have got to make: 
break the commitment to America. I've been sickened by what I've 
had to do to defend America at the dispatch box. '8 
In fact, as this thesis will demonstrate, in many respects Ponting's use of the word 
`understanding' to describe Anglo-American policymaking on these crucial areas 
seems more apposite than Brown's evocation of shady bargains. Castle herself now 
doubts that Wilson made any specific deal, believing `Harold wasn't Machiavellian 
in the way of sitting down and working out little deals ... with people'. 9 In his 
I Ponting, Breach of Promise, p. 148 
7 See also P. Toynbee, 'Dictators, Demagogues or Prigs? ', New Statesman, 5 January 1965 in Kingsley Amis (Ed. ), 
Harold's Years: Impressions from the New Statesman and the Spectator (London: Quartet Books, 1977), p. 57; New 
Statesman, 12 March 1965, 'Vietnam - What's Wilson Waiting For? ' 
8 Barbara Castle, The Barbara Castle Diaries 1964-76 (London: Papermac, 1990), 18 July 1966, p. 76 
Interview with author, 28 April 1993 
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memoirs, James Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Wilson years, 
also vehemently denies any deal involving Vietnam. `Emphatically I must record 
that I encountered nothing said or implied to this effect. "O And yet, while it is 
extremely unlikely that any formal deals were made between Wilson and the 
Americans, this does not mean to say that the Prime Minister was not aware of 
American thinking on the issue, as we shall see, he repeatedly made statements, 
initiatives, and decisions with regard to Vietnam in the expectation of certain 
responses from America toward Britain and her interests. As Castle notes, Wilson 
`would have a kind of understanding and it would be unwritten and almost 
unarticulated ... 
done by instinctive reactions'. 1 I Wilson himself later recognised that 
in one sense the U. K. 's hands were tied over Vietnam. Richard Crossman points out 
in his diaries how Wilson contradicted himself on this issue at a Cabinet meeting on 
defence in February 1966: 
First he repeated time after time that the Americans had never 
made any connection between the financial support they gave us 
and our support for them in Vietnam. Then about ten minutes 
later he was saying, `Nevertheless, don't let's fail to realize that 
their financial support is not unrelated to the way we behave in 
the Far East: any direct announcement of our withdrawal from 
East of Suez] ... could not fail to have a profound effect on my 
personal relations with L. B. J. and the way the Americans treat US. 12 
That Vietnam dominated US foreign policy during the Johnson years is 
without question. George Ball, US under Secretary of State, famously admitted that 
Vietnam `made it very hard to get attention on anything else, that judgements tended 
10 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), p. 176 
11 Interview with author, 28 April 1993 
12 Richard Crossman, Crossman Diaries: Selections from the Diaries ofa Cabinet Minister 1964-70 (London: Mandarin, 
1991), 14 February 1966, p. 180 
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to be colored by the Vietnamese situation ... we were getting things totally 
distorted 
... In fact, I once drew a map for Dean Rusk and said, "this is your map of the 
world. " I had a tiny United States with an enormous Vietnam lying right off the 
coast. ' As an example of this Ball mentioned that the Johnson administration 
`pressed the British so hard to stay in line on Vietnam' that `I'm sure we were willing 
to pay some costs for it we wouldn't have paid otherwise'. 13 The need for allied 
support in its Vietnam crusade was extremely important to the United States and this 
work will consider how far its leaders put pressure on the United Kingdom to remain 
loyal on Vietnam, in addition to explaining why the British Labour Government 
could not comply with all of America's demands. 
Due to the British thirty-year rule, historical assessments of the effects of the 
Vietnam war on Anglo-American relations have until recently been constrained by 
the dearth of authoritative sources. As a result, most analysis of Britain and the 
Vietnam war has been found within the context of broader studies of the Anglo- 
American relationship or the Vietnam War. To date, the only major examination of 
this issue is Caroline Page's doctoral thesis `The Strategic Manipulation of American 
Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-6 and British Opinion on the 
War'. 14 Based largely on unofficial sources and examining a very brief time-span, 
Page's study focussed mainly on the efficacy of American propaganda in retaining 
the support of the British press, public and government. More recently John 
Dumbrell's article `The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government: 
13 Transcript, George Ball Oral History Interview, Interview II, Tape 1,9 July 1971 by Paige E. Mulhollan, p. 17, 
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texax [henceforth LBJL] 
14 Caroline Page, 'The Strategic Manipulation of American Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1966, and 
British Opinion on the War, ' PhD Dissertation, University of Reading, 1989. Caroline Page, US Propaganda During the 
Vietnam War, 1965-73: The Limits of Persuasion (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994) 
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Vietnam, The Pound and East of Suez' has examined Anglo-American relations from 
the American viewpoint. 15 The main object of this study, then, is to provide a 
detailed account of the Vietnam war's impact on the transatlantic relationship. 
The second aim of this thesis is to shed light on the `special relationship' 
during what was undoubtedly a difficult period for both countries. The United States 
faced domestic and international criticism of its war in Vietnam, at the same time as 
the country was riven with racial and other social unrest. If, as Ernest May and 
Gregory Treverton have claimed, the `special relationship' amounts to `a sense of 
company in a confusing, unfriendly world' then America clearly needed all the 
friends it could get during one of its most troubled periods. 16 Equally, Great Britain 
faced major economic turmoil and a concomitant readjustment in its world role; so it 
too needed all the help it could get. Unlike most studies of Anglo-American 
relations this thesis does not primarily examine the inequality of power between the 
nations, although much of the debate over Vietnam was predicated on the knowledge 
of this fact. Instead, it focusses on how quite serious disagreements between Great 
Britain and the United States over Vietnam were handled, and to some extent 
accommodated within the framework of the `Special, if unequal, Relationship'. 
Although case studies have focussed on short-term crises such as Suez, the 
Skybolt affair and the Falklands war, a study of Anglo-American relations and the 
Vietnam War affords an opportunity to study how the relationship coped with a 
prolonged period of tension. ]? Richard Neustadt argued convincingly in Alliance 
15 Dumbrell, 'The Johnson Administration and the British Labour Government'. See also John Dumbrell, The Making of 
US Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. 
16 Ernest R. May and Gregory F. Treverton, 'Defence Relationships: Americans Perspectives' in William Roger Louis and 
I ledley Bull (Eds. ), The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 
181 
17 Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (London: Columbia University Press, 1970); Louise Richardson, 117zen Allies 
Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). The 1956 
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Politics that misunderstandings are much more likely between countries with an 
intimate and close relationship. Differences are magnified because more is expected 
of the respective allies. Nowhere is this more apparent than during the Vietnam War. 
The US expected, indeed almost demanded, loyalty and support from Britain on 
Vietnam. However, a brief consideration of the history of Anglo-American relations 
in Asia should have made the leadership in Washington well aware that Britain was 
unlikely to `toe the line' in this area, while a cursory examination of British domestic 
politics would have indicated that there would be definite limits to the Labour 
Government's support for US actions in Vietnam. 'But an analysis of Anglo- 
American relations and Vietnam in the mid 1960s shows that the White House and 
the State Department seemed to be operating a practice of `doublethink' where 
Britain and Vietnam was concerned. Although they acknowledged the reasons why 
the Wilson government could not commit troops to Vietnam, this did not overcome 
Washington's gut-feeling that the British weren't doing enough on the issue. The 
rhetoric and reality of the `special relationship' was at the root of this confusion in 
Washington and in London, for it is quite clear that the British government was also 
torn on how to behave `correctly' - according to conflicting criteria - regarding 
Vietnam. 
Thirdly, the thesis explores the relationship between personality and politics. 
It has long been considered a truism to state that relations between Harold Wilson 
and Lyndon Johnson were not merely cool, but positively icy, especially when 
compared with the image of warm intimacy associated with John Kennedy and 
crisis over Suez was by far the most serious in terms of the international consequences; Skybolt was very much an intra- 
alliance crisis; and disagreements over the Falklands showed how the interests of Britain, the weaker power, conflicted 
with the interests of the stronger. 1 iowever, in between the Skybolt crisis of 1962 and the Falklands crisis of 1982 was 
another important area of conflict: the Vietnam War. 
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Harold Macmillan. '8 A great deal has been written about the part played by personal 
relationships in the smooth functioning of the `special relationship' and while there is 
agreement amongst scholars that Anglo-American relations are, first and foremost, 
interest-led, there is still a lack of unanimity on the part played by personal 
chemistry. 19 It is generally acknowledged that a warm personal relationship between 
the leaders of Britain and America provides excellent public relations material for 
both the countries and the individual statesmen involved; and can foster a more co- 
operative, working environment. The extent to which personal relations influence 
policy-making is much less certain. It is hard to deny, however, the personal 
significance of the Vietnam War to President Lyndon Baines Johnson and many of 
his key advisors. For that reason, it has to be asked if LBJ's obsession with Vietnam, 
mixed with his already volatile personality, decisively influenced US relations with 
Great Britain. On the other side of the Atlantic, was Harold Wilson so impressed by, 
and fearful of, LBJ as a world leader and personality, that his judgement was 
impaired on the issue of Vietnam? 
The major sources of materials for the thesis were the Public Record Office, 
Kew (PRO) and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL) in Austin, Texas. 20 
Many files, and documents within files, remain classified or have been destroyed, 
particularly cables between the Prime Minister and the President, and especially 
during the February 1967 visit of Premier Kosygin to London. British government 
18 Scholars of Anglo-American relationship characterise the relationship as cool. See Dobson, Anglo-American 
Relations; Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship', David Dimbleby & David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship 
between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (London: Guild Publishing, 1988). Only Philip Ziegler, Wilson 
portrays the relationship as, on the whole, warm. 
19 Esmond Wright, 'The Special Relationship', History Today (April 1991) 
20 The files most consulted at the PRO were the Foreign Office (F0371), the Prime Minister's Office file (PREM) and the 
Cabinet minutes (CAB). 
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documents are often written in formal language, that is largely dispassionate and 
considered. Fortunately, Harold Wilson often wrote his immediate thoughts and 
reactions on the documents, giving the historian some sense of the Prime Minister's 
personal stamp on events. President Johnson's presence is, however, noticeably 
absent in the papers contained in the Johnson Library. Reflecting his preference for 
verbal communication, particularly the use of the telephone, he rarely put his 
thoughts down on paper and only occasionally scribbled his responses on memoranda 
and letters. Consequently, LBJ's opinions and feelings are largely gauged through 
his actions and through second and third parties, such as advisors, ambassadors and 
journalists. Unfortunately, the tapes of the President's telephone conversations 
released and transcribed so far only cover the first few months of the Johnson 
presidency. The relatively few conversations between Wilson and Johnson are not 
yet available. However, notes and transcripts of some key conversations do exist. 
The great benefit of the holdings in the LBJ Library is the inclusion of personal 
papers as well as official ones. These papers, particularly those of Johnson's key 
National Security Advisors, McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostov, tend to be less 
formal than the State Department papers, although even these are more relaxed and 
open than British Foreign Office minutes. The Rostow and Bundy papers, along 
with the cable exchanges between the British Ambassador in Washington and the 
Foreign Office, and the US Ambassador and the State Department, are crucial in 
understanding the behind-the-scenes activity that took place over Vietnam. 
The papers contained in the LBJ Library and the PRO, were buttressed by 
published sources such as the Pentagon Papers, the US State Department's Foreign 
Relations of the United States series, and Hansard. Such official, and semi-official 
10 
documents were supplemented by the private papers of key actors and by the many 
diaries, memoirs and political autobiographies of the period. While generally less 
reliable due to the suspicion of self-aggrandisement on the part of the authors, they 
do provide either contemporary or retrospective explanations and justifications of 
British and American actions. The David Bruce diaries were particularly useful in 
ascertaining the day-to-day unfolding of events. Additional minor sources include 
newspapers and oral interviews with key politicians and diplomats. Many of these 
interviews were conducted on a confidential basis on the grounds that the 
interviewee could be more candid. In general, however, these interviews served only 
to confirm analysis based on consideration of available documentary evidence. 
The thesis is divided into six major chapters, separated mainly around 
Wilson's visits to Washington. The chronological structure reveals both the 
oscillating nature of Anglo-American relations during the period and the processes 
by which policy was formulated and implemented. Ultimately, the thesis 
demonstrates the extent to which Vietnam was a constant undercurrent in relations 
between Washington and London between 1964-1968. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CONSTRAINTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: THE UNITED STATES, 
GREAT BRITAIN AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1941-64 
Historical Tensions over South-East Asia 
The differences between the United States and Great Britain over Vietnam in 
the 1960's did not emerge from a vacuum; rather they were, in part at least, an 
expansion of much deeper disagreements about policy in South-East Asia and the Far 
East generally. These longstanding disagreements, rooted in the different manner 
and duration of the two countries' historical exposure to the region, provided a 
crucial context for the particular tensions of the Wilson-Johnson years. 
Britain had a history in, and consequent knowledge of, South-East Asia. As 
H. G. Nicholas observes, even after World War II, `here was a region largely 
permeated, historically, by British rule, influence or trade'. ' The region was 
important to Britain largely because of the military bases of Hong Kong and 
Singapore and also because of the British dependency of Malaya (until 1957) which 
provided lucrative raw materials such as rubber, copper and tin. 2 For strategic and 
economic reasons, therefore, the United Kingdom was tied to the area. Moroever, 
Britain's experience of empire in the Far East meant it had a distinctive 
understanding of, and empathy with, Asian culture and affairs. America, on the other 
hand, was far removed from the area in terms of both history and geography, `it 
owed little to American enterprise, had meant little for American strategy, and 
' H. G. Nicholas, Britain and the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), p. 90 
2 After the Second World War, Malaya became increasingly more important to Britain as its raw materials, mainly sold to 
the United States, helped support sterling. 
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exercised little or no sway over American sentiment' .3 Although the United States 
had a long history of trading in the Far East, this did not necessitate an involved or 
considered relationship with the indigenous peoples there. Consequently, at times, 
British foreign policymakers viewed the United States as naive and brash in its 
dealings with Asian nations, feeling the United States would do well to take 
advantage of the sophisticated insight and wisdom of the British in this area. 
After the Second World War South-East Asia became an area of shared 
interest for Great Britain and the United States. However, the contrast between 
Britain's deep roots in the region and America's relatively recent involvement in 
Asian affairs meant that Anglo-American relations faced almost continual strain as 
the new superpower often rebuffed the advice of the weakening colonial power. 
Still, after 1945 what tied the US and the UK together on South-East Asia was the 
`complicating' factor of communism, or the perceived threat of communism. This 
led to a `basic identity of British and American objectives in this area; both powers 
wanted to contain Communism without extending the conflict to the point which 
involved an open war in China'. 4 In Malaya, British economic interests were directly 
threatened by communism in 1948 in the form of armed insurrection on the part of 
the Malayan Communist Party. 
However, while the fear of communism proved a mutual interest in the post- 
war years, the two countries failed to deal with the problem successfully in Vietnam, 
partly due to their different assessments of the threat and varying approaches to the 
problem. As H. Nicholas observed, `the paradox was that seemingly Britain, with 
more at stake in South-East Asia than the U. S. A., was yet more reluctant to 
Nicholas, Britain and the United States, p. 90 
lbid, p. 91 
13 
countenance any deeper local involvement. '5 It will be shown that the reason for this 
disagreement between the transatlantic partners was partly because Great Britain was 
not as alarmist over the spread of communism as was the United States, but also 
because Britain no longer had the manpower or resources to play a large, direct role 
in Asia. America, on the other hand, had both the will and the capability to enlarge 
its influence in that part of the world. 
Prior to the Johnson administration, there were four distinct periods of crisis 
in Anglo-American relations concerning South-East Asia: the Second World War; 
the years prior to the 1954 Geneva Conference; the Conference itself; and the period 
leading up to the planned 1956 elections in Vietnam. An examination of all four 
crises reveals that at times there was a lack of full co-operation and frankness 
between the two powers on the issue of South-East Asia and often a chasm in 
attitudes towards the dangers of communism and the maintenance of world peace. 
The Second World War 
During the Second World War the newly forged `special relationship' faced 
serious threat over policy in the Far East. 6 Indeed, towards the end of the war, the 
situation between Britain and America on Indochina has been characterised by one 
historian as one of `virtual noncommunication, coupled with a certain amount of 
bewilderment and suspicion'.? 
Ibid, p. 92 
6 Christopher Thome, `Indochina and Anglo-American Relations, 1942-1945', Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 45, 
(February 1976), pp. 73-76 
7 Ibid, p. 96 
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Wartime uneasiness over the future of Asia has to be understood in the 
context of the changing power dynamic between the United States and Great Britain. 
By 1942, Britain was clearly the junior partner in the Anglo-American relationship 
and, as Christopher Thorne points out, the US's newly emergent preponderance was 
nowhere more evident than in Japan. 8 The US felt that it was taking a 
disproportionate share of the burden within the South-East Asia Command (SEAC) 
and was suspicious of British motives in the area, assuming correctly that Britain's 
main concern was to retain or regain control of its colonies. Moreover, the British 
were in sharp disagreement with the Americans on how the war in the Far East 
should be fought. This was compounded by a military command structure that saw 
the British running operational matters yet the US in overall control of strategy, and 
by a convoluted debate over SEAC's operational boundaries. 
While America and Britain were struggling to work together amicably 
towards ending the war in Asia, plans for the post-war world also increased tensions. 
The possible return of the French to Indochina, which had been occupied by Japan 
since 1941, was a major sticking point. President Roosevelt, and many within the 
State Department, were broadly anti-imperialist in sentiment and on a number of 
occasions the American President made his low opinion of French colonialism 
known. Roosevelt famously remarked that, `after 100 years of French rule in 
Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been before'. 9 
Consequently, as early as 1942 FDR mooted the idea that France should not simply 
8 ]bid, p. 73 
9 Franklin D. Roosevelt quoted in Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time For It'ar: The United States and Vietnam 1941-1975 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 13-14 
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take back its colonial territories, but instead, those territories should become `trustee' 
nations, under the UN, until they were ready for full independence. 
The British Foreign Office did not agree with Roosevelt's damning comments 
on French colonialism, instead believing France's record in Indochina to be, on the 
whole, beneficial in that it provided a stability in the region that would have 
otherwise been lacking. Moreover, Churchill was aware that FDR was attacking 
colonialism per se, and sensed a threat to British power in Asia, particularly in India. 
As the Roosevelt administration failed to deliver a coherent policy on either the 
French colonies or `the entire question of Western colonial empires', the British were 
inclined to ally themselves more closely with their fellow colonialists, the French. 
Sensing potential conflict, and having other problems to worry about, neither 
President Roosevelt nor Prime Minister Churchill were willing to tackle the other 
over this issue. With Roosevelt's death in April 1945, and growing Western 
suspicion of the Soviet Union, the Americans ended their opposition to the 
maintenance of colonialism in Asia. 10 At the end of the war in the Pacific, the 
French returned to Indochina, aided by the British and supported by the Americans 
and with the advent of the Cold War, South-East Asia became one of the world's 
`hot spots'. 
Pre-Geneva years, 1945-1954 
Britain's direct involvement in Vietnamese affairs began with the end of the 
Pacific war in August 1945. Under the jurisdiction of the July 1945 Potsdam 
10 George C. Herring, 'The Truman Administration and the Restoration of French Sovereignty in Indochina", Diplomatic 
History, Vol. I (Winter 1977), pp. 97-8 
16 
agreement, and as they were closer than French forces, British troops were sent to 
occupy key areas in Indochina as part of SEAC. Their mission was to enforce the 
surrender of remaining Japanese forces and to liberate prisoners of war. On arrival 
in Saigon the British forces, under the command of Admiral Mountbatten, 
encountered a confused political situation. Although the Viet Minh had occupied 
Northern cities, had declared Vietnamese independence and had established the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam covering the South as well as the North, in reality 
the South was without a government and was in civil strife, with attacks on French 
nationals commonplace. The British forces along with the few remaining French 
troops and French armed civilians spent the next months using force to crush 
Vietnamese nationalist uprisings. By the time the French forces reached Saigon and 
assumed full control of South Vietnam in January 1946, British forces had sustained 
40 fatalities. In this way, Britain, under the Labour Government of Clement Attlee, 
contributed to the re-assertion of French colonial control over Vietnam under the 
puppet leadership of Bao Dai. " I The United States acquiesced in this by ignoring Ho 
Chi Minh's declaration of independence and his continuing pleas for help. Britain's 
physical intervention in Vietnam ended there. However, the British Government 
maintained an active interest in Vietnamese affairs because of its own Far East 
interests - in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya. Stability in the region continued 
to be essential to British trade with the Far East and to the maintenance of 
Commonwealth links. 
By the end of 1946 a full-scale war had broken out between France and the 
Vietminh. At this stage the US still encouraged the French to recognise the rights of 
11 George Rosie, The British in Vietnam: flow the twenty fire year war began (London: Panther Books, 1970), p. 11 
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the Vietnamese to `some semblance of independence'. They hoped a solution to the 
unrest would come through the discovery of more moderate Vietnamese nationalism 
than the communist inspired Vietminh. By 1947-48, however, the US was 
financially supporting the French war effort against Vietnamese nationalists, partly to 
ensure de Gaulle's agreement on French entry to NATO but largely in an attempt to 
`contain' communism in the area. 12 
Nevertheless, in the immediate post-war years the United States generally 
`deferred to Britain's longer experience and greater immediate stake in South-east 
Asia and ... were prepared to keep 
in step with British policy and leave London to 
take the lead in influencing the French'. 13 The Foreign Office scrutinized events in 
Vietnam and kept in close contact with the French in order to persuade them to take a 
liberal approach to Vietnam. Britain was also one of the first governments to 
recognise the government of Emperor Bao Dai who had been installed by the French 
in their plan for Vietnam (along with Laos and Cambodia) to become Associated 
States of the French Union: `thus diplomatically recognising the Government of 
Vietnam under the Emperor Bao Dai as the only legitimate representative of the State 
of Vietnam'. '4 
Britain's position of leadership in South-East Asian affairs changed 
dramatically after 1949. At this stage British and American views began to diverge 
due to America's obsessional fear of communism and especially of `Red China'. 
Alarm over China increased with the 1949 Chinese revolution, was encouraged by 
12 Herring, "Truman Administration", pp. 104-5 Indirectly at first, through the Marshall Plan. 
13 C. Mary Turnbull, "Britain and Vietnam, 1948-1955", War and Society, Vol. 6, No. 2 (September 1988), p. 104 
14 Note delivered by HM Ambassador at Paris to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 7,1950, Doc. No. 6 in Cmnd 
2834, Documents relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965 (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office, 1965) 
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the Congressional China Lobby and grew to extreme proportions with the start of the 
Korean War in June 1950. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles' policy of 
`brinkmanship' and President Eisenhower's domino theory were applied to the 
situation in South-East Asia. In May 1952 the fact that Chinese ground troops were 
stationed close to the border with Vietnam alerted the Americans to the possibility 
that China might intervene militarily in Indochina. 
By early 1950 the US had also diplomatically recognised the French puppet 
Government in Saigon led by former emperor Bao Dai. Direct aid to South Vietnam 
began in spring 1950 and lasted until the French withdrawal from Indochina in June 
1954. The US monetary contribution totalled approximately $2.76 billion and the 
'US contribution for fiscal 1954' accounted for `78% of the total cost of the war to 
France. ' is 
The British, while supporting much of US policy in the area, thought the 
Chinese were unlikely to enter the war in Vietnam as they would gain nothing by 
internationalizing the conflict. 16 China thus became the root of the differences 
between the British and the Americans in the Far East and indeed in 1951 the British 
Foreign Office described the country as `a major irritant in Anglo-American 
relations'. 17 Although the British were alarmed at the communist victory in China, 
they were less likely than the Americans to see a monolithic communism and 
believed heavy handling of the Vietnam situation would only push the Chinese closer 
to the Soviets. Washington vehemently disagreed with the British view that China 
15 David S. Painter and Sally G. Irvine, The Geneva Conference of 1954: Indochina, Pew Case Studies in International 
Affairs (Washington D. C., 1988), p. 3 
16 Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London: Cassell & Co, 1960), p. 83 
17 Foreign Office memorandum and comments by Eden, 30 October 1951, F0371/92065134, Public Record Office, Kew 
[henceforth PRO] in Kevin Ruane, "'Containing America": Aspects of British Foreign Policy and the Cold War in South- 
East Asia, 1951-54', Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 7, No. 2, March 1996, p. 143 
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should be diplomatically recognised, should be admitted to the United Nations and 
should be traded with. The British were happy to follow a policy of containment but 
were convinced it was necessary to combine this with an element of compromise, 
being prepared to accept the realities of communist rule in China. Consequently, 
they were, at times, alarmed at what they saw as provocative behaviour by the US 
towards China. ' 8 
According to Kevin Ruane's study of the issue, the Churchill government was 
deeply concerned by US unilateralism and adventurism in Asia during the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations. For example, during the Korean war the US failed 
to consult with the British prior to launching a potentially escalatory air strike in June 
1952 against power stations on the Yalu river, which marked the border between 
Korea and China. Ostensibly carried out under the UN mandate covering the Korean 
conflict, as a troop contributor the British felt they should have been fully briefed and 
consulted on the issue. On this occasion British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden 
`watered down his public criticism' of the Americans but only `after a plea from 
Churchill to avoid an open display of Anglo-American disunity. ' 19 Throughout the 
pre-Geneva period (1951-4), the Americans remained evasive with the British on the 
exact nature of their views on Indochina and were not willing to `accord the British 
access to their strategic plans for the area in the event of any type of military 
conflict'. 20 The US had now taken on the mantle of most dominant power in South- 
East Asia and saw no benefit in working in partnership with the British, not only 
because of their differences over China, but also because the British were no longer 
18 Kevin Ruane, `Anthony Eden, British Diplomacy and the Origins of the Geneva Conference of 1954', The Historical 
Journal, 37,1,1994, p. 156 
19 lbid, p. 152 
20 G. \Vyn Rees, Anglo-American Approaches to Alliance Security, 1955-1960, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 153 
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in a position to achieve partner status. With a diminishing military capability in the 
area, the `National Security Council in Washington directed that Britain be accorded 
no special status in U. S. planning in South-East Asia over and above other allies'. 21 
The lack of defence co-ordination and diplomatic consultation was extremely 
irritating to the British who felt that their colonial and commercial experience in 
Asia, and their continued military presence East of Suez warranted some recognition. 
The British hoped to be able to exercise some influence on the Americans in the 
formulation and execution of their policies in the region. This wish became urgent in 
December 1953 after the Bermuda Summit of Western heads of state when the 
British were left with the impression that the US wanted war with China and, even 
more worryingly, that the US now felt that atomic weapons were part of conventional 
weaponry. 22 
With the French ready to admit defeat in Vietnam and the Americans 
anticipating their own response to a French withdrawal, the British now felt that the 
US presented a grave threat to peace in the area and that it was therefore necessary to 
`contain' America. 23 
The Geneva Conference 
The Geneva Conference began on 25 April 1954 and ended on 21 July 1954 
and was convened to discuss both Korea and Indochina. The representatives'of 
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the North), France, Laos, the 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid, pp. 160-161 
23 Kevin Ruane, "'Containing America": Aspects of British Foreign Policy and the Cold War in South-East Asia, 1951- 
4', Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 7, Pt. 1 (1996) 
21 
People's Republic of China, the State of Vietnam (the South), the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part 
in discussions on Indochina. 
Events prior to and during the Geneva Conference illustrated Britain's 
increasing ambivalence towards the situation in South-East Asia, especially in 
relation to the United States' growing involvement there. Even before the start of the 
conference, Anthony Eden and John Foster Dulles clashed over Vietnam. In order to 
persuade the French Government to continue their now unpopular military campaign 
in Vietnam (and therefore keep a pro-European Defence Community government in 
power), Britain managed to get Indochina on the agenda of the planned Geneva 
Conference to discuss the situation in Korea. Getting the Americans to attend a 
conference on Indochina with the Chinese also in attendance strained Anglo- 
American relations. 24 In addition, the Americans were extremely reluctant to 
discuss events in Vietnam until the military situation had improved. 
By the time of the Geneva Conference Britain and America placed emphasis 
on different aspects of the problem in Vietnam. The British felt that stability in the 
region was of paramount importance and, while hoping the French could militarily 
weaken the Vietminh before withdrawing, were willing to countenance plans that 
included some communist influence in the country if it avoided a general war. The 
Americans, on the other hand, maintained that only preventing the spread of 
communism would ultimately bring peace to the area. 
Although by April 1954 Eden was committed to a negotiated settlement in 
Vietnam via the Geneva Conference, recent research has shown that Eden came to 
24 Ruane, `Anthony Eden', pp. 153-172 
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this decision late and did so because of the deteriorating military situation at Dien 
Bien Phu and because of the consequent escalatory plans the US had for Vietnam. 
Dulles felt that a satisfactory diplomatic settlement could not be reached and that 
armed intervention was now inevitable. 25 
At the beginning of April 1954, with the French military position worsening 
by the minute, Dulles and Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, asked Britain and other allied nations to join them in warning the Chinese 
against interference in Vietnam and that this `would carry with it the threat of naval 
and air action against the Chinese coast and of active intervention in Indo-China 
itself. '26 The same nations were also asked to participate in `united action' to 
prevent a French defeat in Vietnam. 27 This action included a massive air strike to 
relieve the French who were struggling to cope with a Vietminh siege at Dien Bien 
Phu. Despite denials from those involved in American decision-making, the French 
later claimed that the US had considered loaning them atomic weapons. Eden, not 
surprisingly given previous suspicions about American rashness, refused to `commit 
British förces to operations in Indo-China' on the grounds that the American 
proposal was not fully thought out and was more likely to provoke the Chinese into 
action. 28 As Ruane notes, `Britain set out to resist American plans to 
internationalize the conflict, for although Viet-Nam was important, it was not worth 
saving at the cost of inviting Chinese and possibly Soviet counter-intervention, and 
unleashing a third (nuclear) world war. '29 According to British documents, Eden's 
25 Turnbull, `Britain and Vietnam', p. 118 
26 Ibid, p. 92 
27 Ruane, 'Containing America', p. 142 
28 Ibid, p. 94 
29 Ruane, `Anthony Eden', p. 171 
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refusal to countenance armed intervention in Vietnam put Anglo-American relations 
in the region under `the gravest strain'. 30 America would have intervened militarily 
in Vietnam `had not the congressional leadership ... made intervention conditional on 
British participation. '31 
In theory the British supported the idea of a collective defence organization 
for South-East Asia, largely because it would help in the defence of Singapore and 
Hong Kong, but also because it might help restrain the Americans. However, Eden 
was not prepared to participate in any such undertaking before the Geneva 
Conference in case it pre-empted proceedings there: `Denied British support - the 
key to wider allied and international approval - and unwilling to intervene on its own, 
the Eisenhower administration had no alternative but to await the outcome of the 
conference. '32 
In the event, and much to everyone's surprise, the Conference issued two final 
documents on Vietnam. The first one, the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities 
in Viet-Nam, Geneva, 20 July 1954 provided for a demarcation line to be drawn at 
the 17 `h parallel to the North of which the Viet Minh (the People's Army of Vietnam) 
would regroup while to the South, the French Union forces would regroup. The 
French Republic agreed in an annexe to this Agreement to withdraw from Vietnam. 
Until democratic elections to reunify the country could be held, an International 
Commission for Supervision and Control (India, Canada and Poland) would oversee 
the free movement of troops and civilians, and check that no new military equipment 
30 Ruane, 'Containing America', p. 142 
31 George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, `Eisenhower, Dulles and Dienbienphu: 'The Day We Didn't Go to War' 
Revisited', Journal ofAmerican History, 71, (September 1984) 
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or additional troops were introduced (except for replacement purposes and unit 
rotations). Foreign troops and military bases were also specifically prohibited. 33 
The second document, the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, 21 
July, 1954 was somewhat different. Whereas the Agreement on Vietnam was `a 
formal instrument in the usual treaty form', the Final Declaration was not signed and 
appeared `to have the character properly of a statement of intention or policy on the 
part of those member States of the Conference who approved. '34 The Final 
Declaration duly recognised the temporary demarcation line allowed for in the 
Agreement and expressed satisfaction at the ending of hostilities. Its main 
significance, however, was its more detailed explanation of the proposed general 
election, declaring it should be held in Vietnam in July of 1956. This would soon 
prove to be an area of major disagreement. In the meantime the members of the 
Conference agreed: 
to consult one another on any question which may be referred to 
them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to 
study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the 
agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and 
Viet-Nam are respected. 35 
The main difficulty with the Final statement was its lack of treaty status. This was 
compounded when the Government of Vietnam (the Bao Dai government) issued a 
statement on 18 July 1954 dissociating itself from discussions on the Conference's 
final resolution on the grounds that it could not be party to a cease-fire based on 
partition. Eden was also unable to persuade the United States to be a party to the 
33 Cnind 2834, pp. 16-17 
34 ]bid, p. 16 
35 lbid, p. 17 
25 
Final Declaration; instead the Americans made a declaration of their own in which 
they agreed to `refrain from the threat or the use of force' to disturb the Geneva 
settlements. 36 Therefore, as neither the South Vietnamese nor the United States 
government signed the Geneva Agreements the seeds of conflicting international 
interpretations of the Conference resolutions were sown. Both sides constantly 
accused the other of violating the Agreements and as the first step towards peace 
called for the other side to abide by them. 
The Post-Geneva Period 
Eden felt that, at Geneva, he had achieved a workable solution to the crisis in 
Vietnam, one that the Americans would abide by. And, indeed, Eden gained much 
credit for his actions at Geneva. While willing to acknowledge the loss of North 
Vietnam, London felt the Accords, if fully implemented, would avoid war, and 
therefore help promote stability in the area. It soon became clear, however, that 
Eisenhower and Dulles had no intentions of honouring the Agreements. Washington 
was now obsessed with containing communism to the 17 `h parallel. Publicly, the US 
argued it was abiding by the Agreements; privately, it regularly acknowledged that 
its action were in breach of the spirit and the letter of them. The Americans vowed 
to strengthen the anti-communist government in the South of Vietnam -a pursuit that 
became known as `nation building'. Ignoring any European advice, the Americans 
`displayed the curious mixture of realism and hopefulness that came to characterize 
the entire twenty-year crusade' in Vietnam. 37 During the post-Geneva period: `The 
36 Declaration by the Representative of the United States, Geneva, 21 July, 1954 in Cmnd. 2834, p. 86 
37 Arthur Combs, `The Path Not Taken: The British Alternative to U. S. Policy in Vietnam, 1954-1956', Diplomatic 
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Americans' "can do" attitude, their refusal to give an inch, and their characteristic 
belief in an ideal solution appeared to Europeans as negligently naive. '38 
Washington also managed to keep its military options open by establishing the 
South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954. Its full members 
were the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
Thailand and the Philippines. South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos could not be 
members as this would have directly violated the Geneva accord that outlawed 
involvement in military alliances. Instead, the countries of Indochina were named as 
`protocol' states to be defended by the SEATO powers. In future years SEATO 
obligations would thereby be used to legitimize US involvement in Vietnam. 
In October 1955 a referendum deposed H. M. Bao Dai, established the 
Republic of Vietnam, and made Ngo Dinh Diem President. Diem upheld Bao Dai's 
view that the South was not bound by the Geneva resolutions and would not 
therefore participate in the proposed general election planned for July 1956. The 
Democratic Republic in the North was enraged. It was convinced, with good reason, 
that the country would be reunited under the rule of Ho Chi Minh at the elections. 
Despite diplomatic efforts to resolve this problem (Her Majesty's Government 
recommended that the Government of Vietnam participate), little could be done 
while the South Vietnamese Government refused to acknowledge the Geneva 
Agreements. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese insisted that the South 
Vietnamese Government was obliged by the Geneva Agreements as France had 
signed on behalf of the southern part of Vietnam and that signatories `and their 
successors' were responsible for observance of the Agreements. 39 While their lack 
38 Ibid p. 38 
39 Letter to the Foreign Secretary from Mr. Chou En-Lai, Peking, 31 October 1955 in Cmird 2831, p. 114 
27 
of respect for the Geneva Agreements was the primary reason for the South 
Vietnamese Government's refusal to allow elections, a given subsidiary reason was 
their belief that the Communist North would never conduct free and open elections. 
The North suggested that this was a lame excuse for the fact that the South 
Vietnamese Government would have been overwhelmingly defeated in a democratic 
election. Although the US agreed with the South Vietnamese position that elections 
should be fair, it too was also sure the communists would win if elections took 
place 40 
At Geneva, the Democratic Republic in the North had only agreed to the 
temporary division of the country and when the international community acquiesced 
in the South Vietnamese Government's refusal of elections to reunite Vietnam, the 
North began to actively support and encourage nationalist unrest in the South. It was 
at this stage that the US began to argue that the Geneva Conference had confirmed 
the existence of two separate states in Vietnam, and that the North was now an 
aggressor nation in relation to South Vietnam. Throughout this period the North 
Vietnamese and the Chinese continually pressed the Co-Chairmen for a conference 
to discuss implementation of the Geneva Agreements. However, Great Britain 
encouraged the US and the newly elected Diem Government in South Vietnam to 
consider complying with the Geneva Agreement to hold elections on reunification in 
July 1956. Saigon and Washington refused to sanction their go-ahead. So, by the 
mid-1950s Britain was, as Mary Turnbull puts it, `reduced to the role of frustrated 
bystander' in relation to events in Vietnam. 41 
40 Eisenhower said in his memoirs that "had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the 
population would have voted for the communist }lo Chi Minh as their leader rather than the Chief of State Bao Dai. " 
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While the North Vietnamese maintained that acts of terrorism in the South 
were spontaneous uprisings against the corrupt government of Ngo Dinh Diem, by 
late 1959 around 90,000 Vietminh cadres had gone South to help organise 
revolutionary warfare. Shortly afterwards the National Front for the Liberation of 
South Vietnam (the NLF) was formed. Although North Vietnamese help was 
important the unpopularity of the US-installed Diem regime was also apparent. The 
debate in Britain, as elsewhere, now centred on whether the North Vietnamese were 
attempting `a calculated Communist take-over bid' or whether the country was in 
civil war. 42 The Conservative Government believed the former, and in 1957 were 
convinced that `the absence of all freedom in the Northern territories makes it 
impracticable for the time being to deal with the preparatory problems involved in 
the question of all-Viet-Namese elections'. 43 
As American involvement in Vietnam deepened in the late 1950s, a number of 
features characterized Anglo-American relations vis-ä-vis South-East Asia. Firstly, 
although agreeing that communism should be contained, Washington and London 
still differed over how best to do this. This difference in approach originated from 
varying perceptions of the threat posed by expansionary communism, particularly 
Chinese-backed communism. In retrospect it is clear that Britain had a more 
balanced view of the problem of communism, recognising that indigenous uprisings 
in the area were not necessarily sponsored by China or the Soviet Union and 
therefore should be taken on their own merit. Secondly, this less inflammatory 
approach resulted from Britain's long colonial experience in the area, an experience 
that the Americans had by the mid-50s discounted. America's lack of recognition of 
42 Doc No 110, Extract from the proceedings of the House of Commons, 26 March, 1963 in Grand 2834, p. 195 
43 Extract from Proceedings of the House of Lords, 25 June 1957 in Cn: nd 2834, p. 127 
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British experience caused much irritation in British diplomatic circles, particularly as 
it was a key facet of their attempt to maintain status without power. Anglo-American 
diplomacy surrounding events in South-East Asia was therefore fraught with 
suspicion and frustrations. The lack of agreement over the exact nature of the threat 
from communism, America's distrust of advice from colonial powers, and Britain's 
readjustment to its new world role, meant that discussions on the issue of Vietnam 
were often guarded and insincere. The United States, in particular, kept its cards 
close to its chest. This lack of openness led its allies to believe its policies were 
naive and/or provocative and that they lacked clarity and coherence. Due to its 
diminishing power, Britain often felt unable to criticise the Americans on Vietnam 
because it needed US support and co-operation in other areas, particularly in NATO 
and Europe. Finally, regardless of Britain's declining fortunes, the US did recognise 
that British commitment and support for its Far East policy, and on Vietnam on 
particular, was of immense psychological and political value. Despite overall co- 
operation between Great Britain and the United States in South-East Asia, these 
features, particularly the secrecy, would be repeated in the 1960s as America stepped 
up its involvement in Vietnam. 
Britain, Vietnam and the Geneva Conference 
The Geneva Conference also left the British with another responsibility and 
another problem: the British Foreign Secretary's role as Co-Chair of the Conference. 
It is crucial to appreciate Britain's role as Co-Chair because of later arguments as to 
30 
the nature of this role. The British alternatively used this role as an excuse for its 
relative inaction in Vietnam, or as justification for its attempts at mediation. 
The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were chosen to occupy the chair at 
Geneva for two main reasons. Firstly, the Conference was organised largely at the 
behest of the British and the Soviets, therefore the two countries already had 
experience of working together on this problem and of dealing with the interested 
parties. And secondly, as the Conference roughly comprised two opposing groups 
(US, UK, France and its associated states against USSR, China and the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam), and as some governments were not recognised by others, the 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union acted in some degree as intermediaries 
between the two groups. So as they were `regarded generally as the less extreme 
members of their respective groups' they also provided the chairman at alternate 
sessions. 44 As a consequence the two countries were seen as having a greater 
responsibility for Indo-Chinese affairs than did the rest of the represented states. 
This perception continued even after the end of the Conference itself despite the fact 
that no formal recognition of the Co-Chair's roles was given in the Conference's two 
final documents. In fact, the only clause directly relating to the members' 
responsibility to consult with one another did not refer to any formal procedures or 
machinery which would allow them to do so. Nevertheless, Eden as Britain's 
Foreign Secretary did, in his final session in the Chair, agree reluctantly that the Co- 
Chairmen would deal with the Conference's financial problems: 
Certain costs arise from the decisions which the Conference has 
taken. It is suggested that it should be left here to your Chairmen 
44 Narrative in Cmnd 2834, p. 13 
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as their parting gift to try to put before you some proposal in 
respect of those costs. I only wish to add in that connection that, 
as this Conference is peculiar in not having any Secretariat in the 
usual sense of the term, the two Chairmen, with considerable 
reluctance, are prepared to undertake this highly invidious task. 
The costs to which I refer are not our own but those of the 
International Commission. 45 
In 1956 the Co-Chairmen achieved an agreement on finance which put the major 
burden on the three Commission powers - India, Canada and Poland - while other 
costs would be shared by the signatories of the Agreements. Still, `the allocation of 
contributions amongst the several governments and the need to induce governments 
to pay their shares imposed a heavy and continuing administrative burden on the Co- 
Chairmen. '46 
The work of the International Commissions in Vietnam was expected to be 
short-term, lasting roughly until the general election allowing for reunification. 
When these elections were not held, the work of the Commission continued longer 
than expected as did the burdens assigned to the Co-Chairmen. A 1965 British 
Command Paper stated that `the Co-Chairmanship thus survived as the only residual 
machinery of the Geneva Conference. '47 It was for this reason alone that Russia and 
the United Kingdom had additional tasks imposed on them. The International 
Commission was to report to Conference members on any problems they faced; yet 
no channel had been established for the issuing of such reports. The Co-Chairmen 
became the channel `as a matter of practical convenience-148 
The consequence of this action was that Britain's involvement in Indo- 
Chinese affairs increased greatly. Not only were there many reports to publish and 
45 Ibid, p. 18 
46 Ibid 
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circulate - between 1954 and 1961, there were eleven Interim reports from the 
Commission in Vietnam; seven from the Commission in Cambodia; and four from 
the Commission in Laos - but the fact that the Co-Chairmen adopted this task meant 
that they became, in effect, go-betweens between the International Commission and 
the Conference members 49 Not surprisingly, Britain and Russia gradually became 
more than mere publishers of reports. The failure of the Geneva resolutions to 
foresee the need for authorised responsibility and to establish machinery for dealing 
with the problems that would inevitably occur in Indochina meant that ad hoc 
arrangements turned into accepted practice. 
Moreover, as it was not practicable to co-ordinate action between all members 
of the Conference when the Commission reported problems, the Co-Chairmen `took 
the initiative in trying to resolve the difficulties which arose, for the very good reason 
that there was no one else to do so. '50 This often involved the Co-Chairmen acting as 
`a medium of communication between opposing interests within and without the 
affected countries. '51 There are many examples of situations in which action of this 
kind occurred but it is necessary to describe only one particular case for illustrative 
purposes. The Agreement on Vietnam allowed for the free movement of civilians 
wishing to change residence between one zone and the other. In May of 1955 
complaints were received from the Commission and within the House of Commons 
that the North Vietnamese government was obstructing the movement of would-be 
refugees and in consequence of such delays the transfer of all those civilians wishing 
to move South would not be possible within the time allowed, which is to say, before 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid. p. 20 
51 Ibid 
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the proposed 1956 elections. After communication between the Co-Chairmen, the 
Soviets announced that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had agreed to a month's 
extension. The Commission duly received confirmation of this agreement. 52 
While the Co-Chairmen's responsibilities with regard to Laos were 
regularised during the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1962, the situation with regard 
to Vietnam and Cambodia never achieved such formality. Nevertheless, the 
formalisation of practices in Laos had the effect of strengthening the informal nature 
of the Co-Chairman's role regarding Vietnam. 
There can be no doubt that Her Majesty's Government, under the leadership 
of Prime Ministers Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan, was 
uneasy about the increased responsibilities it had assumed on such dubious authority. 
One of the main problems was that domestic political pressure was often placed on 
the British Government to interpret the clauses in the Geneva Conference resolutions 
in a particular way. In December 1955 the legal position of the Co-Chairman was 
clarified in the foreword to the Fourth Interim Report of the Commission in Vietnam 
(Cmnd 9654): 
in view of numerous public references to the role of the two Co- 
Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, Her Majesty's Government 
consider it desirable to place on record their view of the position.... 
In the view of Her Majesty's Government their obligations and 
responsibilities and those of the Soviet Government are neither more 
nor less than those of other Powers adhering to the Final Declaration 
of the Geneva Conference. For reasons of practical convenience, 
however, it has become customary for Her Majesty's Government 
and the Soviet Government to act as a channel of communication 
between the International Supervisory Commissions and the Geneva 
Powers, to co-ordinate arrangements for the distribution and 
52 Hansard, House of Commons Debate, Fifth Series [henceforth Hansard] Vol. 556,4 May 1955, Written Answer, 76, 
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publication of the Commissions' reports .... The existence of these 
informal arrangements does not, of course, in any way affect the 
position and obligations under the Geneva Agreements of Her 
Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government or derogate in any 
way from the responsibilities of members of the Geneva Conference 
as a whole in regard to the Geneva Agreements .... 
53 
Despite this clarification the Conservative Government continued to be troubled 
about its role. It did not, however, feel any uneasiness over its interpretation of 
events in Vietnam, especially regarding the United States' involvement. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s the Tories were well aware of Washington's infringements of 
the Geneva accords, particularly the introduction of large numbers of military 
advisers, but still maintained rhetorical support for US action in Vietnam. 54 
The fact that the Conservative Government chose not to side with the 
Communist government in North Vietnam was hardly surprising; the fact that it had 
sympathies with South Vietnam and the United States was also understandable; but 
what was not clear was whether Britain as Co-Chair of the Geneva Conference 
should have at least feigned impartiality over Vietnam in order to act effectively as a 
mediator. This question was part of the general confusion over the exact nature of 
Britain's responsibility as Co-Chair. Certainly the British Government could argue 
that the Soviets could hardly be considered neutral on the situation in Vietnam and 
more importantly, the two nations had been given the Chair at Geneva precisely 
because of their links to opposing countries and ideologies. The Conservative 
53 Foreword to the Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam 
December 1955 in Cn: nd 2834, p. 89 
54 The International Control Commission concludes in 1962 "that the Republic of Vietnam has violated Articles 16 and 
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Government could also claim that the Agreement on Vietnam and the Final 
Declaration of the Geneva Conference had not `formally' assigned any special duties 
to the Co-Chairmen and therefore, in a sense, they had no more or less responsiblities 
to act in a neutral manner than any of the other Geneva powers. However, as the 
practical help Britain gave the United States and South Vietnam remained low-key, it 
can be assumed that the Conservative Government still had hopes of playing an 
important role in the resolution of the conflict precisely because of its position as a 
Geneva Co-Chair. To many within British political circles, the role of Co-Chair was 
not being fully utilised by the British; the Conservatives were too passive. Indeed 
many critics of Conservative policy on Vietnam hoped a Labour government would 
be less closely aligned to the Americans and take a more pro-active role as far as Co- 
Chair position was concerned. Thus, expectations of the Foreign Secretary's position 
Geneva Co-Chair grew rapidly once Labour came to power in October 1964. Such 
hopes proved unrealistic. 
The Search for Allies - The US. Britain & Vietnam 
Throughout the Kennedy and Johnson years, the United States government 
was alert to the propaganda benefits of a making its involvement in South-East Asia 
appear part of an allied crusade to prevent communist domination of the area. The 
Americans welcomed, and in some cases demanded, troop deployments or other 
assistance in Vietnam from other countries. 55 The addition of extra trained 
manpower would have helped ease the demand for American `boys'. However, as 
55 Eventually more than 40 nations provided assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. 
36 
many military strategists argued, the logistical and language problems inherent in 
multi-national armed forces meant that the main benefits of third party support were 
psychological and political. In the `zero-sum' atmosphere of the Cold War, the 
Americans would have liked to have had as many world powers as possible lining up 
on their side in Vietnam. The US understood that its ability to win the war, 
especially the propaganda war, would be enhanced if Vietnam could be turned into 
an allied crusade, thereby invoking images of the Second World War and Korea. 
Having Britain on its side was of particular importance because of its roles in the 
Western Alliance and the UN Security Council. Britain was also a leading `social' 
democracy whose example counted. Any condemnation or ambivalence on their part 
would be seized upon by North Vietnam as proof of the weakness of America's 
cause. William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs, later argued 
that a British troop commitment would also have had an impact on the US domestic 
scene, believing it `would have made a considerable psychological difference ... 
particularly in liberal circles, which was where the main criticism of the war came 
from'. 56 LBJ recalled telling Wilson in their July 1966 Washington meeting that, `a 
platoon of bagpipers would be sufficient, it was the British flag that was needed'. 57 
Or as Dean Rusk put it to the journalist Louis Heren: `All we needed was a regiment. 
The Black Watch would have done. '58 
From the early sixties onwards, the United States increased its military 
involvement in South Vietnam. The Kennedy administration introduced 948 military 
56 David Dimbleby, BBC1 Interview with William Bundy in David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The 
Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (London: Guild Publishing, 1988), p. 252 
57 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-68: A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p. 
264 
58 Louis Heren, No Hail, No Farewell (London: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 231 
37 
advisors in November 1961 and by the time of the President's death in November 
1963 there were 16,000 advisors stationed in Vietnam, including the elite forces 
known as the Green Berets. 59 During this period the Conservative Government came 
under two intense, and sometimes conflicting, pressures. From across the Atlantic 
came continual calls for either a British troop involvement in Vietnam or stronger 
diplomatic or technical support. At home the leadership faced increasing 
parliamentary pressure to define its position regarding the situation in Vietnam, 
particularly in regard to its role as Co-Chair of the Geneva Conference. The 
Conservative government under the leadership of Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) 
and Sir Alec Douglas-Home (1963-1964) struggled to deal with the dual problem. 
Documents from the Kennedy era reveal constant and often forceful enquiries on the 
part of the American government into the possibility of increased allied help over 
Vietnam, with Britain as one of main targets of such requests. As early as 1954, at 
the Geneva Conference, the American government had looked into the likelihood of 
British military involvement. As noted earlier, Eden refused. With the advent of the 
Kennedy administration and as America's own intervention in Vietnamese affairs 
intensified, even more exhaustive enquiries into the possibility of allied contributions 
began. The discussion of `Task Force Vietnam' inevitably encompassed the idea of 
`internationalizing' the problem. Along with the possibility of UN assistance (as 
ground observers) and the consideration of US involvement under the `SEATO 
umbrella', the Kennedy advisors were particularly keen to get the British committed 
`politically' to the defense of South Vietnam. 60 One aide admitted that `others 
59 Robert McMahon (Ed), Major Problems in the History of tu e Vietnam War (D. C. Health & Co., 1995), p. 159 
60 Bob Komer to Wait Rostow, 3 May 1961, NSF, Countries, Vietnam, General, Box 193,5/3/61-5/7/61, John F. 
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should share with us the responsibility for Viet-Nam' and that British participation 
would `maximise the political benefits to be obtained within the western alliance by 
sharing responsibility for this difficult problem'. 61 In July 1961 this resulted in a 
private, bilateral agreement between the British Government and the Government of 
South Vietnam (GVN) to establish the British Advisory Group in South Vietnam, or 
British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) as it became known. The purpose of this 
Mission was revealed to the House in a written answer on 23 October 1961 when Mr 
Edward Heath answered questions on behalf of the Government on the 
circumstances surrounding the Mission: 
The Government of the Republic of Vietnam, one of whose major 
problems is the lack of a sufficient number of trained administrators, 
requested Her Majesty's Government to provide expert assistance 
in the field of administrative co-ordination and police matters. Her 
Majesty's Government agreed to dispatch an Advisory Mission to 
Saigon for this purpose. The British Advisory Mission to Vietnam, 
which arrived in Saigon at the end of September, consists of three 
officers and a small administrative staff led by Mr. R. G. K. Thompson. 62 
The three officers were `former members of the Malayan Civil Service' and were 
attached to the US counter-insurgency team in Saigon. Robert Thompson was a 
defence civil servant who had demonstrated his credentials in counter-insurgency 
during the 12 year long Malayan emergency. 63 The costs of this mission were 
expected to total £110,000 per annum and the Mission was not expected to issue 
reports on its work to the Government. This angered many opposition MPs who felt 
61 'A Program of Action: To Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam', I May 1961, Top Secret, Task Force, 
NSF, Vietnam, 1/61-7/61, JFKL 
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the Mission should be closely monitored by Parliament. While denying that BRIAM 
was involved in the planning of specific operations, the Mission's role remained 
suspect throughout 1962 and 1963. Still, in October 1963 the Government advised 
Parliament in response to a written question, that the Mission's life was to be 
extended to March 1965.64 Its role was to advise on counter-insurgency techniques 
the British had mastered during the Malayan emergency in the 1950s and the 
strategic hamlets, which became a cornerstone of the US policy of pacification was 
`the child of the British Advisory Mission'. 65 Documents recently released under the 
thirty-year rule also reveal that the Mission did, in fact, help plan the clearing of 
Communists from the Mekong Delta. 66 
Closely associated with this venture was a British sponsored Jungle- 
Warfare Training School in Jahore, Malayasia where American and South 
Vietnamese soldiers were trained in guerrilla tactics. 67 Other assistance to the US 
struggle included Royal Navy training exercises with the South Vietnamese navy and 
passing on to the Americans any Vietnamese radio traffic intercepted by the British 
signals intelligence outstation in Hong Kong. 68 
Still this military and non-military aid was not enough to assuage the 
Americans. Kennedy was advised by his aides in a memorandum discussing, 
amongst other things, the `problem of allied support' on November 15,1961 that he 
should `get as much backing as possible from Allies' and that `this means a strong 
64 Hansard, Written Answer, 24 October, 1963, Vol. 684, Col 235 
65 Report on "Developments in Viet-Nam Between General Taylor's Visits - October 1961-October 1962", 
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67 Between January 1964 and November 1967, the British Government trained 240 US troops and 1,035 South 
Vietnamese troops at the School. The cost for the training of South Vietnamese troops alone was £132,364. The Times, 7 
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line with [the] British'. 69 The need for `multilateral participation from ... allies and 
other friendly nations' was made clear to Ambassadors in Washington on November 
17 and 18,1961 when such nations were formally requested for `public support and 
economic and military contributions'. 70 
In late November 1961 Edward Heath, in his position as Lord Privy Seal 
declined during House of Commons questions to `give an assurance that no British 
troops will be used or stationed in Vietnam'. David Bruce, US Ambassador to Great 
Britain, remarked to Washington that this was `most significant' and it does perhaps 
indicate that at this point the situation regarding a British troop contribution was still 
fluid. 7' However, the fact that the Labour opposition regularly called on the 
Government to recommend the reconvening of the Geneva Conference to discuss the 
deteriorating situation in Vietnam and questioned the `civilian' status of the British 
Advisory Mission may have led the Conservative Government to doubt the political 
wisdom of a British military involvement in Vietnam, especially as the British public 
was not clear that a British interest was at stake. In March 1962 Harold Wilson, then 
Chairman of the opposition Labour Party, was one of many opposition MPs to urge 
the Government as Co-Chair of the Geneva Conference to reconvene the Conference 
in order to stabilize the situation in Vietnam. He also made the point that `this 
situation would perhaps have been eased if all of us had carried out our commitments 
with regard to the holding of free elections in Vietnam. '72 This implied criticism of 
69 Memo for the President, 15 November 1962, Subject: Notes for Talk with Rusk - November 15, NSF, Box 195, 
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both the British and American Governments was later withheld, after Wilson became 
Prime Minister. It was, however, indicative of the future Prime Minister's personal 
feelings on the matter. 
Despite mounting Parliamentary concern the Conservative Government 
continued to defend staunchly United States' policy in Vietnam without sending 
British troops. Nevertheless, by 1963 and 1964 the Conservative Foreign Secretary, 
Rab Butler, was facing numerous enquiries on Vietnam from backbenchers from all 
three main political parties. He was persistently questioned by one MP in particular, 
left-wing Labour backbencher William Warbey, who warned of the dangers of 
American and British involvement in a what was essentially a civil war. It seems 
therefore that even before Labour took office not only was Vietnam becoming a left- 
wing issue, but also that American pressure on the British government to send troops 
to Vietnam was now counterbalanced by skeptical domestic opinion over the US' 
handling of events in South-East Asia. 
It is possible to conclude that by 1964 while Britain and America had a 
common objective in containing communism in Asia, they also had a history of 
disharmony over how to achieve this. Anglo-American relations in this area were 
further complicated by the misunderstandings surrounding Britain's role as Co-Chair 
of the Geneva Conference. By the early 1960s one can recognize the emergence and 
steady growth of countervailing pressures on the British government with regard to 
its policy on South-East Asia. This situation was made even more difficult by two 
further, related problems that the Labour Government inherited on coming to office 
in October 1964: the position of sterling, and the over-extension of UK defence 
forces 
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British Defence Commitments East of Suez 
In the 1950s and 1960s British foreign policy placed Anglo-American 
relations at its centre, recognising its need for an ally that could be a key provider of 
manpower and resources in areas where Britain still retained interests. This has been 
described by Kevin Ruane as wanting `power-by-proxy'. 73 By the early 1960s 
Britain's military commitments overseas in the early 1960s included major 
deployments in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. Still, with decolonisation 
well under way, the Foreign Office anticipated a reduced military burden combined 
with a continuance of British influence and interests in its former colonial areas. As 
Darin has argued: 
the passage to independence was not expected to mean the 
liquidation of British interests in the region or country concerned, 
moreover Britain usually had a vested interest in the survival 
and viability of the successor state that had replaced colonial 
rule. 74 
By 1962, the Minister of Defence could state that Britain's military strength was `no 
longer a concept of British forces dispersed around the world in small pockets but a 
concentration on three main bases .... Britain, Aden and Singapore. '75 
Although the Foreign Office had expected a reduced overseas military burden 
due to having fewer colonies to defend, in the short term the opposite happened in 
Malaysia. The Malaysian Federation had been established in September 1963 and 
73 Kevin Ruane, 'Containing America', p. 150 
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comprised Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak (former British colonies) and Singapore (which 
seceded from the federation in August 1965). It was hoped that, `here ... would be a 
colonial successor state, closely aligned with Britain, offering base facilities in return 
for the promise of strategic protection if it became necessary, altogether a powerful 
bastion of British and Western influence in a politically volatile region'. 76 Britain 
was soon called on to honour its commitment to Malaysia. The Republic of 
Indonesia, under the leadership of Achmaed Soekarno opposed the union and 
announced a `state of confrontation' with Malaysia aimed at ending British influence 
in the area. Britain, Australia and New Zealand gave military support to Malaysia in 
its attempts to defend itself against Indonesia, whose guerrillas fought intermittently 
between 1963 and the end of the confrontation in August 1966. Thirty thousand 
British servicemen were stationed in Malaysia at the peak of the conflict (out of a 
total of fifty-four thousand on duty in South-East Asia) - the largest commitment of 
British troops to any one area since the Second World War. 77 The Americans gave 
Britain verbal support in its campaign in Malaysia but did not offer any military 
assistance. Instead, it tried to mediate between the parties involved, hoping a 
diplomatic solution could be found before Indonesia turned to communism. 78 
On arriving in office in October 1964, the Labour government quickly 
initiated a defence review. Partly this was related to its domestic commitments on 
health, welfare and education, but it was also a response to a worsening balance of 
payments problem linked to Britain's high and escalating defence expenditure. In his 
first budget Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan, announced that defence 
76 Ibid 
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costs for the years 1964-69 would be reduced from £2400 million to £2000 million. 
At the same time, however, the Prime Minister was committed to continuing 
Britain's global role, including its position East of Suez, indeed declaring in 1965 
that Britain's `frontiers were on the Himalayas'. 79 
The first phase of the defence review lasted from October 1964 to January 
1966 and concerned itself with how to achieve economies through its equipment 
programme, rather than questioning Britain's existing defence commitments. This 
resulted in the cancellation of three aircraft projects (TSR-2, HS-681 and P-1154). 
The Defence White Paper of 1966 admitted to some limitations in the future scope of 
British military operations. Despite this, British ministers were adamant that the 
British should still be committed East of Suez. 8° 
In the summer of 1966 another sterling crisis prompted a second defence 
review and in July 1967 it reported that a reduction in forces outside Europe was 
necessary and that withdrawal of forces from Malaysia and Singapore would be 
required by around 1975.81 Following yet another deterioration in the balance of 
payments situation in the autumn of 1967, resulting in the devaluation of the pound, 
the government announced a further review of public expenditure. The `Statement on 
Public Expenditure 1968-9 and 1969-70' contained the `East of Suez decision'. This 
historic decision called for an acceleration of the withdrawal from Singapore and 
Malaysia to be completed by the end of 1971 rather than 1975; undertaking to 
79 Harold Wilson quoted in Darwin, `Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez', p. 150 
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withdraw from the Gulf by the same date; and an acknowledgement that Britain no 
longer planned `to maintain a special military capability for use in this area. '82 
Sterling 
The British Labour Government that came to power in October of 1964 
inherited an economic position that would shape its time in office and have 
consequences for the wider financial world. It inherited an £800 million balance of 
payments deficit which threatened sterling and Britain's defence programmes. 83 
This parlous situation was made clear the day after Labour's electoral victory in a 
treasury brief which showed that, despite an apparently healthy economy, imports 
were rising rapidly and the growth rate lagged behind much of the Western world. 
The new government took the decision not to devalue the pound and to avoid descent 
into protectionism. Clearly Wilson's part in the previous Labour Government's 
decision to devalue in 1949 played a part in this decision - the Prime Minister and his 
colleagues wanted to avoid Labour being forever linked with devaluation in the 
minds of the electorate. 84 
Military cutbacks alone were insufficient to deal with the enormous balance of 
payments problem, and the Wilson Government was forced to take other measures. 
It placed a 15% import surcharge on all goods excluding food, tobacco and raw 
materials, raised the bank rate by 2%, and secured a loan from Western banks of $3 
82 Catterall, `East of Suez Decision'. p. 614 
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billion. 85 None of these acts avoided a sense of crisis for sterling which faced its 
first speculative attack in November 1964. From this point onward the pound was 
under constant attack and Britain faced serious sterling crises in July 1965, July 1966 
and in the autumn of 1967. The United States feared that a speculative attack on the 
pound might then lead to an attack on the dollar - and thus threaten the fundamentals 
of the Bretton Woods system upon which western financial stability was believed to 
rest, and so, were resigned to helping sterling by underwriting the pound. 86 
The position of sterling, Britain's defence commitments and the war in 
Vietnam were issues that could never be separated and indeed the complex interplay 
between the three burdens is a key feature of Anglo-American relations in the mid to 
late sixties. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OCTOBER 1964-DECEMBER 1964: 
INITIAL PERCEPTIONS 
For almost a year before the Labour Government came to office, the British 
shadow cabinet and the Johnson administration anticipated working together. The 
Labour Party, and Wilson in particular, had reacted with sadness and genuine grief at 
President Kennedy's assassination but soon felt comfortable with the prospect of 
working with the former Vice-President, Lyndon Johnson, not only because of his 
obvious dynamism but also because they sawn him as progressive on social justice. It 
will become clear, however, that the Labour leadership did not fully understand the 
new President's personality or his politics, and consequently had unrealistic 
expectations for the future of Anglo-American relations. 
Lyndon B. Johnson's Character and World View 
Johnson, as with any other world leader, brought his own personality to bear 
on the conduct of American foreign relations. While it is impossible to unravel 
completely the complex interplay between a President's emotions, beliefs, 
perceptions and predispositions there is much unanimity among those that knew LBJ 
and those that have studied him, on his personality traits. His political philosophy is 
less clear. During the 1930s and much of the 1940s he classed himself as a New 
Deal liberal. Once he became Senator for his conservative home state of Texas in 
the late 1940s, Johnson felt he had little choice but to temper his liberalism. 
Throughout the 1950s he responded to the conservatism of the era. Once in the 
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White House, however, Johnson set out to emulate and out-do Roosevelt and his 
New Deal. The legislative program he headed was designed to combat poverty and 
end racial injustice in the hope of achieving a `Great Society' in the United States. 
Johnson was a huge figure both politically and physically. At six-foot three, 
he used his presence to great effect. He was a skilful manipulator, could exploit 
others and was often a bully. He was also a domineering and often vulgar person 
whose political style was based largely on his mastery of interpersonal relations. He 
thrived on knowing his opponents and allies' strengths and weaknesses; extracting 
promises and debts to be repaid. This became known as the `Johnson treatment'. 
The authors of that term, Richard Evans and Robert Novak, described it as, 
supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance, scorn, tears, 
complaint, the hint of threat. It was all of these together. Its 
velocity was breathtaking, and it was all in one direction. 
Interjections from the target were rare. Johnson anticipated them 
before they could be spoken. He moved in close, his face a scant 
millimeter from his target, his eyes widening and narrowing, his 
eyebrows rising and falling. ' 
He was a mass of contradictions: he demanded loyalty of others but was not 
particularly loyal himself; he could be puritanical in his beliefs yet was known to be 
unfaithful to his wife, Lady Bird; he had a great personal fortune but regularly 
pleaded poverty. He was also inconsistent in his treatment of others and could be 
extremely sensitive to criticism. But above all, Johnson was an energetic activist: his 
congressional experience was unparalleled. Despite his extremely successful career 
in politics, however, the Kennedy assassination meant that the shadow of the dead 
President would always stalk the Johnson White House. The Kennedy image of 
I Rowland Evans & Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise ofPotiver (New York: Signet Books, 1966), pp. 
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youth, style and dynamism underpinned a rapidly congealing Kennedy myth. 
Johnson paled in comparison to JFK. He did not have the easy wit and charm of 
Kennedy and had to battle to shake of the image of an `interloper'. The 
inconsistencies in Johnson's character would become visible over the course of the 
Wilson-Johnson years. 
Johnson's reputation as a politician who thrived on personal relations meant 
that the Foreign Office and Wilson's personal advisors recognised that the Prime 
Minister's ability to forge a friendly, working relationship with Johnson would be an 
important factor in Anglo-American relations. 
Lyndon Johnson's outlook on world affairs fell squarely within the Cold War 
foreign policy consensus. He believed firmly in the containment policy and as David 
Barber has commented, `insofar as he had a philosophy of international relations, it 
was based on toughness'. 2 It has long been charged that on entering the White 
House, Johnson was inexperienced in foreign affairs and uncomfortable on the world 
stage. He certainly had little first-hand experience in high level diplomacy and had 
travelled relatively little. Johnson apparently often voiced his own uneasiness in 
foreign affairs, admitting `foreigners are not like the folks I am used to'. 3 And 
foreign policy was often a distraction from the President's real love - domestic policy 
and his Great Society programs. But Johnson was by no means completely ignorant 
of international affairs. During his time as Senate Majority Leader Johnson had 
liased with Eisenhower on foreign policy initiatives and had chaired a committee 
overseeing the Korean war. However, there is no doubt that he was not completely 
2 James David Barber, Tue Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (New Jersey: Prentice- 
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confident in this arena, and was therefore susceptible to the influence of advisers, 
many of them ex-Kennedy men and drawn from the nation's academic elites. As 
someone not drawn from the nation's intelligentsia, Johnson also had a weakness for 
people who provided short and simple answers to complex problems. 
LBJ and Vietnam: The Personal Equation 
At the height of the Vietnam conflict, the war was so identified with the 
President that it became known as `Lyndon Johnson's war'. While that statement- 
cum-accusation has less currency today, during the mid-to-late sixties the war was 
seen as the product and tragedy of Lyndon Baines Johnson. Johnson was castigated 
by both the right and the left for his policy in Vietnam. His critics on the political 
left felt the President had been wrong to escalate the conflict in July 1965 by 
introducing American ground forces and was immoral in his prosecution of the war, 
particularly his sanctioning of the use of gas and napalm. Many on the right attacked 
Johnson with equal vehemence, mainly for not acting more forcefully in his conduct 
of the war. By taking the middle ground, by trying to vage a limited war in Vietnam, 
Johnson managed to alienate a great swath of the American population. 
Johnson faced immense personal criticism for a number of reasons. His role 
as President meant that he was also Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and 
therefore seen as ultimately responsible for the conduct of the war. Johnson had also 
assured the American public during the 1964 Presidential election campaign that he 
would not send any `boys' to South East Asia. This was part of the reason why 
Johnson also had a `credibility gap' in relation to Vietnam: the lies and lack of 
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openness in the early years of the war meant that the American press and the 
American public eventually distrusted anything he had to say on it. The war became 
LBJ's war, not only to the anti-war protestors, but also in his own mind as it came to 
dominate his time in office. Clearly it eventually destroyed Johnson's plan for his 
own legacy to the nation - the Great Society. This huge programme of legislation 
was stymied due to the diversion of funds to the war in South East Asia. Between 
1965 and 1973 the Johnson administration spent $15.5 billion on Great Society 
programs compared to a massive $120 billion on the war in Vietnam. 4 Johnson's 
interest in the project was also offset by the war. Johnson later lamented, 
I was bound to be crucified either way I moved. If I left the 
woman I really loved - the Great Society - in order to get 
involved with that bitch of a war on the other side of the world, 
then I would lose everything at home. All my programmes ... 
but if I left that war and let the Communists take over South 
Vietnam, then I would be an appeaser, and we would both find 
it impossible to accomplish anything for anybody on the entire 
globe. 'S 
The war swamped Johnson's daily agenda. He was kept closely informed of 
day-to-day events in Vietnam, on domestic and international reaction to them, and 
even got involved in choosing bombing targets. 6 As US casualties mounted and the 
war bogged down into a stalemate, the President's physical and emotional health 
clearly suffered. By 1967 he regularly looked white-faced and tired; he was aging 
prematurely. On 31 March 1968, the day Johnson announced he would not seek 
4 Vivienne Sanders, The USA and Vietnam, 1945-75 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1998), p. 108 
5 Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Signet, 1976), p. 263 
6 Ted Gittinger (Ed. ), The Johnson Years: A 1'ietnam Roundtable (Austin: University of Texas, 1993), p. 78 
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reelection as President, Lady Bird noted in her diary that `his face was sagging and 
there was such pain in his eyes as I had not seen since his mother died'.? 
The Wilson government was therefore faced with a complex President who, 
after his July 1965 decision to send large numbers of US ground troops to South 
Vietnam, was increasingly obsessed by events in South East Asia and the 
consequences of those events back home. If the Wilson government was not 
involved in this all-important foreign affair, then Anglo-American relations 
inevitably would be strained during the Johnson administration. Moreover, given 
LBJ's views on loyalty and his growing paranoia that anyone who did not support 
him on Vietnam was against him in all things, the Anglo-American alliance appeared 
constantly threatened if the United Kingdom was not cooperative on this matter. 
Harold Wilson's Character and Labour's Foreign Policy 
During Wilson's periods in office (1964-70 and 1974-76) - and for many 
years afterwards - the man and his governments were criticised for their shallowness, 
lack of achievement and superficiality. Wilson himself was invariably portrayed as a 
scurrilous, self-serving character with a distinct lack of genuine political beliefs and 
a dark private side involving a possible sexual relationship with his Personal 
Secretary, Marcia Williams and dubious links with several business tycoons. 8 
Wilson's career and personality have however experienced a recent reappraisal. 9 
7 Lady Bird Johnson. A White House Diary (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p. 642 
8 See in particular Paul Foot, The Politics of Harold Wilson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) and Andrew Roth, Sir 
Harold Wilson: Yorkshire Walter dfitry (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1977). Accusations about Wilson's questionable 
liaisons with his secretary and business associates are now considered groundless. 
9 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: HarperCollins, 1993); Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorized Life of Lord Wilson 
ofRlevaulx (London: Heidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993); R. Coopey, S. Fielding, N. Tiratsoo, The Wilson Governments 
1964-1970 (London: Pinter, 1993) 
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The Wilson who emerges from the latest scholarship is more of a pragmatic, 
intelligent leader who, while ascribing to no particular political philosophy, had some 
well-intentioned ideas. Despite this rehabilitation, some of Wilson's less impressive 
personal characteristics rightly remain intact, particularly his susceptibility to the 
fantasy world Andrew Roth referred to when he called Wilson a `Yorkshire Walter 
Mitty'. )° Wilson did have delusions of grandeur when it came to his international 
role. 
Wilson, Anglo-American relations and Vietnam 
The Labour government that came to power in October 1964 inherited an 
established policy on Vietnam. The British government, under the Tories, had 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s supported the American aim of containing 
communism in South East Asia and as a loyal ally did so openly. But as the 
Americans put it, London had decided that it `must help quietly because of its 
peacekeeping role under the agreements of 1954'. 11 However, the British refused to 
become directly involved in the conflict and therefore consistently turned down 
American requests for troops. This policy of diplomatic support but limited direct 
involvement became strained when the direction of US policy became increasingly 
interventionist under the Kennedy administration. Much of British political 
leadership, including some in the Foreign Office, were doubtful that the US could 
achieve any sort of military victory in Vietnam and were worried about the 
increasing risk of Chinese involvement. However, the sanctity of the Anglo- 
10 Roth, Sir Harold Wilson 
II Memorandum for the Record by Bundy, 13 February 1964 in Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-68 Volume 
I, Vietnam 1964 (Washington D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1995) [henceforth FRUS] pp. 69-70 
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American relationship demanded that Britain's true feelings on the conflict could not 
be made public. 
Any new government could, of course, change direction on this issue. Much 
of the left wing of the Labour party was traditionally anti-American and many within 
the Party were concerned about the route being taken by the US in Vietnam. Indeed, 
Wilson's own views on the Anglo-American relationship and on Vietnam changed 
over time. During the 1950s Wilson had spoken out against American foreign policy 
in the area. In a speech in Coventry in February 1952, Wilson stated that: 
It must be the duty of the British Parliament, and the British 
Labour Movement in particular, to make it clear that if any 
section of American opinion sought to extend the area of 
fighting in Asia they could not expect us to support it. 12 
And in 1954, at May Day celebrations in Liverpool, Wilson argued: 
Not a man, not a gun must be sent to defend the French in Indo- 
China. We must not join with nor in any way encourage the anti- 
Communist crusade in Asia, whether it is under the leadership of 
the Americans or anyone else .... I believe it is this country which 
must give the lead to peace-loving nations and see that the world 
can go forward in peace. 13 
In even stronger language, Wilson said: 
The Government should not further subordinate British policy to 
America. A settlement in Asia is imperilled by the lunatic fringe in 
the American Senate who want a holy crusade against Communism 
.... Asia 
is in revolution and Britain must learn to march on the side 
of the peoples in that revolution and not on the side of their 
12 Daily Telegraph, 18 February 1952 in Foot, Politics of h arold Wilson, p. 203 
13 Liverpool Daily Post, 3 May 1954 in ]bid 
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oppressors. 14 
This was during Wilson's brief left-wing phase - his Bevanite period. 15 From the 
mid-1950s until the early 1960s Wilson, as Shadow Chancellor, became engrossed in 
domestic and economic issues and `much of his former antagonism to American 
foreign policy was transferred to American penetration of the British economy'. 16 
When Wilson became Shadow Foreign Secretary in November 1961, he had the 
opportunity to visit the US more often and to meet its leaders. With the election of 
John F. Kennedy Wilson saw America in a new light. In an interview after 
Kennedy's death, Wilson admitted Kennedy's youth and dynamism had influenced 
him greatly, leading Wilson to believe he could work with a Democratic 
administration. '7 Perhaps Kennedy's election coincided with Wilson's growing 
realisation of the vital importance of the United States to the United Kingdom, both 
in foreign policy terms and economically. Either way, by the time he became Leader 
of the Opposition in 1963 anti-American statements were no longer part of Wilson's 
speeches, although he criticised the Tories for their staunch support of American 
policy in Vietnam. For instance, in the lead up to the 1964 General Election Wilson 
asked a number of questions on Vietnam in the House of Commons. In June he 
asked Prime Minister Douglas-Home to confirm that `we would not support any 
extension of the war into North Vietnam'. '8 Douglas-Home did not confirm this and, 
14 Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1954 in Ibid p. 204 
15 In April 1951 Wilson, then President of the Board of Trade, followed Aneuran Bevan, Minister of Labour, in 
resigning in opposition to the Labour Government's plans for defence rearmament and the planned introduction of charges for NIlS false teeth and spectacles. Under the influence of Bevan - the only credible left-wing leadership contender - over the next four years Wilson developed his radical instincts. Nilson condemned American foreign policy, particularly arms 
spending and US accumulation of the world's raw materials. By 1954 Bevan's chance of challenging for the leadership of 
the Labour Party had diminished and Wilson began to reorient himself towards the centre of Labour politics. 
16 Foot, Politics of Harold Wilson, p. 205 
17 Richard Neustadt, Oral History interview quoted in Pimlott, Wilson (London: Harper Collins, 1992) p. 284 
18 Mansard, 30 June, 1964, Vol. 697 
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in the event, Wilson Evas the Prime Minister who would receive much condemnation 
for his decision to acquiesce in the continuous American bombing of North Vietnam 
in March 1965. 
The Johnson Administration and the Labour Opposition, January-October 1964 
By the beginning of 1964 the Johnson administration, still largely dominated 
by Kennedy staff, was beginning to anticipate an enlargement of America's presence 
in South East Asia. Events in Vietnam had become more serious. Ngo Dinh Diem 
had been assassinated in November 1963 shortly before Kennedy, and South 
Vietnam was now being run by a succession of military leaders. In early August the 
Americans alleged that North Vietnamese boats had fired on two of its warships in 
the Tonkin Gulf. Although it is unlikely that any shots had been fired, this incident 
gave the Johnson administration the excuse to ask Congress for authority to act in 
Vietnam. The resulting Tonkin Gulf resolution authorised the President to take `all 
necessary measures' to deal with the problems in Vietnam. Within days he had 
authorised retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. 
At the same, the State Department was continuing to assess `third party' 
contributions: assistance from countries other than the United States and South 
Vietnam. Given left-wing opinion on the war and Wilson's question in the House, 
Washington was keen to assess the possibility that a Labour Government might 
prove a less loyal ally than the Conservatives on the issue. Thus a change in 
government in the United Kingdom could prove significant. Equally, Wilson and his 
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colleagues were faced with a President who, in terms of political style and 
personality, was very different from his predecessor. 
Anxious to be on good working terms with the Americans, members of the 
Shadow Cabinet visited Washington throughout 1964. In February Shadow Foreign 
Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, met several senior members of the Johnson 
administration, partly to prepare the ground for Wilson's planned visit to the US 
early the following month and partly to meet with their prospective opposition 
numbers in the US cabinet. Denis Healey, Labour's spokesman on defence, also 
visited Washington in late March. Vietnam was a major topic of discussion during 
all three visits and it is clear that at this stage both parties were probing one another 
on the issue. The Americans wished to reassure themselves that a Labour 
Government would broadly continue Tory policy on South-East Asia and as America 
contemplated further escalating their involvement in Vietnam, to investigate the 
possibility of an increased British contribution - although given Britain's previous 
reluctance to deploy troops to South East Asia, the Americans were under no 
illusions about the likelihood of a change in this position. The Labour Shadow 
Cabinet was of course keen to know of American plans in Vietnam and to gauge how 
far they might be pushed on this issue, amongst others. 
There were lengthy discussions on South East Asia during the Gordon Walker 
visit in February of 1964. This came shortly after Prime Minister Douglas-Home's 
visit to Washington, during which he assured the Johnson administration of 
continuing support of Vietnam in the light of the Tonkin Gulf resolution and the 
subsequent decision to begin air strikes. In a morning-long talk with Walt W. 
Rostow, a senior State Department official and well-known `hawk', one of the main 
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subjects was Vietnam. Rostow judged `it was clear that he [Walker] was still getting 
the facts and making up his mind' but `did not seem to have ruled out of his thinking 
some kind of negotiated settlement'. 19 Gordon Walker argued `from his Moscow 
conversations, that the USSR at least partially shared our interest in stopping the 
extension of ChiCom power in southeast Asia'. 20 The belief that Britain could, along 
with the Russians, mediate between the US and North Vietnam, seems therefore to 
have been a part of Labour's thinking before the election. Military strategy was also 
discussed. Gordon Walker asked Rostow if they were `prepared to put in the "large 
numbers of troops" which would be required to win the war' 21 Rostow was not 
exactly candid on this issue and recorded that Gordon Walker had `obviously not 
given much thought to the possibility of other kinds of escalation, except for covert 
raids on the North Vietnamese coastline'. 22 
Harold Wilson's first serious meeting with President Johnson and his advisers 
came at the beginning of March 1964. This was Wilson's third trip to the United 
States since becoming Labour leader. Wilson had met with Kennedy in April 1963 
and according to the Americans had `invited himself to Washington for the funeral in 
November' where he briefly met Lyndon Johnson. 23 The Americans accurately 
surmised that Wilson's reason for the March visit was `to become acquainted with 
you [Johnson] and your ideas, to enhance his public image in Britain, and to reassure 
19 Memo, Walt W. Rostow to Mr. Tyler, 17 February 1964, Subject: Talk with Patrick Gordon Walker, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [henceforth LBJL], National Security File [henceforth NSF], Country File, UK, Box 213, 
File: UK, Meetings with Walker, 2/64 
20 Ibid 
21 lbid 
22 lbid 
23 Memo, McGeorge Bundy to the President, 1 March, 1964, File: UK, Meetings with Wilson, 3/2/64, NSF, Country File, 
UK, LBJL 
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you regarding his reliabili as an ally'. 24 Washington awaited the visit `with 
considerable interest' and Johnson's officials made in-depth and often accurate 
appraisals of the leader of Her Majesty's opposition. 25 For example, in an 
assessment of Wilson for the President prior to his visit, Rusk argued that that the 
Labour leader was: 
Not a man of strong political convictions himself, he now probably 
reflects the consensus of Labor Party opinion. He has succeeded 
in getting the warring factions of the Party to present a public image 
of unity in face of the common need to win the election. 26 
The Secretary went on to assert. that 
Somehow, he does not inspire a feeling of trust in many people. 
This is his greatest political hardship. It has led some to say that 
in the next election, the British are faced with a choice between 
"smart aleck and dumb Alec. "27 
The day before the President's first official meeting with Wilson, McGeorge Bundy, 
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs at the White House, also summed up 
the Labour leader: 
I think you will find Wilson interesting, affable, persuasive, and 
seemingly sincere, (although he is widely accused of opportunistic 
insincerity). His detractors say that he has a photographic memory 
and can "spout names, dates, and quotations like a champion quiz 
kid. " He is a cold man. ... He enjoys talking. 
28 
24 Memo, Dean Rusk to the President, 28 February, 1964, File: UK Meetings with Wilson, 3/2/64, NSF, Country File 
UK, LBJL 
25 The Times, 28 February, 1964, p. 10 
26 Memo, Dean Rusk to the President, 28 February, 1964, File: UK Meetings with Wilson, 3/2/64, NSF, Country File, 
UK, Country File, LBJL 
27 Ibid 
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In relation to the Americans, Bundy concluded that Wilson's 
political line is friendly to the United States except for reservations 
appropriate for a Socialist leader and a defender of British 
national prestige. He insists publicly and privately that Labor 
will be a more reliable political partner for the United States than 
the Tories have been. 29 
A later CIA biographic statement also added that: 
Although he has `flirted' with the left, Wilson is not a doctrinaire 
socialist. He is above all a pragmatist, well aware of the realities of 
power. His commitment to Anglo-US relations is not based solely on 
sentiment. 
Commenting on his reputation as `a cold fish' with `no close political friends, the 
CIA noted that `it is said that he trusts no one completely and vice versa'. 30 
Although this was a largely accurate picture of the Labour leader, some of the 
less flattering comments may have persuaded LBJ that Wilson was a difficult, 
devious man who was not to be trusted. In order to get to know Wilson better and 
perhaps to impress him, the Americans laid on special treatment for the Opposition 
leader during his visit to Washington, which included a packed, high profile 
programme. Wilson had meetings with the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
Defence Secretary, a line-up usually reserved for heads of state. Wilson was 
accorded the same amount of media coverage as Prime Minister Douglas-Home had 
28 Memo, McGeorge Bundy to the President, I March, 1964, File: UK, Meetings with Wilson, 3/2/64, NSF, Country File, 
UK, LBJL 
29 Ibid 
30 CIA Biographic Statement on Harold Nilson, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, File: UK, Wilson Visit Briefing Book, 
12/64, LBJL 
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received during his visit to Washington the previous month. As The Times' 
American editor Louis Heren suggested, this equanimity not only emphasized the 
importance attached to relations with Britain but also revealed `the eagerness to get 
to know the man who could be Prime Minister before the end of the year'. 31 This 
may also have been due to the fact that Wilson had only been in charge of the Labour 
Party for just over a year. Moreover, in recent months the Johnson administration 
had recognised that on some issues the Labour Party appeared closer to its position 
than the Conservative Government. During Patrick Gordon Walker's visit a few 
weeks earlier, US Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, had found Gordon 
Walker's views on defence similar to his own. In the lead up to the General Election 
the Conservatives had stressed their commitment to an `independent' nuclear 
deterrent. In doing so, the Tory leadership had also argued that this allowed them a 
certain amount of independence from the United States. Labour had seized on this 
opportunity: 
Here was a chance of appearing to be the party most closely 
aligned with the United States by arguing for the abandonment 
of nuclear weapons (a call much loved by the Labour Left) and 
relying instead on closer relations with the Americans. 32 
Labour began to argue against the nuclear deterrent and for a build-up of more 
traditional conventional forces. This position was much closer to McNamara's 
request that the Europeans provide conventional forces for his `flexible response 
31 The Times, 28 February, 1964, p. 10 
32 John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations/939-1980: The Special Relationship, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1981) p. 81 
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strategy'. 33 Not surprisingly, the Johnson administration was eager to assess such 
possibilities further. 
Wilson arrived in Washington for his two day visit on March 1. The Johnson 
administration impressed upon Wilson similar issues to those emphasized to Prime 
Minister Douglas-Home. In particular, the Administration was keen to discuss the 
Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), the American proposal for a mixed-man nuclear 
fleet, that had been formulated in order to deal with German interest in joining the 
nuclear club. Although the Conservative Government had shown some interest in 
this plan, the Labour Party was totally opposed to it. However, Vietnam was also 
brought up during a discussion on South East Asia. At this point, the Johnson 
administration merely talked of the current political and military situation in 
Vietnam. This was not a time for requests for help or firm commitments from a 
prospective Labour government. 34 
This visit was much more important in terms of the personal relationships. 
Both Wilson and Johnson trusted in their interpersonal skills and would hope to be 
able to persuade the other on particular issues. The following evening Wilson met 
Johnson at the White House for 50 minutes. Wilson was reported as saying shortly 
afterwards that he had got on `all right' with Johnson and that the conversation had 
been `very enjoyable and very frank. There had been no difference of 
communication or any waste of words'. 35 Back home Harold Wilson's record of this 
first meeting with Johnson was much more glowing. Many of his political 
colleagues in Britain were left with an extremely favourable impression of events. 
33 Ibid 
34 Memorandum of Conversation, Harold Wilson and Robert S. McNamara, 5 March, 1964, File: UK, Meetings with 
Wilson, 3/2/64, NSF, Country File, UK, LBJL 
35 The Times, 3 March, 1964, p. 8 
63 
Tony Benn's diary entry of the time states that Wilson `had got on excellently with 
President Johnson' and added that he thought they were `both highly political 
animals and understand each other well'. 36 The press, however, picked up on some 
confusion arising out of the Wilson visit. In his endeavour to demonstrate his desire, 
should he become Prime Minister, to strengthen Anglo-American relations, Wilson 
apparently voiced his opposition to continued moves towards European unity, seeing 
Britain's future in strong Anglo-American ties in co-operation with the 
Commonwealth. 37 Such views were looked upon with suspicion by an 
Administration who still felt European unity was the best way to prevent political 
instability on the European continent. Overall, however, Wilson's views were 
warmly received, particularly his commitment that under Labour Britain would 
continue its world role. 
The following months saw the Labour Party congratulate itself on the prospect 
of close relations with the Americans. Tommy Balogh, a close adviser to Harold 
Wilson, visited the White House in April of 1964 and reported back that `the White 
House is passionately committed to a Labour victory in Britain - more so than when 
"that Eastern aristocrat, Kennedy was in charge"'. 38 
Despite the seemingly positive outcome of Wilson's first meeting with the 
Johnson administration, it was soon apparent to Labour Party observers that the 
Anglo-American relationship still had its downside, particularly in relation to events 
36 Tony Benn, Out ofthe Wilderness: Diaries 1963-1967 (London: Arrow Books, 1989) March 4,1964, p. 97. Benn, 
later became a Cabinet member in October 1964 as Postmaster General, and continued to keep a diary. His comments are 
generally reliable and often extraordinarily perceptive but like all the diaries from this diary-rich government, are also 
personal. They do, however, give scholars a good sense of how the Wilson-Johnson relationship was perceived at the 
time. In Benn's case, his belief in the strength of the Prime Minister's relationship with the President may well be to do 
with his own closeness to Wilson at this time. Later comments which are more critical of Wilson's friendship with 
Johnson, again, perhaps reflect Benn's growing disdain for Wilson. 
37 The Times, 4 March, 1964, p. 9 
38 Benn, Out of the Wilderness, 27 April, 1964, p. 106 
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in Asia. By August of 1964 Benn wryly noted Wilson's reaction to the Tonkin Gulf 
crisis in Vietnam: `we are terrified of saying anything that might upset the 
Americans ... 
The British Government needs American support against Sukarno, 
who is attacking Malaysia and Wilson is particularly anxious not to upset Johnson at 
this stage. '39 In any case, Gordon Walker as Shadow Foreign Secretary had by 
August come to the conclusion that a Labour Government `must back [the] US in SE 
Asia - tho' working slowly for a solution by leaving things to people of the area'. 40 
During the long lead up to the British general election, David Bruce, the US 
Ambassador in London, continued to keep the Johnson administration informed on 
the potential new Prime Minister and relevant Labour policies. On July 20,1964, 
Bruce described Wilson as `exceptional in ability, brilliant in debate'. 41 Richard E. 
Neustadt, a Harvard professor and special consultant to the President during 1964- 
66, spent time in London during June and July, largely to gauge prospective Labour 
policy regarding the M. L. F. He was clear that Wilson, if elected, would have his 
own `recollections of the Anglo-American relationship' based on his experiences 
during and shortly after the Second World War and `hopes for his own personal 
relationship which are quite different from perceptions of reality held by many 
American officials' 42 Johnson had no particular fondness for the British, despite the 
rhetoric, and obviously did not have the same recollection of his meeting with 
Wilson. Neustadt therefore felt that `numbers of things can be done to avoid 
39 lbid, 10 August, 1964, p. 135 
40 Papers of Patrick Gordon Walker, GNWR 314 1964 Foreign Policy, "Thoughts on Foreign Policy August 1964", 
Churchill Archives, Cambridge 
41 Telegram from David Bruce to George Ball, 20 July, 1964, David Bruce Diaries, Virginia Historical Society, 
Richmond [henceforth Bruce diaries] 
42 Memorandum on The British Labour Party and the MLF, prepared by Richard E. Neustadt, 6 July, 1964, published in 
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shocking his sensibilities. '43 And indeed during Wilson's first two years in office, 
the Johnson administration attempted to shield the Prime Minister from the 
President's true feeling for him in order to maintain Wilson's morale at home and his 
commitment to Anglo-American relations. 
A New Labour Government and Anglo-American Relations 
On October 16 the Labour Party was declared the winner of the British 
General Election and asked to form Her Majesty's Government with an overall 
majority of just five MPs in the House of Commons. On the day of Labour's 
election victory, Bruce wired Rusk to `speculate about his [Wilson's] possible 
attitude toward Anglo-American negotiations'. Bruce's positive appraisal of Wilson 
continued as he agreed with the charge that Labour's election campaign had been a 
`One Man Band': `As a politician, Mr. Wilson clearly demonstrated his superiority, 
in intellectual ability, adroitness, and persuasiveness, over his associates. ' The 
Ambassador therefore judged that, 
Wilson's first cabinet will be nothing to brag about in terms either 
of intellect or of experience. He is aware of this and means to 
take all key decisions into his own hands. He wants not merely to 
make ultimate decisions but to pass issues through his own mind 
early, sitting at the centre of a brains-trusts, with himself as first 
brains-truster on the model, he says, of JFK. 44 
Bruce expected Wilson to take a key role in foreign affairs and felt that the US 
should expect `a greater degree of high level negotiation with the British than has 
43 lbid 
44 Ibid, p. 12 
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been our previous experience' 45 This analysis proved correct, all Wilson's foreign 
secretaries complained about Wilson's constant interference in foreign affairs. 
President Johnson took Wilson's election as Prime Minister in his stride. 
Bruce noted that the President `viewed the results with no surprise, as was his habit 
whenever anyone came into office who had been previously in opposition' and 
`extended ... rather quickly an invitation to Mr. Wilson to meet him'. 46 Also, 
according to William P. Bundy, brother of McGeorge and Assistant Secretary for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
No outstanding foreign issues were involved .... So far as 
American official feelings were concerned, Harold Wilson had 
made a generally good impression over the year and a half since 
the death of Hugh Gaitskell, and the change was greeted calmly 
and with every expectation that the close ties between Britain and 
the United States would continue. 47 
Bruce anticipated problems over the proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force - to 
which Labour was opposed - and British entry into the Common Market, but 
acknowledged America's strength in any such negotiations: 
We will find Mr. Wilson a resourceful, tough, realistic, 
opinionated bargainer, but solely our own lack of equal 
resourcefulness and determination would enable him to 
profit at the expense of our more powerful position. 48 
45 Telegram from David Bruce to Dean Rusk, 16 October, 1964, Bruce Diaires 
46 Transcript, David Bruce Oral History Interview, Tape 1,9 December 1971 by Thomas H. Baker, p. 9, LBJL 
47 Papers of William P. Bundy, Box 1, Chapter 16, p. 2, LBJL 
48 Ibid 
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The President helped prepare his own country for the change in British government 
in his foreign policy address to the nation on October 18 just one day after Labour's 
electoral victory: 
The British Labor Party is the same party that held power when 
the Atlantic Alliance was founded; when British and American 
pilots flew the Berlin airlift together; when Englishmen joined 
us in Korea. 
It is a party of freedom, of democracy, and of good faith. Today 
it has the confidence of the British people. It also has ours. 
They are our friends - as the Conservatives before them are our friends 
- and as governments of both parties have been friends for generations. 
We congratulate the winners. We send warm regards to the 
losers. The friendship of our two nations goes on. This is 
our way with all our trusted allies 49 
The change in British government was accepted uncritically by most of the American 
press. The Washington Post thought the President's `remarks on Great Britain's 
change of government were timely and felicitous. The United States and Great 
Britain have a working relationship that is a party issue in neither country and that is 
not likely to be disturbed by the outcome of any election'. The New York Herald 
Tribune expected slight differences in policies: `To the extent that objective realities 
have determined British policy, they will probably continue to do so, but in details- 
which could add up to very considerable changes-the United States must be 
prepared for new adjustments. ' Other newspapers, such as the Baltimore Sun, were 
49 Radio & Television Report to the American People of Recent Events in Russia, China, and Great Britain, 18 October, 
1964, [686], Public Papers of die Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, Volume 11,1964 (Washington D. C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 1379 
68 
encouraged by the appointment of Patrick Gordon Walker as Foreign Secretary, 
describing him as `a man of moderation and a friend of the United States'. so 
It appears the Americans, certainly within the Cabinet, felt little apprehension 
at working with a nominally socialist Labour government. 51 Wilson's hostility to 
American foreign policy was well in the past and his visits to Washington since 
becoming leader of the Labour Party had convinced most of Washington that his 
socialist statements were purely for public consumption. Many of those within the 
Johnson administration knew senior Labour politicians well. Walt Rostow knew 
Harold Wilson and Denis Healey, the new Defence Secretary from his time as a 
Rhodes scholar at Oxford. Dean Rusk also knew Healey and was described by 
David Bruce as having `a warm feeling for him'. 52 Harlan Cleveland, US Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organizations, had been one of Wilson's students 
at University College, Oxford, and most senior British cabinet members had met with 
officials in the Johnson administration prior to the 1964 election. A healthy working 
relationship was also facilitated by continuing strong ties between personnel within 
the American administration and the British civil service. Sir Patrick Dean, British 
Ambassador to the United States, was admired by Johnson. Sir Michael Palliser, the 
Prime Minister's Assistant for Foreign Affairs and Walt Rostow, the President's 
50 "Change in British Government", American Opinion Summary, Department of State, 23 October, 1964, File: UK, 
Walker Briefing Book 10/26-27/64, NSF, Country File, UK, Country File, LBJL 
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National Security Adviser, were old friends from Oxford who enjoyed working 
together at their respective stations. 
At this stage there was little to suggest that Anglo-American relations would 
falter so much over the coming years. 
Patrick Gordon Walker's Visit, October 26-27 1964 
With preliminary examinations of one another out of the way, the realities of 
working together began. Just ten days after Labour's victory at the polls the new 
Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, `an old and esteemed friend' of the 
United States, visited the White House at the invitation of Dean Rusk. 53 Gordon 
Walker had previously visited the United States in late May and early June 1963, and 
in February 1964, and had met with President Kennedy, Dean Rusk, Robert 
McNamara and Roger Hilsman. However, the Americans had no illusions about 
who would be running Britain's external policy. In a discussion with Gordon 
Walker, Rusk noted that `he has worked well with Harold Wilson, but there is no 
indication that Wilson intends to let anyone other than himself set the major lines of 
British Foreign Policy'. 54 As such, the Johnson administration wanted to use this 
opportunity to make sure the Labour Government had `a clear concept' of United 
States objectives and policies on key foreign policy issues `before its own positions 
solidify'. 55 This was particularly the case in relation to defence matters, especially 
MLF and Polaris. Rusk told Johnson the main reason for the visit was to `assure you 
53 Suggested Points for Toast, Secretary's Dinner for Patrick Gordon Walker, 27 October, 1964, File: UK, Walker Visit 
Briefing Book 10/26-27/64, NSF, Country File, UK, LBJL 
54 Memo, Dean Rusk to the President, 24 October, 1964, File: Walker Visit Briefing Book, 10/26-27/64, NSF, Country 
file, UK, LBJL 
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that the United Kingdom does not plan any radical foreign policy initiatives 
embarrassing to the United States'. A visit so soon after the election would also 
demonstrate to the British that `the United States continues to value its association 
with Britain now that Labor is in control'. 56 
At this point Rusk showed measured optimism about the new British 
government: 
This could be a turning point in Atlantic affairs comparable, in 
some ways, to the period 1947-50, when the United States and a 
previous Labour Government launched other great ventures to 
strengthen the Atlantic partnership. 57 
At that time, the Labour Government had aligned itself closely to the Americans on 
such issues as monetary policy, nuclear bases and the H-bomb, largely due to the 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin's vehement anti-communism. Perhaps the 
Americans felt that the British Labour Government, in an attempt to downplay some 
of the party's anti-Americanism and to demonstrate their credibility as a close friend 
of the Americans, would be manipulable. The weakening position of the pound 
would also make the British more susceptible to American pressure. 
The Americans therefore intended to push on with Atlantic policy issues such 
as the Kennedy round of financial talks, MLF, monetary policy and improved 
political consultation. At this stage MLF was without doubt the most vital issue for 
the Atlantic Alliance. The importance of MLF was conveyed to Wilson via Walker 
at the White House meetings. However, it was agreed that: 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid 
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Detailed discussion of certain specific questions, such as the 
MLF and the Polaris Sales Agreement, should be left for a 
later meeting with Prime Minister Harold Wilson, since he 
alone can speak with full authority on them. 58 
Nevertheless, Rusk was well aware of Wilson's small working majority and was 
prepared to take account of it in the coming months: 
We should ... not say anything at this time which might 
be taken 
as serving notice on the British that we intend to move ahead with 
them if they are willing, but without them if necessary. 
Our position should be one of calm reaffirmation of our 
commitment to the development of the Atlantic partnership 
without any overtone of pressure at this stage. 59 
Any strong pressure at this time might have led Wilson to submit to backbench 
pressure and openly come out aainst MLF. 
Interestingly, on Vietnam, the Johnson administration expected `no change ... 
in ... position' because `the British have firmly supported us 
in Vietnam, in part as a 
quid pro quo for support of their effort in Malaysia' 60 In the minds of the 
Americans these two issues were inextricably linked. Moreover, despite Labour's 
criticism of Tory policy on Vietnam and its nominally socialist status, the Americans 
did not expect the new Government to withdraw British diplomatic support from 
their actions or be any more sympathetic to North Vietnam. Indeed, William Bundy 
remembers that: 
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On the most crucial East Asian matter in which Britain was 
involved, Wilson at once made clear his intent to maintain and 
if necessary strengthen British help to Malaysia against the 
Indonesian "confrontation; " there, British forces had been 
strengthened in September, and during October and November 
were further increased ... 
61 
Prime Minister Wilson's Visit, December 7-8,1964 
Wilson's first visit to Washington in December of 1964 was important on a 
number of fronts. Although preparatory work had been carried out during the 
previous month and a half, this visit would see the beginning of the relationship 
between Wilson and Johnson proper, and would witness the formulation of new 
policies and the consolidation of old ones. 
During this trip, Wilson elaborated on his grand ideas about the future of 
Anglo-American relations. In his reply co Johnson's welcoming address on 7 
December, Wilson was careful in his use of words in describing his hopes for a 
continued strong relationship with the United States. 
In the changed circumstances of the sixties, we seek still a closer 
relationship based on common purposes and common aims, on 
consideration for the interest of Great Britain's partners within 
the Commonwealth and of our allies in Europe and elsewhere. 
The theme of these talks, as I conceive them, Mr President, 
whether for the strength of our alliance or for our wider approach 
to the fight for a constructive peace is expressed in the one word 
`interdependence' - truly as among men so among nations we 
are all members one of another ... 
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Later that day during his toast at the formal dinner, Wilson talked about the 
responsibilities of friendship: 
We have our differences. There are always differences between 
friends. We are good enough friends to speak frankly to one 
another, but there will never be anything peevish or spiteful. If we 
ever have differences, we will look you straight in the eye - and we 
will expect you to look us straight in the eye - and say what you 
would expect we can do as friends and only what we can do as 
friends. 
Wilson continued in his speech by talking of his own up-to-date assessment of 
Anglo-American relations: 
We hear arguments. I have heard this often enough about whether 
there is a special relationship between the United States and 
Great Britain. Some of those who talk of the special relationship, 
I think, are looking backwards and not looking forward. They talk 
about the nostalgia of our imperial age. We regard our relation 
with you not as a special relationship but as a close relationship, 
governed by the only things that matter, unity of purpose, and unity 
in our objectives. We don't come to you at any time on the basis of 
our past grandeur or of any faded thoughts of what the grandeur 
was ... we 
have, and we always shall have, a close relationship... 63 
What exactly did Wilson mean by a `close' relationship with the United States? In 
practical terms, how distinct was Wilson concept of a `close' relationship from 
traditional interpretations of the `special relationship'? 
Despite there being no specific mention of British relations with the United 
States in Labour's `Election Manifesto', Wilson had by the time of the General 
Election decided to reinvigorate Anglo-Americans. Anglo-American relations would 
63 Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Ibid, p. 1648 
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remain at the centre of British foreign policy along with ties to the Commonwealth 
but would be reenergised. There were two aspects to Wilson's vision of the future of 
the relationship. Clearly, Wilson hoped to establish a different approach from his 
predecessors. In the spring of 1964, Wilson had sketched out his hopes for the 
Anglo-American relationship at a private gathering of press and politicians. 
According to Tony Benn, Wilson believed `a Labour Government would be able to 
establish a much more informal relationship with the American President than 
Home' had been able to do and `imagines that he can telephone and fly over as and 
when necessary, without the usual fuss of top level meetings.... As soon as the 
Election is over, he and his top colleagues will fly to Washington to renegotiate the 
whole basis of Anglo-American relations in the field of defence and foreign 
affairs'. 64 A more informal relationship, utilising the benefits of speedy transatlantic 
flights and modern communications, based on regular face-to-face meetings and 
frequent telephone conversations, would ensure the two leaders were up-to-date on 
each other's thinking. This would help ensure the greatest levels of co-operation 
between the two countries and maximise Britain's influence on a global basis. 
Wilson expanded on this aspect of the special relationship at a press conference after 
his first formal meeting with Johnson at Washington in December. 
It is first a relationship at all levels. President-Prime Minister 
meetings are essential and should be frequent. There is a good 
deal to be said for the growing informality which has been 
developed, so that they tend to be routine and not symbolising 
any great crisis or dramatic turn of events. It means an equally 
close relationship between senior British ministers and senior 
American cabinet officials, particularly Secretary of State, 
64 Tony Benn diaries, 5 May 1964., p. 108 
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Secretary of Defence, and Secretary to the Treasury. 65 
Wilson's ideas about an informal working relationship between Britain and America 
had been shaped after his meeting with President Kennedy. Invigorated by the 
President's youth and dynamism, and believing he had established a personal rapport 
with JFK based on their shared intellectual qualities, Wilson began to believe Anglo- 
American relations could be more modem and purposive. 
As well as hoping for a change in the style and conduct of Anglo-American 
relations, Wilson desired a change in content. The Prime Minister's emphasis on 
`close' rather `special' relations suggested he envisaged a relationship based on a 
realistic assessment of Britain's current position in the world; that Britain was no 
longer a leading world power and was declining in strength year by year. While he 
hoped for a period of co-operation between the nations, similar to the last time a 
Labour Government had worked with a Democratic administration, this time a close 
working relationship would not be founded on the notion of an `English-speaking 
alliance' policing and leading the world but would see Britain playing a central role 
in international peace-keeping. The Labour Government would abandon vain 
`nuclear posturing' and instead be more committed to NATO in conventional terms. 
Thus Labour's `New Approach' to defence would mean a re-negotiation of the 
Nassau agreement to buy Polaris missiles from the US and `the strengthening of our 
conventional regular forces so that we can contribute our share to Nato defence and 
also fulfil our peace-keeping commitments to the Commonwealth and the United 
Nations. 66 
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Once in Downing Street, any doubts Wilson might have had about working 
closely with the Americans became irrelevant. Faced with the true extent of Britain's 
financial difficulties, the new Prime Minister was probably relieved to find the 
Americans were as opposed to the devaluation of sterling as he was, and would help 
to avoid this by providing massive loans to the British. As Paul Foot later put it, 
`American loans and promises of loans strengthened what used to be called "the 
special relationship"'. 67 
However, there were problems with Wilson's hopes for a `close' Anglo- 
American relationship, particularly its place in the wider international scene. In the 
summer of 1964, Richard Neustadt had warned the Johnson administration about the 
dangers of Labour's `Dreams of Glory (retrospective)': 
Their vision of the place and power in the world which they 
hope to assume as HM Government has rather more to with 
1951 than 1964, judging by the overtones when they discuss 
their prospects. Many of the educative shocks which Tories 
and officials have encountered in the interim do not seem to 
have registered in full on these outsiders. 68 
In Wilson's case, Neustadt felt that this would manifest itself in `dreams of a role as 
honest broker in East-West relations (shades of 1945). Currently he is `the man who 
knows Krushchev. '69 Neustadt was also correct, however, in sensing Wilson's hope 
that Britain could mediate between Washington and Russia. This was very much 
grounded in his belief in the Prime Minister's own talents and experience, 
particularly his long-term relationship with the Russians and his sense of his own 
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interpersonal skills. 70 If the Wilson Government could establish a strong relationship 
with the Americans, it could help make the Cold War world more peaceful. 
The difficulty with this notion was Britain's declining importance in world 
affairs: Britain simply did not have the strategic or military significance to bring 
either of the superpowers to heel. In the absence of this political `muscle', the only 
way for Wilson to play the role of power he so desired, was to establish an intimate 
working and personal relationship with President Johnson. The difficulty for Wilson 
here was Johnson's lack of enthusiasm about working with the Europeans in general. 
The President did not want a close working alliance with Britain, nor with any other 
European nation for that matter. 71 Although Europe remained the first priority for 
US foreign policy and Presidential commitment to NATO was as strong as ever, 
Johnson had no new initiatives on Europe. Indeed, George Ball, admits that he took 
the lead on European policy and in general did not get much interference or guidance 
from Johnson in this. 72 Johnson clearly felt more at home with Latin American and 
Asian nations. His personal experience as a teacher of young, poor Mexican- 
Americans meant he felt he understood the problems of under-developed nations. 
His Presidential visits reflected this preference; overseas trips concentrated largely 
on the Western Hemisphere and the Far East. So, although Johnson recognised the 
unique nature of Anglo-American relations in terms of language, culture and 
tradition, he did not see them as `special' in any real sense, due to Britain's decline as 
a great power and the rise in importance of other European nations, particularly West 
70 Wilson had since the 1940s visited the Soviet Union, sometimes on official visits but also establishing trading links for 
Montague Meyer. 
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Germany. He was also suspicious of the East-Coast foreign policy establishment's 
Anglophilia, describing some of his advisers as `dangerously sympathetic to the 
UK'. 73 
This lack of concern for, or empathy with, the British could be explained by 
Johnson's personal sense of geography. William McChesney Martin, while 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, recalled to the journalist Henry Brandon 
what he thought were Johnson's true feelings towards England: 
First of all you have to know that he does not consider easterners 
... as real Americans. To 
him they look too much to Europe. 
Secondly, the line of Texas, Missouri, Minnesota to him is the 
real America. Those Texans who have gone to live in California 
are in his mind Texans who weren't able to make a go of it in Texas. 
In this picture, England figures about as large as North Dakota. 74 
The main problem Wilson faced in trying to effect changes in the Anglo- 
American relationship was Johnson himself. How likely was it that the two leaders 
could develop a close working and personal relationship? When Wilson had met 
Johnson in March Tony Benn concluded, `Johnson is an old style, folksy, warm- 
hearted New Dealer with much more in common with Wilson than Kennedy had or 
than he (Johnson) has with Home. All that is very encouraging. '75 Clearly the two 
leaders main shared personal characteristic was their total absorption in politics and 
for that reason they had a great deal of respect for one another as professional 
politicians. And perhaps Johnson also felt that Wilson was, like himself, not a part 
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of his country's ruling establishment. 76 They certainly had relatively humble 
origins: Johnson's comfortable, rural background in the Texas hill country and 
Wilson's, lower-middle class upbringing in northern England meant both had no 
more than a middling social status. However, Johnson's high school education was 
in marked contrast with Wilson's academic success as an Oxford don and although 
they may have come from modest backgrounds, they had not had similar life 
experiences and, apart from politics, had no shared interests. But Benn's conclusion 
may also have been a misreading of Johnson and his politics, something of which 
Wilson was also guilty as Henry Brandon noted: 
Like other Labour leaders, he was under the mistaken impression 
that there was little difference between a New Dealer and a British 
socialist. To him the Great Society was another way of talking 
about Labour's kind of socialism when in effect Johnson's approach 
to the welfare state did not prevent his being closer to business than 
to the labor unions. 77 
Wilson may therefore have assumed a closer political affinity than was in fact the 
case. 
Moreover, Johnson would increasingly judge his friends by their loyalty on 
Vietnam. It is no coincidence that of all the world's leaders, Johnson had the 
greatest respect for Australia's Premier Harold Holt. To the President, Holt had 
admirably supported the Americans, and had honoured its SEATO alliance 
obligations by sending combat troops to Vietnam. 
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Johnson's international priorities and personal demands were not clear in 
December 1964. At this stage, the Prime Minister's plan for closer relations between 
Britain and American was still intact. And as the personal dimension was an 
important forerunner to such a development, it was crucial that Wilson's first 
meeting with Johnson, as Prime Minister, go well. The Americans were also worried 
about this aspect of the Wilson talks, although perhaps for different reasons. On 25 
November, Richard Neustadt was sent to London to ensure both sides were fully 
prepared for Wilson's forthcoming visit to Washington and to make it transparent 
`that the success of the talks would be dependent on the acceptance of MLF. '78 
George Ball, Under-Secretary of State, reiterated this during a visit to London. Ball 
met with Wilson with the purpose of ascertaining the Prime Minister's views on an 
Atlantic nuclear force. 
However, it is clear that Neustadt also wanted to stress the importance of the 
`personal equation' in the forthcoming talks between the President and the Prime 
Minister. Wilson was reluctant to see Neustadt, fearing such a meeting would mean 
`letting the Americans have a clear insight' into British views ahead of time. 79 
Derek Mitchell, the Prime Minister's Principal Private Secretary, also met with 
Neustadt and recorded afterwards that Neustadt `repeated the warning already given 
by him to the Prime Minister and others that the Prime Minister should not bank on 
everything going his way when he got face to face with the President. ' He added that 
`the President was not looking forward to the talks with anything approaching the 
same eagerness as the Prime Minister because `he had other problems on his mind, 
for example South-East Asia and a number of personnel matters. Thus preoccupied 
78 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 46 
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he looked forward to next weekend as more of a chore than a major act of policy'. 
All this indicates that even at this early stage misunderstandings were already evident 
in the relationship between the Prime Minister and the President. Neustadt made this 
clear when he explained that: 
It was known that the Prime Minister had received a strong 
impression from his personal meeting with the President 
which he had when he was Leader of the Opposition; and that 
he had been moved by the warmth of the message which was 
sent to him when he took up office. But the President himself 
had not the same recollection of the earlier meeting and the 
warm message of greeting was not more than the result of an 
instruction to officials to draft a warm message of greeting. 80 
Derek Mitchell thought this assessment was a `little one-sided' and moved on the 
offensive by explaining that, 
it was a fact that the Prime Minister assumed he had a personal 
affinity with the President and if he were disabused of this in too 
rude or unfeeling a way he might take it very hard. I said that I 
hoped that he would not look at this problem exclusively as one of 
conditioning the Prime Minister to the President. The opposite 
approach, difficult as it might be for Professor Neustadt and his 
colleagues in Washington, might pay handsome dividends. 
This advice may have been taken on board, especially when one considers the lavish 
attention paid to Wilson on his visit to Washington. Mitchell summed up the 
conversation by saying that throughout the talk Neustadt's `emphasis was on the 
importance of the personal relationship and of making sure that there was no misfire 
or recoil as a result of the confrontation. '8' 
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Wilson undoubtedly received a great deal of advice - from a variety of sources 
- on his forthcoming visit to Washington. Apart from the Foreign Office and private 
secretaries, the Prime Minister was also overwhelmed with correspondence from 
members of his cabinet and party and indirect advice from editors and journalists. In 
his political memoirs, The Labour Government 1964-70, Wilson records that an 
`ominous note' came from a British newspaper editor who had recently met Johnson 
in Washington. 
President Johnson had told the editor that he would never 
trust a British Prime Minister again, because all his 
experience showed their Washington visits to be concerned 
mainly with domestic electioneering. 82 
This may have been partly due to Johnson's disagreement with Prime Minister 
Douglas-Home during his visit to Washington in February of that year. Johnson had 
been furious after the visit of Douglas-Home when the latter had by accident led the 
press to believe that he had acted firmly in response to American criticism about 
British trade with Cuba. The President was livid at the imputation that he had 
allowed an allied leader, of diminishing international significance, to speak to him in 
such a manner, and apparently, Johnson never spoke to Douglas-Home again. No 
such mistakes would be made with Wilson. Throughout the Wilson-Johnson years, 
the Americans were particularly careful to monitor the Prime Minister's public 
statements and actively sought to influence them. 
In addition to this, Johnson apparently took a moral stand against Wilson and 
examined the question of his being a security risk after being furnished with 
82 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 46 
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intelligence reports during the British General Election telling of Wilson's supposed 
affair with his secretary, Marcia Williams. These reports appear to have originated 
in Britain and were picked up by the FBI's London mission. Charles Bates, the FBI 
legal attache in London at the time, asserts that information surrounding Wilson's 
supposed liaison with his secretary were received by FBI Chief, J. Edgar Hoover and 
duly passed on to President Johnson. 83 The same rumours were passed on to 
McGeorge Bundy via Richard Helms, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans. 84 In an 
Oval Office meeting with the President and his advisers shortly before Wilson's 
December visit, David Bruce also noted that such gossip was in circulation: 
The President made no allusion to what I had been confidently 
told was his prejudice against the Prime Minister, founded 
largely on gossip that the latter had conducted an irregular sexual 
connection with his secretary. This allegation had been muttered 
in certain circles during the campaign; Al Irving queried the 
Chief Whip-now Lord Bowden on the subject. He received the 
assurance that the lady's husband would not bring a suit against 
Wilson, naming as co-respondent, since the husband had been 
divorced, remarried, and was the father of a child of his second 
venture. Johnson is said to be puritanical in his views about such 
affairs, and heartily to disapprove of them. 85 
Given Johnson's own marital infidelities, the hypocrisy of such a judgement is 
striking. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Johnson would have felt more 
confident in the knowledge that he had such information at his fingertips, especially 
given his axiom `I never trust a man unless I have his pecker in my pocket'. 86 
Johnson was well aware of James Jesus Angleton's concern that Wilson Evas a Soviet 
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agent and although the President does not appear to have taken this intelligence too 
seriously, as the CIA continued to pass information on Wilson to the President and 
his closest advisers, particularly regarding his relationship with the Russians, such 
poison may partly explain why the President's attitude to Wilson changed 
periodically. 87 
In any case, Johnson was not prepared to have Williams accompany the Prime 
Minister to Washington and there was certainly some controversy over this issue. 
George Ball remembers that, 
on Wilson's first visit to President Johnson in Washington ... 
relations got off to a bad start over the Prime Minister's 
insistence that his assistant, Marcia Williams, attend highly 
restricted meetings; she did not, in Johnson's view, have the 
rank to justify it. 88 
Williams remembers the event somewhat differently. 
The reason I was not taken on that first visit was mainly that the 
Principal Private Secretary had worries because never before had 
anybody political been taken abroad with the Prime Minister. It 
is difficult to tell if this view was accurate. But for another visit 
Derek Mitchell did helpfully suggest that I might have been able to 
go on the plane in the capacity of a `maid' if Mrs Wilson was on the 
trip. 89 
In the event Wilson was accompanied to Washington by the Foreign Secretary, 
Patrick Gordon Walker, Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, the Secretary of the 
Cabinet, Burke Trend, and by senior Foreign Office and Defence officials. The visit 
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took place from Sunday 6 December to Wednesday 9 December and on the surface 
`with Sir Winston Churchill day just over, good will for Britain' was `running 
high'. 90 Privately, however, the difficulties in planning and preparation for the trip, 
meant that uneasiness surrounded Wilson's first visit to Washington as Prime 
Minister. 
On Wilson's arrival at the White House on December 7, President Johnson 
gave his traditional remarks of welcome on the South lawn. Wilson responded in 
much greater detail and as John Freeman noted in the New Statesman, the Prime 
Minister's long-windedness was perhaps a danger to the future of Anglo-American 
relations: 
There was a brief moment on Monday morning in the pale icy 
sunshine of the White House garden, when it seemed as if a new 
and unexpected objective of British policy was being revealed. To 
kill the President of the United States by exposure. The Prime 
Minister had been given the full red-carpet treatment: a 19-gun 
salute, a presidential reception, guards of honour, and a briefly 
graceful speech of welcome from President Lyndon Johnson, who 
faced the near-freezing atmosphere coatless. Harold Wilson, in a 
heavy greatcoat, stepped to the microphones and plunged into a 
portentous address about the purpose of his mission. It lasted 
nearly 10 minutes. Well before the end the assembled dignitaries 
were discreetly shuffling to restore their circulation. The President 
looked stoically blue with cold. And a little peeved. It seemed an ill- 
starred beginning to such important talks with such a sensitive man. 91 
Given Johnson's undoubted ultra-sensitivity, Freeman was probably correct. 
In Wilson's account of the visit, he notes that during their first private meeting 
which lasted from 11.30 am to 1 pm, the President started by repeating `that after his 
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previous experience he had come to the conclusion that he would never trust a 
British Prime Minister again'. Wilson said that he understood what Johnson meant 
and that he personally would `say nothing outside the White House that I had not said 
to him inside'. 92 The fact the President began their first formal meeting with such a 
warning is clear evidence of Johnson's intimidating style. Wilson was immediately 
put on the defensive. 
Getting down to business, Johnson and Wilson's talks were dominated by 
three major issues: MLF, sterling, and Vietnam. Their discussion of such issues 
was, however, prefaced by talk of their respective domestic political problems. 
Wilson felt that the President did not fully understand the British political system, 
especially the problem of governing with a small majority. 
His political reputation had been built up by his success as 
Senate majority leader with, at times a small, and always 
unreliable, majority, so he felt that he understood the problems 
facing our parliamentary leadership. It was harder for him to 
see that while failure to carry a vote in the Senate did not mean 
the end of a presidency, which was secure for a four-year period, 
a serious parliamentary defeat might mean the end of the 
Government, or at least an immediate general election. 93 
This may account for Johnson's later inability to comprehend fully Wilson's 
difficulties in dealing with backbench dissent over Vietnam. Nevertheless, it is 
noticeable that Johnson's interpretation of this discussion of domestic politics was 
somewhat different from Wilson's, again suggesting some problems with 
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communication. In a debriefing of the conversation Johnson conveyed the following 
to McGeorge Bundy: 
The President pointed out to the Prime Minister that there were 
a lot of problems which did not show in the U. S. returns, especially 
with respect to international affairs. He said that our folks were 
damned tired of being told that it was their business to solve all 
the world's problems and do so mainly alone and that he was 
very wary of taking any tall dives that might get him into the 
situation Roosevelt got into in 1937.94 
There was no mention of Wilson's parliamentary difficulties. Such Wilsonian 
concerns did not register as important to Johnson when compared with his own 
foreign policy anxieties. Nevertheless, Wilson and Johnson undoubtedly enjoyed 
talking to one another about the management of politics. 
The discussion then moved onto the major problem facing Anglo-American 
relations at that time: sterling. As well as introducing a 15% surcharge within days 
of coming to office, the Wilson government had increased the bank rate by 2% on 23 
November. Johnson's own budget had been affected by British demands for help 
with sterling and the Administration acknowledged that `problems for the pound 
would also be problems for the dollar'. 95 Consequently the President was blunt in 
analysis of the dangers of a British devaluation but kind about the problems sterling 
caused the Prime Minister. 
Later in the afternoon a full meeting between the Prime Minister, President 
and their respective senior colleagues, advisers and note-takers took place in the 
Cabinet room of the White House. At this full-scale meeting Vietnam was discussed 
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seriously for the first time. The Americans had, however, put much thought into the 
subject before the visit and indeed the British, New Zealand and Australian 
embassies had been informed a few days earlier that the prospect of `more serious 
decisions made it more than ever vital' that the US `have increased third country 
contributions. ' It was suggested the UK increase its number of police advisors 96 
Moreover, pre-empting the Wilson visit, McGeorge Bundy indicated to the British 
that the President had a `deep personal concern' on this, and that he would `discuss 
this with Wilson. '97 
In a memo to Johnson two days before the Wilson visit, Bundy outlined the 
difficulties surrounding the issue of `The British and Vietnam'. He told the President 
that `the British will find it very, very difficult indeed to increase their commitment 
in Vietnam right now' because of a lack of political support for any such action. He 
went on to point out that in a sense it was now too late to start expecting serious 
support from the British because: 
For 10 years we have accepted a situation in which the British 
give political support, but avoid any major commitment on the 
ground of their other interests and their position as Co-Chairman 
of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.... It is hard to treat a thing 
as our problem for 10 years and then try to get people to take a 
share of it, just because it is getting worse (though we choose not 
to say so). 
Bundy still felt it was worth hitting the British `hard' while in Washington but 
recognised that a `definite and affirmative answer' was unlikely. He also 
acknowledged that at present: 
96 Telegram from Rusk to US Embassies in London, Canberra and Wellington, 4 December, 1964, LBJ Library in Gareth 
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the most that Wilson could possibly do ... would be a slight 
enlargement of the Thompson advisory mission and of their 
police training effort, with perhaps a green light to a few bold 
British officers to get themselves in the line of fire as our men 
do. All this he would have to do quietly.... You might press him 
to go from the current level of 7 Britishers to about a hundred, 
but we would be lucky to get 50 in this first phase. 
In relation to a possible second phase of the conflict entailing the need `to land a 
mixed force of U. S. and other troops', Bundy felt that `eve might conceivably get a 
small British contingent along with larger ones from Australia and New Zealand'. 
He judged that this request might succeed because `our own commitment would have 
gone up and there would be a better case for asking the British to join in'. However, 
Bundy was clearly aware of the ambivalent position of the British due to their role as 
Co-Chair of the Geneva Conference and the dangers inherent in any commitments on 
their part: `if the British Co-Chairman send troops in, that might be the trigger, or at 
least the excuse, for the Soviet Co-Chairman to help Hanoi in a similar manner'. 98 
According to the official British record of the meeting, the President 
introduced Vietnam in connection with the importance of Britain's world-wide role. 
He suggested that `there were ... places where a United Kingdom military presence, 
on however a limited scale, might have a significant effect. A few soldiers in British 
uniforms in South Vietnam, for example, would have a great psychological and 
political significance'. 99 Wilson notes in his memoirs that the President's request for 
a token British force in South Vietnam was made `without excessive enthusiasm'. '°° 
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The Cabinet record agrees that `there was no real United States pressure for a United 
Kingdom presence on the ground in South Viet-Nam, apart from an initial suggestion 
that we should contribute a token force of 100 men'. '°' While the Prime Minister 
acknowledged the parallels between the US problem in Vietnam and the British 
problem in Malaysia, and emphasised the existing British help in Vietnam, which 
included the Thompson mission, the training of Vietnamese troops in jungle warfare, 
and the provision of police officers in Saigon, he explained that the British could not 
offer a troop contribution because: 
We were co-chairman of the Geneva conference, under the 
Agreements of 1954 and 1964, and would have a role to play 
in seeking a way to peace. But I stressed the fact also, which 
seemed new to him, that we had as many as fifty-four thousand 
troops in Malaysia. 102 
These two main arguments against the sending of British troops to Vietnam - that the 
British were already over-stretched in the Far East through their commitment of 
troops to the Malaysian struggle against Indonesia and that the British position as 
Co-Chair of the Geneva Conference precluded any active military involvement in 
South Vietnam - would continue to be Wilson's main line of defence against the 
Johnson administration's requests for allied help. In themselves, the arguments were 
reason enough not to get involved and provided a convenient mask behind which 
Wilson could hide his own feelings of apprehensions about US involvement in 
Vietnam. 103 The Johnson administration was not convinced by either argument. 
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After the Soviet Union began supplying arms and aircraft to the North Vietnamese in 
1965, Washington could not see why Britain continued to remain so sensitive over its 
role as Co-Chair. If the Wilson government believed in the wisdom of America's 
objectives in Vietnam, then the Americans could not see how a small troop 
deployment could add significantly to the British military burden around the world. 
In addition to such practical reasoning against British involvement in Vietnam, a 
domestic political one would soon become equally, if not more important: the 
unpopularity of the war in Britain, particularly within Wilson's own party. Even if 
the Prime Minister had wanted to send a token force to Vietnam, his Party would not 
have allowed it. 
Wilson therefore `accepted no new commitment apart from offering to do a 
little more training in Malaysia' and instead pursued the possibility of a British role 
in the initiation of peace negotiations. William Bundy recorded that the Americans 
discussed such issues with `great frankness'. 104 
That evening at a state dinner in the White House, President Johnson 
delivered a toast to the Prime Minister. Things were sufficiently relaxed for LBJ to 
deliver one of his famous jokes on the subject of the present talks. 
Mr Prime Minister, I want you know that I am really enjoying 
them, although sometimes diplomatic negotiations recall Mark 
Twain's story of his visit to a friend up in New Hampshire. 
Mark Twain was walking along the road and he asked a farmer, 
"How far is it to Henderson's place? " 
"About a mile and a half, " the farmer answered. 
He walked awhile longer and he met another farmer and he asked 
104 Papers of William P. Bundy, Box 1, Chapter 19, pp. 21/22, LBJL 
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the same question, "How far is it to Henderson's place? " The 
farmer answered, "About a mile and a half. " 
Mark Twain walked a little farther and he met a third farmer and 
He again asked, "How far is it to Henderson's place? " 
"About a mile and a half, " the farmer answered. "Well, " said Twain, 
"Thank God I am holding my own. "pos 
He continued with another of his humorous anecdotes. `We have many difficult 
problems. I am sure the traditional British ability to find reasoned solution will 
ultimately prevail. During World War 11 the British Minister in Algeria was called 
upon to mediate a dispute between British and American officers. The American 
officers wanted drinks served before their meals. The British wanted their drinks 
served after their meals. He came up with this answer: "In deference to the British, " 
he said, "we will all drink after meals and in deference to the Americans, we will all 
drink before the meal. " This kind of British genius has solved a great many 
problems. ' 106 The sound recording of this event indicates much laughter at this 
point. 107 Despite the inauspicious start and Wilson's refusal to send troops to 
Vietnam, the relationship between the two leaders and their respective 
administrations, appears to have been relaxed. Basking in his landslide victory in the 
1964 Presidential Election by the biggest margin to that point in US history, Johnson 
was confident and self-assured in December 1964. Working hard on his plans for a 
`Great Society', he was in his element, using his dynamism and enthusiasm to good 
effect. At this point, Vietnam was still a troubling problem, but had not yet 
overwhelmed the President's every thought and deed. 
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Nonetheless, at the final meeting between the President and the Prime 
Minister, with the Secretary of State, Foreign Secretary and Secretaries of Defence in 
attendance, Vietnam was discussed in further detail. Rusk talked about assistance 
from other countries `both for its practical effect as well as for the political impact, to 
demonstrate to Saigon and Hanoi the degree of free world solidarity'. He then 
expressed the US government's hope that the UK would `put people into the 
countryside. Engineers, technicians and military were needed ... 
Showing the flag 
was important. ' Rusk didn't just want a small contigent of British advisors, as with 
the Thompson mission, but `a significant number of people'. '°8 The British 
contingent repeated its support for the American policy in Vietnam but again 
reminded the Americans of Britain's efforts against communism in Malaysia. 
Obviously responding to Rusk's comments about the displaying of the British flag, 
Gordon Walker admitted that publicizing British efforts, such as training Vietnamese 
troops in jungle warfare and providing medics `would in fact step up the British 
commitment'. The British concluded the discussion on Vietnam by reminding the 
Americans that they needed to be `consulted about steps contemplated in Vietnam so 
that they could support U. S. efforts effectively'. '09 
The British left Washington feeling moderately pleased with themselves. Not 
only had Wilson managed to successfully put forward his alternative to MLF, the 
Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) but had also secured some sympathy and 
understanding on sterling and had avoided any major commitment on Vietnam. The 
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Prime Minister's convinction that a strong, forward-looking Anglo-American 
relationship was central to British interest, remained intact. 
Deals? 
At this first meeting there is no substantive evidence that there was any deal 
or understanding reached between the British and American governments linking 
American financial support of the pound, a British commitment to remain East Suez, 
and a wider deal involving Vietnam. However, there could have been two other 
possible arrangements. The first may have related to MLF. In managing to persuade 
Johnson to consider abandoning the unpopular MLF Wilson may have agreed to a 
quid pro quo which tied the British to the US on Vietnam. Wilson's Chief Whip, 
Edward Short, endorses this theory. Short argues that Wilson `paid a price -a high 
price' for American acceptance of Wilson's ANF. I 10 Certainly as early as July 1964 
Neustadt discussed South East Asia as a place `where the US might be threatened or 
the UK rewarded in the course of bargaining over MLF'. """ It is clear, however, that 
Wilson's `success' over MLF was not as great a personal victory as it first appeared. 
Prior to the December visit, McGeorge Bundy, spelt out in a memo to Dean Rusk, 
Robert McNamara and George Ball, his reservations about the cost of success on 
MLF, including `a deeply reluctant and essentially unpersuaded Great Britain' and a 
`protracted and difficult Congressional struggle in which we would be largely 
deprived of one decisive argument - that this arrangement is what our major 
European partners really want'. Moreover, Bundy also revealed that, 
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From my own conversations with the President, I am sure that 
he does not feel the kind of personal Presidential engagement in 
the MLF itself which would make it difficult for him to strike 
out on a new course if we can find one which seems better. I 
believe we can. 112 
It would appear, therefore, that while Wilson may have felt victorious over the likely 
scrapping of MLF, it was a smaller sacrifice for Johnson than the Prime Minister 
realised. And, while Wilson may have received much favourable publicity over this, 
Johnson may have felt it was worth it if it made Wilson obliged to him, especially on 
Vietnam. 
The second `arrangement' could have been a straight deal regarding US 
support for the British in Malaysia in return for British assistance over Vietnam. In 
many ways, this was a continuation of established policy. As early as February of 
1964 the link between the situations in Malaysia and Vietnam had been 
established. 113 O. G. Forster, a diplomat at the British Embassy in Washington 
explained in July of 1964 that, 
the link is not in the form of `if you will help us in Malaysia, 
we will help you in Laos and Vietnam', ... Rather 
it is in the 
self-evident parallel between the two situations. It is very 
difficult for the Americans to urge us not to indulge in mild 
escalation in Eastern Malaysia, when they are seeking to 
persuade us that this is the correct policy in Laos and Vietnam; 
it is very difficult for them to argue that we should not take the 
Malaysian question to the United Nations, when this has been 
under consideration for Vietnam and Laos for the very same 
reasons; it is very difficult for them to urge that a Conference 
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of the countries concerned will solve everything, when they are 
resisting another Geneva Conference for the same purpose. 114 
In a briefing paper for Wilson's December visit to Washington, the Foreign Office 
wrote of an `element of reciprocity in the support extended by each Government to 
the policies of the other'. This support was, according to the Foreign Office, 
`implicit in the communique issued on February 13,1964 after Sir Alec Douglas- 
Home's visit to President Johnson'. The relevant passage being: 
The Prime Minister re-emphasized the United Kingdom support 
for United States policy in South Viet-Nam. The President 
re-affirmed the support of the United States for the peaceful 
national independence of Malaysia. 115 
This section of the communique had only been inserted after careful consideration. 
In the McGeorge Bundy memo two days prior to the Wilson visit, the President had 
been advised that `the reciprocal price' of any British force in Vietnam 
would be stronger support on our side for Malaysia and 
perhaps closer participation in naval and air deployment 
designed to cool off Sukarno. This kind of bargain in this 
part of the world makes a good deal of sense, and Rusk and 
McNamara will be ready to go forward with the British in 
detailed discussion on this basis. ' 16 
However, while there may have been an implied agreement to support each other in 
South East Asia, William Bundy casts doubts on the direct nature of any agreement: 
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There is no truth whatever, I am sure, in the idea that the 
Johnson Administration agreed at any time with any British 
government for a kind of sharing of the military burden-no 
American forces in Malaysia (never for a moment contemplated 
in any case) and no British forces in Vietnam. >» 
Before the Wilson visit, the CIA advised the White House that given the UK's heavy 
commitment in Malaysia, 
should they be pressed to increase their participation [in 
Vietnam], they will probably insist on a quid pro quo with 
respect to Malaysia ... we will end up undertaking a bigger 
commitment (both military and political) in Malaysia than we 
would like -a commitment [sic] which would, in the event, 
outweigh the usefulness of an increased British role in Vietnam. 
British visibility in Vietnam would, according to this assessment, be most usefully 
gained by publicizing the work of the British Advisory Mission. I 8 McGeorge 
Bundy, Rusk, McNamara and the President disagreed with the assessment, instead 
believing a slightly increased US role in Malaysia might be a cost worth paying for a 
more substantial UK presence in Vietnam. 
Although Rusk raised the possibility of a `joint venture' between the US and 
UK in Malaysia and Vietnam, Wilson and Gordon Walker did not bite. So, in a 
sense, the December meeting saw an agreement between the US and the UK that 
each country would only give the other limited support in their respective South East 
Asian problems. 
Most likely negotiations about the pound, MLF and Malaysia all played a part 
in the British decision to pledge limited support for US policy on Vietnam. 
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Certainly these issues, explicitly or implicity, were part of the context in which 
Wilson overcame his reservations about the wisdom of the US fight in South East 
Asia. 
Assessment of the Wilson/Johnson Meeting, 
Johnson's interpretation of his first meeting with Wilson is indicative of the 
dominant position US leaders now felt in relation to the British. When a diplomatic 
correspondent asked the President how his meeting with Wilson had gone, he replied 
that handling Wilson was like approaching a girl the first time you date her, first you 
cuddle up a bit and then commence feeling around to test her response. 119 Clearly 
this was how Johnson approached Wilson on Vietnam. William Bundy states that as 
late as November 30 in a draft position paper he had suggested that the President not 
ask for any additional British contribution `in view of the British role in Malaysia'. 
Bundy argued against such pressure `when the `confrontation' situation was at its 
height. ' Nevertheless, as Bundy outlines `in the final version of the Paper, the 
limitation was removed. ' 120 While the Administration did not have realistic 
expectations of a British troop deployment in Vietnam, it would appear that Johnson 
himself could not resist the opportunity of making his English ally squirm a little. 
William Bundy summed up the discussions on Vietnam as `important initial 
explorations of what was to become a crucial subject' but `generally speaking ... 
Wilson's reaction was one of support. There did not appear to be any significant 
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change in the British view of Asia, through the transition from Lord Home's to that 
of Wilson. ' "21 
This first meeting between Wilson and Johnson was, according to Wilson's 
personal and political secretary, Marcia Williams, `the most important and 
successful' of all the Prime Minister's visits. This assessment is undoubtedly 
correct. The trip established an apparently pleasant tone in the personal 
relationships and Wilson's success in persuading the Americans to reject MLF was 
the highpoint of Wilson's diplomatic efforts in Washington. Nevertheless, Wilson 
returned to London: 
a trifle disembodied. He had been at the receiving end of the 
onslaught of economic problems, and then had been to America 
engaged in even more intricate ones of defence. Nov he had the 
problem which face all Prime Ministers, of readjusting to the 
home scene after an overseas trip, particularly after the exposure 
to the grand VIP treatment one receives on these occasions. 122 
Despite this period of readjustment Wilson managed to convey his positive feelings 
about his Washington visit to his colleagues and country. The day after he returned 
from Washington he reported back to the Cabinet. The meeting was recorded not 
only by the Cabinet Secretary but also by Richard Crossman, Minister for Housing. 
Essentially their notes convey the same detail but the Crossman diary is couched in 
less diplomatic language and reveals some interesting asides. According to 
Crossman, and not mentioned in Cabinet records, Wilson `started by stating there 
were two conferences, one which took place and one which the British press 
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reported'. He denied press reports that `a pistol had been put to his head on 
Vietnam'. Wilson himself felt that he had been in a stronger position, personally and 
politically, than was portrayed. Cabinet records note that the Prime Minister said his 
trip to Washington had been `a successful visit, conducted in a very friendly and 
relaxed atmosphere. It established our main purpose of making clear our basic 
defence policy and preparing the ground for further, more detailed, discussions'. The 
Americans had emphasised. the importance of Britain's world role and stressed their 
desire that this continue, particularly East of Suez. They did, however, appreciate 
`the burden on our economy which this entailed'. According to Wilson's notes for 
the Cabinet, the British 
emphasised our determination to reduce defence expenditure 
and to get the economy going again. Very useful and understanding 
talk with L. B. J., Dillon and Martin - `the talk which never happened' 
- about the pressure on sterling and our need for time to allow our 
long-term measures to take effect. They endorsed both what we had 
done and what we had decided not to do. 123 
In an unpublicised meeting to discuss the British economy, Wilson got the 
impression that Johnson was extremely understanding. According to Crossman's 
recollection of Wilson's Cabinet report, Johnson had `virtually promised us all aid 
short of war'. 124 If the Crossman notes are the more accurate it suggests either 
Wilson's tendency for embellishment or Johnson's for hyperbole. Either way, it 
again illustrates problems in communication. 
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On Vietnam, Crossman points out that Wilson was eager to point out that the 
final communique had emphasised continuing discussions at all levels. Wilson 
believed that this meant `they want us with them ... They want our new constructive 
ideas after the epoch of sterility. We are now in a position to influence events more 
than ever before for the last ten years'. 125 
At the end of 1964 Anglo-American relations appeared to be sound, and 
Vietnam was not, as yet, a substantial issue between the two nations. Although 
unhappy with Wilson's refusal to provide troops for the Vietnam war, the Johnson 
administration was not surprised at this decision. Still, the Prime Minister's lack of 
real support on Vietnam would be used as a source of criticism in future discussions 
regarding support of the pound and the maintenance of Britain's military role East of 
Suez. At the same time, however, the US' growing desire for `more flags' in 
Vietnam meant Wilson could use US hopes of a deeper British commitment, or at 
least continuing loyal diplomatic support, to good effect. The fact that Wilson was 
unable to deliver anything of substance on Vietnam and his own hope for a close 
relationship with the US, and Johnson in particular, may have meant that the 
Americans could reap dividends in other areas. In the foreign policy world of 
national interests, the Americans, and Johnson especially, were tempted to indulge in 
moral blackmail. 
Wilson left Washington convinced that he had a growing personal relationship 
with LBJ and a sound basis for a stronger relationship with the United States. 
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CHAPTER 3 
JANUARY-APRIL 1965 
WITH US, BUT WOBBLY ON NEGOTIATIONS ... 
In the early part of 1965 the Johnson administration began laying the 
foundations for a major commitment to the war in Vietnam. The President and his 
advisers - military and civilian - discussed at length the avenues available to them as 
the situation in South Vietnam became increasingly unstable. The options at this 
stage centred mainly on military action although negotiations had not been ruled out. 
In relation to its allies, America was keen to secure more solid support. Events in the 
United States meant that the British Government faced new demands from 
Washington at the same time as facing increasing domestic pressure to initiate peace 
talks in Indochina. Specifically, this led to calls for the renewal of the Geneva 
Conference. As the Wilson Government pursued this and other options, the United 
States became increasingly irritated at Britain's mounting interference on Vietnam 
without any significant military or material commitment to the conflict. Anglo- 
American relations therefore began to suffer as a result of tensions over the war. In 
particular, Britain was concerned about `creeping escalation' and a lack of adequate 
consultation, while America questioned Britain's reliability as an ally. Problems in 
the personal relationship between the two leaders exacerbated the growing rift 
between their two countries on South East Asia. Consequently, by late March there 
was a serious need to find a practical, working solution to the difficulties Vietnam 
raised for the Anglo-American relationship. 
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Anglo-American Relations at the Beginning of 1965 
At the end of 1964 Anglo-American relations appeared to be sound. In his 
Annual Review of the United States in 1964, Lord Harlech, British Ambassador to 
the United States, informed Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker that `Anglo- 
American relations remained close and cordial'. However, he recognised that in the 
coming years the `special relationship' would be tested by the force of `realpolitik': 
we shall be increasingly treated on our merits and shall be regarded not 
so much for who we are as for how we perform. Above all our 
influence will depend upon our ability to solve our own economic 
problems and to bring an end to what seems to the Americans to be a 
position of chronic insolvency. 
Although Harlech felt the UK still possessed `a unique capability of influencing 
American policy' he warned `this will be a wasting asset unless we handle our own 
affairs with considerable skill and attention to the correct priorities'? 
Due to his apparent success during his December visit to Washington Wilson 
believed he was the man for the job. He was convinced he had made a strong impact 
on Johnson, had demonstrated the Labour Government's loyalty and integrity as an 
ally, and had paved the way for yet closer relations between the United States and the 
United Kingdom. 3 To capitalise on this another trip to Washington was planned by 
the Prime Minister for early 1965. 
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Lyndon Johnson also planned to visit Britain for the first time as President. 
This almost happened sooner than anticipated when Winston Churchill died on 24 
January. The President, who greatly admired the war-time leader, very much wanted 
to attend the funeral but was unable to do so as he was recovering from a bad cold 
that had resulted in a three day stay in Bethesda Naval Hospital. To the British, this 
would have been a welcome chance to get to know the Texan better. Many in the 
Foreign Office and in British political circles knew very little about the President, 
and just as importantly, felt Johnson neither knew nor cared much about Britain. As 
it was, Johnson planned to send three official mourners in his place: Secretary of 
State, Dean Rusk; Chief Justice Earl Warren; and the American Ambassador to Great 
Britain, David Bruce. Unfortunately Rusk also pulled out of the funeral with flu, 
leaving, to British eyes, two virtual unknowns at the funeral of the first `honorary 
American'. Although a bad cold was potentially serious in a man who had had a 
heart attack, Johnson could not openly acknowledge his condition and his decision 
not to go to Britain for Churchill's funeral was seen by many as his choice, rather 
than a medical necessity. Not surprisingly, LBJ received complaints from the public 
and the media on both sides of the Atlantic for not attending. 4 The President's 
inability to attend Churchill's funeral also meant that later in the year considerable 
effort would be put into attempting to secure a visit to Britain by both the President 
and Vice-President Humphrey because as Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under 
Secretary at the Foreign Office admitted, `it would be a good thing for the President 
to acquire some first-hand knowledge of Britain before his administration is much 
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older'. 5 Clearly, however, this mishandling of the arrangements for Churchill's 
funeral had done short-term damage to Anglo-American relations and was not a good 
omen for Anglo-American relations in 1965. 
Escalation Begins - The American Decision to Begin Air Strikes on North Vietnam 
The new year brought growing problems for the US Government in relation to 
Vietnam. November and December of 1964 had seen Viet Cong attacks on US bases 
around Saigon resulting in the deaths of Americans and Vietnamese. Despite the 
Congressional authority of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the Johnson administration 
hesitated to bomb North Vietnam, largely because of the fear of reprisals from China 
and the Soviet Union. By January 1965 President Johnson was being advised by 
Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense and McGeorge Bundy that `our current 
policy can lead only to disastrous defeat'. 6 This conclusion came as increased 
activity by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese helped produce an increasingly 
unstable political situation in the South, which saw a series of attempted military 
coups in which General Nguyen Khanh, head of the South Vietnamese government 
looked likely to be overthrown by either his own generals or by the Buddhists.? The 
US felt that selective air strikes on North Vietnam would produce positive political 
and psychological results: they would stiffen the morale of the South Vietnamese and 
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signal US determination to inflict heavy damage on North Vietnam. According to 
McGeorge Bundy, at this point all that was needed was `the right provocation'. 8 
Thus Walt Rostov, a senior Department of State official, was sent to London 
in January to discuss the possibility of selective bombing of North Vietnam. While 
the Americans were not seeking advice as such, they clearly wanted to keep the 
British abreast of some of their thinking, to gauge the limits of the Labour 
government's support, and to assess possible international reaction such to the 
bombing. Apparently Wilson gave Rostow `no encouragement' for such a move. 9 
When McGeorge Bundy announced he was going to visit Vietnam on 4-7 
February, the Foreign Office commented that `the moment of truth approaches'. '° 
Wilson felt, and the Cabinet agreed on 28 January, that he should be in Washington 
at this crucial juncture, if only to ascertain whether the US saw any role for the 
Geneva Co-Chairs. " 1 When the Prime Minister met with Dean Rusk at 10 Downing 
Street the following day he made it clear that although the UK would continue its 
support of American policy, he could not sanction US policy ahead of time. 12 
Although this was, of course, a sensible approach for the leader of a sovereign nation 
to take, Wilson was also leaving himself room to manoeuvre. 
The Foreign Office considered Britain's position more fully when Alexei 
Kosygin, the Chairman of Ministers of the USSR, visited North Vietnam at the 
beginning of February. The possibility existed that this visit might signal the 
beginning of a proposal from the Russians for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. 
8 Telegram from Lord Harlech to Foreign Office, I January 1965, FO 371/175503/DV 103145/2348, PRO 
9 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p. 79 
10 Minute for P. M. Harold Wilson, 4 February 1965, PREM 131692, PRO 
11 Cabinet meeting, 28 January 1965, CAB 128/39, PRO 
12 Bruce diaries, 29 January 1965 
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The time seemed ripe for Britain to `offer her services'. 13 After further deliberation, 
the Foreign Office decided this would be a mistake as the United States had already 
invested `too much effort, too many lives, too much money and, above all, too much 
prestige' in South Vietnam `to welcome such cold detachment' from an outsider. 
We could do grave harm to Anglo-American relations by rushing in 
with unpalatable proposals. If failure comes in Vietnam, it is bound to 
cause profound dismay and recrimination in the United States. There 
will be a general search for someone to blame and British intervention 
at the present stage could all too easily make us the principal 
scapegoat. 14 
For the time being, therefore, the British Government decided to keep its opinions to 
itself, and the Prime Minister's plans for a visit to Washington were abandoned. 
The Johnson administration's deliberations over air strikes ended on 6 
February when an army advisers' barracks at Pleiku was attacked by the Viet Cong, 
leaving nine Americans dead and over a hundred injured. The National Security 
Council advised the President to retaliate immediately. Johnson duly authorised 
Operation Flaming Dart, tit-for-tat bombing raids on North Vietnam. The Americans 
attempted to give Wilson and Michael Stewart, the new British Foreign Secretary, 
advance notice of this action but could only reach the Permanent Under Secretary, 
Harold Caccia at the Foreign Office. 15 Regardless, the British Government rushed 
to approve US action and as Tribune noted: `Significantly enough, these reprisals 
were supported at the United Nations by only two nations - Great Britain and 
Formosa. ' 16 
13 Briefing Paper: Prime Minister's Visit to Washington, 2 February 1965, F0371/I80539/DV 103145/20, PRO 
14 lbid 
15 Gordon Walker had lost his seat at Smethwick during the 1964 election and was replaced by Stewart in January of 
1965. Stewart would be Foreign Secretary until August 1966. 
16 Tribune, Vol. 29, No. 7,12 February 1965, p. 8 
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The rapid escalation in US military involvement in Vietnam, and the 
accompanying increase in world tension, led to British Parliamentary unease. 
Stewart, in his first appearance at the Dispatch Box as Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, faced several questions on the issue. Stewart's appointment had proved 
pleasing to Washington as he was seen as a long-time loyal friend to the United 
States and his stout defence of US policy in Vietnam began during his first series of 
questions in the House. As The Times reported the next day: 
If diplomacy is the art of remaining firm while giving the least offence 
to all sides, then Michael Stewart, the new Foreign Secretary, made a 
most impressive debut in the House of Commons .... 
Dealing with the 
situation in Vietnam, he displayed a smooth blend of tact and authority 
17 
The Foreign Secretary rejected calls for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference 
on the grounds that `he doubted ... whether sufficient agreement existed to 
justify 
such a conference'. '8 This diplomacy endeared Stewart to the Americans but 
inflamed Labour's left-wing and resulted in them tabling a peace motion in the 
Commons the following day. Fifty Labour MPs signed the motion, putting pressure 
on the British Government to take an initiative to bring about a ceasefire and political 
settlement in Vietnam. 
Given the Labour Government's small majority in the House, this largely left- 
wing pressure was not taken lightly by the Prime Minister, especially as he had also 
received private requests for `British diplomacy' on the issue. An old colleague and 
Labour MP, David Ennals, had known Wilson for many years in his capacity as 
17 The Times, 9 February 1965 
18 Hansard, Vol. 706, Col. 38 
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International Secretary of the Labour Party and used their personal friendship in 
order to try to influence the Prime Minister. He wrote to Wilson on 9 February 
arguing that `our co-Chairmanship of the 1954 conference does give us an 
opportunity and a responsibility' to act. He also suggested that `those forces in the 
USA who recognize ... that negotiation 
is necessary would welcome British 
assistance to get them off the peg'. Ennals therefore suggested that `without delay 
Michael Stewart should fly to Washington and then, if possible, to Moscow ... It 
would dramatize our concerns, emphasize our sense of responsibility and would, I 
believe, be warmly welcomed throughout the country'. 19 
These public and private requests for British action go some way to 
explaining the most infamous exchange between Harold Wilson and Lyndon 
Johnson: the Prime Minister's late-night telephone call to the President. As the 
Foreign Office later put it, neither at home nor abroad could Wilson appear to be 
`standing idly by while events moved dangerously in Vietnam. '20 On the evening 
of 10 February Wilson received news of a Viet Cong attack on the US barracks at 
Qui Nhon in which 30 American servicemen lost their lives. He responded to this 
news with a proposal to fly to Washington to have a `personal discussion' with 
Johnson on the dangers of over-reacting to the present crisis, particularly the risk 
of nuclear war. 21 The Prime Minister's vision of an informal `closeness' with the 
President was about to be put to the test. Unfortunately as David Bruce put it, `the 
President made short shrift of this project. '22 
19 David Ennals to Harold Wilson, 9 February 1965, PREM 13/519, PRO 
20 "Vietnam", I1 February 1965, PREM 13/692, PRO 
21 Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971) p. 116 
22 Bruce Diaries, 11 February 1965 
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Harlech informed the Prime Minister that the White House `was very strongly 
against a visit ... at this time' but suggested that Wilson first contact the President by 
telephone before making up his mind. 23 McGeorge Bundy tried to delay such a 
call, suggesting the Prime Minister should ring the following morning. 24 Wilson was 
not willing to take this advice, however, as he knew he would have to face the House 
of Commons later in the day and meet with his Cabinet at lunchtime on Thursday. 
The President agreed to receive the call which took place on an open line between 
3.15 and 3.30 am British time (11 February) and between 10.15-10.30 pm 
Washington time (10 February). 25 
The British transcript of this telephone call, most of which is declassified, 
reveals how Wilson got the Johnson treatment. Johnson dominated the conversation 
and was easily able to put the Prime Minister on the defensive by letting `fly in an 
outburst of Texan temper' as Wilson so aptly put it. 26 McGeorge Bundy made notes 
on the President's side of the conversation and his record does not contradict either 
the official British record or Wilson's own recollection of the conversation contained 
in his memoirs. 27 The President regularly cut Wilson off mid-sentence and had 
ready, forceful and often brusque replies to the Prime Minister's pleas and questions. 
Although Wilson often got close to offering advice, and even hinted at criticism, 
Johnson interrupted him before it could actually be delivered. 
23 Ibid 
24 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson, FRUS, 1964-68, 
Volume 11, p. 229 
25 Record of a Telephone Conversation between the Prime Minister and President Johnson on 11 February 1965, PREM 
13/692, PRO; Wilson, Labour Government, p. 80 
26 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 116 
27 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson, FRUS, 1964-1968, 
Volume 11, p. 229 
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Wilson began the conversation by outlining British concerns about a possible 
escalation in US action in Vietnam and repeated his proposal to fly to Washington to 
discuss matters further. 
Our problem is that every nation in the world is making a statement. 
India and France have taken the initiative. The U. S. S. R. were saying 
last week they would be accepting responsibility as Chairmen. It is 
very difficult here for us to be saying nothing at all except that 
whatever the U. S. decides to do we shall go along with of course. The 
feeling is that we tag along afterwards .... The feeling 
is that I should 
come over as quickly as possible. 
Johnson thought such a visit would be `a serious mistake', that Wilson should `not 
get upset, keep a normal pulse' and in his position `would wait until I was called 
upon to do something and consider it on the merits'. The language here is 
particularly telling; already Johnson was letting Wilson know his place. Johnson 
nevertheless reassured Wilson that US action would `be very measured and very 
reasonable action. ' 
Clearly annoyed by Wilson's presumptuousness, the President reminded the 
Prime Minister that he wasn't constantly offering advice about Malaysia: 
a trip, Mr. Prime Minister, on this situation would be very 
misunderstood and I don't think any good would flow from 
it. If one of us jumps across the Atlantic every time there is 
a critical situation, next week I shall be flying over when 
Sukarno jumps on you and I will be giving you advice. 
When Wilson countered `We do not want to dash over. We just want to talk', 
Johnson replied `We have got telephones! ' 
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The President's suspicion that Wilson's proposal to fly over was part of the 
British Prime Minister's use of the `special relationship' for domestic political 
purposes is also apparent. 
Johnson: Let me send you the exact situation as I view it on a 
classified cable. You could show this cable to your colleagues and then 
you could cable back to me with whatever suggestions you have. 
PM: I cannot show it to the House of Commons, that is my trouble. 
Johnson: You would not want to use me as an instrument to deal with 
the House of Commons. 28 
Eventually, the President's limited patience ran out. Wilson records in his memoirs 
that in relation to `an earlier reference to Clem Attlee's visit to President Truman 
over the danger of Korean escalation in December 1950, he [Johnson] pointed out 
that we had troops in Korea, not in Vietnam'. 29 Although there is no specific 
mention of Korea in the transcript, Johnson evidently resented Wilson's interference, 
considering the lack of British troops in Vietnam. He pointed out that `as far as my 
problem in Vietnam we have asked everyone to share it with us. They were willing 
to share advice but not responsibility'. He then delivered his most telling point: 
I won't tell you how to run Malaysia and you don't tell us how to run 
Vietnam 
.... If you want to help us some in Vietnam send us some men 
and send us some folks to deal with these guerillas. And announce to 
the press that you are going to help us. Nov if you don't feel like 
doing that, go on with your Malaysian problem ... 30 
28 Record of a Telephone Conversation between the Prime Minister and President Johnson, PREM 13/692, PRO, p. 2 
29 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 116 
30 1bid 
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When, later in the conversation, Wilson made the mistake of saying the only thing he 
would be able to say to his critics at home was that there had been a call in the 
middle of the night, Bundy recorded that `the President replied with some sharpness 
that it was the Prime Minister and not he who placed the call in the middle of the 
night. The President was just answering it'. 31 
Although this conversation consisted of more than a discussion of the 
situation in Vietnam, it is particularly noticeable that Malaysia was brought up in this 
context. The President clearly saw the US' limited involvement in Malaysia as 
parallel to Britain's limited involvement in Vietnam. As responsibility was not 
shared in these respects, advice should be sought and not forced on one another. 
Interestingly, LBJ also raised MLF during this argument, suggesting he had 
compromised on this issue and had taken a backseat role, something Wilson should 
do on Vietnam. 
I tried to be very co-operative on the MLF when you were 
here 
.... I tried to hold my real views until you had talked to 
the Germans. I had very strong views on that and I did not 
want to be domineering. 32 
By the end of the conversation Wilson had been exposed to many sides of Johnson's 
character. One minute ranting at the Prime Minister, the next minute expressing his 
understanding of Wilson's domestic difficulties, one minute playing the martyr or 
wounded soldier, the next bullying once more. Wilson was completely disarmed. 
Not only did he fail to get the President's approval to visit Washington, he also did 
not manage to put over any substantive points on Vietnam. Instead he was reduced 
31 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson, FRUS, 1964-1968, 
Volume 11, p. 229 
32 lbid, p. 2 
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to stressing British loyalty on Vietnam and promised that this would `be the position 
tomorrow'. 33 Johnson expressed his appreciation. 
This late-night conversation proved a turning point in the Wilson-Johnson 
relationship, and does seem to turn on their personal chemistries. The call 
demonstrates Johnson's impatience with Wilson, and there is little sign of intimacy 
between the two leaders. In the midst of a growing crisis in Vietnam, Johnson was 
extremely annoyed by Wilson's apparent impertinence in thinking he had the right to 
put his views across in person The call also provides another example of the darker 
side of Johnson's psyche. George Reedy, Johnson's Press Secretary throughout the 
1950s and for much of the Presidency, speaks of LBJ's `tendency to fly into rages for 
reasons totally inadequate to the degree of ferocity which he would display' and of 
his tendency to be a bully who `would exercise merciless sarcasm on people who 
could not fight back but could only take it'. 34 Given Britain's reliance on US support 
of the pound, amongst other things, Wilson had little choice but to take it. Wilson 
did not yet fully understand Johnson's personality or comprehend the limits of his 
personal relationship with the President. The relationship between the two leaders 
was still in its infancy and at this stage the Prime Minister may have believed the 
glowing press and official reaction to his December visit to Washington, seriously 
overestimating his ability to influence the President. The phone call would not be 
forgotten by the President. When rumours about the poor state of the relationship 
between Wilson and Johnson surfaced the next month, including the suggestion that 
the Prime Minister wasn't welcome in Washington, McGeorge told the President that 
`none of it takes account of the very great damage which Wilson did to himself by 
33 Ibid, p. 5 
34 George Reedy, Lyndon Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews and McMeel, Inc., 1982), p. x and p. 56 
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his outrageous phone call to you'. 35 Although Wilson and Johnson would continue 
to exchange views, it was mainly by cable and letter, and very infrequently by 
telephone. Johnson, a President who favoured telephone communication, did not 
want to talk to Wilson unless it was absolutely necessary. 
At the end of their conversation Johnson had agreed to send Wilson a cable 
outlining the situation in Vietnam and current US plans. He would also brief Bruce, 
then in Washington, who would bring a personal message from the President to 
Wilson on his return to London. Within hours the cable was duly sent, via 
McGeorge Bundy, and included advance notice of US plans to bomb an army 
barracks in North Vietnam. Wilson's call may have precipitated this advance 
warning; it certainly explains the timing of it. In the cable the President reminded 
the British Prime Minister how privileged and classified their communication was. 
He also repeated the request that in future Wilson's suggestions should come via 
cable or telephone. The message was clear: the Prime Minister should stay at 
home. 36 
Wilson put the best possible gloss on this exchange when he informed the 
Cabinet the next day that he had been `in personal touch' with the President and `had 
reaffirmed that we were ready, in our capacity as co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva 
Conference on Vietnam, to put our good offices at the disposal of the parties. ' It was 
also noted tactfully that `the situation had not yet developed to the point at which the 
United States Government might wish to avail themselves of this offer. '37 
35 Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, 22 
March 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume 11, p. 468 
36 Telegram from McGeorge Bundy to Oliver Wright for the Prime Minister, 11 February 1965, PREM 13/692, PRO 
37 Cabinet Minutes, 11 February 1965, CAB 128/39, PRO 
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News of the late night telephone call appeared in the Press on 13 February. 
The Guardian's Richard Scott reported that `Mr Harold Wilson was contemplating 
flying to Washington at the beginning of this week to talk to President Johnson about 
the Vietnamese crisis-138 The White House was furious at the apparent leak. George 
Reedy then confirmed in a press briefing that `there was a direct communication' 
between the Prime Minister and the President but did so only because there had been 
a leak in London. Given the President's request for secrecy surrounding their recent 
communications, the Foreign Office at Wilson's request cabled Washington urgently 
to deny any involvement in the leak of specific details of the conversation: 
The Prime Minister wishes the President to know that at this end we 
have kept strictly to the terms of the last sentence of your teleporter 
message to me of Wednesday 10 February: the rest is intelligent 
speculation. 39 
Nonetheless, the leak - the first of many - added to the President's lingering doubts 
about Wilson's loyalty, and the personal relationship between the two was further 
soured. 
On his return to London, Ambassador Bruce was put in an awkward 
position. 40 On 16 February he received a telegram from Washington annulling his 
previous instruction to brief Wilson, instead the Ambassador was advised to `avoid 
seeing the Prime Minister, if this were possible, but if not, to confine' the 
conversation to `generalities'. 41 This evasive action was due to the fact that 
38 The Guardian, 13 February 1965 in Telegram from Murray, Foreign Office to Patrick Dean, Washington, No. 1119,13 
February, 1965, PREM 13/692, PRO 
39 Telegram from Foreign Office to British Embasy, Washington, 13 February 1965, PREM 13/692, PRO 
40 The Ambassador lamented in his diaries later that week that "each night of this week after midnight I have been called 
on the telephone about Vietnam. " 
41 Bruce Diaries, 16 February 1965 
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Washington was still carefully considering its options and had not finalised a 
timetable of action in Vietnam. Bruce met with Wilson and Stewart and informed 
them that he had been told to keep the P. M. `closely informed' on US plans in 
Vietnam but that these plans were not formed 42 The British were particularly 
anxious to know how the Americans saw the issue of the timing of a conference on 
Vietnam and on a possible cease-fire. Bruce could only reply that `the United States 
Government wanted a conference as soon as possible' but would have to continue its 
`program of retaliatory strikes' until a cease-fire had been agreed to. 43 
The next day, having received further instructions from the State Department, 
Bruce saw Wilson again. Unlike the previous day, there was no talk of negotiations. 
Instead, Bruce reported that the US would be continuing air and naval action against 
North Vietnam. Wilson commented that the `plan now appeared to be to step up 
military action without making proposals for a political solution' and `this was the 
pill without the jam'. 44 Furthermore, he believed `this would make it very difficult 
for the outside world and in particular for the UK who would, of course, have to 
support the US without seeing a light at the end of the tunnel. ' He would personally 
`be in for a very rough reception' and there would be increased domestic pressure on 
him to act as a mediator. He also reminded Bruce of Johnson's earlier cable message 
saying he would get a `complete summary of proposed US action'. He asked Bruce 
to report back to Washington that in his view `the question of entering into 
negotiations was a cardinal point of the package' and `without such negotiations' the 
United Kingdom would be put in a very difficult position as Co-Chairman, 
42 Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the US Ambassador, David Bruce, 16 February 1965, PREM 
13/692, PRO 
43 lbid 
44 Ibid 
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particularly in view of renewed Soviet interest in that position 45 Nevertheless, 
Wilson indicated that he `would solidly support' American action. 46 Surprisingly, 
the Prime Minister also asked the Ambassador if he should try to contact Johnson 
directly over his concerns. Bruce remembers that he `tried as tactfully as I could to 
advise him he not do so at the present time, but use as a channel his Embassy in 
Washington'. 47 Obviously the President had communicated his annoyance at 
Wilson's late night call to Bruce and his unwillingness to speak with Wilson at the 
present time. Either the Prime Minister did not recognise the extent of the breach in 
his relationship with the President, or he felt strongly enough on this issue that he felt 
it was worth pushing the President on it. Bruce, who had already earned the trust and 
respect of the President, would be increasingly relied on by the President to deal with 
the Prime Minister's regular questions. 
Wilson was right to be concerned about the lack of talk of negotiations; the 
US government simply was not interested in discussions at this stage. McGeorge 
Bundy reflected the opinion of many of the President's advisers when he informed 
him in February of 1965 that: 
there is no way of negotiating ourselves out of Vietnam which offers 
any serious promise at present. It is possible that at some future time a 
neutral non-Communist force may emerge, perhaps under Buddhist 
leadership, but no such force currently exists, and any negotiated US 
withdrawal today would mean surrender on the instalment plan. 48 
45 Ibid 
46 Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy, "Wilson's Talk with Bruce Today", 17 February 1965, NSF, Memos to 
President, Vol. 8,1/1/65-2/28/65, LBJL 
47 Bruce diaries, 17 February 1965 
48 Memo, McGeorge Bundy to the President, "The Situation in Vietnam", Top Secret, NSC History - Troop Deployment 
in Berman. Planning a Tragedy, p. 44 
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Indeed, there were only two dissenting voices that questioned the efficacy of 
bombing raids - George Ball, Under Secretary of State and James Thomson. Vice- 
President Hubert Humphrey later joined them. Thomson recalls that at this stage in 
the war the decision-makers spent more time selecting bombing targets than on 
assessing possible areas for negotiations. 49 
On 17 February the President met with former President Eisenhower, 
Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, McGeorge Bundy and General Goodpaster 
to listen to Eisenhower's thinking on the situation in South Vietnam. Johnson asked 
Eisenhower to comment on the message being sent to David Bruce as a basis for his 
discussions with Wilson in which a major point was `we do not repeat not expect to 
touch upon readiness for talks or negotiations at this time'. Eisenhower argued that 
the US would be best to negotiate from strength rather than from weakness: 
negotiation from weakness is likely to lead only into deceit and 
vulnerability, which could be disastrous to us. On the other hand, if we 
can show a fine record of successes, or real and dramatic 
accomplishment, we would be in a good position to negotiate. 50 
Eisenhower commented that Wilson `had not had experience with this kind of 
problem. We, however, have learned that Munichs win nothing, therefore, his 
answer to the British would be `Not now boys. '51 This was, in effect, what Johnson 
had instructed Bruce to say. 
As well as forcing a parliamentary reaction, the US air strike on North 
Vietnam also prompted the Foreign Office into a flurry of debate and, as in the past, 
49 Berman, Planning a Tragedy, p. 44 
50 Memo of Meeting with President Johnson, General Eisenhower, Secretary McNamara, General Wheeler, McGeorge 
Bundy, General Goodpaster), 17 February 1965, FRUS 1964-68 Vol. Il, p. 298 
51 Ibid 
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American and British diplomats differed over their approach to the problem of 
Vietnam. The Head of the South East Asia Department, J. E. Cable, assessed the 
problem of `Seeking a Solution in Vietnam' in an internal minute. Summarising the 
American choice as being either `decision or drift', Cable felt that the British should 
favour a deliberate American policy of cutting their losses in Viet-Nam, 
because this offers the best chance of avoiding the dangers of 
escalation while mitigating the adverse repercussions on Western 
influence and prestige. The question then arises whether we can afford 
to let the U. S. Government reach this conclusion themselves or whether 
we ought to or can attempt to influence their choice. 
He concluded that `it is probably premature to attempt to answer this question now. 
We know that the US Government are acutely sensitive on this subject and that 
advice from us would be resented. 52 
Cable's paper then progressed through the hierarchy of the Foreign Office, 
starting with E. H. Peck, Head of the Far Eastern Department. Peck felt Britain had 
no option but to hear U. S. views in the hope they give us an opening to 
discuss, without rancour, an ultimate solution. Meanwhile we must 
support them in public, while getting down to a discussion of realities 
in private. 
The Permanent-Under-Secretary, Sir Harold Caccia, agreed with this summation. 53 
Lord Walston, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, felt Cable set `out 
admirably the unattractive choices facing the Americans' and added that he also 
agreed that despite the Americans' sensitivity on this subject: `they should be 
pressed, with the utmost tact, to face the realities of the situation, to make up their 
52 15 February 1965, F0371/180580, PRO 
53 E. H. Peck, 'Vietnam', 15 February 1965, F03711180580, PRO 
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minds, and to tell us what their choice is. The longer the choice is delayed, the 
harder it will be to make it objectively'. 54 
Michael Stewart toyed with the idea of sending Cable's thoughts to the 
Americans, via the British Ambassador. 
Apart from the intrinsic importance of coming to a speedy decision on 
this matter, our continued apparent inactivity is giving the Russians and 
Chinese the opportunity of spreading it about that H. M. G. is no more 
than a lackey of U. S. Government policy and can take no stand on its 
own without the approval of its dollar masters. 55 
In the event, Stewart asked Harlech to express his disappointment at American 
intentions in Vietnam to Rusk, stating `our aim is not to make any unnecessary 
difficulties for the U. S. Government. But the point has come where they really must 
try to enable their friends to continue to back them wholeheartedly in public'. 
Britain required 
some indication of American readiness to do something other than 
responsive military action. In brief, what were the circumstances in 
which they would be ready to talk. This need not at this stage commit 
them to any particular forum. 56 
Bruce, apparently sympathetic to British arguments, said he would also do what he 
could to see that due weight was given to them in Washington. 57 Wilson asked 
Bruce to let the Johnson administration know that he hoped `the British would be 
54 Lord Walston to Stewart, 17 February 1965, F0371/180580, PRO 
55 Ibid 
56 Telegram from Michael Stewart to Harlech, 18 February 1965, FO371/180589, PRO 
57 Note by J. M. Henderson to W. J. Adams, 18 February 1965, FO3711180580; Telegram from Stewart to Rusk, 18 
February 1965, 'Vietnam', F0371/180580, PRO 
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kept in a position to reply to critics that it had been fully informed in advance-he 
would prefer to say consulted-on proposed American tactics'. 58 
By the end of the week that started with the US air strikes on North Vietnam, 
Wilson, the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office had all arrived at the same 
conclusion: the best way forward for the British was to bide their time in the hope 
that an opportunity would arise when they would either be invited to give their 
advice, or could give it at a time when the Americans would be more open to it. The 
lesson to be drawn from Wilson's offer to fly to Washington was that LBJ could not 
be lobbied at times of crisis, particularly if the Prime Minister's motives were too 
political in nature. Johnson had received Wilson's approach as personal criticism, 
and the President had instantly gone on the defensive. Moreover, the lack of direct 
British involvement in Vietnam severely limited London's ability to contribute to the 
debate taking place in Washington over tactics. 
As well as deciding to play a waiting game with the Americans - hoping to 
find a way of quietly and gently persuading the Americans of the error of their ways 
in Vietnam - the Wilson government had decided to try to maintain some 
independence, and give the impression of activity, via a series of peace initiatives. 
Co-opting the Russians into action would be a good start. 
The Russians and the Geneva Conference 
While Washington deliberated over its reactions to the Pleiku and Qui Nhon 
attacks, the British began to pursue, more seriously, the possibility of revitalizing the 
58 Ibid 
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Co-Chairmanship of the Geneva Conference. George Thomson, Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, flew to Moscow on 12 February ostensibly to sign a new Anglo- 
Soviet cultural agreement. However, the British press rightly surmised that the 
Thomson visit would foster diplomatic exchanges over Vietnam, especially if 
negotiations were to develop 59 Up to this point the Soviets had been cool towards 
the prospect of using the Geneva conference to gain peace in Vietnam. However, by 
the time of Thomson's visit their attitude had changed. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, the 
British Ambassador in Moscow, felt that this was `the result of pressure on Mr. 
Kosygin from the North Viet Nam Government' and was probably as a result of the 
deteriorating situation in Vietnam. 60 The Soviets were certainly alarmed by the 
American bombing of North Vietnam and verbally condemned it, not least because 
Premier Kosygin had been in the country at the time. 
After tentatively courting the Soviets on the Geneva Conference through 
Thomson's visit, the British kept up the pressure through diplomatic exchanges at 
Embassy level. Lord Harlech was engaged in close consultation with Dean Rusk on 
this matter and reported back to the Foreign Office that although the Americans 
`were convinced that the time was not right for the US to take an initiative pointing 
in the direction of negotiation, ' there would be an advantage in getting the Russians 
to take some responsibility as Geneva Co-Chairs because `if they were prepared to 
play this role they would be acting more as mediators than advocates for one side in 
the quarrel'. 61 
59 The Times, 13 February 1965 
60 Cable from H. Treveleyan, Moscow to Foreign Office, No. 326,16 February 1965, PREM 13/692, PRO 
61 Cable from Harlech, Washington to Foreign Office, No. 401,18 February 1965, PREM 13/692, PRO 
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With domestic demands on the British to act on Vietnam, Harlech conveyed 
his wish that the activities of the Co-Chairmen be made public. Implicitly 
acknowledging Wilson's political difficulties, the Americans agreed to this request. 62 
Trevelyan met with Sergei G. Lapin, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister on 
20 February, and proposed that, as Geneva Co-Chairs, the United Kingdom and 
Soviet Union approach all members of the 1954 Geneva Conference and the 
Governments represented on the International Control Commission, requesting `a 
statement on their views of the situation on Vietnam, in particular, on the 
circumstances in which they consider that a peaceful conclusion could be reached'. 63 
There were problems with this peace gambit from the start. The Russians 
would have liked a stronger proposal -a conference - rather than the British proposal 
for consultation with other countries. They were also unimpressed by British 
requests that a public statement be issued announcing their approach to the Soviets. 
Lapin felt: 
We should discuss this question without publicity ... 
if you were to 
announce your initiative, even without revealing its precise nature, it 
would make the Soviet Government look passive, the Soviet 
Government would consequently be obliged to make an immediate 
public statement of its position. 64 
Another major obstacle in the way of progress with the Soviets was the 
possibility of further air strikes on North Vietnam, which would, according to the 
62 The British were told they could tell the Russians `xve are confident that the US would respond to a request for their 
views'. Cable from Lord Harlech to the Foreign Office, No. 401,18 February 1965, "South Vietnam", PREM 13,692, 
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British Ambassador in Moscow, `doom the British initiative with the Soviets'. 65 The 
British urged Washington to `hold off bombing until the Soviet Union had replied to 
the proposal. 66 
British initiatives were also hampered by the fact that they were still in the 
dark about American plans in South East Asia. As happened many times during the 
1950s and early 1960s, extreme concern was being expressed in London about the 
lack of clarity on the part of the American Government. It was noted at a meeting of 
the British cabinet on 18 February that 
before there could be any question of our trying to turn this 
development to our advantage in relation to a negotiated settlement 
of the dispute, the United States Government would have to indicate 
the type of negotiation which they would be prepared to undertake 
and the prior conditions which they might seek to impose before 
embarking upon it. 67 
The Administration was indeed `completely silent ... 
both publicly and privately. '68 
This was, as we now know, mainly because the Americans themselves had not yet 
developed their thoughts on negotiations. 
When Rusk argued that the Soviets might make the ending of US air strikes a 
precondition to playing a role as Co-Chairman, parallels were again drawn with the 
British position in Malaysia. In a now familiar refrain Rusk `assumed that the British 
would make sure that into the ensuing consideration there would also be the demand 
for North Vietnam to put an end to infiltration' just as the British in Malaysia `would 
65 Memo of Conversation, "Discussion with British Ambassador on Viet Nam" between Lord Harlech, Michael Stewart, 
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66 Washington to Foreign Office, 26 February 1965, PREM 13/692, PRO 
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envisage reaction against Indonesia in response to rather less provocation'. 69 The US 
did however temporarily postpone its retaliatory air strikes, during which time 
Stewart and Trevelyan pressed the Soviets for an answer to their proposal. 
Just three days later on 24 February the US informed London of its plan to 
restart air strikes (in response to the capture of a North Vietnamese freighter carrying 
arms and ammunition intended for the Vietcong) from 26 February. Harlech 
repeated to Ball, British `anxiety' that such action might `jeopardize the chances of a 
favourable response from the Russians' and emphasized that the British `had hoped 
that action could be held up at least until we had seen the Russian reply'. 7° David 
Bruce summarised the US attitude on the matter: `While we recognise their concern, 
and the possibility of some Soviet reaction, we cannot ever by implication get into a 
position of withholding a continuation of our air program. '7' 
It was clear to Harlech that the Americans would not accept a unilateral cease- 
fire and that at this stage the image of US military strength was more important than 
peace talks. 72 Partly because of adverse weather conditions and because South 
Vietnam was in the process of establishing a new Government under the leadership 
of General Quat, the US did not restart air strikes on North Vietnam until 2 March. 
British protests were, however, certainly part of the explanation for the delay in 
bombing as the US pondered the implications of increasing their military efforts 
despite calls for more negotiations. 
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Benjamin Read, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, later described 
attempts to reactivate the role of the Co-Chairmen as `more form and less hope ... it 
was something you went through periodically just because if you succeeded you'd be 
better off. But you put very little hope into the process'. 73 The US on this occasion 
did little to help the process along. 
Increasing Public Pressure on Wilson to Take Positive Action 
One of the factors fuelling the intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy with the 
Soviets and the Americans was the growing debate within the Labour Party, and the 
wider Labour movement, on Vietnam. The first half of 1965 sawn backbench pressure 
become increasingly vocal and active in condemnation of the Government. Wilson 
had said at the Labour Party Conference in Brighton on December 12,1964, `we 
now have a Government ready and able to take initiatives for peace'. 74 
Consequently, expectations had been raised that the Labour Government would 
intervene in Vietnam. Very quickly the left-wing of the Labour Party was criticising 
the Wilson Government for its apparent inactivity in this area. Labour's 
`independent' weekly newspaper, Tribune questioned the Prime Minister's emphasis 
on `strengthening the alliance' with America, saying `whatever that policy may 
involve, it surely does not imply the complete and abject sacrifice of our right to 
independent action and opinion. '75 
Centrists within the Parliamentary Labour Party were also beginning to stir 
and, given the Government's small working majority in the House, Wilson had to 
73 Transcript, Benjamin Read Oral History Interview, Tape 2, p. 16, LBJL 
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take the threat of a backbench revolt ever more seriously. On 17 February, a group 
of Labour MPs who had sent a letter to The Times calling for an `immediate British 
initiative to achieve a cease-fire and the reconvening of the Geneva Conference', met 
in private with American Embassy officials to discuss the situation in Vietnam. 
Amongst these were two senior members of the Labour Party, Philip Noel-Baker and 
John Hynd and a number of relatively new MPs, namely Dick Taverne, Shirley 
Williams, Bernard Floud, Colin Jackson, Peter Shore and David Ennals. This was by 
no means a left-wing group of MPs; indeed, the group made it clear that it did not 
wish to cause embarrassment to its own or to the American government `by 
associating themselves with the extreme anti-American and pro-DRV view of [the] 
Warbey faction in [the] Labor Party'. Nevertheless Embassy officials failed to 
convince it of the feasibility of American policy in Vietnam. The group remained 
sceptical over the prospect of a military solution in Vietnam and stressed the dangers 
of escalation. For the time being, however, it was willing to voice its objections to 
American and British policy without joining forces with the Labout Party's left- 
wing. 76 
One of these MPs, David Ennals, approached the Prime Minister for a second 
time, informally, via a personal letter. In the letter Ennals requested a meeting to 
discuss Vietnam because `unless something can be said to the contrary - publicly or 
privately - there will be trouble for the party. ' Ennals indicated that he was 
representing backbenchers who did not want `another left-wing initiative. '77 
In an attempt to appease these moderate MPs - and indeed the bulk of Labour 
Party - Wilson issued the following statement to the House on 23 February. 
76 Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 17 February 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 203, LBJL 
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It is our hope that Her Majesty's Government can play an effective part 
in helping to resolve the present problems and to arrive at a basis for a 
peaceful settlement. To this end, we have been actively engaged in 
diplomatic consultations of a confidential nature. These consultations 
are still going on, and I hope the House will understand that it would be 
unwise to prejudice the results of much patient and discreet diplomacy 
by any premature public announcement. As soon as it is possible to do 
so, I will inform the House of the progress we have made and of the 
further action which we consider could most fruitfully lead to an end of 
the fighting and an eventual settlement. 78 
This sort of announcement hinting at secret, behind-the-scenes diplomacy, was to be 
one of the key tactics used by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary in 
dispelling the notion of Government inactivity on Vietnam. It also implied a degree 
of intimacy with the Americans, which helped justify their public show of support for 
US policy in Vietnam. It was clear, however, that the Wilson Government would 
soon have to provide Parliament with more details of their `consultations'. 
At this stage, before the resumption of air strikes, hope remained that the 
Russians would give a positive reply to the British proposal. The British explained 
to the Americans that they were under increasing pressure to report their efforts to 
help in Vietnam `both vis-a-vis British public, Parliament and also with friendly 
countries and public figures who either have direct interests in [the] matter or have 
raised Viet Nam question with [the] British'. They therefore wanted to inform 
several other countries (India, Laos, Thailand and France) as well as the United 
Nations Secretary General and His Holiness the Pope about their approach to the 
Soviets and to make a further statement to the House on the same lines. 
78 Hansard, Vol. 707 (Feb. 22- March 5), Written Answer, 23 February 1957, p. 69 
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Rusk had no `serious problem' with the British informing the other countries 
as long as they were `carried out on [a] strictly confidential basis' but given Russian 
sensitivities, Rusk felt a public announcement, such as a statement to the House of 
Commons `would seem ... almost sure to 
kill any chances of Russians agreeing to 
proceed. ' It was hoped the British would therefore refrain from such action until all 
hopes of an affirmative reply from the Russians had gone. 79 Consequently, Harlech 
reported that the official reaction from Rusk and Ball was that the British 
approach to the Russians had been an extremely useful initiative which 
might eventually open up a way to a satisfactory solution of the Viet 
Nam problem. They would be very reluctant to see us give up the 
effort now and felt very strongly that the Russians should be given time 
to respond. 8° 
As the British felt they must give a further statement in the House, but hoped to 
avoid damaging the chances of a positive reply, they asked the Americans to `review' 
the Prime Minister's draft statement. 
Before the Labour leadership and the Americans had time to formulate their 
plans on a statement, there was another leak. News of the Co-Chairmen's initiative 
was noted in an Associated Press report from London on 23 February. Dean Rusk 
was `naturally concerned' at the leak, especially as the press report contained a direct 
quotation from Mr. Lapin's recent discussion with Mr. Trevelyan in Moscow. He 
was worried that this publicity might lead to an adverse response from the Soviets. 
The British again denied that the leak had taken place in London and tried to reassure 
the Secretary of State that the quotation from Lapin had come before Russian 
79 Department of State, Rusk to William Bundy, Telegram, 5 March, 1965, Declassified Document, Library of Congress 
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requests for secrecy and therefore should not affect the Russian response. 81 Rusk 
was nevertheless worried that Wilson's acknowledgement to the House that `we have 
been actively engaged in diplomatic consultations of a confidential nature' would be 
taken as confirmation of the soundings being taken by the Co-Chairmen. 82 Wilson 
pointed out that his written reply to a Parliamentary Question carefully avoided 
naming any specific Government. 83 
It is unlikely that the Labour Government's denial of responsibility for the 
leak did anything to comfort President Johnson, who was increasingly obsessed with 
secrecy and loyalty issues. He was particularly concerned that speculation about 
peace talks, especially ones that may well not amount to anything concrete, would 
raise public hopes. And, when the rumours on the peace front came to nothing, the 
Americans would be blamed. Or, even more worrying, Washington might be trapped 
into unreasonable terms by third parties misrepresenting US views. The revelation of 
the Co-Chair initiative therefore added to difficulties in the Anglo-American 
relationship. In public, the US tried to play down the talk of negotiations, especially 
after U Thant, Secretary-General of the UN, intimated at a press conference that the 
US was keeping the truth about potential peace talks secret. George Reedy denied 
that Johnson had any proposals before him. 84 This reaction confirmed opinion in the 
British government and the press that the US was annoyed by talk of peace moves. 
David Bruce admitted that although `public opinion in Great Britain is 
overwhelmingly in favour of negotiations, through reconvening the 1954 Geneva 
81 Cable from Lord Harlech to the Foreign Office, 23 February 1965, "Vietnam", PREM 13,692; Cable from Foreign 
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Conference, or otherwise. That does not suit our book, but the President is under 
great pressure at home to state US policy; it will only be credible abroad when 
presented by him'. 85 
Once the story was out, the British Government saw no need to deny its basic 
validity. On 1 March 1965, Michael Stewart added to the Prime Minister's statement 
of 23 February, and to press speculation, when he announced to the House that: 
as part of our confidential diplomatic discussions, we have been in 
touch with the Soviet Government. I am awaiting their comments on 
certain views which our Ambassador in Moscow communicated to 
them on 20th February. I would not want to prejudice the prospects by 
going into detail about these conversations. 86 
The following day saw the beginning of Operation Rolling Thunder - the sustained 
bombing of North Vietnam. It came as no surprise to the British, or the Americans, 
when the Russians finally came back on 18 March with a negative reply to the 
British suggestion that the Co-Chairs invite opinion from interested parties. 
Strains in the Personal Relationship 
Not surprisingly, given the clear evidence of transatlantic diplomatic activity, 
the press began to speculate on the relationship between Britain and America, and 
especially between President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson over Vietnam. The 
Times' American editor, Louis Heren argued in an article on 25 February that the 
Johnson administration was `in no mood to listen' to anyone on the issue of Vietnam, 
not even old allies like Britain: 
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The consequences are not only exasperated comments on the efforts of 
friendly governments to find a basis for negotiation but the virtual 
severance of relations with those countries as far as the crisis is 
concerned. President Johnson has never favoured personal exchanges 
with ambassadors, but recently the most distinguished have come away 
empty-handed from the State Department. Special relations are of little 
account; the exclusion is complete, and the British Embassy is not 
much better placed than the Burundi Embassy ... 
in spite of the general 
irritation here there are no objections to Britain consulting in Moscow 
as long as American intentions are not misunderstood. The lack of 
communication here, however, does not make this easy. 87 
Heren was right to point out that the `special relationship' did not necessary mean a 
preferential relationship. The Americans had long since stopped treating Britain to 
any special favours on South East Asia. In that sense, demands by Wilson's critics 
for stronger British action on Vietnam, failed to take account of the realities of 
Anglo-American relations in Asia. Wilson, representing the British, did not have, 
and could not have, as strong a profile in the White House or influence on the 
President as some thought. Indeed, many have questioned the extent to which 
anyone not directly involved in the conflict could have influenced the President on 
Vietnam. 
By the beginning of March stories of a rift between Lyndon Johnson and 
Harold Wilson were rife. Bruce cabled Washington explaining that there had been a 
`build up, on what appears to be a narrow base of fact, a public appearance of 
friction between the President and the PM over Viet-Nam'. The Guardian noted 
`signs of exasperation' in Washington against `being pushed too far and too fast by 
her friends' towards peace. 88 Explanations of Johnson's annoyance with Wilson's 
87 The Times, 25 February 1965, p. 10 
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peace moves varied. Godfrey Hodgson in the Observer felt that the President did 
`not take seriously Mr. Wilson's claim that he is engaged in "diplomatic 
consultations of a confidential nature" with the Russians to get negotiations going'. 89 
On 24 February the Telegraph's lead editorial argued that Wilson's `secret feelers 
towards negotiations have brought him only a snub from Washington'. Nevertheless 
the paper also noted that reports that `President Johnson had expressed through a 
spokesman his annoyance over Mr. Wilson's posing as "honest broker" in the Viet 
Nam situation have caused surprise in Whitehall. '90 
When Patrick Gordon Walker, former Foreign Secretary, visited the United 
States in early March and met with Dean Rusk he informed the Secretary of State 
that the British were alarmed by `stories in Washington that the President was upset 
by HMG's attempts to get some kind of talks going on South Vietnam' and did not 
believe the British government had done anything `without close and continuous 
contact with them'. Rusk, although apparently out of town at the time of the stories, 
assured Gordon Walker that such reports `had not been officially inspired' and that 
`Washington was in no way disturbed by our action'. 91 Despite this private 
reassurance, in order to preserve the image of a strong and united Anglo-American 
relationship, it was felt necessary for a State Department official to issue a denial of 
the stories of a rift. 92 
Despite Rusk's comforting words, there ivas discontent in the White House 
concerning the British. As indicated, Washington did not particularly welcome the 
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Co-Chair initiative, although once it was under way, took it seriously. Moreover, 
Johnson was becoming even more concerned that he was being used by the British 
Prime Minister for domestic purposes, particularly after the previous month's late 
night call from Wilson. The President obviously preferred not to see the Prime 
Minister, if at all possible. By the end of February, Jack Valenti, LBJ's close aide at 
the White House, informed him that, `Dean Rusk says there is no escape from seeing 
Prime Minister Wilson when he is here in April. '93 
Another sign of Johnson's growing exasperation with the British was the `mix 
up' over the announcement of Wilson's next visit to Washington (scheduled for 14- 
15 April) which was eventually made in Washington on 9 March. 94 Johnson 
prevaricated over the date of the visit as he was reluctant to meet the Prime Minister 
so soon lest it be perceived as an indicator that something was happening on the 
negotiation front. Wilson later commented to Bruce on the delay in announcing his 
visit: 
Surely, if the President wished ... the visit to be dissociated in the 
public mind from any discussions of the Viet Nam situation then the 
earlier the announcement was made the better. If the Prime Minister 
wished to mediate over Viet Nam he would not say that he was coming 
to do so in six weeks' time. The arguing about the announcement 
could have made both countries look very stupid ... 
9s 
Of course, the President's reluctance to set a date may also have been due to his 
growing disdain for Wilson's meddling on the peace front. It appears this either did 
not occur to Wilson or at least he did want to discuss this possibility with the 
93 Valenti to Johnson, 26 February 1965, GEN CO, Box 76, Folder - C0305 UK. 1/1/65-7/1/65, LBJL 
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American Ambassador. The Press, however, were quick to pick up on this latest 
incident. On 13 March the Daily Mail said that Johnson was: 
far from enthusiastic when he was first approached about a meeting 
with Mr. Harold Wilson .... He even suggested that he might delegate Secretary of State Mr Dean Rusk to confer with the PM. However, he 
has now accepted that such a move would constitute an inconceivable 
snub and the White House has announced that the President would be 
"very happy" to see Mr. Wilson.... Mr Johnson's initial frigid reaction 
was not so much directed against Mr. Wilson personally. It reflected 
his general reluctance to get involved in top level diplomatic 
negotiations in the midst of the Vietnam crisis. Above all he does not 
want to give the communists the impression that he is under pressure 
from America's allies to enter into negotiations. 96 
Clearly there was some unwillingness on Johnson's part to waste time dealing with 
the British. Michael Stewart was due to visit Washington towards the end of the 
month and although Rusk recommended that the President should see him, Johnson 
was reluctant. McGeorge Bundy reminded the President, via Jack Valenti, why in 
his view the President should see Stewart if only for a few minutes: 
Amongst other things, it seems pertinent to note that this is Stewart's 
first trip to the United States as Foreign Secretary; a bit of red-carpet 
treatment at the outset of our relationship with this important man 
might be worth some dividends to us later. 97 
Johnson eventually agreed to Stewart's visit but after Wilson's visit to 
Washington in April, Johnson postponed a number of state visits to the White House 
by international dignitaries, including President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Mr. 
Shastri, Indian Prime Minister, announcing that he would not be travelling abroad in 
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the foreseeable future because of Vietnam and his heavy legislative programme. 98 
The war was beginning to consume the President. 
Continuing Pressures on Wilson 
By the beginning of March the British government was becoming increasingly 
frustrated with the Soviet delay in replying to the proposal to approach interested 
powers regarding Vietnam. As Bruce noted in his diary on 6 March `the restiveness 
here, especially in the House of Commons, over the British Government not seeming 
to play a more active part in trying to induce negotiations over Vietnam, continues. '99 
The previous day, one of the chief left-wing critics of the Government, Mr. Frank 
Allaun, resigned as Principal Private Secretary to the Colonial Secretary, as he 
wished to have `the greater independence' of an ordinary MP. The Labour 
leadership were desperate to report a development on the negotiation front. 
Wilson's problems were also compounded in Cabinet on 4 March when a 
discussion on the public position of the Government regarding Vietnam elicited 
`some disquiet'. '°° Barbara Castle, Minister for Overseas Development, `once again' 
raised the problem of Vietnam, a subject that had by then `been discussed pretty 
often'. 101 Cabinet records show that by this time the fear was that as long as the 
Government `refrained from disclosing the initiative' recently taken, the more 
Parliamentary unease was likely to continue and grow. Fortunately for Wilson, he 
was easily able to control Cabinet unrest as many members of its members were still 
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finding their feet in government. For instance, Richard Crossman, Minister of 
Housing and Local Government, had not yet spoken on foreign affairs. 102 
Consequently, Wilson was well able to convince the Cabinet that behind the scenes 
he was working hard on the issue and that `the best course for the time being would 
be to maintain ... 
diplomatic pressure on the United States Government to agree to a 
conference of the Powers concerned'. 103 
Wilson knew that he would face sterner questions on Vietnam in the House of 
Commons on 9 March, and that he had to give some sort of reassurance, to his own 
Party in particular, that he was not passive on the negotiation front. He would issue 
the prepared statement on the subject that he had suggested the Americans vet before 
delivery. The level of influence the US had over the Wilson Government is apparent 
when one examines the ensuing debate over the statement's content. Bruce's diary 
entry of 7 March 1965 notes that `State and the British Embassy, Washington, have 
attempted to concert language for suggested use by the Prime Minister this week 
when the Vietnam situation is debated in the House of Commons. ' The original 
suggested text was: 
I can assure the House that we are by no means neglecting our 
responsibilities as co-chairman of the Geneva Conferences. We have 
been in touch with the other co-chairman and with the United States 
and other governments. We are continuing these diplomatic 
discussions with a view to achieving a peaceful solution. It would not 
be in the national interest to make a further statement at this time. t04 
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The text then saw a series of revisions. The day before Wilson faced questions in the 
House, Rusk responded to the latest revised draft statement, telling Michael Stewart 
of the British Embassy in Washington that `our first choice remained no statement at 
all by the Prime Minister' as he feared the Prime Minister's words `would be 
advertised as a call by the British for a ceasefire'. 105 Intent on making some mention 
of the British position regarding peace talks, Wilson began to lose patience with 
American interference in what was essentially a domestic affair. After making 
further revisions to his text, the Prime Minister made it clear that he would `be 
answering questions in the House of Commons .... 
in the revised terms suggested but 
should not invite the State Department to comment further'. 106 
Despite this response, just one hour before Wilson was scheduled to deliver 
his statement to Parliament, Rusk was still attempting to dictate the wording. The 
Secretary of State sent a telegram to Philip Kaiser, the US charge d'affaires in 
London to say that `we appreciate British government has a Parliamentary problem 
and recognize some statement will probably be required'. But 
any reference to `hostilities' should make a clear distinction between 
aggression from the North and US efforts to assist in meeting that 
aggression. We should not object if the Prime Minister would wish to 
remind the House that the United States had made it clear that 
American forces in Vietnam could come home if North Vietnam would 
leave its neighbours alone. '07 
He was particularly concerned that `Hanoi, Peiping and Moscow be encouraged by 
any indication of lack of solidarity between United States and United Kingdom' and 
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insisted that any statement be related to the UK's special role as Co-Chair of the two 
Geneva conferences. '08 
Furthermore, Rusk's increasing lack of patience with the British led him to 
tell Kaiser to inform Stewart `that if he has a political problem at home, so do we, but 
ours extends to South East Asia'. He also made threats, suggesting that until the 
British understood the American position on this issue, and therefore adopted their 
wording, he `would request that Michael Stewart's visit not be announced until we 
can arrange more propitious circumstances'. 109 Rusk explained that: 
if the Prime Minister makes a statement tomorrow which cuts across 
[the] very clear and simple statements of United States policy and, on 
the same day, announces Michael Stewart is coming to see me at my 
invitation, I shall be faced with great difficulty in countering the 
suspicion that vague and alarming moves are in the wind which would 
signal both to our allies in the Pacific and to [the] Houses of Parliament 
that we are on the run. I 10 
Although Bruce and others fully briefed Rusk on the extent of Wilson's domestic 
problems on Vietnam, on this occasion little sympathy was shown for his 
predicament. Wilson recalls in his memoirs that on arriving back from Europe on the 
afternoon of 9 March, the day of the debate: 
I had just five minutes before going to the chamber for my Question 
time, during which George Thomson, the Minister of State at the 
Foreign office, with strong Foreign Office pressure behind him, tried to 
get me to take a much more committed pro American line on bombing 
in Vietnam. I II 
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In the end Wilson did reluctantly bend to American will. He acknowledged to Bruce 
a few days later that `in response to last minute representations' from Rusk he `had 
changed the text of his reply. ' 112 His main statement in response to several 
questions on Vietnam therefore included the words `aggression by the North' and 
was as follows: 
.... what would stop the 
fighting would be a proper observance of the 
1954 Geneva Agreements, thus putting an end to the aggression by the 
North against South Vietnam. As the House knows, we have in our 
traditional role as Co-Chairman been engaged in diplomatic 
consultations of a confidential nature. It is the view of Her Majesty's 
Government that if there is genuine cessation of hostilities, then talks in 
some form should be started. But for the moment the form is of less 
account than the basis of the talks. Our main diplomatic efforts have 
been directed to seeing if the basis exists. As I have already told the 
House, we have been in touch with the Soviet Government, who were 
given our views on this problem on 20th February ... 
113 
Having given in to barely disguised American threats, Wilson was able to 
announce to the Commons the Foreign Secretary's visit to Washington on 22 and 23 
March, `when Vietnam will be among the subjects discussed ... Meanwhile, we will 
continue our diplomatic consultations with a view to achieving a peaceful solution 
which stands some chance of assuring a lasting genuine settlement. The House will 
not expect me to say more. " 14 
In domestic, political terms the most controversial answer from the Prime 
Minister came in response to a question by Mr. Konni Zilliacus, MP, when the extent 
of change in Wilson's attitude on Vietnam was revealed: 
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A year ago, the general supposition was that the fighting in South 
Vietnam was a spontaneous, so-called nationalist rising on the part of 
the Viet Cong people. But now there is no attempt at all to deny the 
responsibility ol'North Vietnam who have said that they are fighting a 
Nvar in South Vietnam. That makes a big dift rence, I think, in terms o(' 
our analysis of the problem. 115 
his answer was the last straw for many on the Labour left, who felt Wilson was nOvv 
completely subservient to the Americans. 
There is no doubt, however, that the whole episode further strained an already 
troubled Anglo-American relationship. This time it was the British Prime Minister 
who was annoyed. The Americans had intervened with a heavy hand in British 
domestic politics. Wilson struggled to maintain some independence on this sensitive 
issue and was, not surprisingly, annoyed at the American interlerence. In 
conversation with Bruce, the Prime Minister talked about the invidious position' he 
was in. The Ambassador acknowledged in his diary that it is unquestionable that, 
amongst other things, he resents US officials trying to dictate the terms ol'his 
remarks in the (House of Commons'. ' 16 Bruce himself found the incident an 
unpleasant reminder of Johnson's tendency to play the bully, and consequently 
undertook his duties in this connection reluctantly. Indeed Bruce told Rusk that he 
töund instructing a ftreign head of government what to say to his own parliament, 'a 
tasteless proceeding'. 117 Given LB. I's sensitivity over I Iarold Wilson's very tentative 
"advice" in his late night phonecall, it is, of course, enormously ironic that the 
President and his advisers wielded a sledgehammer to crack this particular nut. 
Although Wilson gave in to American demands, his statement did at least put further 
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pressure on the Americans to consider negotiations. The following evening. Manny 
Shine ell. chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party. along vv ith Arthur I Icndcrson. 
Philip Noel Baker. Mr. Hellenger. Michael Foot and Sydney Silverman, tabled a 
motion on Vietnam: 
That this I louse. noting the recent declaration made by the 
Secretary -General of the United Nations. U Thant. which is 
consistent with the views expressed by the Prime Minister, calls 
for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and a reference of 
the dispute in Vietnam to a contercnce ofinterested parties. ] 1S 
As The Times ' political correspondent noted. the motion had 'much more domestic 
and international significance than the surf ice of the Corm of,, vords suggests'. The 
reason tier its importance was that it had the Governments lull hacking and almost 
certainly was initiated by Mr. Wilson himself'. " t 1`' Wilson's Chiel" Whip in the 
Commons. Edward Short also thought Wilson was behind the motion believing the 
Prime Minister looked for some compensatory action, which he could take to 
neutralise the complaints, and hopefully the complainants. " 12 The Times assumed 
two main purposes behind Wilson's involvement in the motion: 
First, and most important, it is intended to remind President 
Johnson that the British Government have given America loyal 
support in their Vietnam actions but that there is anxiety in 
London that some attempt should be made now to achieve a 
cessation of hostilities. Secondly, the motion is intended to mark 
out ground on which virtually all members of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party can stand with Mr. Wilson at a time of delicacy and 
difficulty. From right to left, pro-American and anti-American, 
Labour M. P. s are expected to agree that U Thant's declaration 
calling for a cease-fire in Vietnam and a conference is the right 
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line for the Government they are keeping in office on a bare 
overall majority. '21 
With the benefit of the released diplomatic exchanges over the statement, a third 
purpose can be added. The Prime Minister was attempting to reassert his authority in 
the domestic affairs of his own country. 
Further Escalation of the War 
On 12 March rumours began to circulate in the press that President Johnson 
had decided to prosecute the war in Vietnam with all necessary means. The Prime 
Minister brought this up at a meeting with David Bruce the same day, insisting that 
even if the story in The Times Evas not correct, that US policy `had changed in nature 
as well as degree. ' 122 And while the British Government `had agreed to support any 
American response that was measured and specifically related to the provocation', 
this was no longer the case and `the United States Government had made the change 
without consulting their most loyal ally. ' He added that this `would place Her 
Majesty's Government in an intolerable position; if it were allowed to continue we 
should soon be hearing stories about satellites and the 51" state. ' 123 Wilson was 
alarmed at the adverse press he was beginning to receive in relation to Vietnam. He 
referred to the leading article of that week's New Statesman which carried the 
headline `Vietnam - What's Wilson Waiting For? ' The article noted the Prime 
Minister's apparent `somersault on Vietnam', calling his change from describing the 
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situation in South Vietnam as `a spontaneous so-called national rising' into an overt 
war of aggression by North Vietnam, `sheer impudence'. It argued Wilson `should 
stop worrying about incurring American wrath and should take on the role of "honest 
broker" much as Eden had at Geneva. ' The editorial further pointed out that when 
Wilson: 
referred vaguely to midnight telephone calls, to Mr Gromyko's 
visit to London and Mr Stewart's plan to go to Washington. 
This was not good enough. The understanding on which this 
journal (among others) gave qualified approval to the British 
government's general support for the American position in 
Vietnam, was that this was to be accompanied by a process of 
secret diplomacy, at the highest level, to bring about a 
conference of the powers involved. 124 
Not surprisingly Wilson informed Bruce, and thereby the Johnson 
administration, that Her Majesty's Government could abide by the originally planned 
posture of the US, `a stick in one hand and an olive branch in the other' but the lack 
of the latter was extremely dangerous to Anglo-American relations: `if things went 
on as they were, they could well lead to the biggest difficulty between Britain and the 
United States for many years, possibly since Suez'. 125 
Wilson's pleas to Bruce regarding the lack of appreciation in the US for his 
position may have had some effect. Later in the month, David Klein, a White House 
aide, voiced his feelings about relations with the British in a top secret, sensitive 
memorandum to McGeorge Bundy. He argued that the 
firmest public support from ay government on our policy in 
Vietnam has come from the British. This, despite the fact that 
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Vietnam is a difficult issue for any British Government, and 
especially a Labor Government.... I think I understand the 
reasons for some of the pique with the P. M. here. But I honestly 
doubt that this in itself is sufficient justification for the way we 
are handling the P. M. 
In a handwritten note on the memo, Bundy said he agreed with this and had `made 
this point with some effect for the time being'. 126 
Meanwhile the Foreign Office was still perplexed by rumours that 
Washington was annoyed with British attempts to foster peace talks. 
Her Majesty's Government have kept in close touch with the 
US Government in London and Washington as far as 
immediate policy is concerned, and have at no stage opposed 
the policy being followed by the United States, but rather by 
suggesting minor changes in timing or presentation from time 
to time, have acquiesced in it. 127 
Even Bruce recognised that Wilson's support of American policy was a `blank check 
endorsement' and explained to the President the difficulties the Prime Minister was 
having because of this. 128 
The press again picked up on the tension between the United States and its 
allies, including Great Britain, from comments made by George Ball, Under- 
Secretary of State, during a State Department conference on March 16. According to 
The Times' Washington Correspondent, Ball criticised those allies who had urged the 
United States to negotiate a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The trouble with most 
Western European nations, he said, was that they had little experience in exercising 
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far-flung responsibility except when defending empires. Now those had gone, they 
should develop a whole new set of attitudes. 
To play a useful and effective role on the world stage it is not 
enough for a nation simply to offer advice on all aspects of 
world affairs. It should be prepared to back that advice with 
resources .... When national positions are vigorously promoted 
without regard to their effect on the responsible common efforts 
of other states, free world interests may well be injured ... 
The Times concluded that the sum of the speech was that European nations had no 
right to be concerned about the prospect of American bombings provoking Chinese 
intervention and another global conflict. This was another example of what it called 
the super-power complex: `While Western Europe remains a sub-tribal group of 
pygmies it must do as it is told or be quiet, and apparently only super-powers have a 
right to be heard. ' 129 
If it was hoped that the rumblings of discontent between the US and its closest 
ally would abate with the British Foreign Secretary's visit to Washington, events 
would later dash these hopes. 
Visit of Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart to Washington, 21-24 March 1965 
During the preparations for Stewart's formal visit to Washington in March 
and Wilson's informal visit in April, both Washington and London recognised that 
Vietnam would dominate these meetings. Some sort of `understanding' had to be 
reached between the two governments as neither felt its position was fully 
comprehended by the other and the issue was threatening to cause a serious rift in the 
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Anglo-American relationship. The South East Asia Department of the Foreign 
Office felt that Stewart should pursue with Mr. Rusk the fundamental question of 
`whether American military policy in Vietnam is aimed at inducing the North- 
Vietnamese to negotiate or to capitulate'. 130 
By the middle of March the Johnson administration had come to the 
conclusion that it would not actively seek formal negotiations on Vietnam until it 
was in a stronger military position from which to deal. As far as Washington was 
concerned, the introduction of large numbers of ground troops would provide this 
necessary strength. In the meantime, it would appear to be seeking peace, by 
stressing that the North Vietnamese had only to leave South Vietnam alone for there 
to be a solution. In the meantime, it could keep `quiet channels' via the UK and 
other third parties `open for hopeful signs'. 131 The White House was confident that 
it could call on the Geneva Conference as and when it wanted to. But, because Rusk 
in particular wanted `to keep the British just happy enough to hold them aboard', the 
Johnson administration would encourage the British to pursue their fellow co-Chair 
on Vietnam. 132 The White House considered this position shortly before Stewart's 
planned talks on 23 March with Johnson and Rusk, mainly because it was apparent 
that `only one serious question' was likely to arise, `the political problem of the 
Wilson Government in holding to its present support for us in Vietnam'. 133 
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McGeorge Bundy informed the President that the British position was `not tenable 
without some slight help from us' and suggested two possible options: 
one course might be to let the ... Labor Party struggle with 
its own political problems, on the ground that Wilson's 
troubles are of his own making, not ours. The difficulty with 
this course is that since Wilson prefers his own survival 
to solidarity with us, he would be mortally tempted to begin 
to make critical noises about us, thus appealing both to his 
own party and to the natural nationalism of many independent 
Englishmen. 134 
The other alternative was to work out what was the `least' Washington could offer 
`in return for continued solidarity in support of the essentials of our policy in 
Vietnam'. 135 According to Bruce this could be as little as joining the British `in 
saying publicly that there is a full and continuous exchange of views and of 
information at all levels between our two Governments on this important issue'. 
Additionally, the White House could `put on some parsley' about how glad they were 
to receive Stewart and how much they were looking forward to the Prime Minister's 
visit. 
In return, the British should undertake not to advocate 
negotiations and not to go back on their existing announced 
approval of our present course of action. They should limit 
themselves to expressions of hope that a path to a peaceful 
settlement will come, plus expressions of alertness, as 
Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, to any opportunities 
... which may 
develop in the future. 136 
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The contempt for Wilson and his problems is apparent in this document. However, 
there is also an implied recognition that the US did not really want to risk losing 
British support on Vietnam and that it was therefore willing to make at least some 
effort to help Wilson with his domestic problems if the British did not publicly 
pressurise them on the negotiation front. 
Stewart's visit to Washington was to take on further significance as his arrival 
coincided with two important developments in Vietnam. On 22 March the US 
Defense Department announced that in addition to the use of napalm bombs it was 
also using a type of gas in Vietnam. On the same day, Maxwell Taylor, US 
Ambassador in South Vietnam, made a statement admitting `no limit existed to the 
potential escalation' of the war. 137 The threat of a ground war in Vietnam, with the 
attendant risks of Chinese intervention, and the use of nuclear weapons, suddenly 
looked within the American purview. Not surprisingly, and justifiably, alarm bells 
rang in the House of Commons. Immediately, six senior members of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, led by the Chairman of the Party's Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Philip Noel-Baker, sent a telegram to Stewart in Washington urging him 
to express British `horror and indignation' at the latest events. 138 A protest 
resolution was also put on the Order Paper of the House of Commons. Michael Foot 
MP wrote later that week that `the blaze of anger about ... Vietnam which swept 
through the Parliamentary Labour Party this week was hotter than anything felt there 
for a long time'. 139 
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If Wilson's memoirs are to be believed, the Prime Minister was also 
personally shaken by these events. His response to them seems to confirm this 
recollection. When Stewart arrived in Washington a telegram was awaiting him 
warning him to make no public statement until the following day. In the meantime 
Wilson grappled with the wording of two emergency telegrams on `the issue itself 
and its handling' and `on the domestic political aspects'. Wilson spent the evening 
dictating and repeatedly strengthening their terms. He eventually suggested Stewart 
raise two further issues, in addition to questioning the use of gas and Taylor's 
inflammatory remarks. First, he should mention the press suggestion that instead of 
the planned bombing missions - which had themselves escalated far beyond 
measured tit-for-tat raids - American pilots would soon be permitted to range freely, 
selecting their own targets. Second, he should assert that the British had it from an 
authoritative source that US military authorities in Saigon had a plan for the next 
month involving continuing escalation. 140 
Wilson told Stewart that Rusk `should be left in no doubt about the strength of 
feeling here and about the difficulties which we are facing. There is a danger of 
widespread anti-Americanism and of America losing her moral position. ' 14' As the 
British press were quick to note, this latest action placed `the propaganda battle on a 
plate to the Communists. ' Wilson was therefore furious that `Her Majesty's 
Government were given no, repeat no, warning that these actions were 
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contemplated. ' 142 The attacks on Wilson were beginning to worry the Prime 
Minister: 
It is becoming harder and harder for us, if the facts seem 
to support the jibe I have already had to put up with that 
Her Majesty's Government is the tail-end Charlie in an 
American bomber and I hope that more thought will be 
given to the wider aspects of these questions. 143 
Wilson assumed that Stewart would reply appropriately if President Johnson tried to 
link this question with support for the pound. The Prime Minister felt it would be 
`most unfortunate' if Britain's `financial weakness ... be used as a means of forcing 
us to accept unpalatable policies or developments regardless of our thoughts'. It 
would raise `very wide questions indeed about Anglo-American relationships'. 144 
Despite this unease at this latest crisis, Wilson told Stewart that Britain would `not 
depart from the general Viet Nam line which we have taken. ' 145 
According to Wilson, Stewart spoke to Rusk and Johnson `in the strongest 
terms'. 146 The British record of the conversation between the British Foreign 
Secretary and the US Secretary of State on the morning of 23 March adds weight to 
this assertion. Indeed, Stewart repeated much of what Wilson dictated in his 
telegrams. When Rusk opened his talks with Stewart by saying the important 
question was what useful diplomatic step could be made next, the Foreign Secretary 
refused to be side-stepped and interrupted him saying there was an `immediate' 
question which he must raise - the strong feelings felt in the UK and elsewhere about 
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the use of gas and the Prime Minister's intention to inform the House of Commons, 
if asked, that he had not been consulted about it. In reply, Rusk played the innocent, 
saying he could only tell the British Government what they themselves knew: that 
the US Government had not known about this particular use of gas and his belief was 
that it was the kind used for riot control purposes. He acknowledged, however, that 
the matter had been badly handled but `expressed regrets' that Mr. Noel-Baker had 
acted `so impetuously in sending his protest before the full facts were known. If the 
United States Government had operated in that way they would have landed 
themselves in a dozen world wars by this time. ' 147 
The Americans did not understand fully British concerns over the use of gas - 
Bundy called it a `stupid fuss'. 148 Indeed Rusk later pointed out to Stewart that it 
was non-lethal gas and had been used by the British during civil disturbances. ] 49 
Wilson and Stewart were concerned about gas and napalm bombs inflicting `undue 
suffering' and were in any case of `limited military use'. 150 And as Rusk 
acknowledged, the revelation of its use was a public relations disaster. 
On General Maxwell Taylor's comments about there being no limits to the 
escalation of the war in Vietnam, Rusk confirmed the US was unwilling to impose 
limits on its own action but repeated that escalation depended on what the other side 
did. However, he reassured Stewart that at present there were no plans to bomb the 
Hanoi area and Her Majesty's Government would be informed in advance if the 
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United States were thinking of bombing there or making any major changes in 
United States policy. '5' 
Stewart was scheduled to meet the President the same afternoon. However, 
on his return from Texas, Johnson postponed his meeting with the British Foreign 
Secretary until the next day. This meant that Stewart would meet with the President 
just half an hour before facing, as Bruce put it, the ordeal of a lunch and speech at 
the National Press Club. The Ambassador met with Bundy to try to resolve this 
`ticklish matter'. Bruce thought Johnson's reluctance to meet with Stewart was 
related to the fact that the President 
has an antipathy for the Prime Minister. He regards attempts 
on the part of the British to insinuate themselves into Vietnamese 
affairs as irrelevant and unimportant. He believes Wilson, for 
his own domestic political purposes, wishes to capitalize on a 
supposed close relationship with Johnson that is non-existent. 152 
Bruce and Bundy saw `eye to eye' on the situation, feeling that Wilson needed to at 
least be able to portray to his associates and the House of Commons, `the appearance 
of an intimacy and a mutual confidence that, in the President's view, is not a reality'. 
To Bruce there was `no room ... 
for lack of conventional courtesies between chiefs of 
allied states. ' 153 The same day, Rusk also pressed LBJ in a similar vein, this time 
recommending a lunchtime meeting between the President and the Prime Minister 
during the latter's forthcoming trip to Washington: 
We have an excellent degree of understanding and cooperation 
in crucial foreign policy matters from the new Labor 
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Government in Britain. Anything we can do to maintain this 
state of affairs is in our best interests. 154 
An approach to the President was `concocted' that would `preserve at least an 
outward harmony' in his meeting with Stewart. LBJ met with Stewart alone at 11.30 
am for about fifteen minutes, at which point the diplomatic entourage of advisers, 
press officers and diplomats joined them. As both the President and the Foreign 
Secretary had strict engagement schedules, both were constantly reminded by their 
aides of time limitations. Nevertheless, according to Bruce, the President was in 
`talkative form'. 
It was great theatre, he fed us oratorical sandwiches, with 
layers of gravity and levity. At one time, after he had 
enumerated the variety of criticisms to which he was daily 
subjected over Vietnam, he remarked `sometimes I just get all 
hunkered up like a jackass in a hailstorm'. 
Despite Johnson's garrulity, according to Bruce, Stewart `kept reverting to the uproar 
in Britain over the use of non-lethal gas by the South Vietnamese air force'. This 
`attack' was easily handled by the President, who gave a rendition of Rusk's 
arguments about the gas being stocked and used by many countries for quelling riots. 
Johnson discoursed for more than an hour, `explaining his objectives, hopes and 
fears', including the fierce domestic pressures on him. According to Bruce, the 
President was `power sublimated, like Niagara Falls ... I think he impressed his 
audience by his grasp of the issues involved, and his own mastery over decisions, but 
must have puzzled the British by the alternation of his manner'. After photographs, 
Bruce records that Stewart `was released, after ninety minutes of an experience he is 
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never likely to forget'. After the Foreign Secretary had left, LBJ said Stewart `had 
not offered a single practical or helpful suggestion, nor had General deGaulle, or any 
other foreigner'. 155 
Notwithstanding the President's best efforts, after leaving the White House, 
Stewart went directly to the National Press Club where he criticised the American 
use of gas in Vietnam. And, although Stewart had informed the President that he 
would repeat his concerns publicly, it was soon reported that Johnson was `furious' 
with Stewart and that his reaction had been `sulphurous'. 156 Apparently the 
President considered sending a rebuke to Wilson but decided against it; something 
Bruce was glad of as he considered it `undignified and unnecessary' to do so. '57 
Overall, Wilson was delighted with Stewart's handling of the gas affair, 
characterising it as `the bluntest straight-talking Britain had indulged in in Anglo-US 
relations since the war. ' He believed it not only `von the approval of Labour MPs' 
but also made a real impact on the President. '58 
Ultimately, the gas episode demonstrated to Washington that the Labour 
Government was beginning to place limits on its diplomatic support of America's 
Vietnam policy. Wilson and Stewart were beginning to discriminate between the 
means and the ends. In an attempt to balance their need to be a loyal ally to the 
Americans with the need to placate the left-wing of the Labour Party, the British 
would support the US aims in Vietnam, but reserve the right to object to their 
methods of achieving success there. 
155 Bruce diaries, 23 March 1965 
156 Daily Mail, 23 March 1965 in Telegram from Kaiser to Rusk, "Vietnam: British Press", 23 March 1965, NSF, 
Country File, UK, Box 207, File: UK, Vol. III, Cables, 2/65-4/65, LBJL 
157 Bruce diaries, January-March 1965 in Editorial Notes, FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. 11, p. 481 
158 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 123 
157 
The New Approach - Going it Alone as Geneva Co-Chair 
When the Russians replied negatively to the British proposal to consult with 
other Geneva powers on Vietnam, London and Washington began to consider the 
possibility of a new kind of initiative. Due to their domestic, political difficulties, 
Wilson and Stewart knew they would have to be seen to be pushing hard on the 
negotiation front, especially given the intensification of the conflict. Consequently, 
by the time of Stewart's visit to Washington the British knew they would have to 
undertake a unilateral approach for peace. They proposed to ask the Geneva powers 
and members of the International Control Commission (ICC) to express their views 
on what they saw as the basis for negotiations. The White House was alarmed at the 
prospect of the British driving the search for negotiations. 
Consequently when Rusk discussed diplomatic initiatives with Stewart on 23 
March he tried to stall the British government's next move. He told the Foreign 
Secretary that he was aware many people `were willing to be a mid-wife to a 
conference' but said he had no objections to contacts being made to assess the 
possibilities. However, he thought the US might address its own message to the 
Geneva Co-Chairs and the members of the International Control Commission 
containing an `extensive, reasoned and dispassionate account of South Viet-Nam, 
Laos and perhaps Cambodia. ' 159 This would obviously be a more limited initiative. 
When Stewart pressed for further details on what such a statement might contain, 
Rusk said it would refer to the need to respect the 1954 and 1962 agreements. 
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It would deal «ith the activities of the North Vietnamese in 
crossing the frontier into South Viet-Nam ... would express 
regret that there \\ as no indication from the other side that 
they were yet ready to stop these incursions. But ... would 
not spell out ... pre-conditions 
for a conference because to 
do so would make everybody muscle-hound. ' ° 
StexN art thought it ' unf örtunate' if the L IS message made no reference to the 
possibility of holding a conference, at which point Rusk repeated his belief that he 
did not want a conference: at any cost. Ile asked the British to postpone their own 
planned unilateral approach to the parties concerned until they had received a draft of 
the US' proposed message. Pointedly. Rusk repeated that he was 'happy that I ter 
Majesty's Government should continue as Co-Chairmen but ... 
did not want to see 
them playing the role of'referee. " 1 to other words. the Secretary of' State vv as 
reminding London that as an ally, it could not be an impartial judge on Vietnam. 
One NN-eek later the U. S. administration had still not produced any statement of 
policy on Vietnam. and the Foreign Office began planning British unilateral action 
on the lines of the earlier proposal to the Russians. Rather than trying to establish the 
basis on which negotiations might begin. they would merely seek the views of the 
Geneva powers. The Americans had in the intervening days thought more closely 
about how best to appear interested in peace as well as war. 'T'hey eventually settled 
on a Presidential statement. 
On 25 March. President Johnson delivered a speech on the war. In addition to 
the usual line on North Vietnamese aggression, he included two important points. 
Firstly. he declared that the US sought no wider war', and secondly that he was 
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`ready to go anywhere at any time, and meet with anyone wherever there is promise 
of progress toward an honourable peace. ' 162 This speech eased the pressure a little 
on the Wilson government, and the US government intimated that a further high- 
level statement was on its way. And, as it had been decided to send Patrick Gordon 
Walker on a fact-finding mission on Vietnam, for the time being London no longer 
felt it necessary or desirable to continue with their plans for unilateral action. 
Johnson's speech of 25 March provided the Government with useful ammunition, as 
The Times put it: 
the most obvious and likely advantage to the British 
Government is that, until Mr. Gordon Walker can report 
his impressions - during, that is, the next three or four 
weeks at least - criticism from the left-wing of the Labour 
Party will to some extent be disarmed. 163 
Intraparty difficulties were also eased when the US Embassy in Saigon was bombed, 
resulting in 13 fatalities and 183 injuries. 164 According to the Americans, this 
incident was `extensively and sensationally reported in the British press' and made a 
`profound impression' in the United Kingdom that `largely erased emotional reaction 
to US use of non-lethal gas'. After a debate on Vietnam in the House on 30 March, 
Philip Kaiser at the US Embassy in London was able to report to the Secretary of 
State that there was strong bi-partisan support for US policy in Vietnam and that 
although the hard-core left wing strongly attacked government policy `along familiar 
lines', the Labour backbenches `were not crowded and left-wingers made no attempt 
to dramatize their opposition'. The atmosphere in the Commons was described as 
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`quiet except for [the] ejection of two protesting youths from [the] public gallery at 
the debate's end. '165 He concluded by commenting that the Labour left-wing had 
been `temporarily driven underground' and that the Prime Minister impressed as the 
`undisputed master in his own house'. 166 
Wilson believed the British government's pressure on the United States for 
public statement of its position regarding its hopes for peace was instrumental in 
forcing the Johnson administration's hand. 167 And, clearly part of the reason for the 
President's statement was the fear in the White House and State Department that the 
British might start a momentum for peace that they were not ready for, or the Labour 
government might give away military information as a result of its initiatives. 
The First Peace Gimmick? - Patrick Gordon-Walker's Tour of South East Asia 
When the British government proposed that the former Foreign Secretary, 
Patrick Gordon Walker, should visit South East Asia on a fact-finding mission, 
Washington felt that it should neither approve nor disapprove this action. This was 
because, as William Bundy put it: 
for us specifically to approve would indicate to many that he 
might be going on our behalf and that we were pressing for 
negotiations without any sign that the other side is interested 
in a peaceful settlement. On the other hand, we would not 
wish to disapprove an effort by our ally who carried on 
the trip we would expect to say that we were informed and 
that we understand the visit is connected with Britain's 
responsibilities as a Co-Chairman, as discussed by the Prime 
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Minister in the House of Commons. 168 
The Americans did not attach much importance to the Gordon Walker visit, except in 
that it would help defuse the anger within the House of Commons. 169 
Gordon Walker planned to visit the South East Asian capitals of Saigon, 
Phnom Penh, Toyko, Delhi, Vientiane, Rangoon, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Hanoi 
and Peking from mid April until early May. 170 At this point, it was hoped that the 
former Foreign Secretary would be able to establish whether a basis for a peace 
settlement existed. '7' 
A Conference on Cambodia 
After the furore over the use the gas, and recognising the world-wide 
suspicion that the US was not pursuing peace to the extent it was intensifying the 
conflict, the US administration began to go on propaganda offensive. On 7 April 
Johnson made another major statement on Vietnam that put the US into the role of 
potential peacemaker. The Baltimore speech, as it became known, was according to 
Johnson influenced by an outside development. On 1 April, the leaders of 17 non- 
aligned nations appealed to the US, North and South Vietnam, the Secretary General 
of the United Nations, and other interested parties and governments, to start 
negotiations `as soon as possible, without posing any preconditions'. 172 The next day 
at a pre-arranged National Security Council meeting, Johnson and Rusk discussed the 
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proposal and decided the US reply should be `serious, restrained, and positive'. ' 73 
Johnson decided to give the main elements of his reply during a speech at Johns 
Hopkins University. The broadcast went out live at 9 p. m. and contained two 
important passages - one regarding peace negotiations; the other regarding future 
economic aid to Vietnam. Johnson listed the essential elements of a just peace: an 
independent South Vietnam that was `securely guaranteed and able to shape its own 
relationships to all others - free from outside interference - tied to no alliance -a 
military base for no other country'. And most crucially, Johnson said that the US 
remained ready for `unconditional discussions'. He then went on to propose a billion 
dollar American investment in South East Asia once peace had come to the region. 174 
Johnson's speech was welcomed by the British. In public, Wilson described it 
as a `statesmanlike and imaginative approach to the serious situation in Vietnam'. 175 
In private, it was praised for placing `equal emphasis on the stick and the carrot' and 
for introducing `a new and more hopeful element in the situation'. 176 In some ways, 
the Baltimore statement temporarily eased Wilson's position in the House of 
Commons as he could now quote the US's readiness for talks. However, although 
the majority of backbenchers regarded the President's offer of `unconditional 
discussions' as conciliatory, and a major breakthrough in the search for peace in 
Vietnam, they also took some credit for the `change' in Washington policy. This 
belief in the success of their sustained pressure through parliamentary motions, 
meant that they felt the Prime Minister should now `maintain and intensify British 
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efforts' to persuade all those involved in Vietnam to achieve a ceasefire and begin 
talks. »? So, in some ways, Johnson's speech made Wilson's domestic problems 
even more acute by creating an air of unjustified expectations about the British 
potential to influence US policy. 178 
Sir Patrick Dean judged the purpose of the speech to be `primarily to 
strengthen the position of the United States vis a vis their allies and the non-aligned 
nations and to put the onus for continuation of the fighting in South Viet Nam on the 
Communists'. He also advised against `putting forward a large list of alternative 
steps' too soon as the Americans would want time to `test the response of the other 
side and to assess reaction world-wide'. He suggested that the best way of `leading 
the Administration and in particular the President to consider seriously the 
possibilities' the British had in mind `would be for the Prime Minister himself to 
initiate the discussion when he sees the President on 15 April'. 179 
London was, however, quick to see this latest development in Washington as 
an opportunity to follow-up on a seemingly genuine proposal made by the Soviet 
Government on 3 April. The Russians had asked Britain to agree to a message being 
sent by them, as Co-Chairs, inviting the members of the 1954 Geneva Conference to 
take part in a new one on Cambodia. The Chinese had agreed to take part. The 
British were willing to consider this, especially if it might prove an indirect route to 
discussing Vietnam. The trick was to persuade the Americans of the desirability of 
this approach. 
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Wilson's Visit to Washington, April 14-15 1965 
During the week between Johnson's Baltimore speech and Wilson's visit to 
the US, preparations were being made on both sides of the Atlantic for the ostensibly 
informal, yet very important meeting. Wilson's two-day visit to New York and 
Washington, postponed from February, was intended to be a follow-up to Wilson's 
discussions with the President in December. The two main items on the agenda - 
both publicly and privately - were the British economic position and Vietnam. 
Wilson records that by the time of his visit to Washington, `President Johnson, in the 
course of now affable exchanges, appeared ... most ready to discuss the Vietnam 
situation with me. ' 
Once the President had helped assuage world opinion via the Johns Hopkins 
speech, and with future escalation in mind, the Johnson administration began to think 
in terms of a quid pro quo. On 9 April Sir Patrick Dean warned London that it was 
evident from recent conversations with senior officials in the White House and State 
Department that, `the President is still very anxious to see a greater participation on 
the ground in South Viet Nam from America's Allies, including ourselves'. The 
arrival of South Korean troops in South Vietnam had been the most recent `more 
flags' development. '8' Australian troops would also be despatched very shortly. 
Contacts suggested that the Americans envisioned a number of British options from 
the `provision of ... military advisers or transport pilots, to a medical team or an 
expert British team to help in the handling of the growing refugee problem, or again 
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more police advisers'. 182 Despite his own protestations about British commitments 
in Malaysia and the difficulties of recruitment, the British Ambassador thought it 
`very possible' that either the President or the Secretary of State would bring the 
subject up `again' during the Prime Minister's visit the next week, believing `a 
practical demonstration of further help from us however limited would be valuable'. 
183 Dean thought 
a willingness to consider additional help might pay quite 
disproportionate dividends in terms of our ability to influence 
United States policies, and I hope that the Prime Minister 
would be willing to say that he is at least prepared to see 
what more we can do. 184 
Pressure on Wilson to consider increasing the British contribution in Vietnam 
also came from diplomats in Saigon. Gordon Etherington-Smith, the British 
Ambassador in South Vietnam, advised the Foreign Office on 12 April that `a limited 
increase in our aid is desirable if we are to retain influence in this theatre with 
Americans as well as Vietnamese'. 185 His reasoning was that other countries had 
recently increased their contributions while the British effort had appeared to have 
diminished. The British Advisory Mission in Vietnam had run into difficulties as its 
advice to the Americans was no longer taken seriously. 
Etherington-Smith evaluated the various possible ways Britain could help. He 
was `doubtful' about the wisdom of volunteering to help the Vietnamese refugee 
problem as this was a risky project: `It is quite possible that the refugee situation 
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may present a major problem in the months to come and if we tried to help the 
Vietnamese we might well be blamed if things went wrong'. '86 He also considered a 
material contribution to be `costly, and, having regard to the immense American 
effort, would soon be forgotten. ' Therefore, the `only form of help ... worth 
considering would be to send an expert or small qualified team here for a short time 
to advise the Vietnamese Government on handling the problem. ' It would be 
essential that any such advisers be assured of full American support and local 
cooperation, something that had been lacking with the British Advisory Mission. 
I still believe that the field in which we can not only help 
most effectively but earn most American appreciation is that 
of police training. A substantial increase in [the] present 
BRIAM team would not only be valued by [the] Americans 
here but would also be a direct contribution to the development 
of an effective participation programme and hence to defeat of 
the Communists [sic] threat. 187 
The Foreign Office were right to be worried about London's credibility with 
the White House, especially the Prime Minister's. The Secretary of State was 
defending the British record to the President saying that the British Government's 
support for US policy in Vietnam had been `stronger than that of our other major 
allies' and had been `skillfully conducted and stoutly maintained by the Prime 
Minister'. Rusk also advised the President that his Johns Hopkins speech and Patrick 
Gordon Walker's mission had helped relieve the pressure on the Prime Minister. 
The President's face-to-face meeting with Wilson would have the same result-188 
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Rusk therefore felt that during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington the President 
should indicate appreciation for his support on Vietnam. 
London was also increasingly aware of Johnson's touchiness on Vietnam 
generally. An insight into the President's mood at this time, and his feeling towards 
Britain and Vietnam, was gained during the presentation of the credentials of Sir 
Patrick Dean, the new British Ambassador to the United States on 13 April. 189 This 
ceremony at the White House took place just two days before the Prime Minister was 
due in Washington, and was described by Dean as `very interesting and to some 
extent embarrassing'. Dean recorded that after a few preliminary remarks to the 
Chilean and Danish Ambassadors, who were also being appointed that day, the 
President `plunged straight into a discussion with me about British affairs and 
policy'. He spoke of the strong feelings in Congress and in the United States that 
America's friends should give them more support in Vietnam. In particular, he 
strongly criticised the attitude of the Labour back bench in 
Parliament and said that although he was at all times ready to 
listen to what his allies had to say, he would not be deterred 
by purely negative opinion. 190 
In what appears to have been a typical Johnson ranting session, according to Dean, 
the President protested that he was, 
not a murderer, nor did he seek to wage war. The bombing by 
American aircraft had been carried out against strictly military targets - 
against steel and concrete as he put it - not even against military 
factors, still less towns. No women or children had been killed and the 
sole purpose was to prevent the supply of arms to those who were 
attacking South Viet-Nam. These bombing attacks against only strictly 
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defined military objectives contrasted strongly with the bombing 
attacks carried out on the ground against people sleeping in barracks 
and still more against Embassies. In these and other Communist 
bombing attacks innocent women and children had been killed, but no 
one seemed to mind that. All the complaints were against the 
American military bombing only. 191 
The President could not resist making a barbed attack on the British 
government regarding recent complaints about the American use of gas, which `was 
not poisonous gas anyway and which the British had used just as frequently. In any 
case, the British were forced to kill quite a few Indonesian infiltrators every day and 
he made no complaint. He said that his friends and allies should certainly state their 
views, but they should not stab him in the back or slap him in the face. ' At this point 
the President `slapped his own face quite vigorously. ' Dean pointed out that 
however much the President `might resent some of the attacks from the extreme Left 
Wing on American policy, he had received and was receiving staunch support from 
the British Government and people. ' Johnson admitted and acknowledged that he 
`equally resented some of the ill-informed criticism which he was receiving in his 
own country'. 192 
Dean recognised that he had been subjected to an `impressive performance' 
by Johnson, who had known full well that the public nature of their meeting 
precluded any serious dissent from the new Ambassador. Dean's silence in the face 
of such verbal onslaughts may, however, explain why the President went on to 
develop a fondness for the British Ambassador. Dean concluded his report of the 
ceremony, saying it had been `an invigorating experience and of peculiar interest. It 
revealed in a remarkable fashion how strongly the President feels about the situation 
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in Viet-Nam and how extremely sensitive he is to any form of criticism, particularly 
that of a negative character even though he acknowledged that he was receiving 
more than satisfactory support from H. M. G. ' 193 The British were, therefore, well 
aware that the subject of Vietnam would have to be handled with some delicacy by 
Wilson. 
The Prime Minister arrived in Washington in confident mood after delivering 
a `robust' speech to the Economic Club at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. He had 
also met with U Thant at the UN Headquarters on the morning of 14 April, when 
they discussed the situation in Vietnam, amongst other things. Wilson was met by 
Rusk at the airport and went straight into talks with the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Henry Fowler at 11.15 am. 
The Prime Minister then met with the President, who began their talks by 
commenting positively on Wilson's speech to the Economic Club and on Britain's 
economic position in general. Washington was pleased with Wilson's `evident 
determination' to defend the pound without devaluation and hopeful that the 
measures taken in Labour's latest budget would help put the British economy on a 
sounder footing. It was acknowledged that world liquidity remained a problem and 
this was discussed at some length. The conversation then moved on to Vietnam. 
According to Wilson's official record of the meeting, the President began by 
expressing his `very deep appreciation of the line we had taken on Vietnam'. Yet 
again Wilson gave the President a `short account' of the political difficulties the 
British government faced on this issue, but thought the President was already `in no 
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doubt about the problem'. The Prime Minister also acknowledged that `the position 
had been transformed both in a world sense and in the British political sense by his 
Baltimore speech' but felt it necessary to tell the President frankly that `there had 
been a real danger that America's image had been suffering'. 194 Johnson replied by 
summarising the `agonising decision he had had to take, the pressures he had been 
under' and said that `his line throughout had been a middle path between those who 
wanted to use Vietnam as a jumping-off ground for an all-out attack on China, and 
those who felt the United States should quit without conditions'. The President said 
he was taking the `bomb-plus-olive-branch' line and that his speech at Johns 
Hopkins University had outlined his 3-D approach: `determination, discussions and 
development'. Wilson urged the President to follow up on the discussions part of the 
equation and that `immediate action best lie in the Cambodian Conference'. 195 
Wilson noted with some surprise that, `there was not at any time any 
suggestion of our committing troops to Vietnam nor any reference to police, medical 
team and teams to handle the flow of refugees. ' It appears, however, that the Prime 
Minister pre-empted any request by referring to the Australian decision to commit a 
battalion to Vietnam. Wilson recalls that he said that the British Government 
`welcomed this though it added to our Malaysian burdens since although the 
Australians were partners in Malaysia their contribution was much smaller than 
ours'. 196 This was another way of reiterating the fact that the British were already 
over-stretched militarily. 
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In a luncheon meeting that followed the two men continued their discussion. 
Johnson was apparently in an `expansive mood' and Wilson went into further detail 
on the British domestic situation. Overall, Wilson felt that `this time our discussion 
on Vietnam was much more constructive', perhaps in comparison to their late night 
call of 11 February-197 This was probably because the Americans had come to the 
conclusion that there was a danger that the British might stray from the fold. If 
Wilson felt it was necessary to pursue peace unilaterally, he might do this and by 
implication join forces with the many other world leaders calling for negotiations, 
including De Gaulle and U. Thant. And, given British objections over the use of gas 
and concerns over escalation, it was important to ensure these criticisms remained 
private. A public divergence on Vietnam would be extremely damaging to the U. S. 
propaganda effort. It would be better to condone their ally's peace efforts than block 
them, if only to ensure US views were properly represented. Consequently, Wilson 
admits in his memoirs that an `understanding' on Vietnam was reached. 
apart from the occasional moment in future years when 
President Johnson revived the notion of a British military 
presence in Vietnam, these April talks set out a division of 
function which he more than once stressed publicly. The 
American Government would not be deflected from its 
military task; but, equally, he would give full backing to 
any British initiative which had any chance of getting 
peace-talks on the move. 198 
In the afternoon, there were more detailed discussions on Vietnam in a 
meeting with the Secretary of State. The talk centred on the issue of a possible 
conference on Cambodia. Rusk was interested in the proposed conference on 
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Cambodia but was `concerned to ensure that it should not fail ... it would be better 
that it should not start than that it should fall flat on its face ... a 
full scale conference 
which broke down without agreement would be an unqualified disaster'. 199 Rusk 
reasoned that before accepting the Soviet proposal, a number of possibilities should 
be considered, including asking Patrick Gordon Walker to ask Prince Sihanouk of 
Cambodia what he would regard as an acceptable result of the Conference. 
Consequently, the US Government would `need a little further time - perhaps no 
more than 24 hours - in which to co-ordinate their views. '200 By 20 April there was 
still a `fundamental conflict between British and American views on this proposal'. 
Essentially, the US desired a prior agreement on the documents to be signed at a 
conference on Cambodia, whereas the British felt `the longer the Cambodian 
conference lasts the better, because it will probably be some considerable time before 
the Communists are ready to discuss Viet Nam seriously'. 201 As it happened, 
Sihanouk refused the idea of conference anyway, mainly because the rumour went 
round that it would be used as a pretext for talks on Vietnam. And although the 
British continued to pursue the idea, invitations to attend a conference were never 
issued. 
The Outcome of Wilson's Visit 
Due to the brevity and informality of Wilson's visit, reaction to it was 
relatively muted. Publicly, the two leaders presented a united front at the obligatory 
press conference. The President termed his talks with Wilson `very interesting, very 
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cordial, very fruitful' and expressed his high appreciation for `the friendship and 
support of our Allies, particularly that of the distinguished Prime Minister and the 
British people. ' 
The Times reported that the visit had been `most useful' and that `tentative 
agreements' had been reached on sterling, and on Vietnam. 202 Nothing was said 
about the personal relationship. Overall, Wilson felt the meeting with the President 
had been `very cordial and friendly, pretty fast moving' and recorded that the 
meeting was `largely an exchange of views without seeking any new agreements. '203 
Wilson stressed his loyalty to the President on the general aim of US policy in 
Vietnam but warned that he could only continue with this limited support if he was 
allowed to deal with domestic criticism through an active role in the peace process. 
Even though it saw little hope on the negotiation front, the Johnson administration 
was now willing to allow Wilson to explore publicly the possibilities for peace. 
This was a price the White House was willing to pay to keep the British on board. 
On his visit to Washington, Wilson gave the President two symbolic gifts: a 
bell from the ship `Resolute' - LBJ called it a `unique symbol of the truly close 
friendship that exists between our two countries'; and a rain repellent raincoat 
(Ganex mac). The coat was the wrong size and had to be replaced. 204 These gifts 
were more symbolic than originally intended. Although there was an enduring 
closeness between the two countries, in the short-term the relationship required 
readjustments over Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MAY-DECEMBER 1965: 
THE SEARCH FOR AN UNDERSTANDING 
The second half of 1965 saw domestic developments in both Britain and the 
United States impinge upon Anglo-American relations and Vietnam. In the United 
Kingdom, problems with sterling and a deepening crisis in Rhodesia added to the 
Wilson Government's dilemma over Vietnam. In the United States, these months 
witnessed growing domestic upheaval, including further racial unrest and increasing 
activity on the part of the anti-war movement. 
Having secured civil rights legislation outlawing discrimination in 
employment practices and public accommodation in the summer of 1964, the Civil 
Rights movement grew impatient for executive action to address voting rights 
abuses. Protest at Selma, Alabama between January and March had resulted in 
pressure from President Johnson for the passage of a Voting Rights Act. This Act 
was eventually signed into law on 6 August 1965. Three days later the Watts district 
of Los Angeles erupted into riots. When they ended four days later there were 34 
dead, 1,000 injured, and extensive property damage. I Johnson was unable to 
comprehend the situation, refusing to take calls from worried Senators and 
Congressmen. Watching television pictures of looting and burning buildings, the 
President asked `how is it possible after all we've accomplished? ' As far as LBJ was 
concerned, he had done all he could for the black community and this was how he 
was repaid. Once more, a perceived act of disloyalty and ingratitude was taken as a 
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personal slight, and would affect his response to black demands for further federal 
aid for the remainder of his term of office? 
The Johnson administration was surprised at the speed with which criticism of 
the war grew. Although they expected opposition to the war to a be factor if the 
conflict continued for three years or so, the White House was staggered to find that 
by mid 1965 the leading anti-war group, the Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS) were organising the growing agitation. Washington D. C. began to see 
organized marches involving tens of thousands of critics of the war. Campus 
protests were regular occurrences. At this stage, however, the President was most 
concerned at Congressional criticism of the war, particularly from its conservative 
element, led by Mississippi Senator John Stennis, who was urging the Administration 
to take stronger action. A right-wing backlash could jeopardize his entire domestic 
programme. LBJ felt a personal sense of embattlement over all these developments. 
This period also saw the Americanization of the war in Vietnam. In July the 
United States gave up the pretence of aiding the South Vietnamese government, and 
took on the military battle themselves, agreeing to send over 100,000 troops to South 
East Asia. Despite the apparent understanding reached between Johnson and Wilson 
in the spring, the British Labour government was alarmed by the conflagration and 
found it ever more difficult to support the methods employed by the US in its efforts 
to achieve an independent South Vietnam. 
Patrick Gordon Walker's Report 
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Patrick Gordon Walker returned from his fact-finding tour of South-East Asia 
on 4 May. Three days later he presented his findings to Prime Minister Wilson in a 
lengthy report. In his considered opinion, the United States' general military strategy 
in Vietnam was right but the British government could be `critical' of some of their 
tactics. He was aware that should America's bombing policy fail and South 
Vietnamese morale collapse again, the Americans might be tempted to bomb Hanoi 
and other populated centres. Gordon Walker felt that: 
Any such decision would be a great error. It would throw 
Asian and world opinion against the United States to such an 
extent as to outweigh any military advantage .... In my view 
we should let the United States know that if they bombed 
Hanoi ... they could not count on our support. 3 
While in South East Asia, Gordon Walker had taken every opportunity to let the 
American authorities know his views on this. Nevertheless, his overall conclusion 
was that Britain `must back the Americans in their present operations in Viet-Nam. 
Their military effort is the only possible policy. An American defeat would be 
disastrous, even if a victory in the normal sense is unattainable'. He suggested, 
however, that Britain `should search for a policy which, while backing America 
loyally, allows us a certain more apparent independence of view'. One way of doing 
this would be to: 
let it be known that our analysis of the situation differs 
somewhat from the Americans. We see more division 
amongst the Communist forces, less of a solid chain from 
Peking to the Viet Cong. We would find some support for 
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this attitude in the State Department. We might also 
indicate what kind of ultimate settlement we envisage. We 
might, too, make more clear our opposition to the bombing 
of Hanoi .4 
He acknowledged, however that `all this would be a very delicate operation' and 
`would probably depend upon America getting into a position of greater strength'. 
Wilson thought Gordon Walker's report was `excellent ... 
filling a lot of the 
gaps' and that the report, and therefore the tour, was `well `vorthwhile'. 5 This did 
not mean, however, that the Prime Minister would act upon all of the aforementioned 
suggestions, despite the fact that at times during the second half of 1965 the United 
States did appear to improve its military position. Limits placed on British support 
of American actions in Vietnam still tended to be couched in terms of Labour's 
internal political difficulties, rather than any open disagreement with the United 
States on its understanding and execution of the war. 
US Pursues the Military Option 
The early days of May 1965 saw the Johnson administration concentrating on 
events in the Caribbean rather than those in South East Asia. On 24 April a faction 
of the Dominican Republic military attempted to return ex-leader Juan Bosch back to 
power. Bosch had won the first democratic election held in the Dominican Republic 
in December 1962, only to be ousted by the military in September 1963. President 
Johnson, believing the rebel forces had been infiltrated by communists, sent around 
20,000 marines to the country in order to prevent `another Cuba', although claiming 
Ibid 
Ibid 
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it was to protect American lives. The President received public backing for this 
apparently successful action which some commentators feel may have encouraged 
Johnson to believe Vietnam could be a similarly popular anti-communist crusade. 6 
The British supported the President in his action. 
Shortly before the Dominican Republic crisis, the Johnson administration 
began to reconsider its options in Vietnam. Johnson's offer to `go anywhere at any 
time, and meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an 
honorable peace' was later described by Chester Cooper, a member of the National 
Security Council, as `merely rhetoric, a public relations holding action'.? Although it 
was made partly to assuage international pleas for a public statement of the US 
position, it was also a response to the growing domestic protests on the war, 
including the first `teach-in' at the University of Michigan on 24 March 1965.8 
The US was surprised to find that Hanoi responded to the President's offer of 
`unconditional negotiations' with the issuance of their own four points. As far as the 
North Vietnamese were concerned these points remained the basis of their 
negotiating position for the next three years. They included a demand for the 
withdrawal of American troops, the cessation of all military alliances, and the 
insistence on no external interference in South Vietnamese affairs, and none during 
reunification of the country. 9 
6 Joseph S. Tulchin, "US Relations with Latin America", in Warren I. Cohen & Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Lyndon Johnson 
Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy 1963-68 (Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 235-6; Larry Berman, 
Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: N. W. Norton, 1982), p. 63 note. 
7 Quoted in George T. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (Garden City, New York 
Doubleday), p. 324 
8 William L. O'Neill, Coming Apart: An Informal History ofAmerica in the 1960s, (Chicago: Quadrangle Book, 1971), p. 
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9 1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people - peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and 
territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the US Government must withdraw from South Vietnam US 
troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle all US military bases there, and cancel its military alliance 
with South Vietnam... According to the Geneva Agreements, the US Government must stop its acts of war against North 
Vietnam and completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV [Democratic Republic of 
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McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk decided the US should 
not respond to this development, at least not until the military situation was 
sufficiently improved for the US to negotiate from strength. As Marilyn Young 
argued, at the time `this logically ruled out any political solution to the conflict'. '0 
The Honolulu Conference 
On 20 April McNamara chaired a meeting of senior military and civilian 
advisers in Honolulu to assess the US position in Vietnam. At this stage the 
Americans had 33,500 of their forces stationed in Vietnam; the President had also 
recently authorised a change in the Marine role from static defence of base facilities 
to active, mobile combat roles, although at this stage still in support of South 
Vietnamese forces. " 
The conferees reported on 21 April that their strategy for victory was `to break 
the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory' and `emphasized the critical 
importance of holding on and avoiding - for psychological and morale reasons -a 
spectacular defeat of GVN or US forces'. 12 They therefore recommended, and 
Johnson accepted, further US troop deployments. Immediately an extra 9,000 troops 
were sent to South Vietnam. On 4 May, LBJ asked Congress to approve a 
supplemental appropriation of $700 million to meet the increased costs in Vietnam 
Vietnam]. 2. Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones the 
military provisions of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected. The two zones must refrain 
from entering into any military alliance with foreign countries and there must be no foreign military bases, troops, or 
military personnel in their respective territory. 3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South 
Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the programme of the [NFL] without any foreign interference. 4. The 
peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign 
interference. 
10 Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 154 
11 Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-69 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston 1971), p. 141 
12 Ibid 
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and by the end of June the President had authorised General William Westmoreland 
to use his forces in combat `independently or in conjunction with' Vietnamese 
forces. 13 
At Honolulu, Secretary of Defence McNamara had also recommended that, if 
possible, allied troops be increased. Obviously, these troops would reduce the 
numbers of US ground troops being asked for, as well as furthering the image of a 
multilateral effort. On 29 April Chester Cooper outlined the existing Free World 
Assistance to Vietnam in a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy. So far only 
Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan had sent military 
contingents to Vietnam, and most of these troops were non-combatant. 14 The US 
consequently explored further possible `third party' support. While the existing 
contributors presented the best hope for large-scale troop commitments, the Johnson 
administration again pressured its other friends and allies to contribute `more flags'. 
One possible way of engaging the British military in South East Asia lay in asking 
the Government of Vietnam formally to invoke the SEATO treaty. The tenth 
meeting of SEATO was due to open in London on 3 May and Washington hoped this 
might provide an opportunity to announce such a move. 
The first draft of the communique for this meeting was prepared in advance 
and outlined this option. Bruce soon informed the State Department that in his view, 
there was `no chance of persuading HMG to provide its military forces to SEATO 
for use in South Vietnam'. 15 The British again stressed their military commitment in 
Malaysia and their need to appear as impartial as possible in order to fulfil their role 
13 Ibid, pp. 142-143 
14 McGeorge Bundy Teach-In, May-June 1965, NSF, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Box 18 & 19, LBJL 
15 Telegram, Bruce to Rusk, 27 April 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 207, File: UK, Vol. III, Cables, 2/65-4/65, LBJL 
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as Geneva Co-Chair. 16 Under-Secretary George Ball and William Bundy, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, then met with Patrick Dean to suggest an 
alternative communique on Vietnam `aimed at trying to meet British problems', it 
said: 
The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam requested the 
Council members to take action under the Treaty to meet the 
aggression from North Viet-Nam. In light of the Protocol to 
the Treaty which designates South Viet-Nam as a protected 
State, the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States agreed that, pursuant to their Treaty obligations and 
within their capabilities, including their commitments elsewhere, 
they will take concerted action under the Treaty to meet the 
Communist aggression in South Viet-Nam. For this purpose 
they will continue and, wherever possible, intensify actions of 
the type they have been taking. ' 7 
William Bundy argued that as the British Government had made clear its support of 
the Government of Viet-Nam in previous SEATO Council statements, another strong 
statement `would not further infringe upon British impartiality'. George Ball agreed 
that last year's Council communique had already committed SEATO members to 
further action `in fullfilment of their obligations under the Treaty' and that if the 
Viet-Nam problem was `not dealt with forthrightly' by the Council the `public 
impression will be created that [the] US is fairly isolated on this issue. ' 
We are not pressing for collective action by SEATO as an 
organization but feel that for Congressional purposes it is 
essential that SEATO communique appear stronger than 
last year's, particularly in view of [the] fact that in [the] 
16 Wilson apparently said "In Malaysia, we are doing the fighting and the Americans are doing the negotiating... In 
Vietnam, it is the Americans who are doing the fighting and we who are doing the negotiating. " Quoted in William 
\Varbey, Vietnam: The Truth (London: Merlin Press, 1965), p. 122 
17 Telegram, Rusk to Bruce, SEATO: Council Treatment of Viet-Nam, 29 April 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 207, 
File: UK, Vol. III, Cables, 2/65-4/65, LBJL 
182 
intervening year several SEATO members have sent troop 
contingents to Viet-Nam. 
The point was also made that if SEATO could not meet the crisis in Viet Nam the 
`question rises as to what purpose [the] organization serves'. '8 
These arguments cut no ice back in London. Michael Stewart told Dean to 
inform Rusk that in his view `the amendment suggested ... make this proposal more 
rather than less objectionable. The proposed last sentence, for instance, would be 
read as meaning that Britain was urging the United States and South Viet Nam to 
intensify the bombing of the North'. He further instructed the British Ambassador to 
make it `quite clear' that he was `not prepared to consider anything on the lines of 
the present proposal' as his objections were to the `substance of the proposal not 
merely [the] wording. ' 19 
When the Australians and New Zealanders were consulted, they had no real 
problem with the notion of invoking the SEATO treaty, and agreed to send combat 
troops. However, after consulting with London they advised the Americans that they 
would not press the British hard in view of their estimation of British domestic 
difficulties. 20 The Americans duly shelved the idea. When the `white man's club' - 
the United States, Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia - met at a dinner the day 
before the SEATO meeting was due to start, the US proposal was not openly 
discussed. 21 After consultation between the Council members, the communique that 
was issued at the end of the SEATO meeting nevertheless provided firm support for 
US policy in Vietnam; indeed The Times felt the Americans `could hardly have 
18 Ibid 
19 Telegram, Michael Stewart to Patrick Dean 30 April 1965, PREM 13/694, PRO 
20 Telegram, Bruce to State, I May 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 207, File: UK, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/65-6/65, LBJL 
21 George Ball was to attend for the US in the place of Dean Rusk who was busy in talks on the Dominican Republic 
crisis. 
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hoped for a more unequivocal diplomatic backing than this'. It talked of `aggression 
against the Republic of Vietnam - an aggression organized, directed, supplied and 
supported by the communist regime in North Vietnam in contravention of the basic 
obligations of international law and in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements 
of 1954 and 1962. ' It also noted `with grave concern the increasing infiltration of 
arms and combat personnel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam'. And, in 
wording suggested by the British, it expressed `warm support for the policy of the 
United States Government as outlined by President Johnson on April 7'. It finished 
by saying that `until the communist aggression is brought to an end, resolute 
defensive action must be continued'. 22 Although the US administration had secured 
a line that would satisfy its congressional critics, it had failed in its latest attempt to 
extract firmer British support on Vietnam. 
The First Bombing Pause 
It was at this time, late April and early May of 1965, that the Johnson 
administration began to give serious consideration to a bombing pause in North 
Vietnam. Opponents of the air strikes felt that the North Vietnamese would not be 
persuaded to talk while such American provocation continued. Given the growing 
criticism LBJ was facing at home over the Rolling Thunder programme, it was felt a 
break in bombing would `put the onus on Hanoi' as well as relieving domestic 
pressure. As with the President's recent offer of `unconditional discussions', this 
latest manoeuvre was not expected to lead to negotiations but was another `time- 
22 The Times, 6 May 1965, p. 13 
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buying device'. 23 Still, George Ball discussed the option of a bombing pause in 
conversation with Harold Wilson at Downing Street on 5 May. Ball informed the 
Prime Minister that at this stage the length of a break in the air strikes was not 
decided upon but the idea was `to create the impression that the present attacks were 
not systematic' and `try to get through signals to Hanoi in order to see whether they 
were prepared to talk'. Wilson replied a pause in the bombing would be `an excellent 
thing to do if the US felt able to do it', but was not sure if the North Vietnamese 
would respond. In any case, `if this proposal were carried out and if there were any 
response from the North, then, once again, the US government would be in a sound 
moral position'. 24 
On 10 May the President finally decided to end the bombing of the North `for 
a limited period'. 25 The following day the US Ambassador in Moscow, Foy Kohler, 
was instructed to see the DRV Ambassador to convey a message announcing the 
bombing pause with the request that it be transmitted to Hanoi. The message said 
there would be no air attacks on North Vietnam from Wednesday 12 May at noon 
and running into the next week; that this action was `in response to "suggestions 
from various quarters, including public statements by Hanoi representatives" that 
there could be no progress toward peace while air attacks continued. ' Just to make 
clear its position, the US said it was `well aware of the risk that a temporary 
suspension of these air attacks may be understood as an indication of weakness' and 
if it was so misunderstood `it would be necessary to demonstrate more clearly than 
23 Young, Vietnam IVars, p. 155 
24 Record of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and US Under Secretary of State, George Ball at 6.30 pm at 10 
Downing Street, 5 May, 1965, PREM 13/694, PRO 
25 Johnson, Vantage Point. p. 137 
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ever ... that the United States is determined not to accept aggression without reply'. 26 
The threat contained in this message was not revealed to the public until Hanoi Radio 
broadcast the text in December of that year. 27 
When both the North Vietnamese Embassy and the Soviet Embassy refused 
officially to receive a copy of the US message (although both were delivered), on 14 
May the Americans asked the British if they could convey the message directly to 
their representative in Hanoi. 28 So on 17 May the British Consul-General duly 
delivered a copy of the message to the DRV. The message was again returned. 
According to the Americans `in view of the negative, indeed hostile, reception by 
Hanoi to our approach, it was decided to resume bombing at about 0800 hours 
Saigon time May 18'. The pause had been complete in the North and lasted 5 days 
and 20 hours from 12-18 May. Bombing of the South had continued unabated. 29 
The following day the French reported to the US that the North Vietnamese had told 
them that Hanoi's `Four Points' were to be considered as working principles for 
negotiations rather than prior US conditions. 
Growing UK Dissent on Vietnam 
By May, America's allies were increasingly uneasy about the lack of 
consultation they were receiving over Vietnam. Although US officials appeared at 
times to be confiding in the British over Vietnam, thus giving the illusion of a fair 
26 Top Secret Report by William J. Jordan, Subject: The Five Day Pause (May 1965), NSF, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Box 
9, File: Marigold-Sunflower, LBJL; Young, Vietnam Wars, p. 155 
27 Young, Vietnam Wars, p. 155 
28 The Soviets appeared not to want to be middlemen in the peace effort at this stage. 
29 Between 1965 and 1968, more than a million tons were dropped on South Vietnam, at least twice the tonnage dropped 
on the North. Kevin Ruane, War and revolution in Vietnam, 1930-1975 (London: UCL Press, 1998), p. 75 
186 
degree of consultation, in fact the White House was revealing very little about the 
future direction of its Vietnam policy. Moreover, just as the Johnson administration 
was being criticised at home for the lack of clarity in its aims in Vietnam, similar 
doubts were being raised abroad. 
On 10 May Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart met with George Ball to 
discuss a range of foreign policy issues. Again the Under Secretary appeared to be 
privileging the British on Vietnam by insisting that certain parts of the meeting's 
record be kept on `a very restricted basis in view of the delicate position of the US 
Government in relation to the Government of South Viet-Nam, with whom a number 
of these points had not been raised. ' But the ensuing lengthy and detailed discussion 
of the possible routes to peace negotiations failed to illuminate American thinking on 
the subject. 
Two days later during a discussion on South East Asia at a restricted session 
of the NATO Ministerial Council held at Lancaster House, Stewart felt it necessary 
to tell Dean Rusk: 
that the friends and Allies of the US ought to support American 
policy in Viet-Nam. But this would be much easier if the US 
would ensure that her friends and allies were fully informed in 
advance of American actions in Viet-Nam, of the reasons for 
these actions and of changes in the American judgement of the 
situation in Viet-Nam. It was also very important that the 
objectives of American policy in Viet-Nam should be constantly 
and publicly repeated. 30 
30 Record of a Discussion on South-East Asia in Restricted Session of the NATO Ministerial Council held at Lancaster 
House, 12 May 1965, PO371/180586, PRO 
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The US Secretary of State accepted the need for `more explanation and exposition', 
noted the request from members of NATO for more information on American 
activities, and said he would do his best to provide this in future. 3I 
The British Government, in particular, wanted the Americans to be more open 
on Vietnam, not only because it was helpful in their own foreign policy-making, but 
also due to the growing dissent on Vietnam within and without Parliament. It was 
vital that Wilson and Stewart appeared to be well informed on Vietnam if they were 
to continue their policy of public support for the United States, coupled with their 
reassurance that their influence was being exerted in private. As the United States 
increased its military involvement in Vietnam, Parliamentary pressure grew. There 
were major foreign affairs debates centring on Vietnam on 3 June and 19-20 July. 
On 15 June and 5 July, William Warbey MP also attempted to force an urgent debate 
on Vietnam. Although he failed in this it was yet another sign of the growing 
impatience of Labour backbenchers. 
The British Government was well aware that it was not only the Labour left 
wing who were upset by British policy on Vietnam, although these elements 
remained the most vocal in their opposition to it. Pressure on the Government's 
Vietnam policy came in many forms. On 11 May the Daily Mirror reported an 
interview with the British police advisers in South Vietnam. 32 According to the 
Mirror journalist, the police said that they were sick of the tortures used by the 
people who employed them. Emrys Hughes MP asked the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs if it was now time to bring the advisers home. Instead Mr. Padley, 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, answering for Stewart, said the Mirror report 
31 Ibid 
32 llansard, 17 May 1965, Vol. 712, Col. 1003 
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would be investigated. The police admitted to being interviewed but dissociated 
themselves from the substance of the report. The interview had however already 
raised the question of police presence, so that Padley was forced to reiterate that it 
did not represent a British military involvement in Vietnam since the police were in 
fact civilians. 33 This two week saga was yet another embarrassment for the 
Government. 
Trade unions were also voicing their concerns in greater numbers. By 11 May 
the Prime Minister admitted to Parliament that he had received 170 resolutions on 
Vietnam from trade unions. In reply he referred them to his statements in the House. 
The vast majority of the unions expressed dissatisfaction with the action of the 
bombing in North Vietnam. 34 
The PLP continued to turn against the Labour leadership on Vietnam. On 26 
May, Len Williams, the General-Secretary of the Labour Party, issued a statement on 
behalf of the National Executive Committee (NEC) that was extremely supportive of 
the Government's Vietnam policy. It argued that `the purpose of the Government 
policy from the outset had been `to try to get discussion started. ' It concluded, 
if success is achieved, it will be due in large measure to the 
patient and vigorous efforts undertaken behind the scenes by 
the British Government, efforts that would have been brought 
to naught if they had taken the advice which was strongly 
pressed on them, to content themselves with public declarations. 35 
33 Daily Mirror in Hansard, Vol. 712, May 10-24, Written Answer, 17 May 1965, Col. 1003/1004; Hansard, Vol. 713, 
May 24-June 4,31 May 1965, p. 153. For a comprehensive coverage of British press reaction to the war, see Caroline 
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Opinion on the \Var', PhD Dissertation, University of Reading, 1989 
34 Hansard, 11 May 1965, Vol. 712, Col. 221/2 
35 Tribune, 4 June 1965, p. 7 
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Tribune felt this was a gross distortion of the truth, rightly pointing out that critics of 
the government were calling for deeds as well as words. The reconvening of the 
Geneva conference and an end to all British aid to Vietnam were just two concrete 
suggestions put forward by opponents of the government's policy. William Warbey 
later recalled that in conversation with him, Wilson had quoted a phrase of Aneurin 
Bevan's `to the effect that emotional declarations were a form of "public 
masturbation", in which responsible statesmen and diplomats could not afford to 
indulge'. 36 Wilson appeared to be losing touch with his party. 
More moderate and intellectual circles were also openly challenging the 
British government on Vietnam. By the beginning of May, Wilson had been derided 
by the New Statesman as `President Johnson's Poodle'. Although this was largely in 
response to Britain's support in the UN of US action in the Dominican Republic, the 
Prime Minister's seemingly uncritical support of the President's Vietnam policy was 
also being questioned. 37 The Fabian Society began to criticise Britain's support of 
American policy in Vietnam in its journal, Venture. Editorials expressed 
disappointment at the new government. 
If even a Labour government cannot be influenced by the course 
of informed discussion, Venture's function becomes merely 
academic. We are not in business just to comment on the 
international scene, but to indicate to the Labour Party and to the 
Labour Government what areas of the world and what policies are 
due for reappraisal. 38 
36 Warbey, Vietnam: The Truth, p. 111 
37 New Statesman, Friday, 7 May 1965, p. 1 
38 Venture, Editorial, April 1965, pp. 2-4 
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They also pointed out the moral and political dangers of continuing Britain's present 
policy in Vietnam. 
Opposition to the Vietnam war is not just a left-wing revolt, as 
some would have us believe, but a major revulsion both in 
Parliament and in the country against the short-sightedness and 
brutality of American policy. For the first time since Suez, the 
roots of popular anti-Americanism have been revealed. This could 
have disastrous consequences for Labour's policy of Atlantic 
solidarity. Mr. Wilson's Vietnam policy is not wrong because it is 
unpopular, it is wrong because it is wrong. 39 
Venture also highlighted the danger of British policy on Vietnam threatening the 
Western Alliance. 
If we continue to support the Americans over Vietnam, we shall 
simply confirm our image in Europe as an American stooge 
[and this] makes impossible any attempt at an independent foreign 
policy, and disqualifies us from adopting a more mediatory 
position in any quarrel in which the United States is involved. 40 
This was a realistic fear. Most obviously, the French, particularly DeGaulle, could 
use British subservience to the US over Vietnam to justify their rejection of future 
British applications to join the EEC. 
Other extra-Parliamentary unrest on Vietnam included the launch on 19 May 
of the British Council for Peace in Vietnam (BCPV). 41 Chaired by the Labour Peer, 
Fenner Brockway, BCPV was conceived as an umbrella organisation and attempted 
to pull together as many anti-Vietnam groups as possible through its National 
Campaign Committee. This group aimed for a negotiated settlement of the war and 
although communist-run, it immediately gained the support of MPs, university 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 The Times, 20 May 1965, p. 8 
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lecturers, teachers, journalists and students, and eventually established support from 
29 organizations - political, religious and labour groups. 
As elsewhere in the world, students were also beginning to debate and 
demonstrate on this issue. The first major `teach-in' in Britain came at the London 
School of Economics and was followed shortly after by one at Oxford on 17 June 
1965, and a national `teach-in' was held at Westminster on 1 July 1965. The Oxford 
teach-in was particularly noteworthy, not least because it was televised in full on the 
BBC and widely reported in the press. Organised by the Oxford Union, its former 
President, the Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, agreed at short-notice to speak, as 
did the former American Ambassador in South Vietnam, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge. 
Other speakers during the seven and half hour session included Professor Max 
Beloff, Christopher Hill, Ralph Miliband of the London School of Economics, 
Commander Edgar Young, Mr. William Warbey MP, and Eldon Griffiths MP 42 The 
political make-up of much of the audience and most of the speakers meant that 
Stewart and Lodge were in for a rough ride. Stewart gave a speech, penned by the 
Foreign Office, which was followed by a rigorous question and answer session. The 
Foreign Secretary's performance confirmed Washington's opinion of him as a loyal 
ally and staunch public advocate of US action in Vietnam, despite his private 
questioning of US tactics. 
Bruce sent an effusive cable to Rusk describing Stewart's defence of US 
policy as `brilliant'. According to the Ambassador the Foreign Secretary, 
was thoroughly at home and prepared for [the] rigged and 
biased audience with which he had to deal. During [an] 
42 The Times, 15 June 1965, p. 12 
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acrimonious question period he fielded [a] series of loaded 
and tendencious questions superbly countering hostile 
allegations with cool, factual replies shot out without hesitation 
and avoiding pitfalls with masterly skill. Throughout he gave 
the impression of having thought out his positions after careful 
study of the facts and arguments of his opponents. His opening 
speech was outstanding for its lucidity, moderation, fair- 
mindedness, command of fact, conciseness, logical structure 
and exactitude of phrase. 
Ironically, Bruce was so impressed with Stewart's arguments he sent the full text of 
the speech to the State Department in the belief that it `may find its argumentation 
useful'. 43 Later the same day, Rusk sent a message of appreciation to Stewart 
congratulating him on his `brilliant exposition of our mutual interests in South East 
Asia' 44 
The speech was indeed pro-American. When asked at the teach-in how far 
the British Government would go in support of the US policy of escalation, Stewart 
replied with what was in fact an exposition of Britain's newly formed policy in 
Vietnam: 
We have thought it right to say that we thought the American 
Government were justified in what they have so far done in 
Vietnam (uproar) but that the British Government reserves 
completely its right to form and express its own opinions on 
any future events. 45 
The Foreign Secretary's cool performance in the face of constant interruptions, 
contrasted with Ambassador Lodge's. Bruce told Rusk that of the 900 packed into 
the Oxford Union Hall, according to Lodge, 80-90 per cent were hostile to US 
Vietnam policy and many were communist sympathisers. 46 As The Times noted, 
43 Telegram, Bruce to Rusk, 17 June 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 207, File: UK, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/65-6/65, LBJL 
44 Ibid 
45 British Information Services, 18 June 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 207, File: UK, Vol. IV, Memos, 5/65-6/65, 
LBJL 
46 Telegram, Bruce to Rusk, 17 June 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 207, File: UK, Vol. IV, Cables, 5/65-6/65, LBJL 
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Lodge `was given a much rougher ride of moans, groans and hisses, having 
misjudged the nature of his audience completely with talk of lavish American aid and 
references to Sir Winston Churchill'. When Lodge was faced with such vehement 
opposition, he eventually asked the Chairman of the teach-in, Christopher Hill, to 
`keep order. '47 On this occasion, the British were more self-assured and confident in 
explaining what was happening in Vietnam than the Americans. 
As indicated by the growing labour and student protest against the war, the 
Wilson government was also facing a growing public interest in Vietnam. On the 30 
June, Philip Noel-Baker MP presented a petition of 100,000 UK citizens to 
Parliament who were `gravely disturbed by the mounting cruelty and destruction of 
the war in Vietnam' and `therefore pray that Her Majesty's Government may act as a 
mediator for peace'. 48 Public opinion polls were also registering concern about US 
action in Vietnam, and British support of it. In April, for the first time the polls 
indicated that a majority of the British public disapproved of American armed action 
in Vietnam 49 By May, 71 per cent believed Britain's role in the conflict was to try 
to get peace talks started. 50 With his own party, the trade unions, British youth, the 
general public, and much of the media beginning to ask questions about British 
policy on Vietnam, Wilson was right to be alarmed about domestic opinion on 
Vietnam, especially given the tenuous nature of his hold on power. 
47 The Times, 17 June 1965, p. 12 
48 Hansard, Petitions, 30 June 1965, Vol. 715, Col. 593/594 
49 41% disapproved, 31 approved, 28% undecided. Gallup Opinion Poll. 
50 Not surprisingly, therefore, July's Gallup Poll showed a 65 per cent approval rating for the Prime Minister's peace 
proposals. Gallup Opinion Poll. 
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On 3 June McGeorge Bundy sent a rather blunt memorandum to the President 
on the subject of `the British and Vietnam'. It indicated not only Johnson's feelings 
on the issue but also showed that his advisers felt he was over sensitive about it. 
On a number of occasions you have showed your skepticism 
when one or another of us has remarked that the British have 
been very solid and helpful on Vietnam. And of course you 
have recollections, which the rest of us only have at second 
hand 
... Moreover, you feel the wounds of what Home said 
about busses and what Michael Stewart said about gas, although 
everyone else has long since forgotten about those particular 
episodes. 51 
Bundy felt the President should make an effort with the British, explaining the value 
of Labour support. 
The support of the UK has been of real value internationally-- 
and perhaps of even more value in limiting the howls of our 
own liberals. It is quite true, of course, that we would get this 
kind of backing more or less automatically from a Conservative 
government, but support from Labour is not only harder to get 
but somewhat more valuable in international terms. 52 
Indeed, Bruce informed Rusk a month later that in his opinion British support on 
Vietnam was stronger under Labour than it would be under a Conservative 
government. He quoted Mr. Godber, Minister of Labour in the last Conservative 
Government who believed, `responsibilities of office have obliged Labor leaders to 
approach [the] question more realistically and in [a] more statesmanlike manner than 
they would in opposition' and if the Conservatives were in power `their support for 
US policy would still be strong but if as he anticipated Labour in opposition followed 
51 Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy, 3 June 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Vol. V, Memos 6//65, Box 208, 
LBJL 
52 Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 16 July 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 208, File: UK, Vol. III, Cables, 7/65-9/65, 
LBJL 
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[a] policy closer to that advocated by its left wing' then the result might compel the 
Tories to adopt a `less forthcoming British Government position'. Bruce agreed that 
`a Conservative Government under fire from Labor opposition might find it more 
difficult to muster popular support for US policy on this issue. '53 
Bundy also felt it was necessary to defend Wilson personally: 
It remains a fact that every experienced observer from 
David Bruce on down has been astonished by the overall 
strength and skill of Wilson's defense of our policy in 
Vietnam and his mastery of his own left wing in the process. 54 
Bundy concluded that: 
the only price we have paid for this support is the price of 
keeping them reasonably well informed and fending off one 
ill-advised plan for travel. This is not a very great cost. 
Moreover, we have had no leaks from the British, and no 
public expression of worry about the length of the pause.... 
I see no advantage at all in putting them at arms length and 
thus increasing the risk that they will be tempted to criticize. 
You have taught us all a great deal about the advantages of 
Congressional consultation in the last year and a half -I myself 
believe the same rules apply in diplomatic consultation. 
After all, we are dealing with human beings in both cases. 55 
This memo provided clear evidence of the President's lack of faith in the British on 
Vietnam and of his growing impatience with the British need to be seen to be close 
to him on this. It may also go some way to explaining Johnson's slightly more 
tolerant position toward Wilson during the second half of the year. 
53 Ibid 
54 Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy, 3 June 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Vol. V, Memos 6/65, Box 208, 
LBJL 
55 Ibid 
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The Commonwealth Peace Mission 
Wilson's next peace gambit, or gimmick as his critics called it, was the larger 
and grander Commonwealth Peace Mission. The Prime Minister was scheduled to 
chair the week-long Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference being held in 
London beginning on 17 June and he sensed the opportunity to play world statesman. 
According to Wilson, after breakfast at Chequers on Monday 14 June and 
while pacing the terrace in the sun, he came up with idea of a three-man 
Commonwealth Mission. The benefits of such an endeavour were obvious. The 
Commonwealth conference represented a sixth of the total UN membership of 117 
countries, and almost a quarter of the world's population. At that time there were 21 
Commonwealth nations. 56 Another strength was that 
every political philosophy was represented there, including a 
majority of non-aligned nations. On the Vietnam issue there 
were pro-Americans, anti-Americans and the totally uncommitted: 
a microcosm of the UN and of the world itself. A peace mission 
sponsored by so widely representative a conference should 
therefore be accepted - as an individual nation's initiative from 
any quarter could not be. 
After discussing it with Derek Mitchell, his Principal Private Secretary and Oliver 
Wright, his Foreign Office Private Secretary, the proposal was ironed out and 
explained to the Foreign Secretary the same lunchtime. Wilson would 
put to the conference at its opening session a proposal to set up, 
56 The following leaders represented their countries at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference: Harold Wilson 
(Great Britain); Mr. Shri Lai Bahadur Shastri (India); President Ayub Khan (Pakistan); Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaysia); 
Mr. F. Wijemanne (Ceylon); Sir Robert Menzies (Australia); Mr. Keith Holyoakc (New Zealand); Mr. Lester Pearson 
(Canada); Dr. Eric Williams (Trinidad); Mr. Donald Sangster (Jamaica); President Kaunda (Zambia); Mr. David Jawvara 
(Gambia); President Nkrumah (Ghana); Sir Abubaka Tafawa Balewa (Nigeria); Sir Albert Margal (Sierra Leone); 
President Nyerere (Tanzania); Dr. Hastings Banda (Malawi); Mr. Joseph Murumbi (Kenya); Dr. Milton Obote (Uganda); 
Dr. Borg Olivier (Malta); Mr. Spyros Kyprianou (Cyprus). 
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with the authority of the whole Commonwealth, a mission of 
four prime ministers - or five, if this became necessary to secure 
balance - representing every point of view on the Vietnam 
issue. No party to the dispute could feel that the mission was in 
any way rigged in favour of some preconceived solution. 57 
The Mission would visit Washington, Peking, Moscow, Saigon and Hanoi and would 
also meet with the three members of the International Control Commission (Poland, 
India and Canada) and would begin its journey during the first part of July. Stewart 
approved of the idea, as did the Foreign Office, but felt the White House should be 
consulted `as a matter of urgency'. 58 
The British also thought it essential to get the Mission endorsed by the 
Australians. Sir Robert Menzies, Australian Prime Minister, approved of the idea 
during a dinner with the Prime Minister at the Australian High Commission that 
evening. At this point, the Australian and British Ambassadors in Washington met 
with Dean Rusk and William Bundy at the State Department. Patrick Dean showed 
Rusk a written copy of the proposal and after he had read it pointed out that, `the 
British Government did not expect formal approval from the U. S. to go ahead with 
this initiative but hoped at least to have U. S. acquiescence'. He also explained that: 
the aim of the British and Australian governments was to be 
helpful to the U. S. It was hoped that by floating this proposal 
on the first day of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Conference, the Conference discussion on Vietnam could be 
turned into constructive channels. 
It was also hoped that this initiative would `take some of the wind out of the sails of 
the forthcoming Algiers Conference'. This was the Afro-Asian conference planned 
57 Harold Wilson, Labour Government 1964-1970 (! farmondstivorth: Penguin, 1974), p. 150 
581bid, p. 151 
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for 24 June to 3 July. This conference of `third world' nations, included many 
communists and non-aligned nationals and Britain and America feared it might 
become `an anti-Western rally' passing critical resolutions. 59 Premier Chou En Lai 
of China would be attending along with 12 members of the Commonwealth. 60 Rusk 
said he would confer with the President before giving Dean the US reaction to the 
planned Mission. 61 
The Prime Minister also explained the initiative in more detail to Ambassador 
Bruce later that same night. Bruce enthusiastically described it as `brilliant', `a 
terrific idea', and `something with great prospects'. Although raising some 
difficulties with the plan, he agreed that `if the project could be got off the ground 
there were bound to be benefits whether it succeeded in its object or not'. 62 The 
Prime Minister was indeed realistic about the chances of his initiative leading to a 
Conference on Vietnam. Although `not over-hopeful' about this, he too stressed that 
`it was bound to be a winner whether or not the Mission succeeded'. As the Foreign 
Office recognised, one way it could be a success was by highlighting the seeming 
intransigence of the Communist nations: 
Even if the Mission fails ... either through the refusal of Peking 
or Hanoi to receive it or because these capitals take an utterly 
negative line, then nonetheless there will be considerable 
advantage for the Western position in identifying the Governments 
which are making a Conference impossible. On the worst 
assumption, namely if Peking and Hanoi refuse to receive the 
Mission at all, this will be taken as a great snub to Afro-Asian 
59 Telegram from Rusk to Bruce, 16 June 1965, Declassified Documents Series 
60 Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, Indian, Kenya, Malawai, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda 
61 Memo of Conversation between Dean Rusk, William Bundy, Patrick Dean, John Keith Waller, 15 June, 1965, NSF, 
Country File, UK, Box 208, File: UK, Vol. IV, Memos 2 of 2,7/65-9/65, LBJL 
62 Note for the Record: Commonwealth Mission on Vietnam, Derek Mitchell, Midnight 15 June 1965, PREM 13/660, 
PRO 
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opinion. 63 
In this way, Wilson hoped to ingratiate himself with the Americans. 
Bruce and Derek Mitchell discussed whether there should be any direct 
contact between the Prime Minister and the President on the Mission. Mitchell said a 
telephone call initiated by Wilson had been advised against because of the only 
previous occasion when he had done so, when the experience had been `thoroughly 
unsatisfactory'. 64 Instead he thought it would be useful if the President could call the 
Prime Minister `confirming whatever reaction was coming back to us through the 
diplomatic channel'. Later that night Bruce sent a telegram to Washington giving 
further detail on the Commonwealth initiative and urging the President to call the 
Prime Minister, or at least to send a pleasant personal message to him. The 
following afternoon Bruce followed this up by telephoning McGeorge Bundy who 
informed him that `the President had no liking for hot line conversations, but he 
might be persuaded to send Wilson a telegram'. 65 The attempt to convince the 
President that the British were worth the effort continued. Johnson did not ring 
Wilson but did send a cable outlining `the President's own thinking about Vietnam at 
this stage'. 66 The President was apparently `keenly interested in the Prime Minister's 
imaginative proposal' and welcomed `the readiness of the Prime Ministers to make 
another try' at ending the intransigence in Hanoi and Peking. He also said that he 
fully agreed with the view that `even if the mission fails in its immediate purpose, it 
should succeed in showing just where the responsibility lies'. 67 
63 Telegram, Immediate to All Post from Foreign Office, 16 June 1965, F0371/180566, PRO 
64 D. J. Mitchell, Note for the Record, Commonwealth Mission on Vietnam, PREM 13/660, PRO 
65 David Bruce diaries, 16 June 1965 
66 Telegram from Bundy to Bruce, 16 June 1965 in FRUS 1964-68, Volume III, p. 11 
67 Ibid, p. 12 
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Whether drafted by LBJ or an advisor, this cable reflected the sentiment in 
Washington regarding the Mission. Dean informed 10 Downing Street that the 
Prime Minister's initiative had been `very well received in Washington' and `so far 
from presenting any real problems has been positively received'. 68 That evening 
Bruce met Wilson again to convey Washington's `warm approval' of the initiative 
and their relatively minor reservation on the route the Mission might follow. The 
Americans preferred it that the first and last visits should not be to Washington. 
At the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday 15 June Wilson used his plan to relieve 
the mounting pressure from his government colleagues to take action on Vietnam. 
Barbara Castle admits she went along `determined to have a showdown about 
Vietnam' but was forestalled by the Prime Minister when he opened the meeting 
with, 
a reference to mysterious negotiations of which he had high 
hopes. He and the Foreign Secretary were in the middle of a 
very delicate operation and he asked us not to press for more 
details at this stage. I merely contented myself with asking 
whether Vietnam would be discussed at the Commonwealth 
PMS' conference. After trying to hedge for a moment, he 
replied, "Undoubtedly. "69 
So before the Commonwealth conference had even started, the Prime Minister 
and the Foreign Office had already finalised a great deal of their plans for the 
proposed Mission. It was decided a three-man Mission would be best, the Prime 
Minister would chair it and the other two members would be chosen by the 
Conference, one from an Asian nation, the other an African. The Mission would 
report back to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers collectively and also to the 
68 Patrick Dean, Washington to Foreign Office, No. 1563,16 June 1965, PREM 13/695, PRO 
69 Barbara Castle diaries, 15 June 1965, p. 20 
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interested governments and to the world at large. The Governments concerned 
would be asked immediately if they would receive the Mission. Only at this point 
would the United States publicly respond to the initiative. 70 
Wilson was now faced with the task of getting the other 20 Commonwealth 
nations to agree to his plans. As the presidents and prime ministers arrived in 
London, Wilson saw them one by one either at 10 Downing Street or at their hotels, 
to broach the subject. He could not be too specific about the details of the plan 
because of the danger of leaks. His idea was, however, initially welcomed by Lester 
Pearson of Canada, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, President Kaunda of Zambia, 
and, it appeared, President Nyerere of Tanzania who according to Wilson was 
`prepared to accept it, without question, though equally without enthusiasm. '7' 
On the morning the Conference began the British informed Bundy at the 
White House that the Prime Minister would `now go into battle ... with good 
hopes 
of bringing off this coup'. 72 His high hopes for the Conference were also revealed to 
Barbara Castle the same morning. 
Harold, coming in to answer his PQS, slipped in next to me 
on the bench. He was as excited as a schoolboy: said he had 
worked out his peace initiative on Vietnam, sounded out a 
number of Commonwealth PMS and was just off to put it to 
them. If all went well, he hoped to be able to interrupt 
parliamentary business at about 6 pm to make his statement. 
It was `very big'. 73 
The official opening of the conference took place at Marlborough House on 
the morning of Thursday, 17 June. The first working session began at 3.30 pm when 
70 Telegram from Foreign Office to All Posts, 16 June 1965, 'Vietnam', F0371/180566, PRO 
71 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 151/152 
72 Message to McGeorge Bundy delivered 11.15 am, 17 June 1965, PREM 13/695, PRO 
73 Barbara Castle diaries, 17 June 1965 
202 
Wilson persuaded the conferees to meet in restricted session in the Chairman's 
room. 74 Wilson put the proposition to the members and it appears to have been 
`warmly endorsed' by most of them. However, despite his earlier apparent 
willingness to go along with the initiative, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was now not 
happy with it. According to Wilson, Nyerere `felt that for us to put forward even the 
neutral posture of an independent mission would appear to condone "American 
aggression"' and `was also deeply concerned about the reaction the proposal might 
have in China. ' And, 
the longer the argument continued and the greater the number 
of Commonwealth countries who supported me, the sharper 
became his objections .... As the evening wore on he made very 
clear, what I had feared all along, that while he was quite willing 
to attend a Commonwealth conference and play an active part in it, 
he was concerned also to take no action which would prejudice the 
success of the conference which was immediately to follow ours, 
the second Afro-Asian `Third World' conference, in Algiers. 75 
Despite Nyerere's objections, Wilson was adamant that a decision be made 
that night. So by 8.30 pm the conference had agreed to issue a communique 
announcing the Mission. Tanzania still objected but did so covertly due to the `long- 
established convention of unanimity at Commonwealth conferences. '76 The only 
changes to Wilson's original plan were in the Mission's format. According to Bruce 
after `a tremendous row amongst the Prime Ministers ... Wilson 
had to shift 
ground'. 77 The conference decided to appoint five heads of government and none of 
74 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 152 
75 Ibid 
76 Ibid, p. 153 
77 Bruce diaries, 17 June 1965 
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them were from Asian countries. Instead, after much discussion the leaders of 
Britain, Nigeria, Ghana, Ceylon and Trinidad were chosen. 78 
The Prime Minister emerged from the talks to give a television interview. 
Together with Bob Menzies, he outlined briefly what had just taken place. After 
that, around midnight, when there was a break in Parliamentary business, Wilson 
announced the initiative to the House where it was generally well-received. The 
Press used words such as `original', `bold and imaginative' to describe it. 79 
Immediate reaction was not all favourable, however. Castle `was disappointed by the 
nature of Harold's "very big" achievement' because `there was no statement of 
principles to suggest the basis of a solution'. It struck her, amongst others, as `a 
gesture rather than conviction'. 80 
Wilson's portrayal of Commonwealth unity on the initiative was soon 
shattered. Later that evening at Wilson's Commonwealth reception at No. 10 for 
Foreign Ministers, it emerged that Murumbi of Kenya was also upset by the 
initiative. According to Castle he was 
very disgruntled by Harold's initiative, said he had rushed the 
conference too much. Anyway, it was quite wrong that Harold 
should be chairman of the mission: he was too committed to the 
American line. `We expected better things of a Labour 
Government. '8' 
Although the next day's press gave Wilson's plan a `glowing reception' as Barbara 
Castle put it, the Prime Minister still had to deal with the `rumbles of discontent' 
78 The following day the Prime Minister of Ceylon dropped out on health grounds. 
79 See Wilson, Labour Government, p. 154 
80 Barbara Castle diaries, 17 June 1965 
81 ]bid 
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among some of the Commonwealth delegates. 82 Wilson's handling of the previous 
day's events was one problem. Apparently when Nyerere had asked Wilson how he 
could record his disagreement, the Prime Minister had said `You can't'. The next 
day Nyerere `came out categorically against it as putting China in the dock'. 83 He 
argued during a BBC interview that: 
The Commonwealth as a group should not appear to be 
backing up Mr. Wilson or the United States on Vietnam. 
We must not appear to be aligned in any action we take. 
Already an attempt has been made by the British Government 
[the Gordon Walker mission] and the other side has said 
`No. ' What is it we are suggesting which will appear to the 
other side to be a new initiative! 
Mr. Murumbi also publicly declared his problems with the Mission. He said that 
while Kenya supported the initiative, `it is opposed to Britain or any other country 
which has committed itself on the issue being a member of the proposed mission'. 84 
Another problem was the insistence by some of the Commonwealth representatives 
that the Mission see the Viet Cong. This was `especially distracting' but was solved 
`by agreement that if the Viet Cong turn up in Hanoi as part of the North Vietnamese 
governmental apparatus, they can express opinions'. 85 In private, the British had 
already reassured Washington that the Viet Cong would only be seen in Hanoi. 
Despite some disagreement, the Prime Ministers of the British 
Commonwealth went ahead and issued a joint message on Friday 18 June to the UN 
Secretary General and to the Heads of Government of the USA, USSR, the Chinese 
People's Republic, the Republic of Viet-Nam (South Viet-Nam) and the Democratic 
82 Ibid, 18 June 1965 
83 Ibid and Wilson, Labour Government, p. 154 
84 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 10-17 July 1965, p. 20841 
85 Bruce diaries, 19 June 1965 
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Republic of Viet-Nam (North Viet-Nam). It expressed `deep concern at the 
increasingly serious situation developing in Viet-Nam' and suggested that a Mission 
`make contact with the Governments principally concerned with the problem of Viet- 
Nam in order to seek their views as to the circumstances in which a Conference on 
Viet-Nam might be held'. 86 They were also asked whether they could be prepared to 
receive the four leaders representing the Commonwealth some time in July. The 
same day David Bruce recognised that `the Prime Minister's imaginative conception 
of a Commonwealth mission' was `in disorder' and felt it necessary to telephone 
George Ball in Washington to `caution him against anyone in our Government 
making premature plans in connection with what may finally eventuate here' "87 
In order to counteract the now numerous diversionary press briefings by 
disgruntled members of the Conference, Wilson came up with the idea of the 
Mission announcing a ceasefire `in order to maintain the momentum of the 
Mission'. 88 Although Washington was willing to receive the Mission, it had already 
informed Wilson that it was reluctant to institute a pause during the duration of the 
Mission's tour. So when by Saturday 19 June, the Mission members had proceeded 
to preparatory work for the tour and issued a statement clarifying the situation, 
although Wilson would have liked it, the US insisted no mention be made of a 
ceasefire during the duration of the Mission. Still, the statement appealed `to all 
parties concerned to show the utmost restraint in military operations as a step 
towards the total cease-fire which the mission hopes will be established at the earliest 
possible opportunity'. 89 
86 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, Draft Message, F0371/180567, PRO 
87 Bruce diaries, 18 June 1965 
88 Record of Events, Commonwealth Peace Mission, 14-20 June 1965, PREM 13/660, PRO 
89 The Times, 21 June 1965, p. 8 
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Very soon negative responses to the proposed mission emerged from Hanoi 
and Peking. Chou En-lai, Chinese Prime Minister denounced the initiative on 19 
June as `a manoeuvre in support of the U. S. "peace talks" hoax' and predicted its 
`ignominious failure'. On 21 June an article in the Chinese People's Daily 
described Wilson as a `nitwit' and said the Mission was a `continuation of the British 
Labour Government's constant efforts to serve as an errand boy for the United 
States. ' Hanoi's leading newspaper, Nzan Dan, described the peace initiative as a 
`vicious scheme. '90 Nevertheless, Wilson retained a measure of optimism, feeling 
that the Soviets were the key to the whole operation, and that the North Vietnamese 
and the Chinese might change their minds. However, on 23 June the Soviets refused 
to receive the mission, followed by the Chinese two days later. 
The Americans cabled the Prime Minister regarding press reports indicating 
the Mission might still go to Washington. 91 On 24 June Bruce noted: 
If it should turn out that visit will only be made to U Thant, 
President Johnson, and the Government in Saigon, our officials 
are apprehensive of a call at Washington, thinking the Afro-Asian 
representatives could make remarks so hostile to our own policy 
that it would accentuate seriously our public opinion and 
Congressional problems. We were therefore instructed to make 
clear to the PM and Foreign Minister our belief that a mission of 
this kind would make no contribution to a peaceful settlement, but 
would only seriously impair the US position and cause great ill will 
at home. 
By 27 June, Washington and Saigon had officially accepted the invitation to give 
their views to the Mission, although not necessarily agreeing to receive it. 
90 The Tinies, 22 June 1965, p. 9 and Keesing's ContemporaryArchives, 10-17 July 10-17 1965, p. 20841 
91 Hand delivered to PM by Phil Kaiser. Rusk to Bruce,. 23 June 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, File: UK, Vol. V, 
Cables, 6/65, Box 207, LBJL 
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By the end of the Conference a set of `instructions for the mission' had been 
established. 
(i) a suspension of all United States air attacks on North Vietnam; 
(ii) a North Vietnamese undertaking to prevent the movement of military 
forces or assistance or material to South Vietnam; 
(iii) a total cease-fire on all sides to enable a conference to be convened to 
seek a peaceful settlement; 
(iv) the objectives of such a conference might be to: 
(a) end the war in Vietnam; 
(b) secure the withdrawal of all foreign military presence from 
Vietnam and the neutralization of the area; 
(c) establish, for a period, an international peace force, under the 
auspices of the Geneva Agreement. to safeguard peace in 
Vietnam; 
(d) establish principles for the eventual unification of the country 
through free and internationally supervised elections. 
Wilson wrote later that getting this set of guidelines through a conference of twenty- 
one states was `no mean achievement'. 92 However, The Americans were troubled by 
these guidelines as they appeared to suggest that in return for ending the bombing, 
the Americans would accept an `assurance' from the communist countries to cease 
their activities. Rusk was also annoyed that they appeared to suggest a ceasefire 
would be a precondition for talks, something the Americans had no intention of 
agreeing to at that stage. 93 
Wilson's Reasons for the Mission 
Ultimately the Commonwealth Peace Mission failed. The tour did not get off 
the ground. It was, however, Wilson's most ambitious and most serious attempt to 
92 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 162 
93 Memorandum of Conversation between Patrick Gordon Walker and Dean Rusk, Department of State, Washington, 29 
June 1965, Vietnam, NSF, Country File, Europe & USSR, UK, Box 208, File: UK, Vol. VI, Memos. 2 of 2,7/65-9/65, 
Doc. 258a, LBJL 
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establish peace talks. For that reason there has been much speculation as to his 
motives in proposing it. Wilson justified it largely on humanitarian and strategic 
grounds: it was a genuine attempt to end a costly and risky var. While this may 
have been Wilson's ultimate objective, he acknowledged the Mission was highly 
unlikely to succeed. The Mission could, however, help him deal with more 
immediate problems. Firstly, such a high profile initiative would greatly ease his 
domestic political problems. Indeed, Richard Crossman, Minister of Housing and 
Local Government, immediately labelled it a `stunt' feeling it was `designed to calm 
the left-wing of the Party'. 94 
A possible second reason why Wilson pressed so hard for the Peace Mission 
on the first day of the Conference lay in the increasing tensions within the 
Commonwealth over Rhodesia. Crossman began to suspect this when the 
Conference had finished and he managed to discuss the initiative with Wilson while 
walking through the corridors of the Houses of Parliament. Crossman expressed his 
anxiety that the Prime Minister would have been away for about a month had the 
Mission gone ahead. Wilson replied that it would only have been a fortnight but 
added, `Anyway, I think we have got most of the value we can out of it already. ' 
Crossman interpreted these words as meaning Wilson had managed to prevent a 
break-up of the Conference on the first day over Rhodesia. 
Black Africa is now virtually at war with Rhodesia whereas the 
white Commonwealth is still trying to keep the peace. In order 
to postpone that row and create a better atmosphere, Harold 
needed a personal initiative on the first day and in this sense I 
have no doubt that the stunt was brilliantly successful. 95 
94 Richard Crossman diaries, 17 June 1965, p. 115 and 18 June, p. 116 
95 Ibid, 27 June 1965, p. 117 
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Wilson did indeed manage to get the Conference to focus constructively on Vietnam, 
and avoided a major discussion on Rhodesia. The Conference's final communique 
merely talked about the possibility of summoning a `constitutional conference' on 
white Rhodesia in due course. 
Crossman rightly concluded that the Prime Minister, 
had pulled off a diplomatic coup which was popular with 
public opinion, eased the situation in his own Party and 
prevented a potential breakdown of the Commonwealth 
Conference. One can't be surprised if he is rather pleased 
with himself. 96 
It is certainly illuminating to see how the Mission proposal was received. The 
Fabian Society's journal, Venture, were effusive in its praise of Wilson and the 
Commonwealth Mission on Vietnam, saying it: 
may fail in its objectives, but in its initiation some useful 
modifications of attitude have been produced. Britain, Australia, 
New Zealand and Malaysia have participated in a demand for the 
cessation of US bombing raids. Two nations whose friendship 
China does not wish to lose, Tanzania and Pakistan, have joined 
the demand to North Vietnam to stop the transit of military men 
and goods to the South. Three Western governments closely 
identified with US policy in Vietnam have joined in saying that 
their mission must meet the Vietcong, thus giving public, if not 
quite `diplomatic', recognition - in defiance of the US ... 
These 
modifications of attitude are useful in themselves and mark a 
breaking down of the rigid positions. The Commonwealth mission, 
whatever it achieves in Vietnam, has stimulated some fresh thought 
elsewhere.... If one of Mr. Wilson's objects in calling the 
Commonwealth conference was to help rally the British Labour 
movement behind him, we can only report that with us he has 
succeeded. 97 
96 lbid 
97 Ventre, July-August 1965, Editorial, p. 3-4 
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In the short-term the Commonwealth Peace Mission had other positive 
political consequences. It was recognised that through the initiative Wilson had 
regained a measure of independence from the US on Vietnam. Bruce noted that 
Wilson `approved generally of our policy in Vietnam, believing we are trapped, but 
reserves the right to criticize - as witness his calls for a cessation of bombings'. 98 
Tony Benn also interpreted Wilson's efforts in this way: 
The Commonwealth Conference has allowed him to put on a 
Commonwealth hat in the place of the NATO hat which the 
Foreign Office is always trying to screw on to him. He has 
disengaged himself from his previous commitment on Vietnam 
with enormous skill .... The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
conference has made a big difference but I don't think it's 
permeated through to ordinary people on the Left yet that it has 
permitted Harold to disengage himself from a close alignment 
with the American position. 99 
Unfortunately for Wilson, although the Commonwealth Peace Mission did 
temporarily quieten dissent on the Labour backbench, it was soon seen by many as 
yet another of Wilson's gimmicks. It is doubtful, however, that Wilson viewed his 
initiatives in this way. Some of Wilson's key advisers suggest that Wilson's peace 
initiatives were not intended as peace gimmicks but that he managed to turn them 
into such by his behaviour. '00 Whereas previous Prime Ministers had been praised 
for their peace gambits - Macmillan flying to Moscow during World War II, Eden at 
Geneva in 1954 - Wilson's manner and reputation prevented him from receiving 
much credit for his efforts. When he announced this particular initiative to the 
House of Commons Wilson had been aware that he should not arouse expectations 
98 Bruce diaries, 26 June 1965 
99 Bent: Diaries, 28 June 1965, p. 281 and 30 June 1965, p. 283 
100 Off-the-record interviews with author 
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unduly and therefore was careful to stress that the chances of success were not great. 
However, in a sense Wilson had already over-sold the initiative before it became 
public, inflating his proposal by describing it to colleagues as `big'. In addition his 
television announcement of the plan appeared too flamboyant. Crossman described 
it in the following terms: 
I ... was just settling down to Michael Stewart's teach-in on 
Vietnam at Oxford when it was interrupted for a news bulletin. 
There was the Prime Minister announcing the Commonwealth 
mission to Vietnam and Bob Menzies clapping him on the 
back and saying, `I give this trip to you, old boy. Really it 
was your idea. ' The political matiness and gimmickry of the 
proceedings were in startling contrast with Stewart's 
performance which preceded and followed it (he was a 
brilliant television success and put the American case more 
competently than any American has ever put it). 101 
Wilson's apparent concern with his own personal prestige, his playing of the role of 
the `honest broker' troubled many. For instance, if he really wanted the 
Commonwealth Peace Mission to succeed, he need not have insisted on leading the 
initiative himself. The fact that he did, led the Communist powers to suspect, 
correctly, that he was not working entirely independently of the United States. 
The Harold Davies Mission 
Wilson's reputation for gimmicks grew even further when he sent Harold 
Davies MP to Hanoi. Even Wilson's loyal Chief Whip, Edward Short, thought it `his 
most colourful move so far. 102 
101 Richard Crossman diaries, 17 June 1965, p. 116 
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Although the signs coming out of Moscow and Hanoi were not good, the 
nature of the replies from the Soviets and the North Vietnamese left Wilson with 
some hopes for the Commonwealth Mission. He informed the Cabinet on 1 July that 
the Soviets `had evaded a direct response by suggesting that the effective decision 
lay with the Government of North Vietnam; and the latter, who were clearly subject 
to conflicting pressures from the Chinese and Soviet Government, had so far 
maintained an ambiguous attitude'. 103 Wilson was alluding to the lack of an official 
refusal from Hanoi to receive the Mission and by 6 July the Prime Minister was 
informing President Johnson that `nearly two weeks have passed without the North 
Vietnamese imitating the Chinese example of final and formal rejection. Hanoi is 
obviously receiving conflicting advice from Moscow and Peking and is temporising 
accordingly. This leaves the door slightly ajar... '. 104 Wilson was determined to use 
this gap to further pursue the idea of the Mission. 
Joint Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Pensions and National 
Insurance and close friend of the Prime Minister, Harold Davies had been a regular 
visitor to Hanoi, had met some of its leaders, and had written extensively on Ho Chi 
Minh. He was considered someone who might be able to establish a link to Hanoi in 
secret. At Wilson's prompting, Davies contacted North Vietnamese journalists in 
London who `constituted an official North Vietnamese presence', to see if it might 
be worth him visiting Hanoi again. An affirmative answer came back and Davies 
was told a visa would await him in Phnom Penh. Donald Murray, a specialist on 
Vietnam at the Foreign Office, was to accompany him. The Americans were 
apparently happy for Davies to try to make contact with the North Vietnamese but he 
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had no authority to speak for them. Sir Paul Gore-Booth found that Bruce `seemed 
to be quite relaxed about this initiative, though not surprised by the difficulties and 
not optimistic about the upshot'. '°5 
As Wilson put it, `unfortunately, whatever hopes the Davies visit might have 
justified were dashed by a serious, indeed disastrous, leak in London, while he was 
on the way'. 106 It was rumoured that the leak had come out of the Foreign Office. 
Whether true or not, British diplomats were extremely dismissive of this particular 
initiative. Gore-Booth later admitted that `one could advise, with all the respect due 
to Mr Harold Davies' personal qualities and knowledge of the area, that his mission 
also could only be a failure. There seemed at the moment nothing that we could 
do'. 107 Another Foreign Office adviser thought it was, `an absolutely ludicrous 
mission to Vietnam but it gave him [Wilson] a respite for about three weeks'. '°8 
Davies visited Hanoi between 8 and 13 July. 109 Possibly due to the leak, 
Davies was not allowed to meet Ho Chi Minh or Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, 
instead being allowed about 7 hours with the Secretariat of the Viet Nam Fatherland 
Front Central Committee. Murray was not even allowed in the country. 
Davies' brief was straightforward. He should tell the North Vietnamese 
leaders that even if they believed their struggle was just and that they could achieve a 
military victory, they should `explore the possibility of negotiations' in order to save 
thousands of lives and prevent the risk of the war spreading. ' 0 Davies found, 
however, that Hanoi exuded great confidence in their conviction of imminent victory 
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and showed no signs of responding to the Commonwealth mission. III Still, he 
returned to London arguing his trip had been worthwhile because, he believed his 
portrayal of British views on Vietnam would be `gone through and ... not 
be ignored 
by the North Vietnamese leaders'. 112 He contended that his defence of the British 
position and the Commonwealth Mission created intensive discussions and that `this 
was the first time that any detailed argument from the West had been heard in 
Hanoi. ' > 13 Wilson admitted there had been no progress as a result of the Davies 
Mission but thought `it might have done something to shift the ice-pack'. 114 This 
was wishful thinking. The Davies Mission did, however, succeed in keeping the 
Labour backbenchers under control. During a two-day foreign affairs debate on July 
19 and 20, that Wilson opened with a firm explanation of British support for the US 
in Vietnam, the atmosphere in the Commons remained muted. According to Bruce, 
the Prime Minister `evidently feels that if Davies trip had limited international 
results, it had been very helpful domestically in calming his own backbenchers'. 115 
Further British Initiatives 
The British Foreign Office decided it was now time to reassess Britain's 
position on Vietnam and negotiations. Never altogether happy with Wilson's 
initiatives, by the summer of 1965 an obvious tension had developed between the 
Prime Minister and much of the Foreign Office. 
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On 12 July, James Cable, Head of the South East Asia Department at the 
Foreign Office argued in a key memorandum that: 
British efforts to promote negotiation have relied on the 
argument that a compromise settlement would be preferable 
to the risk of escalation entailed by the pursuit of outright 
victory by either side. This argument commands widespread 
sympathy at home and, among those not directly involved, 
abroad. But we should not suppose that it is yet accepted 
by the actual contestants. 
Cable then outlined the current thinking in Washington, Saigon, Moscow and Peking 
and Hanoi. The latter two capitals believed that British peace initiatives had had 
been undertaken at the instigation of the US Government. Therefore, `each fresh 
initiative on our part will have reinforced ... the conviction that the Americans are 
desperate and are trying to save by negotiation what they now realise will be lost if 
the fighting continues'. 116 According to Cable, all involved parties interpreted what 
happened at Geneva in 1954 differently, which meant a return to the Geneva 
conference was fraught with problems. He concluded, therefore, that, 
in these circumstances it is most unlikely that further efforts 
on our part will induce the Communists to change their minds 
and offer acceptable terms for negotiation. On the contrary, 
further British initiatives will probably do more harm than 
good, by reinforcing the Communist conviction that the 
Americans are on the run, and will capitulate completely if 
pressed sufficiently hard. 17 
Cable was not optimistic about the prospects of the US achieving much military 
success in Vietnam and argued that the British now had two alternatives, `to remain 
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passive and hope that intensified American military activity will induce the 
Communists to negotiate' or `to persuade the U. S. Government to negotiate on terms 
acceptable to the Communists'. Believing the first option `would involve 
unacceptable risk' and the second one presented a real danger to Anglo-American 
relations that would involve the US abandoning its South Vietnamese allies, and 
thereby risking America's credibility as an ally, Cable came up with his own 
alternative solution to the problem. He wondered if it would be possible for the 
Americans to withdraw from Vietnam on the proviso that the South Vietnamese 
leadership be offered `a fresh start outside South Viet-Nam'. He went into more 
detail: 
Supposing, for instance, that there are as many as a million 
irreconcilable anti-Communists in South Viet-Nam, could the 
U. S. Government undertake to evacuate them all and establish 
them on some Pacific Island? Formosa would obviously be 
unsuitable, but there are plenty of under-populated islands in 
the Philippines and there may well be possibilities in the 
Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides or in other 
island colonies of the South Pacific. 118 
This notion of `towing the "loyal" Vietnamese out into the Pacific' received short 
shrift from Cable's superiors, not least because it was impractical. 119 The problem 
was beginning to look insoluble to some within the Foreign Office. 
E. H. Peck, Head of the Far Eastern Department, agreed with Cable's ultimate 
suggestion that Britain `should abstain from further public initiatives' believing the 
Government had `done enough to demonstrate our good will and to do more would 
be detrimental to our own prestige and future influence as well as, in all probability, 
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actually to impair the chance of negotiations'. Instead a public campaign against 
Communist intransigence should be mounted, coupled with a private warning to the 
Communists that `the Americans mean business'. 120 
Lord Walston, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, took a harder and 
more optimistic line than Cable. On 2 August he wrote to Stewart arguing that the 
only way Hanoi would come to the negotiating table was when it was convinced it 
couldn't win the war. To this end, Walston felt that `the immediate job of the West 
. 
is to convince them of this fact'. He recognised that `the most obvious way of 
doing this is to step up the bombardment, even to the extent of, for instance, bombing 
the dykes and flooding much of the North's fertile rice-land before the crop can be 
harvested'. However, Walston not only doubted the effectiveness of bombing - it 
could strengthen the will to resist rather than weaken it - but also recognised that due 
to the unpopularity of bombing, this action would make Britain's job of `holding the 
line' very much harder. Intensification of America's military effort through ground 
operations would have `none of these drawbacks' and he argued, therefore, and 
Michael Stewart agreed with him, that 
the most useful thing that we can do at the present time vis-a-vis 
the Americans is to try to convince them of these facts. They will 
find it unpalatable because their instinct is to look for quick results 
by massive air superiority; and also because plodding jungle warfare 
is not the trade to which their soldiers have been trained. Nevertheless 
I believe we should try whenever the opportunity presents itself. 121 
At the end of August Cable wrote another discursive memorandum entitled 
`the possibility of a negotiated solution of the conflict in Viet-Nam'. This memo 
120 J. E. Cable, Foreign Office Minutes, `Viet-Nam Negotiations', 12 July 1965, F0371/180587, PRO 
121 Walston to Michael Stewart, 2 August 1965 (with handwritten note by Michael Stewart), 
F0371/180587/DV1075/167, PRO 
218 
considered what was `practicable' rather than `desirable'. He admitted that this was 
crystal-ball gazing because Britain remained `distinctly uncertain about the real 
intentions in this matter of the U. S. Government'. 122 Nevertheless, Cable outlined 
the various negotiation scenarios dependent on either US military success, defeat or 
stalemate. Either way, he did not expect the US to succeed in permanently 
eradicating or reducing long-term, the communist threat. He therefore wondered 
whether 
it would be ... worthwhile to give the Americans a suitably bowdlerised version of this memorandum. Hitherto we have 
rather tended to regard Viet-Nam as too delicate and 
embarrassing a subject for frank or far-reaching Anglo- 
American discussion, but I wonder whether it might not be 
in the interests of both Government to break this tradition 
and exchange views with holds barred. There might be 
some hurt feelings, but, once these had subsided, we should 
have a much better idea of American intentions and future 
Anglo-American cooperation might be facilitated. 123 
Cable's suggestion came at a time when the US `appeared' to be increasing its 
chances of military success. Etherington-Smith, British Ambassador in Saigon, was 
so optimistic about this that he felt that there might not even be a negotiation in the 
end. Peck too thought Cable too pessimistic agreeing with Etherington-Smith that `it 
is true that US might is now beginning to bite on the Viet Cong and that we could see 
a US negotiation from strength'. Not surprisingly, therefore, Peck felt Cable's paper 
might go to Dean in Washington `inviting his comments on the desirability of 
discussing it with the State Department but without doing so at this stage. ' 124 Cable 
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therefore wrote to the British Embassy on 6 September to seek its opinion. The 
reaction from Washington did not come until the end of October and was extremely 
cool in relation to Cable's suggestion of `frank' discussions with the Americans on 
Vietnam. Nigel Trench of the British Embassy in Washington wrote that `we do not 
believe that the time is yet ripe for a "no holds barred" exchange of views'. The 
reason why the British Embassy `would advise strongly against' any such action, was 
that it did not believe American 
thinking has reached a point where either we or they would 
get the best out of frank talks. Indeed, at the working level 
there is remarkably little indication that their thinking is 
anywhere near a coherent policy, and the Australians have 
reached very much the same conclusion. You may think that 
this is a sign either of short-sightedness or of a basic reluctance 
to consider negotiations at all, now that the situation on the 
ground in South Vietnam has reached a slightly more hopeful 
stage, but I do not think that this is the case. '25 
It was also pointed out that `the State Department at least - and I believe also the 
political side of the Pentagon - are under no illusions as to the determination of the 
North Vietnamese'. 126 Trench also conveyed that apart from the question of timing: 
H. M. G. 's chances of influencing negotiations in the direction 
we think desirable would be prejudiced if we tried to push the 
Americans into discussions on the basis of a British paper. In 
view of our position as Co-Chairman they will naturally want in 
due course to take us into their confidence, if only to ensure that 
we play the game in the way that they think most effective, but 
since they are bearing the brunt of the fighting and expense, they 
would probably wonder why we thought we had the right to tell 
them how to play the hand, and this could lessen our chances of 
influencing them in the right direction. We must not forget that 
both their position and ours have changed since 1954, although this 
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does not mean the U. S. Government underestimate the value of the 
support which their Vietnam policy has received from H. M. G. 
Trench therefore suggested the British Embassy keep a very careful watch on the 
situation and inform London when the time was right for negotiations with the 
Johnson administration. 127 By December 1965 the Foreign Office concluded that `in 
the international field no further initiatives are being planned. 128 
The July Decision to Americanize the War in Vietnam 
When General William Westmoreland, Head of the US Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV) requested an additional 150,000 troops in late June 
1965, the Johnson administration debated the utility of a major US troop commitment 
in Vietnam. Their deliberations took five weeks until 28 July when President 
Johnson made up his mind and committed the United States to a ground war in South 
Vietnam. He did not make this decision easily and knew the odds against achieving 
the goal of an independent, anti-communist South were great. But most of his 
advisers, military and civilian, felt that even though it would be a long war with little 
chance of winning, the alternatives would be disastrous in terms of US prestige and 
credibility. The President therefore announced his decision to send 50,000 troops to 
Vietnam immediately, bringing the total number of troops stationed there to 125,000. 
He also admitted that `additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as 
requested'. 129 
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After the December 1964 refusal by Wilson to send troops to Vietnam, the 
Americans were reluctant to ask Britain to reconsider, at least not directly. British 
involvement was still, however, very much desired. In discussions of a British troop 
commitment, American hopes and desires varied widely. The fact that Rusk talked 
of a brigade and Bundy of a platoon or a batallion indicates the request for military 
help was largely for symbolic purposes. A brigade would have been a substantial 
commitment on the part of Great Britain, perhaps involving up to 6,000 troops. A 
platoon, on the other hand, would have been a much smaller gesture, involving only 
12-24 soldiers. The precise figures appear to have been irrelevant; the important 
thing was the conspicuous presence of the British flag. 
In early July 1965, according to the Australian foreign minister, Mr. Hanluck, 
Dean Rusk stated to him that, 
whilst the US Government had not asked for any British 
contribution in Viet Nam and had no intention of making any 
such request, the British would be well advised to send a brigade 
to Viet Nam if they valued American public opinion. In Mr. 
Rusk's view any such British gesture would have an immense 
impact on the US. 130 
Shortly before publicly announcing the Americanization of the Vietnam war, 
the President sent a message to 29 countries contributing assistance to Vietnam, 
including Great Britain. The message served two purposes. Firstly it served as a 
warning of the American decision to commit to a land war. Secondly, the President 
asked for further third party help in the conflict. While reassuring the message 
recipients that in addition to this major additional military effort he would also 
130 Telegram Canberra to Mr. Kinber, Commonwealth Relations Officer, 7 July 1965, "Vietnam" British Involvement" 
PREM 13/696, PRO 
222 
continue to make every political and diplomatic effort to find peace, and that US 
objectives would still be the same, he argued for a multilateral effort. 
In this situation I must express to you my deep personal 
conviction that the prospect of peace in Vietnam will be 
greatly increased in the measure that the necessary efforts of 
the US are supported and shared by other nations. I know 
that your Government has already signalled its interest and 
concern by giving assistance. I now ask that you give most 
earnest consideration to increasing that assistance in ways 
which will give a clear signal to the world - and perhaps 
specifically to Hanoi - of the solidarity of international 
support for resistance to aggression in Vietnam and to a 
peaceful settlement in Vietnam. '31 
Unlike Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the Philippines, who immediately 
expressed a willingness to consider an additional effort, the British did not respond 
straight away. 132 Instead the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister discussed the 
message for four days before informing Patrick Dean on 30 July that `as there was no 
explicit request for a British military contribution' it was `better to say nothing about 
this' in the Prime Minister's reply. Instead, the Foreign Secretary instructed Dean to 
make it clear to McGeorge Bundy orally or `in whatever way you think best' that: 
there is in fact no question of a British military contribution, 
no matter how small, to the war in Viet Nam. Not only do I 
want to forestall another and more explicit message to the PM 
but, the longer hopes of a British military contribution are 
cherished in Washington, the greater the risks of a leak and of 
Anglo-American disagreement becoming public knowledge. 
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The task of straight-talking was delegated to the Ambassador, who was given a long 
list of arguments he could make use of. 133 He could stress, amongst other things, 
Britain's existing, and planned, civilian and surgical role in Vietnam; that a military 
contribution would be to the detriment of Britain's defence of Malaysia; the political 
repercussions of a British military role in Vietnam; and the British belief that an 
increased British role in Vietnam `might well compromise our position as Co- 
Chairman of the Geneva Conference'. 134 
Given Stewart's open and heartfelt support of US policy in Vietnam, it is 
surprising how strongly he felt over this latest request, although no doubt his position 
was delivered more diplomatically by the Ambassador. Despite his own personal 
feelings on the issue, Stewart clearly recognised the political balancing act Wilson 
faced in trying to keep his own party behind him while remaining loyal to Britain's 
major ally. Considering that Britain was at the time delicately negotiating with the 
Americans regarding the latest sterling scare, the vehemence of Stewart's views, 
however indirectly expressed, reflected the fact that sticking to the `no troops' 
position was imperative if the Labour Government wanted to ensure its own survival. 
Stewart outlined this in further detail for Dean, saying that the President, 
himself such a master politician, will readily appreciate what an 
effort it has been, in terms of the British political situation, for 
Ministers to maintain as much support as they have of American 
policy in Viet Nam, not least at a time when economic difficulties 
have compelled them to follow domestic policies falling short of 
the hopes of their supporters. Ministers have only been able to 
maintain their Viet Nam policy, because they have been able to 
assure critics that Britain is at least not involved militarily. Our 
attitude has also been of great benefit to the United States 
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Government in terms of international opinion, if our example has 
helped to restrain a number of European and Commonwealth 
countries from giving more vocal and forcible expression to 
their own apprehension about the course of American policy in 
Viet Nam. In many cases these other Governments are also under 
pressure from their Parliaments or public opinion. 135 
Wilson's official reply to Johnson on 2 August was nowhere near as blunt, and on 
the contrary, was extremely supportive verbally, at times even sycophantic: 
I have followed with admiration the careful balance you have 
throughout maintained between determined resistance to 
aggression and a patient insistence on your readiness to negotiate 
a honourable settlement.... In the face of the persistent North 
Vietnamese refusal to negotiate, I can see no alternative to your 
policy of strengthening your forces in South Vietnam. 
Nevertheless in relation to the request for additional practical help, Wilson did repeat 
some of Stewart's arguments. 
I wish there was more we could do to help you, but I need not 
remind you how far our contribution to international peace- 
keeping has already overstrained our resources and our economy... 
Moreover, I should be loath to run the risk of spoiling any 
chance we may have fulfilling the functions which were originally 
accepted as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference and have 
more recently tried to develop afresh by means of the 
Commonwealth initiative. 136 
Dean delivered the Prime Minister's message to the President via McGeorge 
Bundy. At the time the President Evas in Texas but Bundy thanked Dean on the 
President's behalf and described the Prime Minister's reply as `a help'. He also said 
the President was `well aware of the very great difficulty in political terms of a 
British military contribution at the present time' but admitted that `the important 
135 Ibid 
136 Message from Prime Minister to President Johnson, 2 August, 1965, PREM 13/696, PRO 
225 
thing from the President's point of view was to have made the request. ' Afterwards, 
Dean reminded the Foreign Secretary that it would be `most helpful' if he could tell 
Bundy that progress was being made in providing police advisers and getting a 
civilian surgical team together. 137 Towards the end of September, a British Medical 
Project for Vietnam had been assembled, initially led by a physician from Great 
Ormond Street Hospital. On hearing the news of the successful arrangement of the 
medical team, Wilson commented to Oliver Wright, `I take it we are telling the 
Americans. ' 138 
This high-level approach on Vietnam was, however, only part of the picture. 
Britain's position on Vietnam was also being discussed fervently, and in detail in 
relation to the latest sterling crisis and Britain's on-going defence review. 
The Future of Anglo-American Relations: Vietnam, East of Suez and Sterling 
At the beginning of June, the Johnson administration began to consider its 
options should the British economy, and the pound in particular, run into difficulties 
before winter. 139 Considering the President's growing impatience with the British, 
particularly over Vietnam, it was felt increasingly necessary to explain the Labour 
Government's problems to the President. David Klein, a White House aide, drafted a 
memo for the President outlining the shape of the trouble for Anglo-American 
relations. Britain's economic problems, particularly its balance of payments deficit, 
continued, and although Wilson had rejected devaluation and `tried to meet the 
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problem through tight money, tight budget, import restrictions, controls on capital 
movements and `persuasion' on the wage-price front', the Americans were worried 
that this might not keep the speculators quiet. 140 
In the face of another attack on sterling, it was thought that Wilson would 
have the choice of either dampening the economy even more and risking a full-blown 
recession; imposing full-fledged exchange controls; devaluing; or letting things slide 
until the speculators forced a devaluation. The result of the latter two options would 
have serious consequences for the US, by producing `heavy and sustained pressure 
on the dollar' and the serious possibility that Britain would turn inward and would 
move `away from selective international responsibilities'. 141 
Klein explained to the President, in some detail, British weariness of sterling 
difficulties: 
the strain of coping day by day compounds the trouble. Ministers, 
reportedly, have lost a lot of steam. So have senior civil servants 
on whom any British Government depends. Walking their 
economic tightrope soaks up energy, saps initiatives, and colors 
their approach to every policy, emphatically including their political 
commitments overseas. Not only must they now consider cutting 
back commitments, they are also hard put to conceive of adding 
anything. This adds to their difficulty in responding to you in 
Vietnam. 
Klein also warned the President that `considering the mood in London, tired and 
beset, there is also need on our side for great care about the tone'. 142 Moreover, he 
alerted Johnson to the increasingly negative image of the US in Britain: 
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on Wilson's left and Home's right there is a considerable amount 
of latent anti-Americanism. Santo Domingo and Viet Nam are 
sources of native irritation to some parts of the public, the press 
and even the bureaucracy. Our hard sell on behalf of our own 
aircraft (and other weapons) in markets coveted by the Englishmen 
doesn't help. 143 
If the British did retrench abroad and devalue at home, Klein considered the areas 
where this would impact on the US. If the overseas cuts came they would occur in 
Europe and/or East of Suez. If the British army on the Rhine (BAOR) was cut back 
unilaterally then the Germans: 
will make new demands on us, and certainly will make it hard 
for us to withdraw U. S. troops by mutual consent. (If British 
forces remain at present strength, we might be able to negotiate 
some reduction in the U. S. presence. )144 
If the reductions were made East of Suez, this would not only be a serious problem 
for the US financially and militarily but would also leave the US in the position of 
lone world policeman in some areas: 
It is useful for us to have their flag, not ours, "out front" in 
the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf-in areas where they 
have long historical associations. For we might be very much 
better off to pay for part of their presence-if they really can 
not afford it-than finance our own. 
Klein believed that `as the summer advances we shall have to make our minds up on 
a lot of these, and also on our fundamental attitude toward Britain's role as our ally 
in Asia and in Europe'. He therefore warned of the need for `interagency 
coordination both of substance and timing' as London undertook a variety of 
143 Ibid 
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consultations and negotiations at departmental level, with Treasury, Defense and 
State. A contingency group was therefore set up to co-ordinate a response should the 
British ask for further help with sterling. This group included George Ball (under- 
Secretary of State), Henry Fowler (Secretary to the Teasury), Henry Martin (Federal 
Reserve), McGeorge Bundy (White House aide) and Robert McNamara (Defense). 
It was expected that a British plea would come during the visit of James 
Callaghan, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, to Washington at the end of June 
to meet with Fowler, McNamara and Gardner Ackley,, Chairman of the Economic 
Advisers, and to visit the International Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the 
Federal Reserve Board. Wilson was aware that Washington was generally opposed 
to linking the fate of sterling with the dollar. Nevertheless he still had hopes that 
during Callaghan's visit the US government would publicly announce its intention to 
give full support to maintaining the position of sterling. Interestingly, Bruce noted in 
his diary that Wilson 
is justified. in expecting from us gratitude for his unvarying 
defense thus far of our policy in Vietnam. On the other hand, 
I doubt his awareness of how this is simply taken for granted 
at home. 145 
When Wilson asked if the President would see Callaghan while he was in 
Washington, McGeorge Bundy anticipated this would be to discuss the pound. He 
told Johnson that he had discussed this issue with other advisers: 
We had a full discussion on the British problem in Joe Fowler's 
office and we are all agreed that we should not make any deals 
with the British on the Pound. Any deals we make should be put 
together in terms of our overall interests-political and economic, 
145 Bruce diaries, 24 June 1965 
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as well as monetary. None of us expects this kind of deal can be 
made with Callaghan. It will have to be a bargain at a higher and 
broader level. 146 
In the event very little was decided during Callaghan's visit, and, indeed, 
McNamara and Callaghan appear to have `spoken at cross-purposes'. McNamara 
was `only interested in Britain maintaining her political commitment on the Rhine 
and East of Suez, ' while Callaghan felt that `his over-riding concern was finance and 
that he could only under-take to do what he could pay for'. 147 
As it happened, the 28 July decision to Americanize the war in Vietnam and 
Johnson's request for more aid from Britain coincided with another sterling crisis. 
During June British reserves had fallen by £24 million and by another £50 million in 
July. This was despite Britain's overseas borrowing facility. And although the 
balance of payments situation had improved, there was still a lack of confidence in 
the financial world as the British economy still appeared to be overheating. July 
therefore saw heavy exchange losses. 148 On both sides of the Atlantic there was a 
recognition that a full reassessment of Anglo-American relations now seemed in 
order 
Washington considered the matter urgent and began discussing its available 
options in more detail. The British soon got wind of this. When Bruce met with the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary on 25 July, Wilson told the Ambassador 
that in a recent discussion with Richard Neustadt: 
It had become very clear that every aspect of Anglo-United 
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States relations, every question of policy that the Government 
had to decide, every point of view about the future shape of 
the world was part of the same problem. 
He concluded that Anglo-American relations could be at a `turning point'. 149 
Bruce agreed with Wilson that there was a need for a broader look at the `whole 
complex of problems' but when Wilson suggested it might be time to have another 
talk with the President, the Ambassador recommended instead that Sir Burke Trend, 
Secretary to the Cabinet, should go straightaway to Washington and, while there, 
explore the possibilities of a top-level talk in September. Sensing a crisis might 
develop that week, the Prime Minister thought `this was going about things in too 
leisurely a fashion'. In addition the ongoing defence review was due to report by 
September and the British government would like `a preliminary run over the ground 
with the U. S. administration' before any decisions were taken. 
Washington, however, had not yet formulated a response to events in Britain. 
There were open divisions within the Johnson administration on how to deal with the 
problem. Clearly, discussions over the pound were taking place in between 
discussing the wisdom of the proposal massively to increase US involvement in 
Vietnam. Not surprisingly, the two problems could not be kept apart in the minds of 
many within the White House, State Department and the Treasury. 
On the lunchtime of 26 July, Bruce cabled Rusk to advise him that the British 
cabinet would be meeting the next day to consider further deflationary measures 
proposed by Chancellor James Callaghan. Bruce warned that if these measures were 
not accepted, or proved ineffective in restoring confidence, then in his opinion `we 
will witness almost immediate terrifying run on the pound, with presently 
149 Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the United States Ambassador at 7.30 pm at No. 10 Downing 
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incalculable consequences ... we would probably be faced with alternatives of British 
devaluation or full support of pound by ourselves'. ] 50 
The same day McGeorge Bundy telephoned Derek Mitchell at 10 Downing 
Street to talk about `money matters. ' Bundy made it clear that Callaghan's intended 
programme `might not be adequate to protect sterling', instead advising stronger 
measures to `convince the speculators and bankers that the Wilson government is in 
earnest about saving the pound'. Washington strongly recommended `action on the 
regulator, with respect to fuels and consumer durables; much higher minimum down 
payment and short maturities on hire purchase; quantification of expenditure cuts'. 151 
In reply, Mitchell explained to Bundy that not only did British economists 
think it dangerous to compress demand further than Callaghan's planned measures 
intended, it would be `very difficult to swallow politically'. 152 Regardless, Bundy 
also suggested a six-month wage-price freeze as a possible dramatic alternative and 
emphasised the need to stay in close touch about developments. 
The next day the Chancellor told the Cabinet first and then the House that 
further deflationary measures were needed because demand was continuing to rise 
and exports were not rising enough. The key provisions of his statement included a 
drastic reduction in planned public expenditure: defence expenditure for the coming 
year would be reduced by £100 million; building programmes for hospitals, schools 
and houses were frozen and local authority lending would be reduced by placing 
restrictions on mortgages. In addition hire-purchase provisions were tightened and 
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restrictions were placed on private investments. 153 Consequently the Americans 
were not overly impressed by Callaghan's statement, or his apparent spurning of their 
suggestions, which might explain the events of the next few days. 
Burke Trend became a conduit of information and ideas between the British 
and American governments. The Treasury Department noted that `a principal 
purpose of Trendex is for us to pump Trend about the PM's thinking on what he 
might do and want from us'. However, it was acknowledged that, 
a more delicate part of the exercise has to do with what we say 
or don't say about our intentions. Both sides understand that 
the purpose is not to negotiate but to explore each other's thinking 
-- central staff to central staff. 154 
Shortly before Trend visited Washington on 29 and 30 July, the contingency 
group had a series of meetings and communications in preparation, and a protracted 
debate about the fate of sterling ensued. Bundy sent a memo to the President 
regarding their next day's meeting with Joe Fowler, to discuss the prospects of an 
imminent sterling crisis and the `conditions' for rescue action. Bundy acknowledged 
that he wanted to attend the meeting because his opposite number in Britain, Trend, 
was coming for a meeting planned months ago. 
... there 
is a sense of urgency in his coming just now which 
gives me a feeling that the Prime Minister is trying to set the 
stage for a private understanding with you. I already know 
enough to be tough with Trend on this, but I want to be sure 
to use this meeting to get the right message to the Prime 
Minister, so that when and if there is a crisis your bargaining 
position will be the way you want it. 155 
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Bundy hoped that the Fowler meeting would be `a useful first stage in making sure 
that we all understand each other as well on sterling as we have come to do in 
Vietnam in the last seven days', during which time the Johnson administration had 
agreed to fight a ground war in Vietnam. 156 He recognised that Fowler and the 
Treasury would be most interested in emphasising to the British that devaluation 
would be disastrous for both countries, but added that his own interests, and those of 
McNamara and Rusk, 
are wider. We are concerned with the fact that the British are 
constantly trying to make narrow bargains on money while they 
cut back on their wider political and military responsibilities. 
We want to make sure that the British get it into their heads that 
it makes no sense for us to rescue the pound in a situation in 
which there is no British flag in Vietnam, and a threatened British 
thin-out in both east of Suez and in Germany. 
He also admitted, 
What I would like to say to Trend myself, is that a British Brigade 
in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the moment of truth 
for sterling. But I don't want to say it unless you want it said. 
On Wednesday 28 July Fowler, Ball, Martin and MacBundy met to discuss 
further what advice to give the British on sterling. They concluded that the UK 
should be told that devaluation was `unthinkable' and that it could not be permitted. 
When Gardner Ackley heard this, he immediately penned a memo to the President 
disagreeing with this apparent consensus in thinking. He informed Johnson that 
while he was `no advocate of devaluation', and hoped and thought it could be 
avoided, he saw `serious danger' in telling the British `that it cannot under any 
156 Ibid 
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circumstances be permitted'. Ackley felt that the US might be committed 
indefinitely and unlimitedly to unilateral rescue operations and that this would be 
more dangerous in the long run than devaluation as confidence could be lost in the 
dollar as well as the pound, especially if the UK `was failing to take measures to put 
its house in order'. '57 
In the event, after talking to Fowler on the morning of 29 July, Ackley 
decided not to send the memo to the President. Fowler had tried to convince Ackley 
that the previous day's meeting had come to the same conclusions. Nevertheless, 
Ackley remained unsure that this was the case and said so to Bundy in a note later 
that day: 
My basic point is that the UK has to make its own decision as to 
whether the costs are worth it. If they hold back because we ask 
them to, or demand it, it's not going to work and we will end up 
holding the bag. We can argue that devaluation is unnecessary; 
that it would be bad for them, for us, and the world. But if we 
can't persuade them, it won't work. Whatever we tell them, it's 
also important what we tell ourselves. If we say it's unthinkable, 
the end of the world, we'll get hung up with a unilateral rescue. 158 
Ball was well aware of this and was at pains to convince the rest of the 
administration. It appears that initially the President, McNamara and McGeorge 
Bundy all favoured at least asking the British for a brigade for Vietnam. 159 Ball 
argued that the British were in no position to send a brigade at the present time and if 
they were asked to in connection to financial talks, their `play' would be to refuse: 
`They will say if this is the price they have to pay they will devalue ... the British 
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would say we were making Hessions [sic] out of their soldiers. ' 160 According to 
Fowler, McNamara also said he would give the British `an extra billion dollars for 
one brigade'. 16' Ball and Fowler agreed this would in effect be making mercenaries 
out of British soldiers. Later that morning Ball attempted to convince Bundy that the 
British would say their troops were not for sale. He hoped McNamara would not 
bring up the question of a Vietnam brigade in the context of US help for the balance 
of payments problem. 162 
Bundy was not convinced on either point, arguing `if they really want to do 
business with Lyndon Johnson they have to take into account his basic problems'. 
And as far as he was concerned the basic premise of the Trend visit was that `it 
would not be in any one context' and although he agreed that the US did not want to 
be `buying troops', he maintained `it is equally important that we get it clear in the 
British heads', and he did not think it was ' clear that Lyndon Johnson will even do a 
short run rescue operation'. 163 
Ball differentiated between the short-term rescue of the pound, which would 
not allow room for political discussions, and `from the beginning we can insist on the 
maintenance of the British existing commitment around the world' and the more 
medium term. He recognised that the British had `two weapons-two levers'. 
Firstly a `pullback from commitments around the world' and this would be popular 
domestically. And `if he were Wilson he would play this as his first card with the 
Americans because 
... 
it would be most costly to have to pick them up rather than a 
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one-time bailout'. The second lever was to say that `if they can get no help they will 
have no option but to devalue big'. 164 
Bundy felt the British would not devalue, whereas Ball `thought it a question 
of a balance of risks from our point of view ... and at the end of the 
day we may have 
to be prepared to do something which we don't want to do even though the British 
don't meet our own demands more than 50%'. Bundy agreed and thought the 
problem was a `tactical one to get the maximum out of the situation ... our side 
is 
pretty much stonewalled'. 165 
Overall Bundy was adamant the British should `not be under the illusion they 
can come to the President through the Treasury and make a money deal without our 
getting certain satisfaction on some political points. There will be strings attached to 
any short term thing. ' X66 
At Ball's suggestion, Bundy agreed to mention to McNamara `not to inject 
anything too explicitly because he [McNamara] is a little insensitive to the kinds of 
reaction he might get from these people. ' 167 Francis Bator agreed with Gardner 
Ackley about `thinking about the unthinkable'. 
Vietnam is our paramount problem and what they say and do 
about it is bound to influence Washington's view of Anglo- 
American relations. How concrete should we be on what we 
would like from them? 168 
As regards the possibility of a British troop reduction East of Suez or in the British 
Army on the Rhine (BAOR), it was felt that `anything which could be regarded as 
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even a partial British withdrawal from overseas responsibilities is bound to lead to an 
agonizing reappraisal here'. The sterling link was made clear: 
We have a hint from Dick Neustadt in London that, whereas 
Brown and presumably Callaghan have the point loud and 
clear, the PM might not realize that UK performance on 
overseas defense is tightly linked with what we might do 
for them on money. On the other hand, we will wish to 
avoid giving them a sense that a threat of `disengagement or 
money' will give them the keys to Fort Knox. 169 
The British wanted an open-ended US declaration of support for the pound. 
Bundy met with Trend on Thursday 29 and Friday 30 July and `had a long and 
searching discussion'. The Americans put the British on notice that devaluation 
`would be destructive to all concerned' and that a rescue package would have to be 
multilateral and therefore `accompanied by a package that can be sold to European 
bankers'. But Bundy informed the President that `in accordance with your 
instructions, I kept the two subjects of the pound sterling and Vietnam completely 
separate'. 17° 
By 6 August the Americans decided that they should place two firm 
conditions on their support for the pound. 
a. That the British agree to maintain fully their worldwide 
defense commitments; 
b. That they agree to take whatever additional internal 
measures are necessary to make possible multilateralizing 
a rescue effort. 171 
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Ball recognised that if the British did not comply with these conditions and opted for 
devaluation, this would `almost certainly turn the UK away from support of US 
policies (including South Vietnam) and substantially increase anti-Americanism in 
Britain. ' 12 There were risks on both sides in this diplomatic game of blind man's 
bluff. 
By September, an `understanding' had been reached. George Ball met with 
Wilson in London on 8 and 9 September. Bundy later informed the President that, 
`it took two talks for Wilson to agree to the association between our defense of the 
pound and their overseas commitments'. He also noted that 
the one thing which he was apparently trying to avoid was a 
liability in Vietnam, and you will recall that it was your own 
wisdom that prevented us from making any such connection 
in the summer, although I did once informally say to one of 
the Prime Minister's people that a battalion would be worth a 
billion-a position which I explicitly changed later. 173 
It seems, however, that the British did not have the same recollection of the 
conversation. Indeed, there was some confusion as to whether `strings' had or had 
not been attached to American support of the pound. According to the Foreign 
Office, on 9 September, Ball had been `at pains to emphasise that no specific price, 
in defence or foreign policy, was being extracted from H. M. G. in exchange for 
American help over the pound'. Apparently Ball had said `this [i. e. support for 
sterling] did not necessarily imply that in any particular situation quid pro quos were 
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involved'. 174 The Foreign Office concern, however, was that the implication of 
Ball's words were that, 
the U. S. Government assume that they and H. M. G. have 
common general objectives to which H. M. G. are expected to 
adhere. It might also carry the implication that in some 
situations (nature undefined) the U. S. Government might feel 
entitled to ask for a quid pro quo. 175 
Wilson apparently `turned the argument by asserting as axiomatic the fact that 
we have "world-wide responsibilities" like the US, that we want to carry them out, 
but cannot of course do so unless we are freed from the pressure of economic 
stringency. ' 176 T. W. Garvey of the Foreign Office read this to mean that Britain 
intends `to continue to do the various things that we are doing `East of Suez' and 
elsewhere; but that we rely on the Americans to bail us out if we run out of money; 
or alternatively, reserve our right to alter our policies. ' 77 Garvey's worry was the 
extent to which H. M. G. might be `inhibited by the recent sterling support operation 
and its undertones from adopting policies in particular which are uncongenial to the 
U. S. Government'. He concluded by asserting that `we are not, however, as a result 
of American support for sterling, ipso facto inhibited from pursuing our own 
interests where they and US interests conflict'. 178 
Bundy, however, said `pretty categorically' to Sir Burke Trend that there was 
a quid pro quo. One Foreign Office official surmised that 
the difference may only reflect the more diplomatic approach 
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of the State Department; it may, however reflect a difference in 
policies between the White House and the State Department. If 
so, in this context, I think it would be wise to assume that White 
House policies would prevail. 
Others thought the discrepancy either `more apparent than real' or that there was no 
basic discrepancy `both said sterling and defence were linked; neither tied the 
linkage to any particular quid pro quo; both implied the need for consultation before 
any action affecting defence commitments'. 179 
While the British Foreign Office decided there was no clear `understanding' 
on sterling, by the end of the year Michael Palliser and Burke Trend had decided it 
would be worth while commissioning a study on `the extent to which, in financial 
terms, the Americans might be partly dependent on us as well as we on them'. 180 
Domestic Pressure on Wilson - August-December 1965 
By the time of the Labour Party Conference beginning in late September, 
dissent over Vietnam was widespread within the Labour movement. Although the 
summer recess in Parliament had given the Labour leadership some relief from direct 
harassment, Wilson and Stewart were well aware of the dangers of the Conference 
disintegrating over Vietnam. The National Executive Committee were again 
persuaded to include a favourable reference to Vietnam in its foreign policy 
statement, concentrating on the Government's peacemaking efforts. 181 The fact that 
the Vietnam statement came within the wider foreign policy one, that included 
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sections on the United Nations and Overseas Aid, meant that it would `appeal to 
Labour idealists' and was therefore unlikely to be defeated in a vote. 182 
In his speech to the Conference, the Foreign Secretary expanded on the NEC's 
foreign policy report. The general debate that followed was dominated by questions 
and comments on Vietnam. In his foreign policy address, the Prime Minister 
boasted, `Britain counts again in world affairs' because `Britain's power, Britain's 
influence 
... 
depends 
... on a Government with 
ideas, a Government aligned and 
attuned to the 1965 world we are living in. ' Much of the speech was directed to 
Vietnam and Wilson specifically answered the charge made in the earlier debate and 
elsewhere that the Government's policy was linked to US economic aid: 
even though we were being asked by the United States Government 
to put British troops in Vietnam ... neither then nor at any other 
time was there an attempt to link the financial co-operation with 
any aspect whatsoever of foreign policy. 183 
Given Wilson's recent `understanding' with the Americans over sterling and East of 
Suez, this was, of course, a distortion of the truth to say the least. 
Wilson also argued that British support for US action in Vietnam `no more 
invalidates our ability to act as co-chairman and to bring the parties to the conference 
table than Russian support for Hanoi invalidates their ability to act in this way, 
because it was always understood from Geneva onwards that one chairman (and 
there are two) broadly represents the views of the west and the other the views of the 
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east. ' 184 He also denied that the British position of support for the Americans on 
Vietnam meant his Government was servile. 
Is it not realised how much of the pressure we have put on 
bring the Americans to the conference table has been related 
to our position in these matters? We have spoken out 
frankly. The Foreign Secretary expressed what we felt 
about napalm and about the use of gas, but that does not 
invalidate our general position so far as the Americans in 
Vietnam are concerned. 185 
There were also two composite motions. The first one asked the Conference, 
amongst other things, to condemn American intervention in Vietnam and was 
defeated on a voice vote. The second more moderate and more specific composite 
asked the Conference to call upon the Government to dissociate itself from American 
policies and military operations in Vietnam. This composite went to a card vote and 
was defeated by almost a two to one majority. Still, a large section of the Conference 
was clearly unhappy with Government policy on Vietnam. 186 
Early in September and before Parliament resumed, William Warbey resigned 
the Labour whip because of his disagreement with the Government's Vietnam policy. 
Given the Government's narrow majority, Wilson noted that this action `again 
underlined our vulnerable position'. '87 Even the Foreign Office was increasingly 
concerned about the state of public opinion on Vietnam, believing the war's 
declining popularity could easily be explained. 
While much is being done to counterbalance the highly publicised 
opposition to Her Majesty's Government's policy, we believe our 
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efforts would be more effective if we had a more adequate 
knowledge of the factors influencing that opposition, especially as 
it is by no means confined to Communists, fellow-travellers and 
professional anti-Americans. 188 
The Foreign Office therefore proposed, and the Foreign Secretary and Prime 
Minister agreed, that a `small but sophisticated' public opinion poll be carried out. 
As Murray Maclehose at the Foreign Office acknowledged, `so far as the Foreign 
Office is concerned a poll of this kind would be an innovation: nominally, at least, 
we have no responsibility for public opinion in this country' but in breaking `fresh 
ground' the poll would `ascertain not only people's views on Viet-Nam but, above 
all, how they arrived at them'. 189 The Prime Minister received the preliminary 
results on 19 November and the full report on 14 December. Essentially, the 
majority of Britain's elites supported the Government's policy on Vietnam, although 
more Conservatives did than Labourites. 190 
However, by the end of November Wilson reported to Robert McNamara that 
`Vietnam was no longer really a political problem in Britain'. 191 Wilson knew that 
although his Vietnam policy continued to cause dissent within the Labour Party, 
Johnson's Baltimore speech and the rejection of the various peace moves by the 
communists had helped secure the line that the Americans were willing to talk. 192 
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Wilson's Visit to Washington, December 15-17 
Despite the negative portrayal of the relationship between Harold Wilson and 
Lyndon Johnson in the press, the British Prime Minister maintained his belief that 
relations were close and friendly. This was because comments coming from 
Washington, from Patrick Dean in particular, carried more weight with him than 
journalistic gossip. In August of 1965, Wilson got feedback from Dean suggesting 
he had every reason to be confident in the apparent strength of his relationship with 
Johnson. The President had seated himself next to the British Ambassador during an 
Ambassadorial dinner on a boat sailing down the River Potomac. Dean wrote to 
Stewart that the President `spoke in the highest terms of yourself and the Prime 
Minister and said that he realised only too well how difficult it had been for Her 
Majesty's Government to continue to support US policy in Vietnam with so small a 
majority in Parliament and in the face of much criticism from the press and other 
quarters'. 193 The President apparently `spoke bitterly of the criticism to which he 
had been subjected in some of the British newspapers' and Dean thought this an 
`interesting confirmation of our existing impression that such a dominant and 
successful character as the President should be so extremely sensitive to personal 
criticism, particularly of the type of intimate, gossipy remarks which are exemplified 
in "The Observer" articles. ' 194 Dean thought the final `interesting' thing that the 
President asked was to `convey to the Prime Minister his best wishes and to inform 
him that he was ready to help him in facing our current problems in any way he 
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could. ' Dean also thought that the fact that the President had been willing to spend 
so much time talking to him, 
goes to show I think that the President and the Administration 
generally ... really are anxious to continue the close co-operation 
with us in all possible fields and that, although at times they are 
irritated by press and other forms of criticism, they recognise 
that our continued support is of real value to them. In order to 
preserve it I think they are prepared to go quite a long way to 
help us in our current difficulties, provided that they remain 
satisfied that we are ready to continue to help ourselves and do 
our share in the world. 195 
Dean emphasised, however, that: 
although our position in this respect is fairly strong, we are 
definitely not in a position to exert undue pressure or influence 
on the Americans. They are willing to help us and to talk things 
over with us extremely frankly, partly because they realise that 
it is in their interests to do so; but if they were to lose confidence 
in either of these they would not, with their present resources, 
find it difficult, although they would regret it, to ignore us 
altogether and to go their own way. In these circumstances, we 
have obviously a good deal of room for manoeuvre and a 
reasonable chance of influencing them in the conduct of their 
affairs, and we should certainly do so, provided we use the right 
methods and speak frankly to them. 196 
Despite Dean's generally positive assessment of the climate in Washington, 
Wilson's visit in December was not expected to be easy. Lyndon Johnson was 
recovering from a gall bladder operation carried out on 7 October which had resulted 
in the President being hospitalized for two weeks in Bethesda Naval Hospital. Still 
recovering from surgery, the President was seeing Wilson in between two other state 
visits: President Ayub Khan of Pakistan was due to meet Johnson on the 14 
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December, Wilson on 15 and 17 December, followed by the visit to Washington of 
Chancellor Erhard of West Germany on 20 December. Consequently, the British 
expected the President to be stressed. This was confirmed by McGeorge Bundy who 
informed them that as the President was still convalescing the best time for Wilson to 
talk to the President would be in the morning and early afternoon, `after that he still 
gets tired and is not in very good form'. 197 There were also alarming reports of the 
President's growing volatility. The decision to escalate US involvement in the war 
had not been an easy one and Johnson was aware that the war might jeopardize his 
entire presidency, but particularly his plans for the Great Society. According to his 
advisors, by the summer of 1965 the President was increasingly paranoid and his 
moods erratic. 198 Johnson, never comfortable with criticism, was reacting angrily to 
the growing number of opponents of the war, on the political right and left, and to 
those questioning his actions on the race issue. 
If the President's physical and mental state was not already troublesome 
enough, the preparations for Wilson's visit had yet again further annoyed the 
President. Bruce noted on 17 November that the President appeared to be in need of 
further rest. This was the Ambassador's way of saying Johnson was in a bad mood. 
He also noted that, 
The President was irritated by the request made today by the 
PM for them to meet on December 17. He said he was tired 
of Wilson trying to commit him to such meetings through 
newspaper leaks. I suggested he might ask the PM to come 
down to the ranch. 199 
197 Letter from Patrick Dean to Burke Trend, Cabinet Office, 30 November 1965, PREM 13/6, PRO 
198 Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times 1961-1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 
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The President would rather not have met with the Prime Minister but Bundy advised 
that `if Wilson is in the country to address the United Nations, and asks to see you, 
there really isn't much choice'. At that stage, the plan was to minimise the visit to 
`one serious talk at the Ranch, and leave it at that' and that `the real point of the visit 
is for you and Wilson to talk'. 20° 
Accordingly Michael Stewart told the Prime Minister he was `making the visit 
at a time when the President is reported not wholly to have recovered his strength 
and good humour. You might hit him on a bad day. 1201 Stewart suggested that given 
the short time the Prime Minister would have with the President there was a `danger 
of the Americans generally, and of the President in particular, feeling that, in our 
own difficulties, we have too little consideration for the present troubles of the 
United States administration. ' Stewart felt, therefore, that in his talks with Johnson it 
would be advantageous if Wilson paid lip service to the problems of Vietnam and the 
US budget difficulties. 
If you did this at a fairly early stage it would pave the way to 
a better reception of our own demands on the United States, 
which are likely to be considerable, - concrete support ... over 
Rhodesia, understanding our insistence that we shall have in due 
course to leave Singapore, a proposal that the Americans should 
take over the main burden of the defence of Libya and contribute 
to installations in Australia and a general desire for financial 
support for sterling. 
The press rightly surmised that the main theme for the talks would be the British 
government's defence review. 202 A `Defence Week-end' had been held at 10 
200 Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy, Subject: Visitors, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 215, File: UK, 
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Downing Street on 13-14 November, after which it was felt it was time for the Prime 
Minister to have a `personal discussion' with the US President `about the global 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. ' It was expected 
that the Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary would visit early in 1966 to discuss 
matters in further detail. 203 The Americans, however, also recognised that Rhodesia 
and Vietnam/Malaysia would also be at the top of Britain's Washington agenda. 
They also knew it would be necessary to indulge Wilson a little. When planning the 
`cast of characters' for the President's working lunch with Wilson, McGeorge Bundy 
recommended keeping the group small, with just the major players involved - the 
President, Rusk, Bruce and himself - as this would help `Wilson's own sense that he 
is getting businesslike treatment'. 204 
Vietnam continued to cause tension between the two countries. Wilson 
started his trip to the United States by delivering a speech to the General Assembly 
of the United Nations in New York. Rusk had told Bruce that `it was important for 
the Prime Minister in his speech to the UN on Wednesday of this week not to 
surprise us by embarrassing references to the Vietnamese war, indeed he would 
prefer no statement at all by the PM on the subject'. 205 Bruce was uncomfortable 
with this degree of interference, describing it as `a somewhat difficult matter to 
handle', remarking that he was `not sure if President Johnson were making a speech 
to the UN he would welcome advice from the British as to what its contents should 
be'. The Ambassador spoke to Oliver Wright on the matter, who said he would pass 
203 Prime Minister's Visit to the United States and Canada, 15-20 December, 1965. PREM 13/686, PRO; Telegram from 
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the comment on to the Prime Minister. 206 Wright called Bruce the next day to say 
that the Prime Minister `would certainly say nothing of an embarrassing nature' 
about Vietnam in his speech. 207 He was good to his word. Although his speech 
ranged over the gamut of world problems, the US was most keen to know what he 
had said on Vietnam and Rhodesia. Ball asked Arthur Goldberg whether Wilson had 
said anything about the possibility of US bombing of Petrol, Oil and Lubricant stores 
in Hanoi and Haiphong - he had not, instead giving the US strong support on 
Vietnam. 208 The speech was memorable for another reason. Due to British 
reluctance to use force against the Rhodesian Government which had recently issued 
its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, as soon as Wilson stood to speak, 
virtually all the African delegates walked out. 209 
In the months leading up to Wilson's visit, the Johnson administration was 
considering another bombing pause. McGeorge Bundy was trying to persuade the 
President and Dean Rusk that the domestic and international arguments for a pause 
were stronger than ever. One of his given reasons was that during talks with 
Secretary McNamara and Mr. Ball in London on 27 November, Prime Minister 
Wilson had indicated, without elaborating, that he had `some new Vietnam gambit up 
his sleeve', as Bundy put it, and that the plan had a one in ten chance of success. 210 
Wilson intended to put it to the President during his December visit. The Americans 
surmised that the Prime Minister would say that the UK was willing to talk with the 
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DRV and the Viet Cong if this was attractive to the US. As Bundy argued, `eve will 
spike his guns and those of everyone else like him if we have a pause in effect at the 
time of his visit'. 211 
McGeorge Bundy also advised the President that Wilson would be `very 
inquisitive about our future plans' in Vietnam, and that the President's frankness on 
this issue would `help to keep his flag nailed to our mast'. Given the fact that many 
of the administration's next decisions had not been finalised, it was also suggested 
that the President speak to Wilson `very privately', perhaps during one of their one- 
on-one talks. 212 
The Prime Minister met the President privately on both 16 and 17 December, 
and in formal talks with their respective advisers once. They also talked during 
lunch on 17 December. As Rusk was not back in Washington until 17 December, 
Vietnam was not discussed in any detail during the first day of talks. Instead, after a 
private talk of almost one hour, Wilson and Johnson joined their advisers to discuss 
Rhodesia, nuclear sharing and the British defence review. The Americans pledged to 
`reinforce and supplement' British actions on Rhodesia, which included an oil 
embargo and airlift for Zambia. 213 Wilson expressed his appreciation of American 
support on this. On the defence review the Prime Minister was more guarded, giving 
no specific details to the Americans, apart from acknowledging cuts were necessary 
East of Suez, and that Singapore was the most likely target. He did, however, 
reaffirm Britain would maintain a world role and said no decision would be made 
until the Americans had had an opportunity to give their views on the matter. Bruce 
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later noted that Wilson had been `careful in phrasing his remarks on the defense 
review to-indicate a desire to have our comments while avoiding any commitment 
that British decisions would conform to our views'. 214 
On the morning of 17 December, the President discussed the visit of Prime 
Minister Wilson in a meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Bundy and Jack Valenti. 
Rusk had just returned from attending the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Paris (14-16 December) and was asked by the President if he had brought 
back any peace proposals. Rusk answered: 
No. After moving around in NATO, I find Wilson is a paragon 
of courage. The rest are doing nothing. I really can't see why 
the British can't put in men to support the Australians. 
The President responded bitterly, saying, `Wilson is going to do nothing. He wants a 
DSC for fending off his enemies in Parliament'. 215 
When Johnson and Wilson had a brief discussion on Vietnam before lunch 
that day, the Prime Minister again highlighted his problems back home by showing 
the President a letter he had had from 68 Labour MPs `only a few of them 
traditionally concerned with the Vietnam question'. According to Wilson, Johnson 
was sympathetic to his difficulties but nevertheless went on to describe his own 
internal problems. 216 At the lunch that followed, attended by the Prime Minister, the 
President and Dean Rusk, very little of any consequence was said on Vietnam. All 
three agreed that the best role for Her Majesty's Government at present `was to 
214 Visit of Prime Minister Wilson, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 209, UK, Vol. VII, Memos, 10/65-1/66, LBJL 
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pursue vigorously and by every means the possibility of opening negotiations'. 217 
Wilson did raise the issue of an extended bombing pause, which the Americans 
admitted they were seriously considering, and also indicated that any bombing of 
Hanoi or Haiphong `would create the most serious problems for him and his 
Government in determining what line they would be obliged to adopt'. 218 The Prime 
Minister also agreed to increase the British contribution to the Asian Development 
Bank from $10 million to $30 million. 219 
Reactions to December Visit 
The Prime Minister felt `the talks could hardly have been more friendly, more 
open and more generally satisfactory and the Americans clearly welcomed the 
opportunity for a frank exchange of views'. 220 He was once more particularly keen 
to emphasize the warmth of the personal relationships, telling his colleagues about 
the President and Mrs. Johnson's invitation to join them for the Christmas Tree 
celebrations on the White House lawn. Wilson thought the visit had been `eminently 
successful. ' Bruce said that the Prime Minister had `every right to be pleased' by the 
visit `for President Johnson has been favourably impressed by him, and their 
relationship will be more intimate than heretofore. '22' 
The Americans noted that the Wilson visit: 
marked another step forward in the understanding and mutual 
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respect between the British Government and our own. The 
President and Prime Minister were able to understand each other 
quickly and easily on every issue they discussed, and both 
governments will now be able to move forward with confidence 
in a whole series of efforts which are of great concern to both 
of them. 222 
Wilson ended the year with talk of the `good atmosphere' created by his visit to 
Washington still prevalent. Bundy told Dean that `he thought this general feeling 
would begin to percolate widely since the President was letting everybody know how 
pleased he had been with his talks with you and how valuable they were likely to be 
as a foundation for the future'. 223 
There can be little doubt that part of the reason for the temporary 
improvement in Anglo-American relations was due to the recent abstention by the 
British from peace initiatives. The December visit had seen very little discussion or 
movement on the issue of Vietnam, partly because the British focus had turned to 
Rhodesia. 
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CHAPTER 5 
JANUARY-AUGUST 1966: 
`HALF THE WAY WITH LBJ': BRITISH DISSOCIATION 
With President Johnson's domestic difficulties mounting week by week, and 
with a successful outcome to the war in Vietnam proving illusory, Anglo-American 
relations were never likely to be a priority issue for the Johnson administration in 
1966, particularly now that the British government had made clear its decision not to 
play a military role in Vietnam. But Vietnam remained the Wilson government's 
major day-to-day domestic political problem. As the war escalated still further, the 
Prime Minister was faced with the difficult task of attempting to distance himself 
from the Johnson administration on Vietnam without alienating himself from the 
President. This would require delicate political footwork, not least because Britain 
still required American financial help for the pound. 
However appreciative of Wilson's diplomatic support on Vietnam during his 
rational moments, Johnson was furious that Wilson was not absolutely loyal, and 
therefore compliant, on this all-important issue to his administration. Throughout 
1966 the President's gut reaction towards Wilson and the British would challenge his 
logical understanding of the Prime Minister's domestic political problems. As the 
war continued to escalate, and appear increasing intractable, so the absence of the 
British flag in Vietnam became more problematic. And, after Wilson increased his 
Parliamentary majority in the 1966 General Election, the Johnson administration 
feared the Labour government might begin to backtrack from the 
`understandings' reached in 1965. 
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Anglo-American Relations - January 1966 
On 18 February 1966 Patrick Dean delivered his annual review of the United 
States for 1965 to the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart. Two particular 
issues stood out now that `the Johnson stamp' had become clearer. ' First was the 
fact that America's European policies had suffered due to the prioritisation of Pacific 
and Far Eastern affairs; second the fact that Americans viewed any alliance in terms 
of its usefulness to them had been `brought out more brutally by President Johnson 
then [sic] by his predecessor'. 2 Anglo-American relations were characterized as 
`close and friendly but essentially business-like. ' Although Wilson's visit to 
Washington in December was described as `a notable diplomatic success'. Dean 
stressed that: 
Mr. Johnson, like most Americans, believes that alliances 
are of little value unless they produce results. We are judged 
on what we can give to the free world and the stability and 
prosperity of the United States. 3 
Britain would be judged on its ability to deal with its continuing economic 
difficulties and any American help in that direction would come at a cost: 
They were not entirely satisfied that enough had been done 
to modernise the British economy; they were disturbed at 
elements in our labour situation especially the attitude 
between management and men. If Americans make economic 
decisions favourable to us they will have been made with 
more than half an eye on what we can deliver in return. 4 
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The only other noteworthy issue during 1965 was, of course, Vietnam. According to 
Dean 
British support for the American position in Viet-Nam 
was warmly acknowledged throughout 1965, though 
criticism of British shipping in North Viet-Nam ports 
appeared fairly regularly at the end of the year. 5 
The Johnson administration had indeed continually pressed the British government to 
deal with the shipping issue. At the end of January 1966, Dean Rusk, Secretary of 
State, again spoke to Stewart of Congressional `resentment' of British-registered 
ships visiting Hanoi and, indeed, said that this affected Congressional understanding 
of other British problems, including Rhodesia. He believed that if there were to be a 
vote it would go against the British 3 to 2.6 
In May 1966 after a Presidential approach on the issue, Wilson replied that the 
British had done all they could to gets their flag shipping out of North Vietnam, and 
indeed the problem had been `almost entirely reduced to Hong Kong registered 
British flag ships'. The Americans concluded that, `we do not feel there are any 
additional persuasive considerations which can be advanced to Wilson at this time'.? 
It was nevertheless a festering sore in Anglo-Americans relations in South East Asia, 
and contributed to the sense that the British were not being entirely cooperative on 
Vietnam 
' Ibid 
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Another Bombing Pause 
By the end of 1965 US troop deployment had reached 180,000 and the US Air 
Force had intensified and escalated its bombing program. On 15 December, the US 
bombed a major industrial target -a thermal power plant in the North and was even 
bombing Laos in order to curb infiltration of South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh 
trail. 8 The continued military build-up in South Vietnam added to the charge that 
the US was still seeking a military solution to the war. 
However, in the midst of this escalation the United States had begun a peace 
offensive. Beginning on 24 December, the United States and the NLF agreed to a 
30-hour Christmas truce. As part of this, the US suspended its bombing of North 
Vietnam. The Johnson administration decided to extend the halt in bombing in order 
to allow diplomatic exchanges to continue, either directly or indirectly through third 
parties, and to demonstrate its desire for peace to the growing number of opponents 
of the war. At the same time, however, ground, air and sea operations in South 
Vietnam not only resumed but actually increased. 
In order to emphasize the seriousness of US endeavours for peace, President 
Johnson wrote to 113 world capitals to discuss the route to negotiations. This 
correspondence included a list of `fourteen points' that contained the elements 
Washington thought should be included in any settlement. This was, of course, 
partly aimed at countering the North Vietnamese's `four points. ' As well as the 
Presidential approach to world leaders, Vice-President Humphrey was sent to Asia to 
see the leaders of Japan, Korea, Formosa and the Philippines in person, while UN 
8 Chester Cooper, The Lost Crusade: The Full Story of US Involvement in Vietnam from Roosevelt to Nixon (London: 
MacGibbon & Kee, 1970), p. 492 
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Ambassador Goldberg, had conversations with UN Secretary General U Thant, the 
Pope, General de Gaulle, Italian leaders, and Prime Minister Wilson. 9 
Wilson had however requested the briefing he received from Goldberg, it had 
not been volunteered. '0 As a result throughout the prolonged bombing pause the 
United States kept in close touch with London. As part of the peace offensive, 
President Johnson cabled Harold Wilson on 29 December asking for his advice and 
for his suggestions about possible British action. I I After some deliberation, Wilson 
replied on 31 December. Not only did Wilson encourage the US in its peace efforts, 
he also offered British services. He suggested to the President that, as well as 
informing the North Vietnamese about the continued pause through the American 
Ambassador in Rangoon as the US intended, the British could also approach them 
through their Consul-General in Hanoi and would also approach the Russians to 
persuade them of the sincerity of the American desire for peace. 12 
During the pause the Soviets sent a five-man mission to Hanoi headed by 
Alexander N. Shelepin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist 
Party. 13 Speculation was rife in London and Washington as to the purpose of this 
visit and to the possibility of talks developing from Shelepin's visit. The British 
suggested Washington extend the bombing moratorium, at least until Shelepin 
returned from Hanoi. This was partly because Patrick Dean had informed the 
Foreign Office that `some of the President's less sophisticated advisers' were not 
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`taking full account of the difficulties which the other side would have even if they 
wanted to change course'. 14 The British worried Washington would not give peace a 
chance. 
While the Americans may have agreed with the British that it was worth 
waiting for Shelepin to return home, they were not entirely confident that the British 
could be trusted with the delicate role of mediation. Rusk, in particular, felt the 
British were too anxious for peace and indeed told the President that they had to be 
watched as `they'd be inclined to give away too much. We don't want to lose cards 
we need to deal with. We must be clear with [the] Brit[ish]'. 15 This lack of trust in 
the British as intermediaries became a recurring theme in US attitudes to British 
peace efforts. On this occasion, the President thought that Wilson ought to 
understand the situation by now, that is, he should know the British could not speak 
for the United States without prior authorisation and understood the necessity for 
secrecy in Moscow or anywhere else. 16 
Although there was some evidence that Hanoi was probing the `fourteen 
points', after almost a month without bombing the Johnson administration's patience 
began to fail. '? On 24 January the President gave Wilson `as one of those who have 
most strongly supported our peace effort' a full picture of American views on the 
suspension of bombing, informing him that the pause had been successful 
14Letter from Tom Bridges, Foreign Office to Malcome Reid, 10 Downing Street, 30 December 1965, PREM 13/1271, 
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`everywhere except in Hanoi and Peking'. '8 Worried about the adverse publicity a 
resumption of bombing would attract, the Prime Minister told the President, 
It is of course of vital importance to the American image in the 
world, as well as to us and your other friends who will wish to 
defend your actions, that everything possible should be done to 
bring home your case to world opinion. 
To this end, Wilson suggested making public `all the evidence you are able to release 
of the use which the North Vietnamese have made of the bombing pause and the two 
holiday truces to reinforce their own military and to inflict casualties on American 
and South Vietnamese troops and civilians'. 19 Johnson listened to this advice as he 
was well aware that some of America's allies, including Japan, Canada, Poland and 
Pakistan, were against a resumption of bombing at this time 20 When bombing began 
again, the President knew it was crucial to `hold down statements from other nations' 
in order to prevent the escalation of domestic and international condemnation of the 
war. 21 However, Rusk admitted that the Americans were `a little thin about VC 
activity on the ground' and that this might `cause some trouble' when they resumed 
bombing. The President nevertheless agreed to all diplomatic missions receiving a 
summary of enemy military activity during the pause. And as one of the United 
States' `special friends' Johnson gave Wilson notice on 30 January that bombing was 
about to be resumed and told the Prime Minister that his firm support of this action 
18 Telegram from the President to the Prime Minister, 24 January 1966, PREM 1311196, PRO 
19 Telegram from the Prime Minister to the President, 26 January 1966, PREM 13/1196, PRO 
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was `another encouraging proof of the depth of our understanding'. 22 The bombing 
resumed on 31 January 1966. 
British Domestic Politics - Hull by-election to General Election - January-March 
1966 
The death of Henry Solomons, Labour MP for Hull North on 7 November 
1965 reduced the Labour Government's majority to one. 23 Hull North was a highly 
marginal seat and the by-election that followed centred on the issue of Vietnam. 
Richard Gott of the Radical Alliance stood against the Labour candidate, Kevin 
McNamara. Although Labour increased its majority in the Hull North by-election on 
27 January from 1,181 to 5,351, the by-election illustrated the growing importance of 
Vietnam in British domestic politics and highlighted the precariousness of Wilson's 
hold on power. 24 
The US resumption of bombing in North Vietnam meant as Wilson put it, 
`suddenly, the Labour Party was deep in a new crisis over Vietnam'. 25 Much of the 
outrage was due to a statement issued by Michael Stewart on the day the bombing 
restarted saying Britain `understood and supported' the action. This statement had in 
fact been written by the Foreign Office which, according to Wilson, had been `falling 
over itself to get into line' and issued a statement that had not been summitted to him 
for approval. Despite later arguing that he would `not have agreed to a statement in 
those terms, ' Wilson had no choice, however, but to tell his critics that the Foreign 
22 Memorandum from Bundy to the President, 22 January 1966 in FRUS, Vol. IV, p. 103; Telegram from the President 
to the Prime Minister, 30 January 1966, PREM 13/1196, PRO 
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Secretary had acted with his full authorization and cabinet approval. Privately, 
Wilson was `fuming' about it. 26 By now there was growing divergence of views 
between the upper echelons of the British Foreign Office and 10 Downing Street. 
The response to the Government's latest act of diplomatic support for US 
policy in Vietnam was widespread and vociferous. On the same evening Stewart's 
statement was issued, 90 Labour MPs signed and sent a telegram condemning the 
action to William Fulbright, US Senator, Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee and a growing critic of US policy in Vietnam. 27 No doubt LBJ was 
infuriated by this action, not least because Fulbright was rapidly becoming the 
President's bete noire. Until he openly turned against the Vietnam war in the autumn 
of 1965, the Senator had been a long-time friend of Johnson's. Fearing a 
confrontation with China or the Soviet Union, and believing the United States could 
not win where the French had lost, Fulbright was about to begin open Senate 
hearings on the war: Johnson would never forgive him for this betrayal. The Labour 
MPs could not have chosen a more telling target; by sending their concerns to 
Fulbright, they were aware they were fuelling Congressional criticism of the Johnson 
administration's conduct of the war. 
Despite the victory in the Hull by-election, the media reported excitedly on a 
Labour split over Vietnam. 28 On 2 February Wilson faced these critics at a private 
meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). 29 In what Wilson characterized as 
a `major storm', he replied for thirty minutes on the subject of Vietnam. As he later 
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put it when telling Johnson of his actions, `the Foreign Secretary and I decided to 
meet the challenge head on whatever the risk'. 30 With a General Election in the 
offing, the Prime Minister was alarmed that Labour were `presenting the image of a 
badly split party. '31 One `high placed Labour Government source' leaked the details 
of this meeting to the Americans and confirmed that the Prime Minister had indeed 
laid down the law and the `political facts of life' and was `in most aggressive, 
uncompromising, and effective style, completely ovenvhelming critics'. 32 According 
to the source, Wilson had let them know that he 
could not continue to govern with this kind of sniping from 
party dissidents on so central an issue. Moreover, he implied 
that if dissidents persisted in open opposition, which only 
gave comfort to Tories and weakened Labor's public credit, 
his hand might be forced and he would have to consider 
whether [the] matter should be put to [the] country. 33 
Wilson took particular pleasure in telling the President that he 
got considerable mileage out of [the] point that during the 40 
days bombing pause there was not a sound out of them 
commending the United States administration for the 
opportunities they had opened up for a peaceful settlement .... What I think was really damaging to the critics was my 
repeated jibe that none of them during this period had 
thought fit to send a telegram to Ho Chi Minh demanding now 
that he should respond in kind, or to demonstrate with `peace 
in Vietnam' banners outside the Chinese Embassy. This had 
the effect of detaching from the lobby all but the irreconcilables ... 
34 
30 Telegram from Prime Minister to President, 9 February 1966, PREM 13/1196, PRo 
31 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 267 
32 Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 2 February 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 209, UK, Vol. VIII, Cables, 1/66-7/66, 
LBJL 
33 Ibid 
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This taunt was also repeated on 8 February when Wilson faced a further grilling in 
Parliament during a lengthy debate on South and Southeast Asia when Wilson also 
voiced his conviction that President Johnson was sincere in his desire to end the 
fighting the Vietnam. 35 As Bruce pointed out, the Prime Minister's emphasis on 
Hanoi's part in the conflict `did well in ridiculing in advance points dissident Labour 
MP's' were likely to make. 36 He was also happy to report that as a result of `the 
rout' in Parliament, a telegram was duly sent to Ho Chi Minh by some of the same 
individuals that had earlier sent a telegram to Fulbright. Wilson summed up the 
`operation' as a `total success' but reminded the President that the problem was not 
likely to go away: 
We have got over a very awkward moment though it shows once 
again the difficulties I am bound to have from time to time when 
subject to group pressures with a parliamentary majority so much 
less than my real present majority in the country. 37 
This emphasis on a small working majority, naturally ever present in the Prime 
Minister's mind, would soon come back to haunt Wilson in his dealings with the 
President over Vietnam. 
The day after the Prime Minister's meeting with the PLP, 3 February, a 
meeting of the Cabinet took place which resulted in what Barbara Castle termed `the 
most spirited wrangle yet on Vietnam'. 38 Although the Cabinet minutes merely 
record that the discussion of the Foreign Office statement elicited `considerable 
35 Cable from Bruce to SecState, Washington, 8 February 1966, NSF, Country File, Europe & USSR, UK, Box 209, UK, 
Vol. VIII, Cables, 1/66-7/66, Doc. 65 ; Hansard Vol. 724,1965-66, Feb. 7-18, Col. and Hansard, Vol. 724,1965-66, Feb. 
7-18, Col. 252 
36 Hansard, 8 February 1966, Col. 36, Vol. 706 & Cable from Bruce, London to SecState, Washington, 8 February 1966, 
NSF, Country File, Europe & USSR, UK, Box 209, UK, Vol. VIII, Cables, 1/66-7/66, Doc. 65 
37 From Prime Minister to President, 9 February 1966, PREM 13/1196, PRO 
38 Barbara Castle diaries, 3 February 1966, p. 52 
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disquiet', it is clear this meeting presented Wilson with yet another challenge to his 
authority. Castle recalls that as well as herself, Richard Crossman, Minister of 
Housing and Local Government, Frank Cousins, Minister of Technology, and 
Frederick Lee, Minister of Power, protested at Stewart's statement of support for the 
renewal of American bombing. Apparently even Wilson's loyal Chief Whip, Edward 
Short was also `angry' about it, provoking Stewart to lose his temper with him. 39 
Barbara Castle acknowledged that this had been Harold's `most stormy week over 
Vietnam' but that he had `succeeded in allaying some of the bitterness about Michael 
Stewart's statements' during the Parliamentary Party meeting. 40 However, many in 
the Cabinet suggested the Government could have dissociated from the resumption 
of bombing whilst maintaining the official policy of support for American 
involvement in Vietnam. Wilson and Stewart defended their actions firmly, still 
maintaining Britain could act best as a mediator by not criticizing the Americans 
publicly. Indeed they argued it was their 
initiative which had originally persuaded the United States 
Government to institute a short bombing truce over Christmas 
and to extend it thereafter for a longer period than they had 
originally envisaged. 41 
Wilson later repeated this opinion in his memoirs saying the President `agreed to our 
demand for the extension'. 42 Although is could be argued that Wilson genuinely 
misjudged the extent of his influence on LBJ, this exaggeration of the truth was 
probably a case of retrospective self-aggrandisement by Wilson. The Johnson 
39 Barbara Castle diaries, 3 February 1966, p. 52 
40 Ibid 
41 Cabinet Minutes, 3 February 1966, CAB 128/41, PRO 
42 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 205 
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administration was under pressure from a number of countries to begin, and then 
continue the bombing pause. However, external pressure was only one factor 
influencing the Johnson administration's actions. Domestic considerations were 
much more important. Rusk admitted to the US Ambassador in Vietnam on 28 
December that: 
The prospect of large scale reinforcement in men and defense 
budget increases requires solid preparation of American public. 
A crucial element will be clear demonstration that we have 
explored fully every alternative but that [the] aggressor has left 
us no choice. 43 
He quoted the latest opinion polls which showed that the American people 
overwhelmingly favoured a renewed effort for a ceasefire and those same people 
would favour increased bombing if a pause or cease-fire failed to spark the interest 
of the enemy. 44 He further acknowledged that the Administration had the same 
problem in Congress. International pressure to institute a bombing pause had been 
worrying for the US, but it had not been a crucial factor in its decision; dissent at 
home was a much more urgent factor. 
By 9 February Wilson was bemoaning to the President that `the Foreign 
Secretary and I have had over the past ten days to face by far the most dangerous 
attack from within the Parliamentary Party on the question of Vietnam'. 45 The Prime 
Minister had proved adept at handling this crisis. It proved to be the last one that 
threatened his Government's existence. On 28 February Wilson announced a 
General Election for 31 March. Unlike the Hull by-election Vietnam was not an 
43 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 28 December 1966, FRUS 1964-68, Vietnam, Vol. 
III, November-December 1965, p. 717 
441bid. Harris poll showed 73% favored renewed effort for ceasefire and 61% favored increased bombing if pause failed 
to have any impact. 
45 Telegram from Prime Minister to President, 9 February 1966, PREM 13/1196, PRO 
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important issue in the General Election campaign and Labour won convincingly, 
increasing its over-all majority to 97. This had important ramifications for the Prime 
Minister's relationship with the White House, as Wilson could no longer justify his 
policy on Vietnam to President Johnson, as he had so often in the past, in terms of a 
small working majority. It would also mean the chances of an internal rebellion on 
Vietnam were much greater. Dissenters would now have much more freedom to 
publicly express their opposition to Wilson's policy on Vietnam. The Prime Minister 
also knew he would have more freedom to act in relation to the United States. With 
a comfortable majority, devaluation of the pound would not necessarily threaten the 
very life of his government. 
Yet More Peace Initiatives - Wilson's Visit to Moscow, 21-24 February 
On 31 January, the day President Johnson announced the resumption of 
bombing, he also asked the United Nations Security Council to consider a draft 
resolution seeking an international conference to end the war in Vietnam and 
establish peace in South East Asia. Clearly this was part of the propaganda effort to 
persuade domestic US opinion that despite the end of the pause the Government was 
still seeking peace by all means possible. It also had the added bonus of helping to 
assuage British domestic opinion on the same lines. 46 On 1 February the Security 
Council met to discuss the resolution but North Vietnam rejected any such action. 47 
46 Cable from Arthur Goldberg, London to President and SecState, Washington, 5 March 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, 
Box 209, UK, Vol. VIII, Cables, 1/66-7/66, LBJL 
47 Cooper, Lost Crusade, p. 492 
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During the pause Wilson had also raised with the Americans the possibility of 
a new British initiative as Geneva co-chair 48 After the resumption of bombing the 
Prime Minister felt it more urgent than ever that he try some new approach during his 
trip to Moscow, planned for 21-24 February. To this end, he cabled Johnson to say 
that he would attempt to persuade the Russians to call for the re-convening of the 
Geneva Conference. He also had another idea. He would try to arrange a meeting 
between himself and a senior North Vietnamese representative `who might come 
from Hanoi for the purpose, but, failing that with their resident representative in 
Moscow. '49 If the meeting took place Wilson told Washington he would: 
explain that the United States cannot be expected to accept 
the four points as they stand that it is useless to suppose that 
your government will be worn down by any military 
pressure North Vietnam can exert. I would then try to 
probe the North Vietnamese about possible ambiguities or 
loopholes 
... 
in their own proposals and would again offer to 
transmit any messages or proposals they may have. 50 
Wilson saw two advantages to this approach. Even if it produced no tangible results 
it would still be `a further demonstration of our will to peace and determination to try 
every means' to achieve it. And further, if the North Vietnamese refused to meet 
with him, Wilson would `at least be able to tell the Russians, with added force and 
emphasis, that their co-operation in joint action by the co-chairmen is indispensable 
if there is to be any progress towards a peaceful settlement'. 51 Johnson replied that 
he thought Wilson's proposal was a `good idea' and promised to furnish the Prime 
48 Summary Notes of 555th Meeting of the National Security Council, 5 January 1966, `Peace Offensive Regarding 
Vietnam', FRUS, Vol. IV, p. 19 
49 Cable from Prime Minister o President, No Date, PREM 13/1196, PRO 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid 
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Minister with the latest communication from Hanoi, although reminding him of `the 
great sensitivity of this contact'. The President ended by saying `your continuous 
and constant interest gives me strength and I send my thanks and the gratitude of my 
countrymen'. 52 The President clearly appreciated the Foreign Office statement of 
support regarding the resumption of the bombing. Wilson sent a further telegram 
that seems to demonstrate the cordiality of the personal relationship between the 
President and the Prime Minister at this point. He expressed his thanks 
for the kind words with which you ended your latest message. 
It is not difficult for me to go on trying, but I do deeply 
admire your own patient determination to explore every 
chance of peace in spite of all the sacrifices your forces are 
making in Vietnam and of the stubborn intransigence of the 
other side. 53 
In the event Wilson's trip to Moscow proved fruitless on Vietnam. On his return the 
Prime Minister cabled Johnson to let him know that the British delegation `made, as 
expected, absolutely no progress at all'. 54 It appeared the Russians felt they had little 
room to manoeuvre at this stage as any move on their part to put pressure on Hanoi 
would be taken advantage of by the `militant Chinese'. 55 Hanoi did not take Wilson 
up on the idea of a meeting of senior men, and instead a Minister of State at the 
Foreign Office, Lord Chalfont, met with the North Vietnamese charge d'affaires for 
a four hour discussion. The Prime Minister reported to LBJ and to his Cabinet that 
Chalfont also made no progress. 56 The private nature of this latest peace effort, not 
reported to his Cabinet or Parliament, indicates the Prime Minister's genuine desire 
52 Cable from the President to the Prime Minister, 14 February 1966, PREM 13/1196, PRO 
53 Cable from Prime Minister to President, Secret, 17 February 1966, PREM 13/1196, PRO 
54 Cable from Prime Minister to President, No date, PREM 13/1196, PRO; Wilson, Labour Government, p. 213 
55 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 214; Cable from Prime Minister to President, No Date, PREM 13/1196, PRO 
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to be of help in ending the war; he was not only motivated by domestic political 
considerations. 
The End of the Malaysian `Confrontation' 
On 22 February Defence Secretary Denis Healey's review of British defence 
policy was published. The White Papers outlined sharp cuts in defence expenditure. 
The aim was to cap the defence budget at £2,000 million for the years 1967-1970 by 
reducing it by £400 million. This would reduce the percentage of the Britain's gross 
domestic product spent on defence from 7% to 6%. These economies would be 
achieved through, amongst other things, the withdrawal of British forces from Aden 
in 1968 and the cancellation of plans for a British aircraft carrier. American F-111 
aircraft would instead provide a shore-based strike force role. 57 Although the 
Review spoke of the maintenance of a number of worldwide commitments, including 
a presence East of Suez, it was clear on both sides of the Atlantic that it was only a 
matter of time before Britain's military responsibilities overseas would be scaled- 
down even further. In the meantime, President Johnson and Secretary McNamara 
were adamant that Britain should maintain its presence in the Far East. The Johnson 
administration also renewed its hopes for a more conspicuous, military role for 
Britain in Vietnam. 
By early 1966 the United States began to realise that if the confrontation in 
Malaysia ended, Britain would have a substantial number of troops that could be 
made available for the fight in Vietnam. Consequently, one of Wilson's lines of 
57 Barbara Castle diaries, p. 56 
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defence against a troop commitment would have gone. Late in 1965 Sukarno was 
overthrown in a coup and replaced as President of Indonesia by Suharto who signed 
a peace agreement with Malaysia on 11 August 1966. It was apparent throughout the 
first half of 1966 that the Commonwealth forces were in a commanding military 
position and that the confrontation would shortly be resolved. 58 
Although the US sensed an opportunity to put pressure on the British to 
commit more fully to Vietnam, Rusk was worried that the ending of the 
confrontation in Malaysia might instead signal a complete withdrawal of British 
forces from the Far East. In January 1966 he voiced his concerns to the British 
Foreign Secretary while he was in Washington: 
It would be difficult for the United States if the United 
Kingdom plans for reduction of forces were predicated 
solely on the ending of confrontration. It would be much 
better if the assumption were more general, such as a 
peaceful situation in the Far East. 59 
As far as the British were concerned, a pull-out East of Suez was certainly not 
imminent at this point but neither was a deeper commitment in Vietnam. Stewart, 
apparently in answer to a direct question, said `even if confrontation [in Malaysia] 
ended, it would be extremely difficult for the United Kingdom to consider sending 
troops to Viet-Nam'. Rusk then asked if anything could be done in terms of civil aid, 
pointing out that even Iran had just undertaken responsibility for medical work in one 
province of Vietnam. He further pointed out that: 
in the United States the tendency was to call the roll and see 
which of America's allies were in Viet-Nam. The 
58 Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's War 1948-1966 (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 139 
59 Record of a Conversation over Lunch between the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Rusk, the United States Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, State Department, 27 January 1966, PREM 13/1272 
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Administration had used our Indonesian preoccupations in 
our defence, but in view of recent developments in Indonesia 
which most Americans considered favourable to us, this was 
wearing thin. 60 
Stewart did not respond to the implied criticism on this occasion. 
When the improved situation in Malaysia coincided with Labour's increased 
majority in the General Election, the US decided to act. In the middle of May one of 
the President's special assistants on Vietnam, Robert Komer, asked George 
Thomson, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, if Her Majesty's Government might 
be able to provide help on the `civil side' in Vietnam `from assets [the] UK might 
otherwise redeploy from Malaysia as a result of [the] easing of Indonesian 
confrontation policy'. The Americans were interested in civil truck outfits or 
construction units, specifically requesting 200 trucks. 61 Thomson told Komer he had 
no idea about their availability but would look into it. 62 
In early June Dean Rusk met Stewart again at a NATO meeting and discussed 
the United Kingdom's contribution in South East Asia more fully. He repeated his 
earlier observation, speaking of `the great difficulty that would be caused for the 
Administration if the ending of confrontation resulted in large withdrawals of British 
manpower from Malaysia without any compensating contribution to the stability of 
South East Asia. '63 Recognising that the British government faced severe political 
constraints on Vietnam, Rusk tried a different tack, suggesting the British had no 
Parliamentary commitments in respect of Thailand, and asked Stewart to give `very 
60 lbid 
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serious consideration' to helping the military there. The Thais had asked the 
Americans for about 12 helicopters to help with the counterinsurgency in the north- 
east. 64 The Foreign Secretary said he would think over the request but admitted that 
`it would certainly cause Parliamentary difficulty ... and moreover there was the 
financial aspect to be considered'. 65 The British government would have to think 
carefully about these latest propositions, especially in light of the latest defence 
review. 
Arms Sales 
With two American requests for material assistance already on the table - one 
for civil truck units for use in Vietnam, the other for military helicopters for use in 
Thailand - and with the Prime Minister due to meet Rusk on 10 June, the British 
Foreign Office urgently considered the best response. 
On 17 May, under intense Parliamentary pressure over Britain's Vietnam 
policy, Wilson had affirmed in the House of Commons that the British government 
`was not supplying arms directly or indirectly for the fighting in Vietnam'. 66 Wilson 
had based this policy on the British position as Co-Chair of the Geneva Conference, 
although he was keen to emphasise that the Soviets had no such compunction as Co- 
Chair and were `supplying arms on a very considerable scale for use in Vietnam'. 67 
Despite British claims of the moral highground, we now know that the British 
641bid 
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government had considered selling weapons to the US Navy for use in Vietnam. 
According to a June 1965 memo of conversation between Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk and the British Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, 
The British Ambassador said that the UK had received a request 
through Navy channels for certain bombs to be used in Vietnam. 
The UK was naturally only too happy to sell the bombs but 
preferred that in the future it not be said that they were to be used 
in Vietnam. 68 
While it is not clear whether these weapons were actually supplied or not, Healey 
later stated in Parliament that the British had turned down an American request for 
arms during this period. Nevertheless the intent to do so was there, as long as it 
could be done in secrecy. 
The supply of trucks alone was a complicated matter that would require the 
British Government to engage in yet another balancing act. As a major ally it was 
policy to sell military equipment to the United States. It had, however, been viewed 
as too sensitive to admit to selling arms for the war in Vietnam, thus the Prime 
Minister's statement on 17 May. Consequently, to send trucks to Vietnam would be 
to go against this statement. The Foreign Office acknowledged that in terms of 
`political considerations' to send truck units to Vietnam would be in effect to send 
troops there and would therefore also be `contrary to H. M. G. 's policy'. Moreover it 
could be the thin end of the wedge. 
If truck units went to Vietnam we might soon be faced with 
the request for armed troops to guard them; and in any case 
we could not ensure that they would be used for purely civilian 
purposes. 69 
68 Memo of Conversation between Patrick Dean and Dean Rusk, 22 June 1965, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 208, File: 
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The Foreign Office also questioned the advantage the Americans `would gain by 
introducing new-type vehicles into Vietnam, with all the attendant difficulties of 
maintenance and spare parts'. One Foreign Office diplomat acknowledged the truth 
of the matter, in a hand-written comment, `they want to be able to say we are 
helping. '7° The symbolic help such a commitment would have given was ultimately 
much more important than the practical help it would have provided. 
The request for helicopters was even more difficult. Indeed, this would have 
been a `new departure, contrary to our policy of avoiding further military 
commitments on the Asian mainland', while also running foul of the defence 
review's proposal to reduce costs. Unlike South Vietnam, which was only a protocol 
member of SEATO, Thailand was a full member. British army engineers were 
already there building a military airfield, in line with existing SEATO commitments. 
But as the Foreign Office acknowledged, `to station an operational unit in Thailand 
for active counter-insurgency tasks is a very different matter from supplying engineer 
units for a SEATO constructional task which is almost completed'. This would be a 
military, combatant role that would be unacceptable politically to the British 
government. 
The Prime Minister discussed this request with Rusk during a meeting in 
London on 10 June. The Secretary of State repeated his request for help in Thailand 
expressing his hope that `H. M. G. could ... draw some distinction between military 
aid for Vietnam and for Thailand'. 7' Instead of refusing immediately, the Prime 
70 Ibid 
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Minister detailed the nature of his domestic political problems over Vietnam, and 
also explained that the opposition to US policy on Vietnam had now been, 
compounded by growing Parliamentary and political opposition 
to the whole of Britain's East of Suez policy. This was essentially 
an unnatural alliance between those who held extreme left-wing or 
pacifist views and others who wished Britain to centre all her efforts 
in Europe. 
He further explained that, 
though unnatural, this alliance was potentially dangerous, 
more particularly since its general approach was supported 
by sophisticated economists who argued that we could not 
afford an East of Suez policy. We could not ignore the 
danger that giving what would inevitably be very marginal 
help to Thailand to deal with the bandits would strengthen 
this movement of opposition (which included a number of 
people who were increasingly taking a strongly anti- 
American line as well) and thereby merely create more 
difficulties for H. M. G. 's policy of support for the United 
States in Vietnam. 72 
Wilson had already begun to signal to the Americans the likelihood that due to 
domestic pressure, rather than his own predilections, he might soon be forced to 
reconsider his position on the British presence East of Suez. 
Denis Healey, also at the meeting, was more blunt. He suggested that 
Britain's `difficulties resulted from the underlying motive for the American request', 
which was `to commit H. M. G. publicly to a military presence further north within 
SEATO than hitherto'. This wish was `politically very delicate in Britain'. Rusk 
asked if the British people knew that Britain already had troops in Thailand, to which 
Healey replied they did not. Moreover, he believed there would 
72 Ibid 
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be real opposition to what Mr. Rusk was proposing, or indeed 
to anything like a further Thomson-type mission to Vietnam. 
We could get away with what was on the ground now; any 
addition would multiply our difficulties. 
In any case, Healey explained Britain was actually `very short' of helicopters and 
crews, and these were last kind of equipment they would wish to release for 
American use. 73 
The British record of this meeting also reveals a debate over whether the 
problem in Thailand was a legitimate issue for SEATO. If it was an internal security 
matter, a view Healey espoused, then it was not covered under the Manila Pact; if it 
was an external problem, as Rusk believed, then it was covered by the SEATO 
agreement. A debate ensued on the part SEATO played in international politics, with 
Wilson arguing that it `certainly existed, but surely it was not at the centre of any of 
our policies'. The US had, of course, used its commitments under the SEATO 
Treaty as legal justification for its involvement in Vietnam and, therefore, the 
alliance was a more salient topic in the United States than in Great Britain. Healey, 
probably reflecting Wilson's views as well, had let slip his belief that the Vietnamese 
problem was a civil war and was not likely to be won by the Americans. 74 
After the meeting, the Prime Minister cabled the President, saying the talk 
with Rusk had been useful and that he wished `we could help you with a few 
helicopters in Thailand' and that he would `look carefully at this'. 75 The British had 
no intention of being sucked into the Vietnam war via a military commitment to 
Thailand and it was decided that Stewart should inform the SEATO meeting in 
73 Ibid 
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Canberra, 27-29 June, that the British Government could not undertake any force 
commitment specifically to counter Communist subversion in Thailand. 76 
Denis Healey further confused the issue of arms sales by making a statement 
in the House on 23 June 1966 in which he attempted to refute newspaper allegations 
that Britain had agreed to supply British bombs and other weapons without imposing 
restrictions about their use in Vietnam. He said `the reports are totally inaccurate, 
and Her Majesty's Government have no intention of acceding to any such request'. 
When pressed on the nature of the requests made by the United States, he informed 
Parliament that, 
a request for certain airborne weapons was received from the 
United States a year ago, and we were unable to accept it. A 
further request was received some weeks ago. We are considering 
it, but we are satisfied we shall be unable to accept that, either. 
Leader of the Opposition, Edward Heath asked if the reason for the negative reply to 
these requests were `reasons of production, or because the weapons will be used in 
Vietnam'. 77 Healey admitted `we shall be unable to meet it for reasons of 
production'. After cries of `Ah' were heard in the House, Healey went on to say 
`But, in any case, after looking into the matter ... we are satisfied that it would not 
have been proper to meet this request'. 78 
To ease parliamentary pressures, Healey even considered seeking Cabinet 
approval for a Government statement barring the sale of lethal weapons which might 
be used in Vietnam. 79 The Americans were extremely unhappy with these public 
76 Hansard, Vol. 730,23 June 1966, Col. No 922 
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statements, and did not see Healey's proposal as much of an improvement, firmly 
believing the United Kingdom, as a major ally of the United States, should assert its 
willingness to sell arms to them `without restriction as to end use'. 8° Washington, 
and the President in particular, also viewed British prevarication as further evidence 
of the British distancing themselves from US policy on Vietnam. Bruce advised 
Washington `if the US wants the British to repudiate Wilson's and Healey's prior 
statements ... the only chance of taking this up successfully would be at the personal 
level between the President and Prime Minister'. 8' However, the Ambassador 
recognised that if Washington took this line it would be `posing Wilson with a most 
sensitive domestic political problem' and that `if the President does communicate 
with [the] Prime Minister he may wish to consider proposing that [the] British take 
[a] position that they are willing to restrict arms sales for use Viet Nam if Soviet do 
likewise'. 82 
Before this issue was resolved the US bombed oil installations near Hanoi and 
Haiphong and priorities changed. Healey did, however, try to clarify the British 
Government's position in a written answer on 30 June, when he said: 
Her Majesty's Government draw a distinction between the 
intentional supply of arms to Vietnam via a third country, 
which we would not allow, and the general supply of arms to 
allies, on which we do not normally place any restrictions. 
As I indicated in the House on 23rd June, Her Majesty's 
Government can and does ensure that arms exports are 
restricted, both by type and destination, to those which 
cannot be used in violation of its policies. 83 
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The Americans were still far from impressed by this apparent arms embargo, 
describing Healey's comments as a `serious error'. 84 However, after the Hanoi- 
Haiphong bombing, Bruce admitted to Washington that the issue of Vietnam was 
becoming `so acute' for the British Government that the chances of getting a 
`substantially improved HMG statement on arms policy' was `becoming more 
remote'. 85 Despite some additional Parliamentary statements that attempted `to make 
amends' as Walt Rostow put it, the arms sales issue cast a long shadow over US 
perceptions of Britain's trustworthiness as an ally. 86 
`Half the Way with LBJ': British Dissociation from the Bombing of Hanoi and 
Haiphong on 29 June 
In the weeks leading up to the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong the British 
and the Americans engaged in a protracted debate about the efficacy of such action. 
Much of this debate took place, by telegram, between the Prime Minister and the 
President. 
On 2 June 1966, General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
told General William Westmoreland, Commander of the US Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam, that it was time to take a decision on expanding the air 
campaign against North Vietnam. 87 For the previous six months Washington had 
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been seriously considering targeting two oil installations near Hanoi and Haiphong. 
In a cable to Wilson sent on 27 May 1966 the President explained, 
I am coming to believe it is essential that we reduce their oil 
supply in light of the radical increase in the flow of men and 
material by truck to South Vietnam. For me the calculus is, 
simply, whether they shall have less oil or I shall have more 
casualties. But I am determined that their civilian casualties 
be low and minimal. 88 
Well before this, at their Washington meeting the previous December, the Prime 
Minister had warned the United States that Britain would have no choice but to 
dissociate from any bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, and on his return to London 
had told the House of Commons that the Government had `always made it clear that 
there are some escalations of the bombing which we could not support, including 
bombing of the major cities of North Vietnam'. 89 
Colonel Rogers, a US army officer was sent to London by Secretary 
McNamara on 2 June to brief the Prime Minister and British Foreign Secretary on 
US plans to bomb Petrol, Oil and Lubricant (POL) storage installations near Hanoi 
and Haiphong. The Prime Minister cabled the President the next day with his 
response to the briefing. Although sympathetic to the President's `dilemma' over 
this decision, and aware of the great efforts to ensure civilian casualties would be 
low, Wilson reiterated his view that, 
as seen from here, the possible military benefits that may result 
from this bombing do not appear to outweigh the political 
disadvantages that would seem the inevitable consequence. If you 
and the South Vietnamese Government were conducting a declared 
war on a conventional pattern ... this operation would clearly be 
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necessary and right. But since you have made it so abundantly clear - 
and you know how much we have welcomed and support this - that 
your purpose is to achieve a negotiated settlement, and that you are 
not striving for total military victory in the field, I remain convinced 
that the bombing of these targets, without producing decisive military 
advantage, may only increase the difficulty of reaching an eventual 
settlement. 
He then repeated his own intentions in this matter. 
The last thing I wish is to add to your difficulties, but ... if this action is taken we shall have to dissociate ourselves 
from it, and in doing so I should have to say that you had 
given me advance warning and that I had made my position 
clear to you.... Nevertheless I want to repeat ... that our 
reservations about this operation will not affect our 
continuing support for your policy over Vietnam. 90 
The decision to order the bombings was delayed, in part, because the 
Americans wanted time to convince their closest ally not to dissociate from this 
action. 91 Rusk arranged to see Wilson in London and informed Washington that he 
would do his best to encourage the Prime Minister to rethink his decision. 92 In the 
event, the meeting on the morning of 10 June lasted only fifteen minutes and as 
previously noted mainly consisted of a discussion on British military assistance in 
Vietnam. Rusk was faced with a Prime Minister who had obviously made his mind 
up on proposed POL bombings and the Secretary of State soon realised his task was 
now damage limitation. To this end, he told the Prime Minister that the President 
approved of, and indeed hoped Wilson would say he had been consulted on US 
intentions prior to the bombing. However, he also hoped that the British would re- 
affirm their belief that Hanoi was the stumbling block over negotiations. The Prime 
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Minister and the Foreign Secretary examined their draft statement which would be 
issued in the event of POL bombings and decided `the point was adequately 
covered. '93 
Wilson did, however, elaborate on the rationale behind his deep concern over 
the planned escalation in bombing. He argued that bombing Hanoi and Haiphong 
would further jeopardize the chances of re-convening the Geneva conference on 
either Cambodia or Vietnam, especially as there had recently been evidence that the 
Russians were keen to have further talks with him on Vietnam. Rusk appeared to be 
extremely interested in these latest developments and agreed that Wilson should 
discuss his ideas with President Johnson before visiting Moscow again. Yet again 
Rusk encouraged Wilson to believe the US was exhaustively exploring every peace 
hope, thus indulging Wilson's belief that the US believed in Britain's `private' peace 
initiatives. 
Although Rusk explained to Wilson that the decision to bomb had not been 
finalised, the Prime Minister came away from their meeting feeling it was `virtually 
inevitable'. 94 British approval was desirable, but ultimately the military and civilian 
strategists in Washington were prepared to go ahead without it. Nevertheless, a 
series of terse exchanges between the President and the Prime Minister began the 
same day. Wilson and Stewart were puzzled over the apparent inconsistencies in the 
American position. If Washington `thought there was some chance of the Russians 
proving responsive to ideas of this kind' the decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong 
was `even more incomprehensible'. 95 Privately the Prime Minister believed the 
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bombing decision `was now necessary if only for domestic reasons in the United 
States'. Still, he cabled Johnson to point out the effect of the disastrous decision to 
bomb on any prospects for reconvening the Geneva conference. `I don't see how this 
can fail to affect the prospects of reconvening a Cambodia conference or of 
suggesting a meeting at Geneva for those who wish to come. '96 
At the same time as consultations over the POL bombings got under way, 
Wilson raised the prospect of another visit to Washington. The Prime Minister told 
Bruce on 2 June that there were a number of things he would like to discuss with the 
President and it had been six months since their last meeting. Perhaps sensing 
Presidential sensitivities over his visits, he assured the American Ambassador that 
`part of one day' would be sufficient. 97 Although Bruce thought Wilson would not 
`go along' with the bombing `affair', he still felt `the pros of a meeting, so obviously 
desired by him outweighed the cons' and therefore recommended the President see 
him because `in other policies of vital interest to us, I think he will be steadfast, and 
would be encouraged by direct contact with you'. 98 It was proposed that the 
meeting be unofficial as this would `be conducive to an informal atmosphere. '99 
Bruce explained to Johnson that he and Wilson felt the problem of a meeting 
was its timing: a visit shortly before the bombing `might be construed as a last 
minute plea' for Johnson to abandon the plan; if it took place just after it `might be 
interpreted in Britain as representing a summons from you to rake him over the coals 
for not having supported you in this respect'. 100 At their meeting on 10 June, Dean 
96 Personal Telegram from Prime Minister to President, 10 June 1966, PREM 13/1808, PRO 
97 Telegram from Rusk to White House, 2 June 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 209, UK, Vol. VIII, Cables, 1/66- 
7/66, LBJL 
98 Ibid 
99 Ibid 
100 Ibid 
285 
informed Wilson that Johnson had agreed that another visit would be useful. Later 
that day the Prime Minister cabled the President to elaborate on his ideas regarding 
the date of a visit. He said that he would prefer the visit to take place before he went 
to Moscow (a visit planned for July 9-10) `so that I am fully up to date on your 
thinking when I talk to the Russians' but recognised that this might not be possible, 
in which case he could visit after his return from Moscow `and would at least be able 
to give you a first hand account of their view'. On the issue of the POL bombing, 
Wilson argued he was sure : 
it is right for us not to meet too near the bombing. I should not 
wish to come before it. It would be a political mistake for both 
of us if people could say that I was making a trans-atlantic dash, 
with my shirt-tails flying, to put pressure on you. '°' 
Wilson then admitted the reason for his gentle pressure on the issue of a visit. He 
said he wanted to announce it publicly because 
I have a tricky Parliamentary Party meeting on June 15 (though 
it is causing me no loss of sleep) and I think there is some slight 
advantage in letting it be known that we are to meet before rather 
than after this, simply because an announcement after may get a bit 
close to your own d-day. 
At this stage Wilson was prepared merely to announce that they had agreed, in light 
of the Prime Minister's `useful talk' with Dean Rusk, to have a further brief meeting, 
as they did at fairly regular intervals and that this would probably take place at the 
end of June or early in July. 102 What is remarkable about this cable is Wilson's 
continuing disregard for Johnson's strong resentment about being continually used to 
101 Telegram from the Prime Minister to the President, 10 June 1966, PREM 13/1083, PRO 
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deal with Wilson's domestic problems. The President's suspicions on this count 
were compounded by the lack of a specific agenda for such a meeting. 
On 14 June Johnson tried the personal approach with Wilson over the British 
plan to dissociate. He cabled the Prime Minister expressing his deep hope that 
Wilson could `find a way to maintain solidarity' with the US, asking him to `give 
further thoughts' to British `interests and commitments in Southeast Asia under the 
SEATO Treaty'. The President's patience was obviously stretched on this point: 
Dean tells me that, in his talk with you and your colleagues, several 
references were made to the `revival [ofl SEATO. ' South Viet Nam 
and five signatories of SEATO are not talking about a revival but are 
committing troops to repel an armed attack from the north. 
He also let it be know that he now considered Britain's Co-Chairmanship of the 
Geneva Conference a convenient fig-leaf behind which to hide: 
Nor do I believe that your role as co-chairman means that 
Britain should stand aside; the other co-chairman is 
furnishing large quantities of sophisticated arms and other 
assistance to North Viet-Nam and is, therefore, an active 
partner in the effort to take over South Viet Nam by force. 103 
Recognising that his personal plea would probably be in vain, Johnson then virtually 
dictated Wilson's dissociation statement: 
Quite frankly, I earnestly hope that you will not find it necessary 
to speak in terms of dissociation. But it would be important to us 
if you could include the following elements: 
1. You were informed of the possibility that such an action would, 
in our minds, become necessary. 
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2. You expressed your own views to us in accordance with statements 
which you have already made in the House of Commons. 
3. The particular step taken by U. S. forces was directed specifically 
to POL storage and not against civilian centers or installations. 
4. Since Britain does not have troops engaged in the fighting, it is not 
easy or appropriate for Britain to determine the particular military 
action which may be necessary under different circumstances. 
5. It is a great pity that Hanoi and Peiping have been so unresponsive 
to unprecedented efforts by the U. S. and others to bring this problem 
from the battlefield to the conference table. 
6. Britain is satisfied that U. S. forces have no designs against civilian 
populations and are taking every possible precaution to avoid civilian 
casualties. 
7. Britain as a member of SEATO fully understands and supports the 
determination of its fellow SEATO members to insure the safety and 
the self-determination of South Viet Nam. 
I would hope that you could in this context affirm your support for the 
effort in Viet Nam and your understanding that it is Hanoi which is 
blocking the path to peace. '°4 
The President also wrote that the timing of Wilson's visit to Washington was 
`somewhat complicated'. He agreed that there should be `a good deal of blue sky' 
between the visit and POL bombings and therefore felt any time in June was no 
good. Early July was also problematical as their respective calendars were pretty 
full. He therefore suggested mid or late July if the Prime Minister felt a talk at that 
time `essential'. Precise dates for the visit would be left `open for further 
determination'. 105 Again, the suggestion was that if Wilson did not comply with 
Johnson's wishes regarding the statement, a visit to Washington might not happen at 
all. 
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Not surprisingly the President's cable worried London. Stewart sought 
Patrick Dean's advice on the President's reply, protesting the cable was 
`disappointing in terms both of timetable and of substance'. He found the 
President's emphasis on military action in relation to the POL bombings, without any 
mention of possible peace explorations with the Russians, and his comments on 
SEATO, particularly 'discouraging'. 106 However, the Foreign Secretary advised 
Dean that although HMG would have to dissociate `we should not have too much 
difficulty in incorporating most of the elements mentioned by the President' in the 
dissociation statement, except for point 7. This point, linking Vietnam to SEATO, 
would cause `considerable difficulty' for Britain as it was not `either in the interests 
of SEATO itself, or politically feasible for H. M. G. '. Regarding the timing of 
Wilson's visit to Washington it was noted that the tone of the President's reply made 
a meeting in mid July `all the more desirable' and indeed the `Prime Minister would 
prefer to visit Washington to clear the air fully with the President, before going to 
Moscow'. '°7 
Patrick Dean agreed with Stewart's summation, admitting that `apart from its 
content' he also found the tone `quite disturbing' 
in its emphasis on military action, the possible implied link 
between satisfying the President's wish for public support 
and his agreement to a Washington visit, and his apparent 
lack of interest in the Moscow visit, seems to indicate an 
unusually difficult frame of mind. This, unfortunately 
incalculable, consideration is perhaps the most important 
factor against which the desirability of a visit in mid-July 
should be measured. '08 
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Dean was probably well aware of the rumours circulating around Washington about 
Johnson's state of mind. From early 1965 reports emerged from the White House of 
the President's increasing paranoia regarding anything to do with the war. By the 
middle of 1966 the President's moods were increasingly unpredictable. As more and 
more people questioned his policy in Vietnam, including Robert McNamara - who 
was now privately expressing his view that a military solution was impossible - the 
more Johnson `hunkered down'. LBJ felt a growing sense of frustration as he led his 
country into a deepening conflict in the knowledge that there was no immediate 
military or political solution in sight. He was tormented by the loss of life, regularly 
quoting the number of American `boys' lost each day. Moreover, the war on poverty 
and the Great Society programmes were being damaged by the spiralling costs of the 
war. Congressional critics of the war though still relatively small in number, were 
becoming increasing vociferous, especially Senators Mike Mansfield and William J. 
Fulbright. The anti-war movement intensified its activities with sit-ins, mass 
marches and teach-ins now commonplace. The chant of `hey, hey LBJ, how many 
kids did you kill today? ' could be heard outside the White House. By the beginning 
of June public opinion polls revealed that 37% of the American public disapproved 
of the job the President was doing in Vietnam, with 41% approving. The sentiment 
in the country appeared to be either win the war by escalating it or withdraw from it. 
By the end of June more people disapproved of the President's handling of the war, 
42% than approved 40%. I09 
Johnson's image of his own Presidency was crumbling before his eyes. 
Instead of rethinking the limited war strategy, in light of the lack of 
109 Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
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military progress and the growing domestic and international criticism of US 
involvement, he increased his determination to plough on with the bombing and the 
war in general. Consequently 1966 saw a marked hardening of the President's 
attitude, accompanied by an increasing bloody-mindedness towards critics and allies 
- especially ones who failed to toe every inch of the US line - alike. By and large, 
his advisors fell into line with this tougher attitude. As Robert Dallek put it, by the 
middle of 1966 
The war now so enraged Johnson, Humphrey, and most other 
foreign and defence policy makers in the administration that they 
could no longer respond unemotionally to criticism of their 
actions ... they had come too far to turn back .... There was a 
quality of illusion to everything they said and planned for Vietnam. I1° 
All this may explain why the British Ambassador in Washington asked HMG 
to reconsider its stance on SEATO in light of Johnson's own domestic 
considerations. 
The SEATO point is one on which, I must underline, the 
administration has become deeply committed in public not least 
in relation to its attempt to maintain support in Congress.... This 
is strongly reflected in the President's sour remark about `not 
talking about a revival of SEATO'. This is of course for the 
Americans not a legalistic point, but goes to the very heart of the 
notion of collective security and their approach to Asian defence, 
which they see as being in our interests to share. III 
As a compromise, Dean wondered if it would be possible `to go some way to meet 
the President's seventh point, which merely asks us to understand and support the 
determination of our fellow SEATO members, by reaffirming previous statements 
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about Viet Nam made in the context of SEATO'. He acknowledged, however, that 
he could not be sure if this would satisfy the President. ' 12 
Dean was equally concerned over the matter of another visit by the Prime 
Minister to Washington. 
I cannot escape the impression that the President is trying to 
meet the Prime Minister's wish for an early announcement 
while in fact leaving himself free to call the visit off later on, 
on some pretext or other. This would be entirely consistent 
with his general policy of keeping himself uncommitted for 
as long as possible to specific engagements. In other words 
he would like to wait and see what the position is in general 
following the bombing. He cannot now foresee what 
complications and difficulties there might be and hence 
cannot decide at this stage whether a visit by the Prime 
Minister would be in his interests or an added embarrassment. 113 
Three factors might influence LBJ's decision. Firstly, whether or not Wilson 
announced a visit to Moscow after the bombing. Secondly, the Prime Minister's 
actual reaction to the bombing. And thirdly, how Congressional and public opinion 
shaped up in response to the Prime Minister's position on the bombing. 114 The 
Ambassador therefore advised the the Prime Minister to postpone any announcement 
of a possible visit to allow `time for further considered exchanges with the President 
leading, I would hope, to amicable agreement. 115 
Before replying to the President, Stewart, on Wilson's suggestion, arranged to 
meet with the American Ambassador, David Bruce for further guidance. ' 16 Bruce 
felt the Prime Minister `should not be put off by the apparently chilly phrase `if you 
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think it essential" and should therefore go ahead with the visit in mid to late July. 
He thought it particularly important that the personal relationship `should be kept up 
by means of a further visit'. 1 7 He was also `emphatic' that, once arranged, the 
President would not cancel the meeting but advised `very strongly against making an 
announcement before its terms and date had been cleared with the President. ' He 
apparently volunteered that the British `should not repeat that all the time the Prime 
Minister required would be a working lunch. It was just possible that this idea might 
be taken literally'. "8 He advised not commenting on the content of Johnson's 
message. 
Wilson listened to this advice and responded to President's cable the next day, 
merely saying that he was grateful for Johnson's frankness, acknowledging `each of 
us now fully understand the others position about the bombing of the oil 
installations'. 119 He did, however, note that the recent exchange had convinced him 
of the need for a short meeting and accepted the President's suggestion that they 
meet in mid or late July. As he suspected the bombing would start shortly, Wilson 
pressed for an announcement as soon as possible. Unusually for Johnson, who rarely 
put his thoughts down on paper, he scribbled his response to Wilson's acceptance of 
his suggested dates on the cable. He wrote, for Walt Rostow's reading, `if Rusk 
and you think necessary'. 120 This was yet another clear indication of LBJ's 
indifference to the British; he had no real agenda to confer with Wilson or help with 
his domestic difficulties. 
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An earlier draft of Wilson's message perhaps reveals Wilson's real thoughts 
on this issue. In this version the tone and content was much more forceful and 
assertive, particularly on the issue of British support on Vietnam, and on the role of 
SEATO. 121 Wilson acknowledged to Johnson that his problems on Vietnam must 
seem `relatively minor ... compared with its all-pervading importance in your own 
case. ' However, referring to that morning's confrontation with the PLP he pointed 
out that `the whole complex of Far Eastern defence problems is becoming 
increasingly difficult here. My concern is not to do anything which will reinforce the 
unnatural alliance, small in size but covering the whole spectrum of the Party, which 
we have for the time being totally deflated. ' The Prime Minister also attempted to 
assert some independence on the issue: 
You point out in your message - and indeed ask us to admit 
publicly - that the fact of our not being militarily involved 
makes it difficult for us to comment authoritatively on the 
required military action. I know you will not mind my saying 
- and indeed to say this to someone of your immense political 
experience is almost an impertinence - that we must equally be 
the best judges of what is politically feasible for the Government 
if we are to maintain (as I am determined to do) our support for 
you in Vietnam and our continued military involvement in South 
East Asia. 
This unsent version of Wilson's reply also commented on the issue of the SEATO 
request: 
Of course we accept our obligations under the SEATO Treaty 
[including the obligation for consultation under paragraph 2 of 
Article IV]. But these kinds of Treaty obligations cannot be 
isolated from the political context affecting them. As I said 
before, I believe that the relatively marginal military support 
you are asking us for here would threaten the policies I have 
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referred to above. 122 
The Prime Minister's anger at being dictated to by the President was evident in the 
unsent message. Wilson's decision to send instead a brief, dispassionate reply was 
therefore something of a triumph for the British and American Embassies and the 
Foreign Office as they struggled to contain the emerging crisis over `dissociation' 
which continued over the following weeks. 
In the weeks leading up to the POL bombing, despite the clarity of Wilson's 
position, the White House - more specifically Walt Rostow - continued to put 
pressure on the British not to dissociate. While Patrick Dean was out of Washington 
on a visit to the North West, J. E. Killick deputised at the British Embassy and 
engaged in a series of exchanges with Murray Maclehose, a Foreign Office adviser in 
Downing Street. Despite Wilson's reply, Killick remained concerned about the 
President's message of 14 June. 123 He puzzled over the implications of the `SEATO 
ploy', wondering if it was 
a serious attempt to put the Prime Minister on the spot 
(and if so, whether it presages an attempt to get British 
troops into Vietnam - which we rather doubt - or simply 
to hold the line on moral support from a vital SEATO ally 
in the suspicion that we are keen to write off SEATO - 
which is best guess), or whether it is no more than an 
attempt to pull out all the stops, which will have no 
particularly serious effect on relations between the two if 
it does not succeed. 124 
The following day, 17 June, Killick talked to Walt Rostow on the telephone 
and gained further insight into the extent and nature of the President's displeasure. 
Rostow said that Rusk and he had had to work very hard on 
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the President to prevent the message of 14 June from being 
`something really bad'. He was afraid that it was not fully 
appreciated in London that the President's state of mind was 
one of absolute determination to see Viet Nam through, come 
hell or high water. The Americans were being knocked `from 
hell to breakfast' on the ground over something which the 
President and Rusk saw in absolutely clear-cut terms as a matter 
involving SEATO no less than the Geneva Accord. The Asian 
Allies were all with the United States, the Europeans were not, 
and the President no longer attached any real importance to the 
co-chairmanship point in the case of the United Kingdom. 125 
Again, Killick thought Rostow's comments might be meant to push the British as far 
as possible: 
It may, of course, be that much of this is a conscious ploy as 
part of an exercise to pull out all the stops ... but I do not 
think this can be wholly the case, and it will be wise to tread 
with the utmost caution in further exchanges in the foreseeable 
future. Although he has underlined his own internal difficulties 
in his message of 14 June, the President understands the 
Minister's need to put a certain slant on anything he says 
publicly for home consumption over the next few weeks; but it 
would be no bad thing, if when this has to be, the President 
could be given some reassuring private warning and/or 
explanation. 126 
This Wilson would do. Johnson's retort that Wilson should visit only if he thought it 
`essential', was ignored by the Foreign Office who thought it right to go ahead with 
such a visit. Maclehose told Killick that he thought this decision was `right' because 
the damage that might have been expected from a suspended 
idea of a visit once it had been broached could have been greater 
than to go ahead and announce it as we have done. We all realised 
there were risks either way and that in any case we were dealing 
with an imponderable with the President's personality. 127 
125 Telegram from Killick to Maclehose, Foreign Office, 17 June 1966, PREM 13/1083, PRO 
126 Ibid 
127 Letter from Maclehose to Killick, 17 June 1966, PREM 13/1083, PRO 
296 
Maclehose understood the problem of reacting to gossip and rumour coming out of 
the White House, regardless of its source. He therefore advised Killick unofficially 
that not only could he see little chance of the terms of the announcement of 
dissociation being further revised, but thought Killick was 
right not try to extract from the White House indications of the 
President's reactions to these exchanges. We are very interested 
in the side effects and the noises off but what matters is the texts 
that passed; for the rest I suggest you play it Cool. 128 
Johnson's anger became demonstrably apparent, however, in his obvious 
reluctance to receive Wilson in Washington. Having appeared to have agreed to the 
Prime Minister's visit, even if not a particular date for it, the President appears to 
have changed his mind shortly afterwards. As Rostow put it to Rusk, `as of the last 
moment the President became deeply disturbed about the Wilson visit'. 129 
Johnson's initial doubts about the visit had now apparently crystallised into definite 
opposition. On the day the visit was made public in London, the British were 
perplexed to find that the announcement had not been made simultaneously in 
Washington as planned. Killick noted a few days later that `the handling of the 
announcement at this end was distinctly odd'. 130 He outlined events as follows: 
Although we know that the President himself, in an off-the- 
record talk with selected journalists the night before the 
announcement, made passing reference to Mr. Wilson in 
reply to a general question about visitors he expected 
during the coming weeks, the White House in fact did not 
itself formally make the announcement at all at the agreed 
time on the following morning. When our Information 
Department checked with the White House press people 
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half an hour before the release was due, they were told 
enigmatically that there would be `no White House 
announcement at this stage' and that further enquiries 
should be directed to Rostow. 131 
Behind the scenes, the President was reconsidering. At 3.30 pm that afternoon 
Rostow sent a Top Secret memorandum to the President summarising the evolution 
of the visit's announcement as he saw it. Rostow explained that the change of date 
from `mid' to `mid or late July', cabled to Wilson on 14 June, had been the 
President's idea. However when Wilson replied accepting the suggested timeframe 
on 15 June, the President conveyed to Rostow his `deep and serious reservations 
about the visit as a whole' but `concluded ... 
by observing reflectively that it would 
be difficult for us to turn down Wilson, having just agreed to Erhard'. Then, 
according to Rostow's recollection, he had called Secretary Rusk telling him of 
Johnson's `grave second thoughts about the visit' and urging him to talk to the 
President immediately. And as noted earlier, on 16 June the President had marked 
the Prime Minister's message with a grudging 'OK if Rusk and you think 
necessary'. 132 According to Rostow, Rusk had thought that it was `wise' to go ahead 
with visit because of the commitment to see Chancellor Ludwig Erhard of West 
Germany and felt the announcement should be `as soon as possible before the week 
end so it would not be connected with decisions which might be made this week 
end'. The British were informed that the announcement could go ahead for Friday 
17 June at 11.00 am. As Rostow put it `as of last night I thought we were all 
together'. 133 
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Rostow then outlined the position `as things stand'. 
I take it to be our task to make bloody clear to the British 
Embassy in Washington and the British government in London 
that (1) the visit must be very carefully prepared; (2) the Prime 
Minister, whatever his pressures at home, should not come unless 
what he says here in public and in private reinforces your position 
on Viet Nam; (3) if this is impossible for him, he must find an 
excuse for the visit not to take place. 134 
The President agreed that this was the position and Rostow duly informed Rusk of 
the need to ensure that the relevant parties were informed. 135 The visit would go 
ahead but Johnson obviously felt he had been pushed into it. The President now had 
no enthusiasm for a meeting with the British, especially if Wilson intended to 
criticise US policy in Vietnam. 
The Americans deliberated over the bombing of the POL targets for another 
two weeks. On 17 June the President acknowledged during an NSC meeting that one 
of the reasons for a delay in making a decision had been that Rusk had had to have 
time to talk to some of American's key allies, including Britain and Canada. 136 Rusk 
recognised that domestic and international opinion was trying to push the United 
States Government in opposite directions. He explained that the American people 
have a feeling of impatience, and, over time, they demand a 
quick end of the war as the price for their continued support. 
This restlessness is evident in the public opinion polls. Opinion 
abroad hopes that no larger military measures will be necessary... 
We are under constant observation by everyone abroad. 137 
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This fact was brought home later that month when a group of Democratic Senators 
met with Senator Mike Mansfield to discuss Vietnam. The results of the discussion 
were forwarded to Johnson. The report was incredibly negative, particularly in 
reference to the almost $2 billion per month cost of the war and the implications of 
that expenditure for Johnson's domestic policy. The senators were extremely 
concerned about the damage Vietnam was doing to the party: `Viet Nam is worse 
than Korea and remember what Eisenhower did with the latter. ' They also noted 
starkly that `the only major country supporting us is Britain which is totally 
dependent on us'. 138 The Johnson administration was well aware, therefore, of the 
dangers posed by any weakening of Britain's public support for US policy in 
Vietnam, however slight it might be. Despite the fact that British `dependency' gave 
Johnson's some leverage, in the days before the POL bombing, Johnson was 
unwilling to force Wilson to go back on his Commons statement, and not dissociate. 
Discussions on sterling had revealed the risks involved in making Wilson co-operate 
on areas of foreign and defence policy. The British might just see devaluation of the 
pound as preferable to complete domination by their American cousins. This being 
said, Johnson was extremely angry at Wilson's plans to dissociate and would 
therefore not stop heavy hints being made about the potential impact of such an act 
on Anglo-American relations. For this reason, Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow both 
spoke to Patrick Dean about Wilson's forthcoming visit to Washington. As 
instructed, they were at pains to ensure Wilson's visit did not cause Johnson further 
difficulties. On 22 June Dean informed Michael Palliser of the nature and content of 
138 Discussion of Viet Nam by Committee Chairmen or Designees, Washington, 28 June 1966,12.30 pm, FRUS, 
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his talks with Rostow and Rusk, noting that `both said very much the same things. ' "39 
Palliser passed the details on the Prime Minister. 140 
Rostow admitted the President's first reaction to the idea of a visit by the 
Prime Minister had been `far from favourable'. This was because the President was 
`under great domestic pressure and was, because of Vietnam, having to sit by and see 
his overwhelming political power fragmented'. 141 In April 1965 Lester Pearson, 
Liberal Prime Minister of Canada has angered Johnson by making a critical speech 
on Vietnam in Philadelphia. When Johnson met Pearson at Camp David, the 
President had the Prime Minister by the lapels, castigating him for adding to the 
Presidents problems. If it wasn't bad enough some his liberal friends at home where 
condemning him, he now had to contend with his allies abroad joining in. 142 
Rostow warned that `if anything of this sort were to occur the damage to Anglo- 
American relations would be great and long-lasting'. He also passed on the White 
House view that if the Prime Minister `could not say helpful things about Vietnam 
both privately and publicly, i. e. to leading Senators and so on, when he was in 
Washington' then it would be best if he did not visit. Johnson was frustrated and 
annoyed by the disparity between the large amount of support he was getting 
privately on Vietnam and the minimal public expression of that support. Rostow said 
the President had received messages from Mrs Gandhi, Lee Kuan Yew and the 
Israeli government `urging him not to give way or abandon South Vietnam', yet they 
did not support him publicly. 143 
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According to Rostow, the President wanted `practical help, not advice about 
how to run the war and conduct limited military operations from those who were 
taking no active part'. 144 As a result of these feelings on the President's part, Rostov 
indicated that Johnson's first reaction to the Prime Minister's message of 14 June 
`had therefore been very strong, particularly to the implication that he was about to 
order the bombing of civilian centres when in fact all that the Americans intended to 
attack was oil installations and trucks. ' Moreover, the President `had very much 
admired the way in which the Prime Minister had stood his ground and given ... such 
firm support when he had only a majority of three' but `could not understand why, 
when Mr. Wilson had a really big majority, he felt it necessary to dissociate himself 
much more than before from American action'. 145 This indicates two errors in 
Johnson's understanding of the situation. Firstly, in many ways the existence of a 
large majority allowed backbench opponents of the British stance on Vietnam the 
freedom to voice and act on their views in a way that was impossible when the 
Government's tiny majority meant the life of the Government might be jeopardised 
by internal dissent. And secondly, the President was ignoring the deepening 
unpopularity of US action in Britain, particularly the military escalation. The 
numbers questioning the Labour Government's support of US policy in Vietnam had 
not remained the same. 
The following day Dean conveyed yet more political gossip to Palliser. 
Francis Bator, who Dean felt was `friendly' to the British, had the previous night told 
an Embassy officer much the same as Rostov had said to him. However, he said 
`specifically that if there is a row between the Prime Minister and the 
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President over all this it will spill over into a lot of other matters'. Dean suspected 
this meant `support for sterling'. He therefore again suggested Wilson rethink 
dissociation. 
It does seem to me that if the bombing takes place and is 
successful in hitting the oil installations only and killing very 
few civilians, it would be well worthwhile if it were possible 
for the Prime Minister either not to make a public dissociation 
statement or to say the absolute minimum. 146 
The same day the Foreign Office informed the Prime Minister that: 
even making allowance for some colourful reporting by Rusk and 
Rostow -I think we must take it that, whatever the President's present 
mood, he has been thinking and speaking privately pretty harshly 
about us during the past few days. 147 
London was aware that dissociation would be a gamble; no-one could predict 
Johnson's response. To Wilson's credit, he resisted pressure from his own civil 
servants, and maintained his position on the POL bombings. 
Reaction to POL Bombings 
On the day of the POL bombings 10 Downing Street issued a carefully 
worded statement that Wilson later read out to the House. The Foreign Office 
apparently tried to water down the statement offering Wilson an alternative, but 
Wilson refused: `I indicated to them into which part of their filing system they were 
free to put it. ' 148 The key sections of his statement were as follows: 
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It is difficult for the British Government, which is not involved 
in the fighting in Viet-Nam, to assess the importance of any 
particular action which the United States Government regards as 
militarily necessary in this conflict. Nevertheless, we have made 
it clear on many occasions that we could not support an extension 
of the bombing to such areas, even though we were confident that 
the United States forces would take every precaution, as always, to 
avoid civilian casualties. We believe that the value of each 
application of force must be judged not merely in terms of the 
military needs which it is designed to meet, but also in terms of the 
additional suffering and distress which it inflicts upon innocent 
people and the effect it can have on the prospects for an early move 
to a political solution. ... For these reasons, when President Johnson 
informed me that the United States Government judged it necessary 
to attack targets touching on the populated areas of Hanoi and 
Haiphong, I told him that we should ... feel bound to reaffirm that 
we must dissociate ourselves from an action of this kind. 149 
Despite this, Wilson announced that Britain remained 'convinced.. that the United 
States are right to continue to assist the millions of South Vietnamese, who no longer 
wish to live under Communist domination' and blamed the North Vietnamese refusal 
to talk for the continuation of fighting. 150 Wilson thus delivered his statement on the 
lines suggested by the White House, except for the exclusion of any reference to 
SEATO. 
Wilson was criticised by the leader of the opposition, Edward Heath, as 
holding `a completely untenable position', in generally supporting the US policy in 
Vietnam while at the same time `dissociating himself from the implementation of 
that policy'. 151 This was because, as the Economist later put it, Wilson had 
`alienated [the] US, and weakened the cardinal operating principle of Anglo- 
American alliance that UK generally goes along with US on big questions of foreign 
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policy, while retaining useful `nudging' function at times'. 152 Wilson defended 
himself by arguing it was, 
perfectly possible, reasonable and logical to support a 
general policy without committing oneself to every action 
taken in support of that policy. To assume in advance that 
one will support every action taken in support of a given 
policy might lead Her Majesty's Government, or even Her 
Majesty's Opposition, into a very difficult situation. 153 
Despite criticism from the official opposition, most within his own party supported 
the dissociation, although some argued for a complete dissociation from US policy in 
Vietnam. There was undoubtedly a fear that this latest action on the part of the 
Americans could trigger intervention by China or the Soviet Union, and thus spark a 
third world war. 154 On the day of the bombing Barbara Castle noted in her diary, 
What will Harold do now? None of us were consulted of course, 
but I was immensely relieved when he volunteered a statement to 
the House dissociating himself from it. It was a careful minimum 
of dissociation, however. '55 
Wilson went to Cabinet the next day to ask for its approval of his dissociation 
statement. Richard Crossman noted that: 
we did so unenthusiastically because few of us, I think, felt it 
was more than a posture. We knew perfectly well that as soon 
as he got across the Atlantic and talked to Johnson, Harold would 
indicate to the President that there was nothing in what he had 
said or done which made his loyalty to the Vietnam policy less 
profound. 156 
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British dissociation from the POL bombing was not the only negative reaction 
around the world. A number of nations voiced their objections to this latest 
escalation of the war. George Ball, Acting Secretary of State while Rusk was in 
Canberra at the SEATO meeting, was faced with responding to the criticisms. ' 57 
During a meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright said 
that it was significant that none of America's NATO allies had given support for the 
raids. Defending US action, Ball thought the British Government's linkage between 
the POL targets and a loss of civilian life was a mistake. 158 
Wilson faced a double bind. Not only was he confronted with intense 
Parliamentary pressure to extend his dissociation of the POL bombings to an outright 
dissociation of American policy, he also knew that he had to prevent a full-scale rift 
with. President Johnson. On 1 July Wilson sent a six-page telegram to Johnson in an 
attempt to justify his decision to dissociate, and as Crossman suspected, to assure the 
President of his continuing support of American's general policy in Vietnam. He 
began with a now familiar refrain, `my thoughts have been very much with you 
during these past two exceptionally difficult days'. 159 He then went on to outline the 
nature and extent of the negative criticism he had received over the POL bombing 
operation and castigated his critics for being `more vociferous in their criticism than 
fertile in providing any constructive alternative'. He again explained the spread of 
opposition to the war: 
Many of our more moderate British critics are gradually being 
maneouvred into taking their stand with extremists whose views 
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as put forward they would probably, if challenged, repudiate. 
The fact that the British people are physically remote from the 
problem and, in particular, are not suffering the tragedy of the 
losses which your people are suffering serves to increase this 
lack of understanding of my full support for your basic policy. 160 
He then got on to the real reason for his telegram: 
I know that you must feel that some actions and statements of 
ours in the past few days have not been helpful. And there are 
no doubt in both countries those ready to exploit those actions 
for the sake of sowing discord between the two government or 
of pushing the two of us further apart, you in one direction me 
in another, from the position we have jointly held and still hold. 
He elaborated further: 
I am being pressed to acknowledge that the logic of disagreeing 
with this particular operation would be a total denunciation of 
the whole of your Vietnam policy. This I have firmly rejected, 
not only because I distrust the motives of those who put this 
argument forward, but because their argument itself is balls ... 
after the deepest heart searching ... I cannot see that there 
is 
any change in your basic position that I could urge on you. ' 16' 
Still, Wilson was assertive in defending his decision to dissociate. 
I want you to realise that where we have differed in detail - 
but never in basic policy - and have had to express a different 
point of view, while we recognise that this can only add to 
your difficulties (and especially this time be more than a little 
hurtful), we believe that what we have done is right and 
necessary. I must be quite frank in saying that this is the price 
I have to pay for being able to hold the line in our own country 
where the public reaction is very widespread even if, as I have 
said, it stems from widely differing motives. 162 
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After repeating his assurance that he was stoutly defending the US record on peace 
moves, Wilson again put himself forward as a mediator. 
But I wanted to make it absolutely clear that I would not 
contemplate taking any steps towards it unless I thought it had 
your agreement, not grudging or reluctant agreement, but 
wholehearted feeling that it was right and that it would not add 
to your difficulties. 163 
He had one possibility in mind and that was trying a personal approach to Kosygin 
during his forthcoming visit to the British Trade Fair in Moscow. 
The Johnson administration considered Wilson's telegram the following day. 
Patrick Dean spoke to Rostow and asked about the President's reaction to the 
message. Rostow related to Dean that once again Johnson felt that Wilson might use 
his forthcoming visit to Washington `for political purposes at home' and that the visit 
`must not be used in any way to undercut the President's position, particularly on 
American soil'. 164 
Dean valiantly defended the Prime Minister saying he was sure he 
knew very well what was in the President's mind and that the 
whole tone of his recent message showed how sympathetic he 
was to the President's difficulties. Moreover, the Prime Minister's 
statement had been very carefully worded and two thirds of it had 
been devoted to confirming the U. S. basic policy as regard 
Vietnam still had the support of the British Government. 
Rostow could not resist asking Dean to request that the Prime Minister say at some 
stage `that he had been worried over the risk of inflicting casualties among the 
civilian population if the bombing operation took place but that he was very pleased 
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to hear that the casualties, if indeed there had been any, were extremely light. ' 165 
Wilson's did not change his position on this, and nothing of the sort was said during 
a debate in the House on 7 July. 
Despite Rostow's view that Johnson's had `not gone up in smoke' on 
receiving Wilson's message, the following day Johnson wrote a terse, four-paragraph 
reply to Wilson's cable that demonstrates Johnson's continuing irritation on this 
matter: 
Your message gave me the picture of your political problem 
and how you intend to deal with it. My problem is not merely 
political. I must also convince Hanoi that the will of the 
United States cannot be broken by debate or pressures - 
at home or from abroad. 166 
On the proposal of another Wilson initiative, Johnson was non-committal, although 
Rostow had in fact felt it would be useful: 
We must and will continue to apply hard military pressure. 
There should be no ambiguity about this. It would be useful 
for the Soviets to be clear on this point. Yet it may give you 
some problems in connection with your trip to Moscow. 
If you do go to Moscow, I would hope you could canvass all 
useful possibilities with Kosygin and his colleagues and that 
your joint responsibilities as co-chairman might lead to some 
constructive initiative... 
He also informed Wilson that `an acceptable date' for his visit would be 29 July. 167 
The telegram ended abruptly, just with salutary `best wishes'. Rostow had suggested 
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Johnson concluded with the statement `I look forward to talking with you of these 
and other matters'. 168 The President clearly did not look fonvard to such discussions. 
Moreover, he was unhappy with Wilson's use of the word `balls' in his 
message. Bruce felt responsible for the Prime Minister's use of the `rather colourful 
word. '169 Wilson intended to use the word `bull' but had asked Bruce if he thought 
the President `would be offended if he substituted balls'. Bruce later noted that the 
latter term had greater currency in Britain than the former but at the time told Wilson 
`that the two words, and the physical juxtaposition of which they were expressive, 
were so intimately connected that I believed them equally apposite. ' Bruce had 
assured Wilson that Johnson `would not be disturbed by this picturesque 
description. '] 70 Bruce's explanation of events was not passed on to Johnson as it 
was felt to be `chancy humor'. '7' Again, Wilson over-estimated the intimacy of his 
personal and working relationship with the President, and unfortunately for him, 
Bruce's usually sound judgement, was on this occasion flawed. 
Despite Wilson's lengthy and repeated explanations behind his decision to 
dissociate, Johnson remained puzzled over it and asked Bruce to comment on the 
reasons behind it, the position the Administration should adopt during the 
forthcoming Washington visit, the agenda, and what Wilson himself was likely to say 
and do during the visit. 12 Bruce was sympathetic to Wilson's domestic political 
pressures on Vietnam, and argued as much to Washington. He began by stating, yet 
again, that Wilson was `a political animal, highly skilled, intelligent, a master at 
168 NSF, Files of Walt W. Rostow, `Wilson Visit', Box 12, Doc. 2 
169 Telegram from Bruce to George Ball, 4 July 1966, NSF, Files of Walt W. Rostow, `Wilson Visit', Box 12, LBJL 
170 Ibid 
171 Ibid 
172 Telegram from Bruce to Ball, II July 1966, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, `Nilson Visit', Box 12, LBJL 
310 
infighting 
... and usually adept at making ambiguous public statements to serve his 
political aims'. He explained that Wilson had `little or no room for maneuver' over 
the POL bombings because, in order to `meet tactical pressures from within his own 
party' he had in previous months frequently stated that there were limits on British 
support. 173 While Wilson was committed to preserving friendly relations with the 
United States and was `prepared to cooperate with the United States on major 
American policies in ammeasure [sic] that would not always be popular here', in 
order `to counter the charge of being a mere puppet or satellite of the US, HMG 
would, from time to time, assert its independence by taking exception to certain 
details of policies to which he [sic] is ready to give general support'. ] 74 Indeed, 
Bruce felt that Wilson regarded Vietnam `as posing in acute form the problem of 
defining acceptable limits of Anglo-American cooperation'. 175 
Moreover, Bruce rightly acknowledged that Wilson's personal convictions on 
the war had also come into play: `the military buildup apparently increased his fears 
of escalation and certainly cut against the grain of his belief that there could be no 
clear-cut military victory in Vietnam'. Believing strongly in the need for a political 
settlement and increasingly frustrated by the lack of one, Wilson began to listen 
closely when `the dissidence over Vietnam widened to include a substantial number 
of Labor MPs in the center and on the right-wing' because party management was 
now at stake. According to Bruce, Wilson was also `influenced by an exaggerated 
idea of his possible effectiveness as a mediator with the Soviet authorities. He 
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probably believes that had it not been for dissociation Kosygin would not now be 
about to receive him in Moscow. ' 176 
The Ambassador, taking care not to sound too supportive of Wilson's 
decision, admitted that the Prime Minister `may have trapped himself... prematurely 
... 
by foreclosing the possibility of later differentiating between attacks successfully 
confined to military targets and those which have, in fact, consequences for civilian 
populations'. He admitted however that it was doubtful Wilson could have sustained 
such a distinction within the Labour Party. He concluded by saying `what saved him 
in domestic political terms was his not going ... the whole 
hog with us'. '77 
Bruce then went on to respond to the President's obvious fury over Wilson's 
statements and subsequent comments to the House. Johnson apparently expressed 
his firm opinion that British support for America's Vietnam policy should be 
complete. 18 Given what he had already said about Wilson's practical difficulties, 
Bruce suggested the President `content himself with remarking on his 
disappointment in this connection, and say he expects continuing fidelity to the 
promises of adherence to our overall objectives in Vietnam'. Having done that, 
Johnson could then `effectively add that after reviewing the debates in the House of 
Commons he had noticed that Heath, Douglas-Home and others of the opposition 
had been much stronger advocates for American policy in Vietnam' than Wilson's 
Government. ' 79 
Bruce felt that he could not guarantee Wilson's silence over Vietnam during 
his trip to Washington: 
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Wilson is a cautious master of obfuscation. No one can 
guarantee in advance the conduct of another; the tongue is 
one of the least predictable of human organs. But given the 
overriding desire and necessity for the Prime Minister to 
remain on good terms with the President, or to restore any 
impairment of them, he will be doubly careful to try to avoid 
saying anything embarrassing to us. 180 
At this stage the Ambassador predicted that Wilson would `descant' upon British 
internal politics, Rhodesia, Vietnam, Europe, Arms Sales by Britain to the United 
States, East of Suez commitments, the economic situation in Britain. 
The following day Bruce attempted to analyse Wilson's decision-making still 
further. In a question and answer exercise sent to Washington by cable, he asked 
why Wilson did not recognize that with the failure of Hanoi and Peking to talk `there 
would be progressive increase in scale of US military power' in Vietnam, since the 
President was determined to see the war through. He answered tentatively that: 
Wilson has never made that `logical' jump. For political 
reasons he would not find it possible openly to endorse. He 
felt that he had to maintain posture that military victory in 
Vietnam not on cards, even though auspices for peace were so 
discouraging. 181 
Washington, and the President in particular, had three major misgivings on the whole 
dissociation affair. Firstly, why Wilson had gone to the `lengths of positive 
dissociation' from the bombings, `once it had been explained to him in advance that 
the sites selected were not near city centres' but legitimate military objectives that 
`could be taken out without substantial civilian losses. ' Secondly, why, given his 
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now large majority, Wilson could not `more easily have controlled rebels than in last 
parliament. ' And lastly, if the United States escalated its bombing campaign even 
further would Wilson engage in other 'dissociations'? 182 Bruce admitted he wasn't 
certain of the answer to the first question, he surmised that Wilson may have `felt 
trapped' by previous commitments, may have felt that the bombings changed the 
situation psychologically and politically even if not necessarily militarily, and of 
course, he had to manage his party. The second area of contention was easier to 
explain. Wilson could, and indeed had, been able to manage the hard left on 
Vietnam but now the problem was more widespread and `it was because Wilson 
went part of way through dissociation to dramatize importance of "independent" 
British position re. threat of expanding war ... that 
he was able to avoid wider pattern 
of revolt in party ranks'. The last question surrounding the chances of further 
dissociations was, of course, unanswerable but Bruce argued that Wilson `had made 
it 
... 
difficult for himself by taking this decision. He cannot `reassociate' himself if 
bombing patterns develops [a] new turn'. 183 
Without doubt, the dissociation episode had a detrimental impact on Anglo- 
American relations, particularly the personal relationship between Wilson and 
Johnson. Philip Kaiser, Deputy US Ambassador to Great Britain, explained that 
When we bombed Hanoi, Wilson felt compelled to criticize us, 
though he did so rather mildly. Johnson reacted with typical 
vehemence, sharply castigating the Prime Minister. As a 
consequence, relations between the two men, never too warm, 
deteriorated temporarily. 184 
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William Bundy agrees stating `the President just didn't trust Wilson' after 
disassociation. 
He thought he was trying to make time politically .... there's 
no doubt in the President's mind this established Wilson, as 
far as I know unchangingly, as a man not to go to the well 
with. '85 
On Thursday, 14 July the Cabinet took note of a statement by the Foreign Secretary 
on the United States which said: 
our relations with the United States Government were passing 
through a difficult phase. They were understandable [sic] 
preoccupied with the conflict in Vietnam and, although our 
opposition to the bombing of the oil installations near Hanoi 
and Haiphong had been expected, there had been an adverse 
reaction to our public statement. Our position over the sale 
of arms which might be used in Vietnam had also been the 
cause of some friction. Although we must maintain our right 
to disagree from time to time with those aspects of United 
States policy of which we could not approve, it was important 
to our interests that there should be no major disagreement 
between US. 186 
Washington and London recognised that the summer of 1966 was the lowest point in 
the Johnson/Wilson relationship so far. Attempts to repair the damage began straight 
away. 
Wilson's Trip to Moscow, 16-18 July 1966 & The Sterling Crisis 
In early July the British were faced with yet another crisis over sterling. 
( Despite the Chancellor's optimism over the state of the British economy, expressed 
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at a meeting on 1 July, the publication on 4 July of gold figures for June showed a 
further drain on sterling. '87 There were a number of factors involved in this, not 
least of which was the cost of the seven week Seaman's Strike that began on 16 May. 
Rampant speculation ensued and by 14 July the Labour Government faced 
hard choices on how to deal with the crisis. At the Cabinet meeting on that day 
Wilson, Callaghan and George Brown were in agreement that `it was no answer to go 
on borrowing', that there had to be `a fundamental appraisal of strategy'. '88 They 
announced that they would make a statement in the House that day saying overseas 
spending would be cut by £100 million (in addition to previously announced defence 
cuts). In the course of the debate on this decision and in response to an attack by 
Michael Stewart who felt this would have great effects on UK foreign relations and 
`ruin our influence', Wilson admitted it would mean 150 million out of Germany 
and £50 million East of Suez'. 189 A statement was duly delivered that announced a 
thorough review of Britain's financial position and the necessary measures needed to 
rectify the situation. 190 It did nothing to alleviate the pressure on sterling. 
The Cabinet also agreed that a fuller statement would be made the following 
Wednesday, 20 July, announcing measures to compress internal demand. The 
Americans were keen to influence this particular statement. Secretary to the 
Treasury, Henry Fowler telephoned Callaghan on the evening of 14 July to express 
his disappointment in the performance of the British economy in the last year and to 
urge the Chancellor to take swift action to deal with the present crisis that `not only 
sounded adequate but would prove to be adequate'. Callaghan outlined the program 
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of measures to be undertaken and said he felt confident that it would be a success, 
although it would `comprise a very tough package for the country to swallow. ' He 
also said there was `no dissension in the Cabinet, except with respect to overseas 
expenditures, and the source of that problem really was in the United States'. 191 
The US Contingency Group that had been assembled the previous year to 
discuss sterling issues met again. The Group acknowledged Wilson's difficulties in 
the long-term and admitted that he still faced the prospect of saving money by cutting 
defence expenditure, both internally and externally. There was great domestic 
pressure for Wilson to do this. The US position, however, remained opposed to the 
proposed British cure. McNamara in particular still believed it was `absolutely 
essential' that the UK remain in the Far East. Fowler informed the President of 
McNamara's views: 
For the next year or two, he thinks anything which will smell 
of a British pull out will fatally undermine our domestic base 
on Viet Nam. Further, he believes that confrontation in Malaysia 
will, in fact, continue indefinitely and is determined that it remain 
a British responsibility. 192 
Fowler admitted the US faced some `critical choices' on this issue and informed the 
President that his advisers were `of two minds': some supporting McNamara's view 
that Britain had to remain in the Far East at all costs; others believing devaluation of 
the pound should not be ruled out. Fowler personally believed that, 
if we adopt Bob's position-and Wilson goes alone-it will 
either cost us a weak Britain and a great deal of balance of 
payments money or, even more likely, a weak Britain and an 
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eventual devaluation of sterling. Either would have disastrous 
consequences for the dollar-and for our international political 
position. 
Moreover, he did 
not believe that this, or any other U. K. government, will be 
willing to maintain an overseas position in which it does not 
believe, for the sake of a friend-unless that friend is willing 
to pay for the favor. 193 
As Fowler felt the US could not afford an open-ended financial commitment to the 
UK he argued, 
our first priority should be to move the United Kingdom to save 
its long-term economic and financial position and thereby to 
prevent potentially disastrous consequences for the United States, 
our over-all foreign policy, and the stability of the Free World 
financial system. A weak ally is of no use to us East of Suez, in 
Europe, in the international financial set-up, or anywhere else. 
Despite Fowler arguments, Johnson, a politician with an image to consider, 
particularly in the lead up to Congressional elections, favoured McNamara's view 
that the US could not afford to act alone as world policeman. 
The White House was well aware that sterling would be on the agenda during 
Wilson's visit to Washington. In the middle of the sterling crisis, between 16-18 July 
Wilson visited Moscow. the Prime Minister faced much criticism for leaving the 
country amidst an economic crisis and partly for this reason Wilson defended his 
decision in his memoirs, perhaps exaggerating the impact of his trip. 194 Ostensibly 
arranged so that he could visit a British trade fair, the primary reason for his visit was 
to mediate over Vietnam. Although Wilson was genuine in his desire to encourage 
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the Russians to intervene on Vietnam, he was once again primarily motivated by 
domestic considerations. After the Prime Minister's announcement of dissociation, 
Wilson faced calls from his left-wingers for complete dissociation from US policy. 
On 6 July a petition signed by 100 MPs had called for a total condemnation of US 
policy and Wilson had had to intervene personally to prevent a PLP split. Before the 
visit to Moscow the US Department of State felt `the subject matter and visibility of 
the trip are certainly designed to earn (and have already won) new political points for 
the Prime Minister on the domestic front in the UK, even if the gains in foreign 
relations terms turn out to be very minor'. 195 It was also recognised that: 
coming less than two weeks before a Wilson visit to Washington 
to see President Johnson, the trip to the Soviet capital also gives 
Wilson the aura and glamor of confidante and go-between 
between East and West. This is a role which the British have 
long sought to play, while remaining closely linked to the US. 196 
They also noted that Wilson's ploy had `effectively restored the situation among 
Labour Party MPs' when he was able to announce the visit to Moscow on 7 July 
during a Commons debate, `together with a Government motion that implied 
criticism of the bombings without directly expressing or withdrawing general support 
for US policy in Vietnam. ' According to US intelligence: 
In the division on the Government's motion some of the original 
rebels, such as Michael Foot, voted for the Government; none 
voted against; and only thirty-one chose to abstain. Many stated 
that the announcement of the Moscow visit had strongly 
influenced their ballot. 197 
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The Government won its motion. 
Publicly Wilson made great play of the fact that his visit had Johnson's 
approval, although again the State Department held no great hopes for the visit in 
relation to Vietnam, believing correctly that the Russians would merely use Wilson 
to convey their belief that the dangers of escalation were great. However, in his 
memoirs Wilson emphasized what he called his `main point' in the discussions on 
Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had been threatening to put American POWs on 
trial in Hanoi and it was hoped Wilson could urge the Russians to intervene on this 
issue, particularly considering the probable US repercussions should such trials go 
ahead. The Americans did not believe the Russians would want to discuss this. 198 
However, Wilson claims that he `urged them as strongly as I could to bring home to 
Hanoi what this would mean. Clearly they were impressed; their fears of escalation 
were very real and I was left in no doubt ... that they were going to act. They 
did. ' 199 
He therefore judged his visit a success: 
President Johnson later privately said, and Senator Mansfield, 
Senate majority leader, clearly on the President's briefing, 
publicly said that it was my intervention which had stopped 
the trials, and headed off the most dangerous situation in the 
war. Without doubt, US opinion, sharply divided on Vietnam, 
would have lurched violently to the side of the hawks if the 
pilots had been put on trial and I have little doubt, from all the 
President told me, that he would have had to respond. 20° 
Wilson certainly voiced his belief that he had been vital in getting the North 
Vietnamese to rethink their plans for show trials. At their meeting in late July 1966, 
Wilson described to the President and his advisers how he had warned Kosygin 
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`repeatedly and categorically of the reaction which the Soviet Government must 
expect if the Government of North Viet-Nam took exemplary action against the 
captured United States pilots; and he thought it reasonable to believe that it was as a 
result of Moscow's transmitting this warning to Hanoi that the Government of North 
Viet-Nam had subsequently adopted a more lenient attitude. '201 This partly explains 
Wilson's continuing belief that he was playing a vital role as a mediator between the 
United States and the Soviet Union/North Vietnam, despite the fact that he had to 
conclude after his Moscow trip that there was `no give whatever' in the Soviet's 
position on Vietnam. He told President Johnson that Kosygin remained `bitter and 
tough', casting the US President as `the bloodthirsty villain of the piece' and working 
for his `increasing isolation and friendlessness in the world'. 202 Nevertheless, 
Wilson believed his visit had been worthwhile, believing the `unsensational 
relationship' that was developing between Kosygin and himself, had `real - if still 
largely potential - value'. 203 
During his visit to Moscow, Wilson was `kept in close touch with the situation 
in London. '204 After the financial measures announced by Callaghan on 20 July, the 
US government acknowledged that Wilson had `clearly swallowed the necessary 
economic medicine'. 205 Indeed, the steps taken were extremely tough. Along with 
even more cuts in public investment and tighter controls on hire purchase and foreign 
exchange, the Labour government introduced a six-month freeze on pay and price 
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increases, to be followed by a further six months of `severe restraint'. Not 
surprisingly, this package proved extremely unpopular with much of the Labour 
movement, including many within the Parliamentary Labour Party. Again, the US 
Federal Reserve Bank helped co-ordinate a massive purchase of sterling to restore 
confidence. 
It was at this time that the British Embassy in Washington began to get the 
distinct impression that many US officials were no longer terrified by the prospect of 
a British devaluation. Some of this feeling stemmed `from the D. O. D. [Department 
of Defence] who feel that continued United Kingdom psychological support of the 
United States in the Far East is of more importance than the sterling rate. '206 The 
Prime Minister would therefore have to raise the issue of further financial support, if 
needed, during his trip to Washington. 
Wilson's Visit to Washington - 29 July 
With the Wilson-LBJ relationship fraught over POL dissociation, the Prime 
Minister's plans to visit Washington proved predictably contentious. Wilson later 
admitted `no overseas visit had a worse build-up'. 207 Nevertheless, despite - or 
indeed because of - the careful preparation that took place, the visit went remarkably 
well. 
Shortly before the Prime Minister's visit a member of the Foreign Office, J. A. 
Thomson, met with White House aides and State Department officials, concluding 
that most agreed with Rostow's view that the mood would be `tough' but `polite' 
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when Wilson arrived in Washington. 208 Thomson reported back to London that 
many people spoke of `the President's adverse reaction to Her Majesty's 
Government's recent statements about the bombing and the sale of arms' and that 
Mr. Rostow had observed that the President `vas hurt'. 209 Reportedly Johnson 
wondered why the Prime Minister was coming. Thomson observed that `one 
implication of this remark was if the main reason for the visit lay in domestic 
political considerations in the United Kingdom the President would not be 
sympathetic. ' However Thomson found evidence of a `deeper and more important 
implication' that was conveyed to him by Francis Bator, someone who did not 
always agree with Rostow. Thomson explained that Bator was Rostow's deputy on 
political matters but `is autonomous ... 
in economic matters and has independent, 
direct access to the President'. Apparently Bator was so concerned that Thomson 
knew the President's mind on the question of Wilson's visit, that he concluded their 
interview in Washington on 15 July by driving Thomson to the railway station, 
talking as they went. 210 According to Bator, Johnson had two criteria for judging the 
worth of the visits: 
(a) what effect will it have on his big problem, Viet Nam? 
(b) how much confidence could he have in Britain controlling her 
affairs in such a way that she could play a useful and important role? 
Overall, Thomson was left with the impression that it was hoped in the White 
House that the Prime Minister could `restore the President's shaken confidence in the 
reliability of Britain as an ally'. This questioning of British trustworthiness as an ally 
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was due to Wilson's statements on arms sales and on Vietnam; by yet another 
sterling crisis; and by doubts in Washington that Britain could sustain the world role 
it had outlined for itself in the latest defence review. On Vietnam, Bator surmised 
that the President hoped Wilson's actions before and after the visit would reiterate 
general support for the President's policy; repeat that `the conflict and its 
continuance was the fault of Hanoi'; and completely refuse to say `anything 
substantive about the bombing of oil installations or the sale of arms' instead 
referring all questioners to Hansard. Overall, it would be considered a 
`disappointment' if the effect of Wilson's visit was `merely neutral' on Vietnam. 21 
But, a few days later, the atmosphere in Washington appears to have changed. 
Sir Patrick Dean cabled London on 22 July to report on his latest talks with Rostow 
and Bator and wrote that: 
It is clear that the Prime Minister's announcement of the new 
economic measures has created a new situation and a much better 
climate here. It has removed previous doubts about the purpose 
and value of the Prime Minister's visit and has defined fairly 
clearly the main issues for discussion with the President. 
As Rostow put it `there are now very basic things for the 
President and the Prime Minister to discuss'. All talk about 
`a laundry list' has disappeared. 212 
Wilson had stuck to the September 1965 `understanding'. Monetary policy and 
Britain's world role would nevertheless be at the top of the agenda in Washington. 
George Ball felt that Harold Wilson's visit offered an `opportunity for an act 
of statemanship' on the President's behalf. Perhaps sensing that Wilson might pull 
out of the `understanding' now that he had a new majority, Ball, in a lengthy 
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memorandum, told the President that instead of following a `general line of short- 
term improvisation that has marked our relations with a succession of British 
Governments since the end of the war' the alternative would be `to look beyond the 
immediate present and to talk with Wilson in some depth about the longer-range 
relations between our two nations based on a clear understanding of the respective 
roles which each country should play in the development of a rational world system. 
This is a difficult and rigorous exercise. It requires each of us clearly face reality'. 213 
Ball explained the reality of the situation as he saw it: 
Britain must recognize that she is no longer the center of a 
world system but that she can nevertheless play a critical 
role by applying her talents and resources to the leadership 
of Western Europe. We, on our part, should face the fact 
that it is basically unhealthy to encourage the United Kingdom 
to continue as America's poor relation, living beyond her 
means by periodic American bailouts. We must, in other 
words, redefine the so-called `special relationship' in terms 
consistent with the longer-range interest of both our nations. 214 
The British in Washington got wind of these thoughts but were reassured that this 
was Ball experiencing `end-of-termism', and that there was no serious likelihood of 
the President or Secretary of State approving this action. Nor did they, not least 
because to have taken Ball seriously at the time would have been to broach a major 
realignment of the alliance system during an already difficult period for US foreign 
policy. In the event, the discussion between the President and the Prime Minister did 
not venture beyond short and medium-term policies. 
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On the morning of Friday, 29 July Johnson and Wilson had a private talk for 
about one hour and fifteen minutes. As was now usual, their talk included a 
discussion of their respective domestic concerns. Johnson reported to the other 
participants of the talks that `he felt that he now had a very good understanding and 
appreciation of the problems which faced the United Kingdom, and he hoped that the 
Prime Minister felt the same as regards the United States'. The President also said 
the discussion had been `very interesting and most helpful' and that they discussed in 
detail the Prime Minister's trip to the Soviet Union and had exchanged views on their 
common problems, especially Viet-Nam, the British position East of Suez, the 
German situation and the British economic measures. 215 The President said the 
purpose of the meeting `was to strengthen the ties which bound the two countries ... 
in order that they might go forward in unity to deal with their common problems and 
to give the necessary leadership to their two peoples. '216 
The meeting adjourned for lunch at which there were the usual toasts. The 
President began with a reference to recent events: `someone suggested, to-day, Mr. 
Prime Minister, that I begin by saying this toast: "My good dis-associates. " But this 
is not the case at all. For 200 years the British and the Americans have had their 
differences but from them have emerged a strong bond, a hearty spirit, and a mutual 
respect that neither adversaries nor age can diminish. ' Later on in his toast, Johnson 
appeared to compare Wilson to Winston Churchill: 
In World War II, Mr. Prime Minister, England saved herself by 
fortitude and the world by example. You personally are asking 
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of the British people to-day the same fortitude - the same resolve 
- that turned the tide in those days. 
I must say that England is blessed now, as it was blessed then, with 
gallant and hardy leadership. In you, Sir, she has a man of mettle. 
She is blessed with a leader whose own enterprise and courage will 
show the way. We believe your firmness and your leadership have 
impressed the people of the world deeply in the tradition of the great 
men of Britain. 
Mr. Prime Minister, I feel blessed, in a time of some distress and 
danger, with a comrade who has, in addition to his pluck, a delightful 
sense of humour. In the late evening, when I am going through that 
night reading and the cables, Mr. Prime Minister, that does make a 
difference. 217 
Wilson's response included his thanks that the President had rejected the 
`disassociates' theme, commenting, `We are allies and not satellites and I think as 
long as we are allies and not satellites we are of more use to you, we are of more use 
to ourselves, and we are of more use to the world. '218 According to Wilson, the 
President's `gently ironic allusion' to British dissociation as Wilson put it, did not 
detract from the warmth of the President's speech, which stressed the permanence of 
the bonds between Great Britain and the United States. 219 Wilson was also so 
pleasantly surprised by the fact that Johnson never mentioned the dissociation 
episode again during the talks, nor did he say anything about British arms supplies 
for use in Vietnam. Of course, this may well have been a case of not opening old 
wounds. 
When the meeting resumed at 2.30 pm, the only commitment the Prime 
Minister made regarding the `joint effort' in South East Asia was to allow British 
Army engineers to remain in Thailand for a further year to help with civil 
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construction projects and to send specialist troops currently in Malaya to deal with 
communist guerrillas on the Thai border once confrontation in Malaysia had 
ended. 220 At a later meeting between Rusk and Wilson, the Secretary of State said he 
wondered if the recent episode with the captured US airmen perhaps suggested 
Hanoi was susceptible to pressure and consequently wondered if it was worth `trying 
to organise some kind of joint Parliamentary and Congressional demarche in relation 
to Hanoi to try to persuade the Government of North Viet-Nam to respond to the 
repeatedly declared willingness of the United States to start discussions for bringing 
the war to an end'. 221 He suggested the Prime Minister convey a message to Kosygin 
on those lines, emphasising the US interest in de-escalating, rather than escalating, 
the conflict. The United Kingdom might also approach the Government of non- 
aligned and commonwealth countries to the same end. Rusk also suggested 
mobilizing the support of the Pope and all living holders of the Nobel Peace Prize. 
In response to this, Wilson agreed that this might work but suggested `that any 
proposal of this kind might be combined with, or be an alternative to, the suggestion 
that the United States should now stabilise the level of their troops in Viet-Nam and 
abstain from any further build-up in return for an undertaking that the Ho Chi Minh 
trail would be effectively blocked'. 222 Rusk said he would speak to the President 
about this but could see no reason `to reject the idea out of hand'. The Prime 
Minister felt: 
the first step might be to send two or three British 
Parliamentarians to Washington to discuss the project 
with such Congressional spokesman as the United States 
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might suggest. Thereafter, the Commonwealth might be 
mobilised to support the initiative. And the process might 
culminate in a new international mission to Hanoi. 223 
Yet again Wilson's need to appear active on the diplomatic front was given sanction 
by the Americans, and possibly in order to avoid further British dissociations, 
actively encouraged. 224 
Reaction to the Washington Visit 
Wilson returned to London in time for England's victory in the World Cup 
Final and, as he himself admitted, `the British reading and viewing public were not 
interested that weekend in international affairs'. 225 Nevertheless, on Saturday The 
Times reported on Wilson's `pugilistic performance' and his `confident tone' while 
in Washington and the Sunday newspapers were, as Castle noted in her diary, `full of 
Harold's spectacular reception by Johnson in America'. 226 Henry Brandon in the 
Sunday Times described Wilson's public performance as `truly impressive'. 227 
After the visit, Johnson sent a personal message to Wilson that was extremely 
warm in tone considering the previous month's difficulties. 
Thank you for coming my friend. We had a good talk. As you 
know, our friendship is a source of comfort and strength to me. 
I very much enjoyed your toast - and I meant what I said in mine. 
And I look forward to meeting with you again. Best wishes to 
you and your colleagues for a safe journey home. I wish you 
well in the difficult task which you and your Government 
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now face. 228 
Wilson reciprocated in equally friendly terms: 
I find it difficult to say how much out talks have heartened me 
at a time when life has not been altogether easy, there may still 
be rough weather ahead for both of us, but I have no doubt that, 
so long as we go on pulling together, it will work out all right 
in the end. Thank you so much for everything - and especially 
for your very kind message which Phil Kaiser had just given me. 229 
The British were perplexed at the warmth of the reception Wilson had received in 
Washington. In the week following it, Patrick Dean reported that the general feeling 
in Washington was that the visit `was highly successful ... certainly more so than 
people had expected'. 230 He reported further that number of people had said 
how well the Prime Minister must have handled the President 
to have obtained such a satisfactory result and there is I think 
general pleasure on almost all sides that the close and friendly 
relations established during the Prime Minister's visit here last December 
have not only been preserved but strengthened. 23' 
During a brief conversation with the President at the diplomatic reception for Luci 
Johnson's wedding, Johnson told Bruce how much he had enjoyed seeing the Prime 
Minister and what a useful meeting it had been. And, Jack Valenti, one of the 
President's closest advisers, also told Bruce that the President had said to him `I 
really do like that man'. Rusk admitted to Bruce after the visit that he had been very 
surprised at the warmth of the toast proposed by the President at the lunch. Dean 
confided to Maclehose at the Foreign Office that Rusk's comments reflected `a 
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report that the President's decision to line up so closely with the Prime Minister was 
only taken rather late in the day'. 232 
Dean attempted to explain the success of the visit, particularly `why ... the 
President deployed such an exceptional effort to turn the visit into a major political 
and personal event'. Firstly, the President's `instinctive friendliness' may have 
played a part. 233 And, combined with this, Wilson had been wise to keep the visit 
short considering how busy the Administration was. He believed `one of the reasons 
... the President 
likes doing business with the Prime Minister is that he can in a very 
short space of time talk to somebody who really knows his business and talks about 
what really matters'. 234 Secondly, Dean surmised that for purely selfish reasons it 
made sense for the Americans to `reinforce international confidence in the Prime 
Minister and H. M. G. and, hence in sterling. ' 
When there are already so many problems and so many unfriendly 
`allies' all over the world, there is no point in seeing them increased 
by the political or economic demise of the only other Western 
country which exercises genuine worldwide responsibility, whatever 
they may feel about the relationship between the pound and the dollar. 
Thirdly, and directly related to the situation in Vietnam, Dean believed that 
although the President must have known that he could not expect 
anything of major importance in the way of additional help or new 
commitments East of Suez, the negative aim of ensuring that H. M. G., 
whether now or later on, do not withdraw their general support for 
the United States over Vietnam and in relation to South East Asia 
generally, acquired an almost dramatic importance when the 
President reflected upon the potential consequences of Britain drifting 
seriously out of line. 
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The reason why the President came to this view was also explained by Dean: 
It may be that H. M. G. 's dissociation from the bombing of Hanoi 
and Haiphong and the position we took over arms supplies did 
more than just irritate the President at the time. Once the first 
annoyance had subsided they may actually have rattled him. On 
any careful calculation it is extremely important from the point of 
view of American standing with world opinion that the leading 
socialist-governed country in the world should support their 
objectives in South East Asia. The converse could be extremely 
damaging, not only internationally, but in domestic terms since 
American public opinion still has a latent sense of guilt which it is 
much easier to allay when the Administration can point to the 
moral and physical support of other countries for what the U. S. is 
trying to do in Vietnam. 
This, of course, was received in London as evidence that Britain could influence 
Johnson and his policies. If Dean was right, and all the evidence seems to point that 
way, Britain still had some leverage in its relations with the United States. 
And finally, Dean suggested the Johnson administration might have had a fit 
of compassion for, and empathy with, the British Government over its financial 
difficulties: 
As, is becoming more and more apparent, the Administration 
may be faced in the not-too-distant future with the need for 
fairly stringent economic measures to control the growing 
inflationary tendencies in the American economy stemming, 
in part, from the approach of full employment. The President 
may therefore see a strong vested interest in praising the Prime 
Minister's courage, endorsing H. M. G. 's economic policies and, 
of course, in the success of a programme of retrenchment 
which is going to hurt quite a large section of the British public. 235 
Dean concluded that the only way to understand Johnson's change of heart was to 
recognise that: 
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underneath all the President's fair words ... there was a good deal 
of American self-interest in the whole exercise. Certainly the 
personal rapport between the President and the Prime Minister 
was reaffirmed and I have no doubt that the President genuinely 
enjoys seeing the Prime Minister and talking to him about their 
mutual problems. He also has admiration for the Prime Minister's 
power of exposition and conviction. In addition, the meeting 
brought out quite clearly that both the Americans and ourselves 
badly need each other ... 236 
If it was essential that both Britain and the United States make their interests 
coincide, as the Foreign Office responded to Dean, then Wilson's July visit went as 
well as could be expected. The United States was reassured to hear that Wilson was 
being firm on economic issues and that Britain intended, for the time being at least, 
to continue the `joint effort' East of Suez. It was also relieved to hear that Wilson 
intended to continue to support the US's general policy in Vietnam, even if he 
reserved the right to disagree with some of the specifics. The US also believed that 
Britain could still increase its practical contribution to the fight in the South East 
Asia. Wilson and his colleagues came away from Washington not only with 
pandered egos but also with the feeling that the Americans still needed them, 
particularly on Vietnam, and that that strengthened their position on sterling. The 
tensions in Anglo-American relations that had been so severe in June, now appeared 
to have subsided. This was particularly timely as in the second half of 1966 events in 
Rhodesia preoccupied the British Government's foreign policy and London needed 
Washington's acquiescence and co-operation over this. At the same time, the United 
States continued its escalation of the war, and the unpopularity of the war continued 
to grow both at home and abroad. Consequently, although the Labour 
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Government had more pressing issues to deal with towards the end of 1966, plans for 
yet another peace initiative were under way. 
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CHAPTER 6 
AUGUST 1966-FEBRUARY 1968: 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS 
With the Labour government's attention fixed on events in Rhodesia during 
the second half of 1966, very little of substance occurred in Anglo-American 
relations regarding Vietnam. These months were used by the British, however, to 
prepare the ground for another peace initiative in February 1967 involving Premier 
Kosygin of the Soviet Union. This latest move would not only end in ignominious 
failure but would also test the so-called special relationship to the extreme. By early 
1967 the Johnson administration was beginning to face the prospect of a military 
stalemate in Vietnam, yet the President still wanted a negotiated settlement without 
major concessions and only after some indication of military progress. After the 
debacle of the Wilson-Kosygin initative, the British government was left to question 
the sincerity of the US desire for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. 
George Brown's Approach to Moscow, 22-25 November 1966 
On Friday 12 August George Brown, Deputy Leader of the Labour Party and 
former First Secretary of State and Minister of Economic Affairs replaced Michael 
Stewart as Foreign Secretary. Despite his suspicion that Wilson had engaged in 
'unsavoury' deals with Johnson, he would nevertheless prove extremely sympathetic 
to the US cause in Vietnam. At the time of his appointment David Bruce accurately 
portrayed him as a `staunch and useful supporter of major US policies' but admitted, 
`the Foreign Office has never before been headed by such an unorthodox diplomat'. 
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Brown's reputation as a maverick politician and a hard drinker was well known in 
Washington. By the end of September Bruce noted that `his abounding vitality, 
inquisitive absorption of briefs, informality, boisterousness, already amaze, inspire, 
or appall his staff, as they did those previously associated with him in official life'. ' 
Brown was determined to make his mark in his new position and almost 
immediately turned his attention to a new initiative on Vietnam. At the Labour Party 
Conference in Brighton on 6 October during the foreign affairs debate, the Foreign 
Secretary announced a new plan for a negotiated settlement on Vietnam. 2 Brown 
announced that a conference of all interested parties should be called as soon as 
possible and suggested the NLF or Vietcong could be represented at it. He argued 
that once the principle of a conference was established, the US should cease bombing 
North Vietnam, and stop introducing US forces and military supplies into Vietnam, 
while the North Vietnamese should cease despatching troops and military supplies to 
the South. He then put forward six main points for a negotiated political settlement 
that was based on free elections and the neutralization of North and South Vietnam. 3 
This announcement was made partly to assuage the growing number of opponents of 
the Government's policy on Vietnam who had put forward critical composite 
resolutions at the conference. The Government's foreign policy motion, which was 
passed by a small margin, also stressed Britain's ability to act independently on 
Vietnam 
The Government have generally supported the American position 
because they believe quite simply, that so long as Hanoi refused to 
I Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 26 September 1966, `Subject: when George Brown Comes to Washington', Declassified 
Document Series 
2 Report of the 65th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Brighton, 3-7 October 1966, Transport House, Smith 
Square, London, SWI 
3 Ibid 
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negotiate, the alternative to continuing the struggle is to abandon 
the South Vietnamese to aggression. On the other hand it has 
been made clear that we would not support every U. S. action 
regardless of its nature; the Government have dissociated 
themselves from the bombing of oil installations at Hanoi and 
Haiphong. 4 
The Americans were not given advance warning of this plan. 5 However, they 
admitted it was `largely consistent' with their present position in that it allowed for 
`certain concessions to Hanoi to break the impasse', primarily the provision for the 
inclusion of the Viet Cong in any talks. 6 Still, Washington felt it `regrettable' that 
Brown's formula had `surfaced publicly' as it reduced Hanoi's ability to respond 
favourably. North Vietnam did indeed reject the proposal immediately as `echoing 
previously discredited US "peace tricks"'. 7 
Nevertheless Brown hoped to discuss his plan further during his first trip to 
Washington as Foreign Secretary. The visit was scheduled for 14 October, as part of 
a visit to the UN General Assembly, and once again Johnson had to be persuaded that 
it was worth cultivating a friendship with a senior British politician. Ambassador 
Bruce felt Brown was worth the effort. He advised that it was `wise to consolidate 
the goodwill he has always manifested toward Americans' and he was `sure the 
President would enjoy the encounter with a politician so singular in deportment and 
speech'. 8 Johnson agreed to meet Brown and as expected Vietnam dominated the 
discussion between the President and the Foreign Secretary. As Mr. Gromyko, the 
4 Ibid. Carried 3,470,000 to 2,932,000 against. 
5 Telegram from Bruce to Harriman 6 October 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 2101, File: UK, Vol. IX, Cables, 8/66- 
1/67, LBJL 
6Background Paper `The Brown Proposal for A Negotiated Settlement On Vietnam', Visit of UK Foreign Secretary, 
George Brown, 12 October 1966, NSF, Country File, Europe & USSR, UK, Box 216, UK, Visit of FonSec Brown, I of 2, 
10/14/66, LBJL 
7 Ibid 
8 Draft Memorandum of Conversation: President, Bruce, Brown & Dean, Subject: US-Soviet Relations; Viet-Nam, 14 
October 1966, Declassified Document Series 
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Soviet Foreign Minister, was also in the United States for the session of the UN 
General Assembly and Brown was planning to visit Moscow at the end of November, 
the President stressed that in his talks with Gromyko, or with anyone else, Brown 
`was perfectly free to commit the President to meet anywhere at any time if there 
seemed to be a reasonable prospect of solving the Viet-Nam problem. ' Johnson also 
made it clear that although the US could not abandon its commitments to South 
Vietnam, he personally was `most anxious' for the war to end as it overshadowed 
everything else. 9 The major importance of the Washington visit, as Brown 
confirmed in his memoirs, was that Washington authorized him to take a secret 
proposal, known as the 'Phase A-Phase B Formula', to the Russians on his 
forthcoming trip to Moscow. '° This plan proposed secret measures of mutual de- 
escalation. The US would stop bombing and then take additional steps to de- 
escalate, on the prior understanding that this would be followed by similar acts of de- 
escalation on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. I 
Ater meeting Gromyko in New York Brown reported back to the British 
cabinet that he sensed a softening of the Soviet position on a number of issues, 
`though not as yet on Vietnam. ' 12 Two weeks later the British acquired `additional 
examples of [the] more friendly Russian style first revealed by Gromyko in New 
York last month'. 13 Premier Kosygin confirmed that he would accept Wilson's 
9 Ibid 
10 Brown, In Afy Way, P. 142 
11 Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 4 November 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 210, File: UK, Vol. IX, Cables, 8/66- 
1/67, LBJL 
12 Cabinet Minutes, 20 October 1966, CAB 128/41, PRO 
13 Ibid 
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invitation to visit London and agreed to a four or five day trip beginning 5 
February. 14 Brown's visit to Moscow was also brought forward to 22 November. 
On the evening of 6 November, Averell Harriman, US Ambassador for Peace, 
met the British Foreign Secretary to discuss his forthcoming talks with Gromyko in 
Moscow. This proved to be a very important meeting for Anglo-American relations, 
although not for reasons that were immediately apparent. Brown emphasised the role 
the British could play in influencing the Russians to mediate on Vietnam at a time 
when the Russians appeared to be signalling their intention to play a more active role 
on the negotiation front. ' The British Foreign Secretary was adamant that there was 
now `strong evidence' of a Soviet `desire to do business', quoting Kosygin's previous 
statement that he would not accept Wilson's invitation to come to London until such 
a visit would be `fruitful'. 15 The British felt that they had managed to convince the 
Russians that the US desired peace and that they could have a `critical influence' on 
the Russians in the next few months. 
Brown's most `emphatic point' at this meeting was, however, as Bruce put it, 
`his desire for explicit, specific US guidance for use in Moscow'; Brown wanted to 
know the US position on such issues as the role of the NLF at any peace conference 
and the steps the US would regard as `appropriate' from North Vietnam in response 
to a unilateral US cessation of bombing. The President had apparently told Brown 
that he might settle for 40% reciprocity from North Vietnam, rather than a 50/50 
deal. 16 It was agreed that the Foreign Secretary should not urge the reconvening of a 
Geneva Conference, instead he should `simply stress Soviet-UK responsibilities as 
14 Ibid 
15 Telegram from Bruce to Harriman, 7 November 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 210, File: UK, Vol. IX, Cables, 
8/66-1/67, LBJL 
16 Ibid 
339 
co-Chairmen and explore ... possible first steps toward de-escalation of hostilities 
and secret talks'. Brown ended the meeting with Harriman by repeating his belief 
that he was going to Moscow for `a straight bit of negotiation on a specific topic'. 
He then said something of which careful note was taken by the Americans. In what 
Bruce felt was a `deliberate choice of words' Brown said any further escalation of 
bombing `might well lose you the support of all your friends in Europe like me, who 
are trying to help'. Harriman said he would get Washington to provide Brown with 
`ammunition' for his trip and that this would include information on the US 
Congressional election results and Vietnam, and explicit guidance for his talks in 
Moscow. '7 
In the event, the White House was not prepared to provide the British with 
full and advance notice of their own peace plans. At a meeting on 10 November, 
State Department officials met with Presidential advisers to consider what advice to 
give George Brown and Italian Ambassador to South Vietnam, Giovanni D'Orlandi. 
At the end of June 1966 a Polish representative of the I. C. C., Janus Lewandowski, 
contacted D'Orlandi to inform him he had met with Ho Chi Minh, General Giap and 
Premier Pham Van Dong and believed there was room for compromise in the North 
Vietnamese position. He believed Hanoi would begin negotiating if the US 
suspended its bombing campaign and allowed the NLF to take some part in the 
proceedings. '8 The key individuals present at the meeting - William Bundy, Averell 
Harriman and Chester Cooper - agreed that `Brown's talks in Moscow offered better 
immediate possibilities than the D'Orlandi channel'. 19 At this stage the Americans 
17 Ibid 
18 Janos Radvänyi, Delusion and Reality: Gambits, Hoaxes, and Diplomatic One-Upmanship in Vietnam (Indiana: 
Gateways Editions, 1978), p. 193 
19 Memorandum of a Meeting in FRUS, Vol. IV, p. 822 
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were not convinced that D'Orlandi's contact was operating under instructions from 
his own government and so the meeting decided to `concentrate on what we could 
give to Brown'. 20 Harriman thought after material for Brown had been prepared, `we 
should see what morsels could be given to D'Orlandi'. 21 William Bundy's main 
concern was if Phase A-Phase B was accepted and `Hanoi took significant reciprocal 
action and we then suspended the bombing, pressures would quickly build up for us 
to stop troop re-inforcements as well'. And, as Cooper reminded the meeting, Brown 
had publicly announced his own plan calling for `a bombing pause plus no- 
reinforcements in exchange for an end to infiltration'. Bundy `agreed that ending 
U. S. troop re-inforcement seemed to figure prominently in Brown's thinking and 
came high on his timetable'. For that reason Bundy observed that the US `had to be 
careful about how far' it went with Brown, `we would not want to make substantial 
concessions before Hanoi was even at the negotiating table'. 22 Still, Bundy thought 
it right `to give Brown something to contribute to the value of his talks. Though he 
was not a discreet man he was well intentioned and capable and was a good friend to 
the US'. 23 Although there was some scepticism regarding the Soviets' interest in a 
role as intermediary, Harriman concluded that they `might be interested in trying out 
some ideas in their talks with Brown' and therefore they `should not conclude in 
advance that nothing constructive would emerge'. Noticeably, Harriman noted that, 
`furthermore, our relations with the British would suffer a damaging blow if the 
British government were to conclude that we were not serious about reaching a 
negotiated settlement in Vietnam'. It was agreed that the US `should give Brown 
20 Ibid, p. 821 
21 Ibid, p. 823 
22 Ibid, p. 822 
23 Ibid, p. 822-23 
341 
enough to work with to satisfy him but obviously should not give away our 
position'. 24 
At this stage Chester Cooper, an NSC staff member, outlined US plans for 
peace, and Brown's part in them, in a memo to Harriman a few days later. 25 The 
Americans clearly felt that Brown's visit to Moscow just one month before 
Christmas, when another bombing pause might take place, was significant and a 
pause might be all-important in determining the success or failure of the visit. 
However, they would not let the British know their definite plans regarding the 
prospects of a Christmas bombing pause. This may have been because they felt it 
was not worth risking a leak at this stage but it may also have been that ultimately 
they did not trust the British to represent them adequately. So, Brown was advised to 
tell the Russians that a bombing pause was likely on the grounds of `precedent, 
rumor and reason' but that he had no advance knowledge of this. He was also to 
stress that if there was a pause, time was of the essence. The pause would be short 
due to Johnson's limited patience and would be the last one. Hanoi and Moscow 
ought to begin `contingency planning' immediately. In terms of what the US would 
consider an appropriate response to US cessation of bombing, the President would 
want `some credible and discernible reaction' in order to keep the pause going; such 
as `(1) an immediate stopping of southbound truck traffic ... (2) an immediate and 
substantial decline in the level of Communist military action and terror in the South. ' 
If this happened, the US would be prepared to move to either public or private 
discussions with Hanoi, bilaterally or multilaterally. They were also prepared to do 
24 Ibid, p. 823 
25 Memorandum from Governor Harriman to Chester Cooper, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 210, File: UK, Vol. IX, 
Memos 8/66-1/67, LBJL 
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this at short notice `perhaps during January before Kosygin's visit to London and 
before Tet. '26 It was envisaged that the Wilson-Kosygin talks could be used to set up 
a more formal Geneva-type conference. 
Unfortunately, during Brown's visit to Moscow both Gromyko and Kosygin 
continued their hard line on Vietnam, stressing that any negotiations on Vietnam had 
to be understood and arranged in light of the US position as the aggressor. And, 
although Brown presented the Phase A-Phase B proposal to Gromyko, both verbally 
and on paper, the Soviets argued that there was `nothing new' in this and therefore 
they had `no new opinions' to express. 27 Nevertheless Brown informed Rusk that 
Kosygin had characterised their discussions as `very useful' and that he felt the 
meeting had still been worthwhile not least because he had improved his `already 
sympathetic' relationship with Gromyko and `had established himself on amiable 
terms with Kosygin'. 28 Also, although Brown had said he was acting in a personal 
capacity, without the authorization of the United States, he passed on to Kosygin, 
Johnson's comment that if the Soviets could help, the British Foreign Secretary could 
say that he knew he could deliver his friend. 29 Brown reported back to the Cabinet 
that the Soviet Government `no longer maintained a wholly negative attitude on a 
number of major international issues' and that on Vietnam `the tone of the discussion 
was less harsh' even if the position was still the same. 30 The British would shortly 
26 Ibid 
27 Record of a Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in the 
Kremlin, Moscow, at 10.30 am, on 25 November 1966, Visit of the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Union 22-25 
November 1966, Annex, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
28 Cable from Bromley Smith to the President, 26 November 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 210, File: UK, Vol. IX, 
Memos 8/66-1/67; From Bruce to Rusk, 27 November 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 210, File: UK, Vol. IX, Cables, 
8/66-1/67, LBJL 
29 Record of a Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in the 
Kremlin, Moscow, at 10.30 am, on 25 November 1966, Visit of the Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Union 22-25 
November 1966, Annex, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
30 Cabinet Minutes, 1 December 1966, CAB 128/41, PRO 
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discover why the Russians had not appeared interested in Brown's rendition of Phase 
A-Phase B. 
Christmas Truce 1966 
From the end of November, Wilson had been under pressure at home to press 
Johnson for another bombing truce. The war in Vietnam continued unabated and 
between 2-6 December the US carried out a series of bombing raids on military 
targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi, the first in the area since the POL 
installations were attacked in the summer. Although the targets were considered by 
the Americans to be legitimate military ones, such as truck depots, rail yards and fuel 
storage dumps, the possibility of mass civilian casualties alarmed much of world 
opinion. The air raids were further escalated on 13 and 14 December when US 
bombers targetted the Hanoi area. The Soviet Union responded by accusing the US 
of bombing residential sections of the city. Although Washington officially denied 
this, the suspicion remained that the likelihood of civilian casualties through stray 
missiles was high. The public outcry in Britain was greater than ever. Fifty-five 
members of Parliament sent a cable to Johnson expressing their grave concern at the 
successive bombing attacks on Hanoi and the `resultant loss of life among the 
civilian population' and asking that these attacks be stopped in the `interest of world 
peace. '31 Donald Murray of the British Foreign Office reported to the British 
Embassy in Washington on 16 December that the `head of steam' over the Hanoi 
bombing had become `very serious indeed' and requested further information on the 
31 Telegram to the President 15 December 1966, EXCO305, United Kingdom 1/1/65, Box 76, C0305,11/4/66-6/14/67 
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raids in order to prepare an official statement that Brown could deliver in the House 
of the Commons. 32 Wilson was pressed to dissociate Britain from the American 
`bombing of schools, hospitals and population centers' as Labour MPs put it in the 
House. 33 Bruce also suggested that Rusk, who was in Paris for the latest NATO 
meeting, should do a background press briefing on the bombing to try to deal with 
the emerging public relations disaster. The original material sent to London by the 
State Department had in the words of one US official, been 'god-awful'. 34 By 
refusing to provide a specific rationale for the attacks and by not providing sufficient 
detail on the target areas, the Americans were not helping themselves, or their allies 
to deal with the flak they would undoubtedly receive as a result of such incidents. 
Matters were made worse a few days later by the publication of press reports from 
Harrison Salisbury in the New York Times describing civilian casualties in North 
Vietnam from the latest wave of US air attacks. The official presentation of the air 
raids as surgical attacks on military targets was increasingly difficult to sustain as 
Salisbury reported at length that several towns and cities had been hit with resultant 
civilian casualties. 
In the event Brown had little choice but to respond to such criticism of the 
bombing of Hanoi with the now standard Government response: he blamed the North 
Vietnamese for `prolonging the fighting', assured the House that the US was only 
attacking military targets, and reiterated the urgent need to establish peace 
negotiations. 35 Bruce judged Brown's performance to be `smooth and authoritative' 
32 Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 16 December 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Vol. IX, Cables, 8/66-1/67, Box 210, LBJL 
33 Hansard, 19 February 1965, Vol. 706, Col. 254 
34 Memo for Mr. Rostov from Richard M. Moose, 16 December 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Vol. IX, Memos, 8/66- 
1/67, LBJL 
35 Ibid & Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 20 December 1966, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 210, File: UK, Vol. IX, 
Cables, 8/66-1/67, LBJL 
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and credited the Foreign Secretary with effectively lessening the outcry over the 
bombing. 36 Wilson and Brown were also fortunate in that the Parliamentary recess 
for Christmas was about to begin and news of Rhodesian sanctions had hit the 
headlines. 
Aware of the growing unrest in Britain over the bombing, Washington knew it 
was essential that the British Government's resolve not waver. Although not a 
priority issue, the White House and State Department worried about further British 
dissociations in the light of the bombings. Strangely, members of the Johnson 
administration adopted a quixotic response to this concern. Rusk's patience with the 
British was running out and the President obviously shared the same view. 
Reporting back on his NATO meeting, the Secretary of State told the President that 
he had given the Council some `old-time religion' on Vietnam and that this pressure 
might result in more allied assistance on a bilateral basis, particularly from Germany 
and the Netherlands. In relation to Britain, Rusk said he had hit George Brown 
`pretty hard' on their joint SEATO commitment in face of `the common danger' in 
Vietnam. 37 He further commented, `I intend to press them very hard for more 
participation but they will probably act like scared rabbits in the face of their 
domestic political situation. '38 Even at this late stage, Rusk remained dissatisfied at 
the British commitment on Vietnam. 
The following day the President met at the Ranch to discuss Vietnam with 
some of his key civilians advisers, including Secretary McNamara, Walt Rostoliv, 
Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Lodge. Lodge reported that progress had 
36 Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 20 December 1966 8/66-1/67 
37 Personal Telegram from Rusk to the President, 16 December 1966, Declassified Document Series 
38 Ibid 
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been made on third country participation but more could be made. However, he 
thought the US had `reached the limit of generating such assistance by exhortation'. 
Again, Britain was specifically mentioned. Lodge said the US could use the kind of 
British policemen who had worked in Kenya and suggested, `we ought to pressure 
the British to get some -- perhaps by holding up shipments of scotch whiskey to the 
U. S. '. 39 
While Rusk and others were still determined to press the British towards a 
deeper involvement in Vietnam, they also recognised that Wilson needed to be 
encouraged to maintain his present level of support for the President. Patrick Dean 
had separate meetings with Dean Rusk, Walt Rostov and Averell Harriman and 
reported their views back to the Foreign Office. 40 According to Dean, Rusk said `it 
was highly unpopular for the Americans to have to go on alone and that was why the 
political support of the British Government was so valuable' and reiterated that 
`South East Asia and the attitude of foreign governments to the war in Vietnam 
mattered by far the most to the U. S. Government'. 41 Ambassador Harriman also 
wished to make it clear that if governments who were not 
directly engaged in Vietnam wished to retain influence with the 
President, who would be under continuous and increasing strain 
from the hawks to spread and intensify the war, it was most 
important that these governments should not'dissociate' 
themselves from the President. 'Dissociation' was in any case 
an unfortunate word and had had an unfortunate effect. If 
outside governments felt that they could not approve any action 
the U. S. might take they should use expressions like'they did 
not see the necessity for such and such an action. ' Those who 
dissociated themselves from the President could not expect to 
39 Meeting with the President, Friday, 17 December, 1966, Austin, Texas, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, Box 3, Meeting 17 
December, 1966, (Vietnam; NATO; UN etc), LBJL 
40 Letter from Sir Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 28 December 1966, PREM 13/1917; Two letters from Sir Patrick 
Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 29 December 1966, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
41 Letter from Sir Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 28 December 1966, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
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have much influence with him. 42 
Harriman reminded Dean that by and large outside the White House the President 
was under pressure from hawks and therefore `those who were in favour of 
moderation should ... seek to preserve their 
influence with the President and the best 
way of doing so was to sympathise with and support him'. Although never more 
than token resistance, Congressional disaffection had been evident since January 
1966 when Senator William Fulbright presided over the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee hearings on the war. However, Johnson not only faced criticism from 
opponents of the war; he also faced a small group centred around Senator John 
Stennis and the Senate Armed Service Committee. This group wanted to end the war 
by winning it through stronger action. Johnson continued to face countervailing 
pressures in Congress for the duration of the Administration. Nevertheless, at this 
point, the 'hawks' had the upper hand because of the approaching 1968 Presidential 
election. Johnson was well aware that Democratic losses during the 1966 
Congressional elections were largely due to questions surrounding his own 
credibility on the war, and his handling of it. 43 The President was well aware that he 
would find it extremely difficult to achieve re-election without a satisfactory 
resolution of the war, or at the very least, some indication that the war was being 
successfully prosecuted. Nevertheless, at this stage Harriman reassured Dean that 
there were 
no signs at all the President was going to take any rash 
42 Letter from Sir Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 29 December 1966, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
43 Although the Democrats retained a large majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the party had 
sustained 47 losses in the House and 3 in the Senate. Before the 1966 elections the position had been 295-140 in the 
House and 68-32 in the Senate, after it the majority was reduced to 248-187 and 64-36 See Dallek, Flared Giant, pp. 338- 
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action in the near future. On the contrary, he would resist 
pressures for this for as long as he could, but he needed 
the support of world opinion and above all of the British 
government. This meant a very great deal both to the U. S. 
Administration and to the President personally. 44 
But to complicate the picture, although probably reflecting Johnson's uncertainty 
about the best way forward, Rostow told Dean that the President was `personally 
disinclined to adopt a soft line toward the North Vietnamese'. He also stressed that 
although the US was still committed to the fight in Vietnam, it was also ready to find 
peace and were `encouraging all contenders for the peace prize'. 45 
Fearing further Parliamentary anger over US bombings, Dean highlighted in 
his letters to London the fact that all three men had expressed appreciation of the 
British support on Vietnam and hoped that: 
if the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State feel that 
they cannot actually continue to support U. S. policy, they 
will take account of Harriman's warning when formulating 
any statement. 46 
This advice was heeded; the British would not dissociate themselves from the 
bombing. 
Parallel Peace Efforts - From Marigold to Sunflower 
According to William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Eastern 
affairs, by the end of 1966 the Johnson administration, and in particular the 
President, had decided to take peace talks more seriously. If this was the case, then 
44 Ibid 
45 Letter from Sir Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 29 December 1966, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
46 Letter from Sir Patrick Dean to Sir Paul Gore-Booth, 30 December 1966, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
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LBJ and his staff mishandled many of the tentative contacts between their 
representatives and North Vietnamese officials. 
The British decided to try another tack on the peace front as George Brown 
came up with another initiative. On 30 December, Brown sent a confidential cable 
simultaneously to the Governments of the United States, North Vietnam and South 
Vietnam. In it he proposed a three-way meeting to `arrange the cessation of 
hostilities'. 47 Brown offered the services of Her Majesty's Government to facilitate 
such a meeting and said that, if desired, the meeting could take place on British 
territory. He suggested the facilities at Britain's base in Hong Kong. Hanoi rejected 
the proposal. This response was especially predictable considering the fact that the 
Chinese had two days earlier charged that Hong Kong was being used as a base for 
aircraft carriers whose planes were bombing North Vietnam. American journalist, 
Harrison Salisbury put this down to either `incredible bumbling' on Brown's part or 
suggested it was a measure aimed at appeasing those baying for the Labour Party to 
take action to end the war. 48 It could have been both. The Americans formally 
welcomed Brown's proposal and Johnson repeated his position that the United States 
was `ready to meet anywhere, any time that Hanoi is willing to come to a conference 
table'. 49 
Just a few days later, however, the British were to hear some disturbing news 
from the Americans. Rusk informed London on 4 January that during the previous 
six months, the Poles had been negotiating with the North Vietnamese with the 
agreement of the United States government. Rusk had been forced into this 
47 Telegram from Foreign Office to British Embassy, Hanoi, 30 December 1966, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
48 Harrison Salisbury, Behind the Lines - Hanoi, (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 230 
49 Telegram from Rusk to Bruce, 13 January 1967, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 210, File: UK, Vol. IX, Cables, 8/66- 
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admission by the fact that Harrison Salisbury had had discussions with Britain's 
Consul in Hanoi, John Colvin about his exchanges with North Vietnamese 
ministers. 50 Salisbury told Colvin that from his discussions with the Prime Minister 
of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, he thought the North Vietnamese `had gone 
further than ever before, and that if there were any receptivity in United States 
Administration there were grounds for further exploration'. 51 
Not surprisingly the British were alarmed and disheartened by this revelation. 
It told Wilson, Brown and the Foreign Office three things. First, that the Americans 
were being far from frank with them regarding their attempts to find peace. Second, 
that Washington had been prepared to let Brown go to Moscow ill-informed. And 
third, that the chances of the latest discussions with Hanoi coming to anything were 
compromised by the fact the latest intermediary was a journalist whose temptation 
would be to publish an account of his discussions with Premier Pham Van Dong 
rather maintain the required silence. 
Still, the Polish peace effort, code-named `Marigold' in Washington, did 
suggest the North Vietnamese were looking to negotiate. The Marigold affair 
reveals a great deal about the negotiating stance of the United States and their 
apparent ineptitude in diplomacy on Vietnam. 
In November the US showed serious interest in the D'Orlandi/Lewandowski 
channel, at which point Ambassador Lodge allowed the Polish diplomat to pass on 
the US position regarding a final solution to the current stalemate to the authorities in 
Hanoi. This included Rusk's fourteen points, the statement of the Manila conference 
(24-25 October, 1966) that American troops would withdraw from Vietnam within 
50 Top Secret Report on Vietnam for the Prime Minister, 4 January 1967, PREM 13/1917, PRO 
51 Telegram from British Embassy, Hanoi to Foreign Office, 4 January 1967, PREM 13/1917 
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six months of a peace settlement (on condition that the North Vietnamese would also 
withdraw from the South), and the Phase A-Phase B formula that Brown had also 
taken to Moscow in November. On November 30 Lewandowski returned to Saigon 
from Hanoi to report to Lodge on his meeting with the North Vietnamese. On 1 
December he told the US Ambassador that he was authorized to tell the American 
government: `If the U. S. is really of the view which I have presented, it would be 
advisable to confirm them directly by conversation with the North Vietnamese 
ambassador in Warsaw'. 52 A direct contact was on the cards. However, the State 
Department scrutinised Lewandowski's version of the American position presented 
to Hanoi, only to find that he had neglected to include the details of the de-escalatory 
Phase A-Phase B formula. Lewandowski said that it had been presented orally. 
Washington decided to pursue this lead telling Lewandowski that their Ambassador 
in Warsaw, Gronouski would be in contact with the North Vietnamese Embassy on 
December 6 or soon afterwards. At the same time, however, Lodge added that the 
Ten Points Lewandowski had presented only broadly reflected the U. S. position and 
that `several specific points were subject to important differences of interpretation'. 53 
Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, intervened at this point and warned that 
any American intensification of the bombing campaign would destroy the possibility 
of a contact through Warsaw, expressing deep concern at any re-interpretation of the 
Ten Points. The Polish attempt at mediation ended when the US stepped up its 
bombing campaign on 13 December attacking a railroad yard and vehicle depot near 
Hanoi for the second time in 10 days. 54 Four days later, Wilfred Burchett, an 
52 Telegram from Lodge, American Embassy in Vietnam to Rusk, I December 1966, in FRUS, Vol. IV, p. 893 
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Australian communist journalist with close ties to the North Vietnamese leadership, 
told US officials in Paris that the DRV had had an official en route to Warsaw `when 
the US resumed bombing Hanoi'. 55 Rapacki informed Gronouski that Hanoi had 
requested that the Poles end their mediation to arrange a direct contact between the 
Governments of North Vietnam and the United States and said that `the whole 
responsibility for losing this chance of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam War rested 
on the United States government'. 56 The United States tried one desperate attempt to 
restart the exchanges by stopping the bombing within a ten-mile radius of Hanoi. 
The Poles again contacted Hanoi but to no avail. Despite US protestations that the 
Hanoi bombing targets had been decided upon months before, Moscow, Poland and 
Hanoi were left with the impression that Washington preferred a military solution. 
Brown was furious at Rusk's cable telling of the Polish peace efforts. In a 
cable designated 'flash' traffic, Brown replied tersely: 
Thank you for this information. But, though I realise your 
difficulties, I must say I wish you had told me of this before I 
went to Moscow. To put it mildly a very valuable opportunity 
may have been lost. It is not surprising that the Russians were 
so puzzled... If a further opportunity arises I am sure you will 
keep me fully in the picture. 57 
Not surprisingly, this latest revelation prompted a flurry of discussions in Downing 
Street and the Foreign Office. Reporting on the matter to the Prime Minister on 4 
January 1967, Michael Palliser commented that Rusk's telegram was `disheartening' 
as it revealed `a disconcerting lack of frankness with us by the Americans'. 
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Moreover, Palliser felt `the gravity of this failure by the Americans to keep us 
informed (however valid the reasons given by Rusk; and the validity seems at best 
questionable) is compounded by the fact that they let the Foreign Secretary go to 
Moscow from November 22-25 without knowing what was going on between them 
and the Poles'. He elaborated further on the perception the Russians may have 
received during Brown's visit and hinted that this had been a lost opportunity: 
Since the Polish representative in Saigon (Lewandowski) got 
the message wrong and was in fact conveying to Hanoi an 
inaccurate summary of the American position (omitting in 
particular the two-phase agreement under which U. S. bombing 
would have stopped provided there was clear advance agreement 
about subsequent action by Hanoi) at precisely the same time as 
the Foreign Secretary was in Moscow giving the Russians an 
accurate account of the American position, it is not surprising 
the Russians (who pretty clearly had been informed of what was 
going on) seemed puzzled by the Foreign Secretary's exposition and 
pressed him very closely on it. Since it did not correspond with 
what Lewandowski was explaining to Hanoi they may have 
concluded that the Foreign Secretary did not, despite what he 
said, enjoy full American confidence - which seems regrettably 
to have been true - or alternatively that the two-phase agreement 
was his own bright idea and had no American backing. 58 
Washington's decision to keep the British deliberately in the dark on this matter, was 
probably made in the genuine belief that the less third parties knew about the Polish 
contact, the less likelihood of leaks and therefore failure. Certainly Hanoi and the 
Polish government had requested absolute secrecy. 59 If this was the case, however, 
the Americans would have saved British blushes had they not given Brown the Phase 
A-Phase B proposal. 
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Wilson asked to see Bruce to discuss the exchanges between Rusk and Brown 
over the Polish contact. According to the record of conversation the Prime Minister 
spoke firmly on the matter, saying it `raised a major issue of confidence in relations 
between the Foreign Secretary and himself and the President and Mr. Rusk'. The 
Prime Minister said he had been `disturbed' at what had happened, that Brown had 
been `placed in an impossible situation for his talks in Moscow' and that those talks 
may have proved `counter-productive' with the Russians. Not only did Wilson 
express his dissatisfaction that the Poles knew what was going and Brown didn't, but 
also that he thought it `even more unacceptable' that the Italians also `knew the facts' 
when they had no `need to know', whereas the Foreign Secretary `who had to deal 
with "some of the toughest eggs in the business" did not'. 60 He felt that the Foreign 
Secretary's message to Rusk over this had in fact been `relatively temperate' and 
things were more serious than this implied. Wilson was keen to ensure that this 
should not happen again, especially given Kosygin's planned visit to London early in 
February, arguing that `it was essential, before he came, the United States 
Government should have put the British Government completely in the picture 
without holding anything back'. To this end, the Prime Minister requested that 
Chester Cooper be sent to London to fully brief himself and the Foreign Secretary. 
Cooper was considered someone who would not attract too much media attention, 
and lead to speculation that the British Government was being briefed or indeed 
being given instructions before the visit. 61 
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Bruce gallantly tried to defend the US position, stressing he had not known 
what was happening with the Poles and that this in itself was proof that `this was all 
being kept very close'. The Prime Minister reminded Bruce that the situation was 
`similar' to one that happened the previous year, when it was only as a result of his 
own pressure that Mr. Goldberg, US Ambassador at the UN had been sent to London 
to brief Wilson on the 'peace offensive' and that `without that exchange, the British 
Government would not have been as well informed as they should be'. 62 
Wilson was not content to leave things at that; instead he told Bruce that `the 
broader question of confidence must be raised with the President at some point. ' 
Wilson emphasized the serious pressure he would be under once Parliament 
reassembled but said `there was no question of this affecting the Government's 
general attitude' and assuring Brown that they had no intention of dissociating from 
the US Government on Vietnam. He did admit, however, that Harrison Salisbury's 
articles had made a big impact and that public opinion in Britain generally was 
growing ever more critical of the US Government. For this reason, although he felt 
he `could hold the position', he believed that `the general Anglo-American 
relationship' was bound to come under greater strain `and this made even more 
intolerable the American failure to keep us in the picture over the Vietnam exchanges 
with the Poles'. As was now usual, Wilson discussed with Bruce the merits of 
sending a personal message to the President. At first Bruce suggested he `get some 
illumination' on the Polish discussions before Wilson did this and obviously inferred 
that it might even be best if the Prime Minister left such a discussion until their next 
face-to-face meeting. Bruce emphasized the President's many difficulties at home. 
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Wilson replied that although he recognised that Johnson was `going through a tough 
period' and he would not let a friend down at such a time, their working relationship 
must become more of a partnership `in things that mattered'. Indeed, he fired that 
`this kind of thing must not happen again or he would go personally direct to the 
President. ' At this point Bruce said he thought Wilson should contact the President 
via a short message expressing how seriously he took the matter. 63 
Wilson's advisers worked on a draft message later that day. In it Wilson 
repeated his serious concern over the Polish discussions and Brown's `equivocal 
position' while in Moscow, expressing his doubts that Britain would have been 
informed at all had it not been for Harrison Salisbury. He repeated that it was 
essential that there be `complete frankness' before Kosygin's visit. 64 The draft went 
further talking of `the key' to their `whole relationship' being `mutual support and 
counsel' and a `concept of partnership' based on `total confidence between us. I am 
bound in all honesty to say that, in the present case, this confidence seems to me to 
have been lacking: and I wanted you to know how gravely I view such a situation. '65 
Wilson, as with previous angry draft messages, changed his mind and two 
days later sent a brief and somewhat mellower message to the President as follows: 
I want you to know that, as I have told David Bruce privately, 
I am seriously concerned at a matter which is, I think, pretty 
fundamental to our relationship. David will of course be 
reporting about it but, as I told him, I feel that I should send 
you this personal word about it. Best regards. 66 
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This did not mean, however, that London had relaxed over the issue. On the 
contrary, a reply from Rusk to Brown's cable enflamed British sensitivities. The 
Secretary of State argued that, 
there was nothing on which we could have informed you prior 
to your visit to Moscow. Your visit came at the time of 
Lewandowski's visit to Hanoi but before we had any information 
whatever from him on his visit ... In fact, we gave you for your 
trip a major concession to the other side in the form of a two- 
phased proposal in which we would stop the bombing if they 
would agree that subsequently there could be a de-escalation 
of the violence. I am sorry if there has been any mis- 
understanding on this point. 67 
Brown apparently found this statement `disappointingly disingenuous' and although 
he decided to continue the exchange with Rusk, did ask Murray Maclehose to write 
to Patrick Dean explaining the nature of Brown's grievance. Dean could then pass 
this on to Bill Bundy. 68 Maclehose explained: 
We do not want an argument, but the State Department must 
not be allowed to pass off the impropriety of this action in 
this way. They must realise that the Secretary of State's 
message to Rusk was based on very serious considerations. 69 
Maclehose privately hoped that the Russians had understood what had happened in 
November. 
In the long run, and after they had time to check it all up (and 
no doubt to grill Lewandowski) they have probably got it all 
straight now, and realised that Lewandowski muffed it, and 
the Secretary of State got it right. Perhaps as a result of this 
belated realisation the Secretary of State's stock may even 
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have risen rather than the reverse in Moscow, and the extent 
of the generous concession which he conveyed may have got 
through. 
Notwithstanding this glimmer of hope, Maclehose concluded that `the risk which the 
Americans ran, both to their own interests and to the Secretary of State's reputation, 
by their lack of frankness, strikes us as amazing'"70 
The following day, when Brown addressed the British cabinet, he reported 
that the chances of resolving the conflict in Vietnam were `slightly more hopeful 
than hitherto' even if they remained `confused and uncertain'. He reassured his 
colleagues that the Government was continuing to `promote some form of mediation 
between the parties to the dispute' via both public and private discussions. Perhaps 
bending to pressure from within the Party, Brown admitted that the British 
Government `must continue to deplore the United States bombing of North Vietnam' 
but argued, as the Americans had pressed him to, that it would be 
impolitic to dissociate ourselves from United States policy, 
especially since we had reason to believe that the United States 
President, although determined not to expose United States 
prestige to a rebuff, was continuing to resist pressure within 
his Administration for the adoption of more extreme military 
measures against North Vietnam. 7' 
Chester Cooper was despatched to London to try to smooth the waters by 
briefing the Prime Minister on the latest developments on Vietnam. When he met 
with Brown and Wilson on 18 January, the Prime Minister's sensitivities regarding 
the Polish affair were still apparent. Cooper tried to appease him over this, 
explaining that, 
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the President was in a 'psychotic' state about leaks not only in 
regard to top secret matters such as these but over anything 
that he wished to keep confidential; this was why there had 
been a 'clamp-down' on security about the exchanges. 72 
Wilson and Cooper then concentrated on the Kosygin visit. Cooper elaborated on the 
latest contacts with the Russians and reported that Washington now understood that 
if there was to be a settlement, Hanoi wanted advance notice of what'package' would 
be available before committing itself to talks. The American Ambassador in 
Moscow, Llewelyn Thompson would soon be informing the Russians of this change 
in the US position and would also confirm that Washington accepted that the NLF 
could be involved in any discussions. Cooper also confirmed that a draft `package 
settlement' had now been written and that it was envisaged that a basic 
understanding be agreed between Hanoi and Washington before holding an 
international conference to ratify the secret agreement. Cooper presented this 
information as top secret, noting that as only four people in the State Department 
knew of it, `there were now more people on this side of the Atlantic who were fully 
in the picture of the current United States approach to Vietnam than in the United 
States itself'. 73 This emphasis on absolute secrecy was, of course, necessary to 
preserve the chances of a private deal being negotiated. It was also, as Cooper had 
stressed regarding the Polish affair, the result of Johnson's growing paranoia. 
Wilson pressed Cooper to emphasise to Washington not only the desirability 
of a Tet truce but also that the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam should last for 
the duration of the entire Kosygin visit. Again, Wilson suggested reinforcing 
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Cooper's points by sending a message to the President. When Cooper said it was best 
to wait and see whether Washington were amenable to the Prime Minister's views, 
Wilson said he would not send an immediate message. 74 In the end, Wilson trusted 
Cooper to do the job and merely responded to Johnson's reply to Wilson's telegram 
on the Polish affair. Wilson thanked Johnson for the `admirably full briefing' he and 
George Brown had received from Cooper, and said he felt they were `now fully in 
possession of the facts. ' He also asked that Cooper pay another visit, immediately 
prior to the Kosygin visit. 
Kosygin's Visit to London - 6-13 February 1967 
By the end of January, the United States suspected Hanoi was seeking a 
settlement in Vietnam. In addition to coming close to establishing direct contact 
with North Vietnam during the Polish affair, a number of indirect contacts indicated 
some movement in North Vietnam. By the beginning of February, three journalists 
had had separate interviews with senior North Vietnamese officials that suggested 
Hanoi had changed its formula for establishing peace. Harrison Salisbury's interview 
with Pham Van Dong had been followed on 28 January by an interview between 
William Burchett, an experienced Australian communist journalist, and the Foreign 
Minister of North Vietnam Nguyen Duy Trinh, during which Trinh appeared to 
abandon the four points as a pre-requisite of any peace settlement, instead indicating 
there `could' be talks if the US stopped bombing. This statement marked the first 
time that Hanoi had `directly addressed the possibility of an official dialogue 
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between North Vietnamese and Americans'. 75 Moreover, Trinh had modified the 
condition that a bombing halt should be `final and unconditional' to `unconditional' 
only. A meeting between Robert Kennedy and officials of the French Foreign 
Office on 31st January seemed to confirm that this was Hanoi's official policy. This 
movement in Hanoi's position was underscored by the publication of Trinh's 
interview in North Vietnamese newspapers, including the party journal Nhan Dan, 
indicating that Hanoi was preparing its own public for talks of some kind. 76 These 
private contacts appeared more portentous in light of recent statements on North 
Vietnamese radio indicating that there might be a willingness in Hanoi to negotiate. 
Also on 20 January an interview between Gloria Stewart and Nguyen Van 
Hieu, the NLF's 'foreign minister' was published in the New Statesman. 77 The 
Vietcong's settlement aims appeared to differ from North Vietnam's 'four points'. 
Apparently, Hieu said to Stewart that the NLF was willing to `begin preliminary talks 
directly with America - without conditions' and argued that the NLF was not wedded 
to the idea of establishing the same political system as the North. 78 Clearly, at the 
very least, there were discussions on possible peace terms taking place amongst the 
Vietnamese nationalists. 
In the lead up to the Wilson-Kosygin talks, the British Foreign Office liased 
closely with the British Embassy in Washington and with Chester Cooper to ensure 
that the US Government kept Wilson and Brown fully abreast of the latest 
developments. The British would not be'put into bat', a second time without 
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adequate protection and without knowing the score. 79 By the end of January, less 
than a week before Kosygin was due to arrive in London, Brown was pressing 
Cooper for `any additional information on American thinking on Vietnam'. 80 He 
was particularly concerned to learn whether Thompson had spoken to the leadership 
in Moscow about the latest US position, and whether the Americans could comment 
on the conversation between the journalist William Burchett and Pham Van Dong. 
As already noted Burchett's report of the talk indicated that the North Vietnamese 
might be trying to make contact via a communist country. 8' Three days before 
Kosygin's visit, Chester Cooper arrived in London in response to Wilson's request to 
be fully briefed on these latest developments in Vietnam diplomacy. Although 
Cooper had originally intended to return to Washington before Wilson's talks with 
Kosygin began, the Prime Minister asked that Cooper remain in England so that he 
could `serve as link between London and Washington in the event there were 
substantive discussions on Vietnam'. As Cooper put it `it was by no means clear that 
such discussions were likely' but he stayed on just the same. 82 Cooper, representing 
Washington's views, told Wilson that these latest contacts 
sounded rather less forthcoming than what tended to be read 
into the public statements of the North Vietnamese. Their 
present line was not apparently that, if the Americans would 
stop bombing, they would then be willing to talk seriously 
about negotiation; but simply that, if this happened, they would 
be prepared to listen to what the Americans thereafter had to 
propose; which implied that stopping the bombing would not be 
enough in itself to produce a real dialogue. 83 
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Nevertheless, Wilson and the Americans believed Hanoi was now sending signals to 
the Americans. The State Department were certainly `disposed' to treat the Stewart 
and Burchett interviews seriously. Goldberg believed that the various approaches 
from Hanoi represented either: 
(A) A sign of serious interest on Hanoi's part in beginning 
process toward reaching settlement or toward mutual 
abatement of the conflict; or 
(B) Part of an intensified propaganda effort to increase pressure 
of world and domestic opinion on US to end bombing. 
He suggested to Rusk that Washington should follow a course that did not exclude 
either possibility. 84 
For this reason, the Americans decided to pursue parallel peace efforts. In 
addition to allowing Wilson to pursue peace talks with Alexei Kosygin, during his 
visit to London beginning on 6 February, the President agreed to a direct American 
approach to Hanoi via Moscow. According to Cooper, `in early January the Russians 
had informed the US Embassy in Moscow that if the Americans made an effort to see 
the charge d'affaires of the North Vietnamese Embassy, preliminary exchanges might 
take place which could lead to serious talks. '85 The Americans decided to go along 
with the suggestion and on 10 January John Guthrie, the senior Embassy Officer in 
Moscow called at the North Vietnamese Embassy. The Embassy was not expecting 
Guthrie and after a long delay he met with a North Vietnamese official, La Chang. 
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Guthrie followed his brief and told the shocked official that the US government was 
prepared to engage in direct talks with the North Vietnamese government. 86 
As the Pentagon Papers noted, the Wilson-Kosygin peace initiative and US' 
direct approach to the North Vietnamese, code-named `Sunflower', began separately 
but eventually became interrelated. 87 The Sunflower effort was `enormously 
complex and confusing' but also offered `further evidence of American diplomatic 
ineptitude'. The Pentagon Papers also noted that this episode `aroused heated 
controversy' between the United States and Great Britain. This was clearly the case. 
A detailed analysis of the evolution of the Wilson-Kosygin peace initiative 
illuminates the sources of the disagreement between Washington and London, and 
the reasons for the intensity of the feelings on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Of course, neither the British nor the Americans were sure that Moscow was 
interested in acting as an intermediary. Although Brown had felt there was some 
movement in the Soviet position, and Wilson was convinced that Kosygin's decision 
to come to London during the Tet truce was a hopeful sign, prior to the actual visit 
there was no clear evidence that the Russians would play `go-between' on Vietnam. 
They might just decide to leave Hanoi to make a direct contact themselves. Brown 
was worried this was the case when it was announced that the entourage Kosygin 
would bring with him to London was relatively low-level. 
Unlike the Marigold peace effort, which focussed on the terms of a final 
peace settlement, Sunflower focussed on mutual de-escalation as a way of 
establishing the right atmosphere in which to discuss a final settlement. The impasse 
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at this stage was still as follows: the US required some kind of mutual de-escalation; 
the North Vietnamese demanded that the US stop the bombing unconditionally. 
The Phase A-Phase B Formula - The Confusion Over Tenses 
Wilson felt optimistic about a positive outcome from his talks with Kosygin. 
Cooper describes the Prime Minister as being in `high spirits' about meeting the 
Russian premier at London airport and escorting him to Claridge's Hotel. The 
American representative admitted later that Wilson might not have been so 
enthusiastic had he known how Washington viewed his plans to talk to Kosygin 
about Vietnam. According to Cooper, the President, Walt Rostow and some within 
the State Department `took a rather dim view' of Wilson's eagerness to play a part in 
Vietnam diplomacy. 
There was a sense that the British Government was pushing 
hard, perhaps too hard, to undertake the role of mediator. To 
be sure the British could claim both a right and responsibility 
to assume such a role; they and the Russians were Co-chairmen 
of the 1954 Geneva Conference and of the 1961-62 Laos 
Conference. But some of Wilson's American cousins felt 
his underlying motivation was to bolster his own and England's 
prestige ... that 
both Wilson and Brown were having happy 
dreams of being in the spotlight of a major international 
conference. 88 
The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers verify Cooper's beliefs. Clearly 
there was deep suspicion about the `eagerness of the British leaders to participate 
with maximum personal visibility in bringing peace to Vietnam'. 89 Wilson certainly 
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would have experienced a great deal of domestic relief from backbench pressures 
had he pulled off such a coup and would have welcomed the recognition that went 
along with it. However, it is difficult to believe that Wilson and Brown were 
primarily concerned with their chances of receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. It must 
be remembered that Wilson was simply not convinced that a military victory was 
possible and that he had openly questioned US military tactics. His desire for peace 
in Vietnam appears to have been genuine and one must credit him with some 
humanitarian, as well as political, motives. That is not to argue, however, that 
domestic, political concerns or international prestige factors were not spurring 
Wilson and Brown on; rather it is to affirm that there were other, important motives 
at work here too. 
Cooper admits, however, that Washington held another `less articulated but 
more deeply felt attitude' about Wilson's talks with Kosygin. 90 Basically, Johnson 
was not about to let the British Prime Minister get credit for pulling off peace talks 
after all the work the Americans had recently put in through the Polish contact and 
Guthrie's meetings with La Chang. In this sense, any form of third-party mediation 
was not particularly welcomed. If Hanoi was ready to talk, then the President was 
determined to reap the political benefits. There was also a third factor involved in 
the President's lack of enthusiasm for the Wilson-Kosygin talks: Johnson did not 
trust Wilson in negotiations. The Americans generally preferred direct talks, but they 
were particularly worried that the Prime Minister might trap them into terms that 
would prove unpalatable to them. 
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Despite American reservations about the desirability of the Prime Minister 
conducting peace talks, Washington had little choice but to support the Wilson- 
Kosygin talks. The Johnson administration still wanted British support on Vietnam 
and was well aware that the price they paid for it was condoning Wilson's peace 
efforts. There was also a recognition that the Soviets might be able to apply pressure 
on the North Vietnamese on the negotiation front. As the Pentagon Papers show, 
the State Department later judged this matter in the following terms: 
Kosygin's visit to London in early February made British 
participation inevitable. Kosygin and Wilson would discuss 
Vietnam and issue statements on it with or without a US 
input. If we stood aloof from it, the results could be harmful 
to the US. And the possibility that Kosygin could use Soviet 
influence in Hanoi introduced an element of potential value, 
not available in direct US-DRV exchanges... Looking back on 
it, there seems little doubt that bringing the British in was to 
US advantage. 91 
However, this did not mean Washington was going to be fully open with the British. 
President Johnson had since the end of January been working on a draft letter to Ho 
Chi Minh appealing for peace. Early drafts apparently included the now standard 
Phase A-Phase B formula but also included talk of an unspecified time lag between 
the cessation of US bombing and the ending of North Vietnamese infiltration of the 
South. When the letter was finally delivered via Moscow on 8 February the terms 
had changed. The letter published in full in Johnson's memoirs, set out the following 
offer: 
I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your 
country and the stopping of further augmentation of U. S. forces 
91 Herring, Secret Diplomacy, p. 396 
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in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into 
South Vietnam be land and by sea has stopped. 92 
The operative words were `has stopped'. Unfortunately for the Wilson-Kosygin 
talks, the British had not been made aware of this letter to Ho or its content. Nor, as 
far as we know, were the US representatives in London told of this development. 93 
Kosygin arrived at London airport on the 6 February, having been diverted 
from Gatwick because of fog. Wilson's first session of private talks with Kosygin 
was at 3.30 pm on the day of Kosygin's arrival in London and the two statesmen got 
straight down to business on Vietnam. Wilson reviewed the US position as he knew 
it and referred to the apparent change of position in Hanoi that the Trinh interview 
seemed to indicate. He also reminded Kosygin of the Phase A-Phase B proposal that 
Brown had delivered in Moscow the previous November, and emphasised the nature 
of the opportunity offered by the fact that current talks coincided with the Tet truce. 
According to the British record, Wilson presented his interpretation of this formula 
as a two-phased agreement designed to meet the situation in 
which North Viet-Nam required an unconditional cessation of 
bombing while the United States needed an assurance that some 
measure of de-escalation would follow if the bombing stopped. 
Assuming that an agreement could be reached secretly on such 
an arrangement, it would result in two things happening - first 
there would be overt action in the cessation of bombing, and 
secondly there would be further action in de-escalation by the 
United States side to which North Viet-Nam and the Liberation 
Front would respond by similar acts of de-escalation. 94 
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This outline of the formula `got no flicker of interest' as Cooper quickly reported 
back to Rusk in Washington. 95 Wilson was also eager to arrange a Geneva-type 
conference to arbitrate over Vietnam but Kosygin felt that this was a premature 
suggestion, as did the Americans. 96 
At this stage Wilson was `holding back on US refinements' on the mutual de- 
escalation formula, particularly the nature of the further acts of US de-escalation that 
would comprise Phase B. 97 He nevertheless stressed the hope that Kosygin could 
encourage the North Vietnamese to give the Americans `a firm sign, during Tet, of a 
readiness to make a positive and visible response to a cessation of bombing'. 98 
According to Wilson, for the first time Kosygin seemed ready to talk on this issue. 
Although denying that he was speaking for the North Vietnamese, or that he knew 
any more about their position than had been publicly stated, Kosygin did say that 
Trinh's statement should be endorsed by Britain and the Soviet Union in a public or 
private statement to the President as a basis for direct talks between the United States 
and North Vietnam. This was `unacceptable' to the British but was considered to be 
merely `Kosygin's opening gambit' and therefore not taken too seriously. 99 
Little more was agreed at this first meeting but the British were not 
discouraged. Indeed Donald Murray of the Foreign Office concluded that Kosygin 
was getting over four points, all of which were new. Kosygin agreed that there was a 
sense of urgency over the situation in Vietnam and the need to encourage peace 
talks; he acknowledged that the Tet truce provided an opportunity to begin the 
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process of establishing contact between the US and North Vietnamese; he accepted 
Russia and Britain had a part to play in assisting such talks; he acknowledged that the 
North Vietnamese appeared ready to consider settling by negotiation. '°° 
The next meeting between Kosygin and Wilson was to be at an informal 
dinner given by the Prime Minister at No. 10 Downing Street at 8.00 pm that night. 
In the meantime, as Wilson put it, `both sides were busy'. ' ' The Prime Minister had 
further talks with Bruce and Cooper, and Kosygin was in touch with Hanoi. 102 
Wilson also sent a telegram to Johnson reporting on his talks with Kosygin and 
asking for further clarification on the US position, especially regarding the Trinh 
formula. He specifically asked `whether the U. S. could stop bombing North Vietnam 
in exchange for an indication that Hanoi would enter into talks without any military 
acts of de-escalation on their side'. 103 Johnson was clearly annoyed by this message. 
In a lengthy reply the President reminded Wilson that the US had refrained from 
bombing within a ten-mile radius of Hanoi because this had been given as the reason 
for Hanoi's termination of discussions with the Poles. Despite the continuation of 
this restriction, Hanoi had not offered any corresponding action Moreover, given 
that Hanoi insisted on a permanent end to the bombing, rather than a suspension, 
Johnson felt it `all the more necessary to know what military action Hanoi would 
take' if the US stopped bombing. The Americans feared the North Vietnamese 
would use an end to the bombing to their military advantage by introducing even 
more troops and supplies into the South in order that their position be strengthened 
during negotiations. Johnson explained to Wilson that: 
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we are prepared to and plan, through established channels, to 
inform Hanoi that if they will agree to an assured stoppage 
of infiltration into South Viet Nam, we will stop the bombing 
of North Viet Nam and stop further augmentation of U. S. 
forces in South Viet Nam. We would welcome your joint 
advocacy of this position. '°4 
Wilson was, therefore, well aware of the United States' continuing approaches to 
Hanoi but did not realise that the wording of this communication would differ from 
Johnson's final draft letter to Ho Chi Minh. It would change from `if they will agree 
to an assured stoppage' to `as soon as I am assured that infiltration ... has stopped'. 
It was a subtle difference but an important one. 
Johnson also expressed his scepticism regarding Hanoi's willingness to begin 
talks and revealed his suspicions regarding North Vietnamese motives. 
You should be aware of my feeling that, in all of our various 
contacts with Hanoi, we have had no impression from them as 
to the substance of the issues which must be resolved as a part 
of a peaceful settlement... In sum, I would suggest that you try 
to separate the political processes of discussion from military 
action... We are prepared to move immediately on major steps 
of mutual de-escalation ... What we cannot accept 
is the exchange 
of guarantee of a safe haven for North Viet Nam merely for 
discussions which thus far have no form or content, during 
which they could continue to expand their military operations 
without limit. 
The President was annoyed at Wilson's pushiness on this issue saying he doubted that 
Kosygin `expected to resolve this matter on his first evening in London'; he strongly 
urged the two co-chairman not to send a joint message to him `suggesting a stoppage 
104 Ibid 
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of the bombing in exchange merely for talks' but instead explore `additional 
leads'. '°5 
The Foreign Office and Downing Street were alarmed by the strident and 
dismissive tone of this presidential message. After talking to Cooper, however, they 
explained to the Prime Minister that the message was `pure Rostow' and that had the 
message originated in the State Department, then the tone would have been 
`substantially different'. Either way, this brief from LBJ was `tougher' than Wilson 
wanted to it be. Cooper believed that, after discussions with the Prime Minister and 
his advisers, he would be able to get `something rather more forthcoming out of 
Washington'. 106 Wilson, well aware that the Tet pause would begin the next day, 
was not prepared to wait for Washington's tone to change, instead he decided to 
maintain the momentum of the previous day's talks by putting Vietnam on the 
afternoon's agenda. 107 
At that meeting, which Wilson carefully recounted in his memoirs, Kosygin 
was informed by the Prime Minister that he was `satisfied the Americans would now 
be prepared to move to further actions to strengthen mutual confidence if they were 
able to secure some assurance that this move would be reciprocated'. 108 This was a 
rather optimistic reading of Johnson's cable, nevertheless Wilson went on to explain 
to Kosygin that, 
the Americans recognised the need for a first and visible step 
by them, and equally they recognised that this step must be 
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the cessation of bombing. This I believed they would do, and 
they realised it must be presented as being done unconditionally. 
Therefore, we had to use our ingenuity to find a means of 
divorcing, in presentation, the stopping of the bombing itself 
from the consequential actions, which Mr. Kosygin and I knew 
were essential if we were to get the bombing stopped. 
He also expanded on the Phase A-Phase B proposal, volunteering one of the 
refinements in the US position: 
The US were willing, over and beyond the two-phase formula 
previously discussed, to stop the build-up of their forces in the 
South if they were assured that the movement of North Vietnam 
forces from the north to the south would stop at the same time. 
Essentially, therefore, the two stages were kept apart. But, 
because the United States Government would know that the 
second stage would follow, they would therefore be able first to 
stop the bombing, even if there was a short interval between the 
first stage and the actions to be taken by both sides at the second 
stage. There would be balanced concessions at the second 
stage, while the first stage would mean action only by the 
United States. They would be able to take that action only 
because they knew that the second stage, involving DRV 
action as well as US action, would follow in a short period 
of time. 
Wilson also informed Kosygin that the US was now seeking to get word directly to 
Hanoi along similar lines. Indeed, Wilson and Brown expected that the secret 
discussions were set for the following day. ] 09 While Kosygin welcomed the fact that 
Washington was about to contact North Vietnam directly, he argued that he could not 
praise a decision to stop the bombing as the bombing had been wrong in the first 
place. He did however show `considerable interest in this formulation'. 1lo After 
further clarification from Wilson, Kosygin asked for the proposal to be put in writing 
to him. When Bruce visited 10 Downing Street after the talks to hear a `resume' of 
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Wilson's discussions with Kosygin, he got the impression that things that gone 
`unexpectedly well'. He admitted in his diaries: `I have begun at last to feel a 
moderate optimism about the possibilities of at least initiating talks with Hanoi. " I 
Later that night Cooper cabled Rusk and Harriman to outline the day's events. 
In it he noted the British: 
hope that if any questions arise as to differences in the 
formulation of Phase A and Phase B as worked out today 
in London, and the formulation forwarded to Hanoi by 
Washington, Hanoi be told that the British text was 
authoritative in substance, although there may be stylistic 
or translation differences from the U. S. version. 112 
This was probably ultra-cautious British diplomacy but it proved prescient. 
On the afternoon of 7 February Wilson was attending question-time in the 
House, when he mishandled a reply to a supplementary question referring to `some 
tentative peace reports that Hanoi was willing to start negotiations but called them 
off when the Americans started bombing again last December'. His reply was a little 
too unguarded: 
I do not think that during this week it would be helpful to 
comment on a number of important points about Vietnam, 
but, as my Hon. Friend has referred to the discussions in 
December, of which I have all the details, perhaps I might 
tell him it is my view that what happened then was based on 
a very considerable two-way misunderstanding, and that is 
why I think certain events in December occurred. If my 
Hon. Friend is referring to the Polish discussions in anything 
that has happened since then, I do not think that it would be 
very helpful for me to offer comments this afternoon. 113 
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Wilson's response, with its tacit acceptance of the questioner's premise that secret 
peace negotiations had indeed been attempted in December 1966, caused 
consternation in the White House. Rostow cabled his friend and British counterpart, 
Michael Palliser, saying that the Prime Minister's answer had `greatly distressed' 
Washington. His reasoning was that the Americans had `held the facts tightly' and 
`severely avoided any response, analysis, or explanation of that series of exchanges'. 
Moreover, they disagreed with Wilson analysis of events, 
we are by no means convinced that there was a mis- 
understanding. Other explanations better fit the facts as 
we know them. In any case it is the strong feeling here 
that public discussions, leaks, etc., are incompatible with 
the enterprise in which we are engaged, which includes a 
half million of our fighting men. 114 
Given the Prime Minister's hopes for the Wilson-Kosygin talks, Palliser felt it 
necessary to reply at length to Rostow's cable in the hope that the matter would be 
laid to rest. He pointed out that the British Sunday papers had run with stories from 
Rostow himself that peace moves were under way behind the scenes and that `an 
extremely interesting and delicate phase' in diplomatic probing had opened in an 
effort to find out whether the communists were really interested in ceasefire talks'. 
This revelation had been linked to the disclosure by the Washington Post that 
Lewandowski had been involved in talks in Hanoi. Palliser went on with admitted 
`frankness' to say that the Prime Minister would find it ironic to be charged with 
leaking information on this subject, when it would not have been possible for the 
supplementary question to be asked had Washington not given the British press 
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enough details already. ' 15 Indeed, Palliser argued that taking Wilson's political 
problems into consideration, the Prime Minister could not have said less without 
`exposing himself to heavy pressure to say a great more. As it was the Prime 
Minister had refused to comment on the Polish discussions, was in no way critical of 
the US Government, had merely revealed that he had knowledge of the events, and 
his answer had disposed of the matter'. 116 Also, by talking of a `two-way 
misunderstanding' the Prime Minister was letting Kosygin know that he did not 
necessarily believe Hanoi's version of events'. 117 
Clearly, Washington, or at least Rostow and Johnson, overreacted to Wilson's 
comments in the House, possibly because they were not fully aware of the 
background as Palliser explained it, but probably because by now they no longer 
trusted Wilson to maintain a dignified silence on such issues. Rostow expressed his 
gratitude for Palliser's explanation but replied that Rusk's rule on peace moves was 
`no substantive comment on any single channel'. At this stage, Rostow was content 
to say that the damaging part of Wilson's answer in the House was `two-way 
misunderstanding' and that that they would have to deal with that `sometime'. He 
also accepted `full opprobrium' for his own lapse in this respect when he used the 
words `interesting and delicate' to describe private peace moves. "8 The incident 
may partially explain why the White House had failed to inform London of the 
revisions to the letter to Ho Chi Minh. 
While this spat between London and Washington was simmering in the 
background, diplomatic wranglings over Sunflower were hotting up. On 8 February, 
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the day LBJ's letter was sent to Ho Chi Minh, Kosygin attended a number of 
business and civic engagements. During one of these, a luncheon given by the Lord 
Mayor at the Guildhall, Kosygin gave a speech in which he appeared to be inviting 
the British to reconvene the Geneva Conference: 
The United Kingdom is a state whose voice is heeded by many 
and it is precisely for this reasons that the Soviet government 
believes that today, as in 1954, Great Britain together with the 
Soviet Union and other nations could make its contribution to 
the settlement of the Vietnam issue on the basis of the Geneva 
agreement, which must be implemented by the United States. ' 19 
Given the British preference for a reconvening of the Conference, this speech 
prompted a flurry activity on both sides of the Atlantic. Cooper remembers how 
Kosygin's `cryptic comments' 
interrupted the first proper dinner I had had in several 
days, kept me up most of the night, threw parts of Whitehall 
into disarray, gave Mrs. George Brown a pounding headache, 
and complicated Washington's instructions to me. 
Cooper was called to George Brown's flat after an `excited call' from the Foreign 
Secretary. Apparently, Brown `was convinced that he and Wilson were on the right 
track in proposing another Geneva Conference - Kosygin's remarks suggested that 
the Russians were anxious to take this route'. 120 Brown and a reluctant Foreign 
Office came up with the suggestion that as well as pursuing peace talks privately 
(Phase A-Phase B), a public route should also be taken. Brown, Gore-Booth, 
Maclehose and Cooper worked on a draft written proposal that the two Co-chairmen 
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invite the US and the North Vietnamese to begin mutual de-escalation and should 
they agree to this the Co-chairmen would invite members of the 1954 Geneva 
Conference to reconvene on 15 February to work out a settlement of the present 
conflict. 121 Should the Soviets dissent from this public approach, Brown would press 
them to endorse the Phase A-Phase B formula in private instead. Cooper cabled the 
State Department after midnight to report Brown's plans; the reply confirmed his 
belief that Washington `was unenthusiastic about the Geneva track'. 122 
Washington preferred a private package deal prior to an ending of US 
bombing or, indeed, a public Geneva-type conference. At the same time that Cooper 
had been summoned by Brown, Bruce had been called by Michael Palliser, just as he 
was about go to bed, asking him to go to Downing Street. Bruce remembers that his 
chauffer, Hyatt, deposited him `in the lee of the Foreign Office, whence I circuited 
around to the postern gate in Whitehall. It seemed conspiratorial'. There he met the 
Prime Minister, Palliser, Burke Trend, Michael Halls, and Lord Chalfont who were 
discussing Kosygin's speech and the `possible ploys' they might use in that day's 
meeting. Bruce noted that all present looked tired. No-one got to bed before 2.30 
am. 123 
The late night was, however, used constructively. Despite Washington's 
preferences, Wilson and Brown planned to probe Kosygin on his Geneva comments 
at the following morning's meeting with the Premier. Although this discussion 
centred largely on economic issues, Brown asked if Kosygin's references to 
collaboration between the Soviet Union and Britain on Vietnam, and subsequent 
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reference to the Geneva agreement, signalled a Russian willingness to reconvene the 
Conference. According to notes taken by Murray of the Foreign Office, Kosygin 
replied that this was `not exactly' what he had meant to imply, rather that he had 
`proceeded upon the assumption that the main thing was for the UK and the Soviet 
Union to assist the two sides to meet together after the bombing stopped. ' He 
suggested that after this has been done `there may be various proposals for moving 
further ahead, including the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. ' He also pointed 
out that he `could not speak for Hanoi at this point' and that it was important to `do 
first things first'. 124 Brown thenpressed Kosygin further on the prospects of a 
Geneva conference, asking if he would agree to it reconvening on 15 February if the 
two-phase acts of de-escalation were agreed upon. 125 According to Cooper, again 
`Kosygin gave the idea short shrift' although he did enquire whether this proposal 
had been discussed with the Americans. 126 Brown answered that if Kosygin could 
deliver his friends in Hanoi the British would try to `deliver the Americans. ' Kosygin 
said that he would need to know Hanoi's views first and that, in any case, a Geneva 
Conference would be `a complicated issue. 127 
The following morning, Friday 10 February, two days after LBJ's letter to Ho 
Chi Minh, Wilson met with Kosygin and summarised the current position. There 
were now two propositions on the table both based on mutual de-escalation: a public 
one that would result in a Geneva-type conference; and a private one based on Phase 
A-Phase B. Kosygin asked to hear the Phase A-Phase B proposal again. Wilson 
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outlined it again. According to Wilson, `Mr. Kosygin suddenly looked interested. It 
seemed that the way I had put it was in some way more attractive than what had been 
said earlier in the week'. 128 At this stage, Kosygin said he would like to think about 
the proposal. Wilson and the Foreign Office felt that Kosygin's response `was 
sufficiently forthcoming' to warrant the Prime Minister's promise to provide the 
proposition in writing later that day. 129 Kosygin wanted it before leaving for 
Scotland that evening. 130 
On hearing news of the latest developments in London, the US State 
Department decided it was time to make its views more explicit. Rusk cabled Bruce 
to express his doubts that Hanoi would accept a public announcement of their 
acceptance of mutual de-escalation, even if it could be persuaded by the Soviets to go 
for such a deal. Russian involvement in the brokerage of the deal might make it 
particularly difficult for the North Vietnamese in light of their concerns over Chicom 
reactions and the Russians themselves might be concerned to appear to be working 
so closely with the Americans. Rusk's scepticism about the possibility of a public 
deal led him to inform Bruce that the `British should be left in no doubt that, while 
we are most grateful for their serious considered efforts, they may well have to 
accept results rather than overt British participation in them'. 131 Wilson might have 
to settle for less of a public profile in the resolution of the conflict, in the background 
helping to secure a private settlement, rather than being the orchestrator of a public, 
Geneva-type conference. The British were told formally that they wanted Kosygin to 
know, and to pass on to Hanoi, their willingness to go along with either proposal. 
128Wilson, Labour Government, p. 455 
129 Telegram from Cooper to Rusk and Harriman, 9 February, in Herring, Secret Diplomacy, p. 37 
130 Cooper, Lost Crusade, p. 359 
131 Rusk to Bruce, 9 February 1967 in Herring, Secret Diplomacy, p. 39 
381 
They did not `at any cost want to appear to be pressing Hanoi to accept publicly any 
commitment which they might think would involve them in a loss of face'. 132 
The previous day, Washington had sent information to London on the 
movement of troops and equipment from North Vietnam heading towards the South. 
The bombing pause had only just begun and, as Wilson put in his memoirs, `the 
Americans were getting worried'. 133 Wilson had mentioned this to Kosygin at their 
Thursday morning meeting, explaining that this did not help in the call for an end to 
US bombing. 134 According to Wilson, Kosygin `took the figures seriously'. 135 
Further messages were sent from Washington on this issue and were passed on to 
Kosygin. 
Late on Thursday afternoon, 9 February, Chester Cooper, Murray and Gore 
Booth had begun work on the written version of Phase A-Phase B to be delivered to 
Kosygin. Wilson records he `wanted to make absolutely certain that the text was 
approved by the Americans'. 136 Wilson insisted that he was assured the text had 
been confirmed as the American position and that he had been `assured that there had 
been the fullest consultation with the State Department at top level' about the text. 
The Americans viewed the situation differently. 137 When drafting the letter to 
Kosygin, Cooper and Murray clearly had America's fourteen points in mind. The 
points, which had been publicly issued on 7 January and further elaborated upon as 
recently as 27 January, contained the following as part of the fourteenth point: 
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We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North 
Viet-Nam, the moment we are assured -- privately or otherwise 
-- that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding 
and appropriate deescalation of the other side. 138 
Cooper thought the draft also `seemed fully consistent' with the text of Johnson's 
cable to Wilson of 7 February. The authors of the text therefore felt that they were 
clear on America's terms for Phase A-Phase B. Consequently Cooper `cabled the 
statement to Washington, confident that it required little more than pro forma 
approval'. 139 
Cooper recorded that he felt happy that Washington should receive his cable 
by around 6.30 pm Washington time on Thursday 9 February and that this allowed 
plenty of time for the State Department to reply before Kosygin's scheduled 
departure for Scotland on Friday evening. However, the only cable Cooper had 
received by Friday morning was one reminding him to tell Wilson of the State 
Department's concern that North Vietnamese troops continued to move southwards. 
He thought, however, `the Department might have taken a dim view of my troubling 
busy people with such a simple question. But, I thought, they could at least send a 
terse `O. K. '. 140 Cooper informed Wilson about the cable regarding the continuing 
flow of North Vietnamese troops, but that he had heard nothing back on the Phase A- 
Phase B message. By late afternoon there was still no reply, so a repeat message was 
sent. The cable merely said `here is text of Phase A-Phase B formula which is to be 
sent to Kosygin at his request ASAP. Need guidance urgently' and then outlined the 
steps involved in this plan (my emphasis): 
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(A) The United States will stop bombing North Vietnam as 
soon as they are assured that infiltration from North Vietnam to 
South Vietnam will stop. This assurance can be communicated 
in secret if North Vietnam so wishes. 
(B) Within a few days (with the period to be agreed between 
the two sides before the bombing stops) the United States will 
stop further augmenting their forces in South Vietnam and North 
Vietnam will stop infiltration and movement of forces into the 
South. 
(C) The cessation of bombing of North Vietnam and the 
cessation of build-up United States forces in the south are actions 
which will be immediately apparent. 
(D) A cessation of infiltration is more difficult for the world to 
observe. Nevertheless the United States will not demand any 
public statement from North Vietnam. 
(E) Any secret assurances from Hanoi can reach the United 
States direct, or through Soviet channels, or through the Soviet 
and British governments. This is for North Vietnam to decide. 141 
Apparently Wilson was `restless' about Washington's lack of feedback as Kosygin 
had pressed the British for the written version earlier in the day. 142 Cooper however 
remembers that by `7 o'clock I was convinced there would be no reply - and that 
silence meant consent'. 143 By that time, Wilson had left for a reception given by the 
Soviet Ambassador and Cooper felt able to go to the theatre to watch a production of 
Fiddler on the Roof. He left word that he could be contacted there and informed the 
ushers where he was seated. Twenty minutes into the first act, around 9 o'clock, 
Cooper felt a tap on his shoulder and he was escorted `through a maze of corridors' 
to a phone close to the stage door: 
The stage doorman, a somewhat aged but very distinguished- 
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looking fellow, was beside himself. He shoved the phone at 
me shouting `It's from Washington - the White House! ' 
Around me were running, shrieking girls from the chorus. 
Under me the orchestra was pounding away. I had a 
difficult time getting through. Finally, in exasperation 
Walt Rostow shouted across 3,000 miles of ocean, `Where 
the hell are you? ' I remember shouting back, `If I told 
you, you wouldn't believe me! P 'How far are you from 
the Embassy? ' Rostow demanded. `About as far as I 
can possibly get, ' I answered. `Well, get back damn fast. ' 
He got back to the Embassy around 9.30 pm and received a message saying there had 
been a `complete revision' of the proposal to be handed to Kosygin. 144 Although 
Cooper had telephoned Walt Rostow on his returned to Grosvenor Square and had 
told him that there was a possibility that the written version of Phase A-Phase B had 
already been passed to Kosygin, he did not think `it registered'. 145 Cooper was told 
to meet Wilson and Brown at to 10 Downing Street where the revised message 
would come through on teletype. 
The Prime Minister had returned from the reception and private dinner at the 
Soviet Embassy at Kensington Palace Garden where at around 7 pm he had handed 
Kosygin a document outlining `almost word for word' what Wilson had said in their 
morning meeting. 146 According to Wilson, `Mr Kosygin was taking the day's 
developments very seriously and clearly with some hope'. 147 On returning to 
Downing Street, Wilson says he found Bruce and Cooper waiting for him. 
According to Wilson, after telling them of the latest talks with Kosygin, Wilson says 
Bruce said, `Prime Minister, I think you've made it. This is going to be the biggest 
diplomatic coup of this century'. Wilson claims he `demurred' arguing that Hanoi 
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and China's reactions were not yet known. 148 Bruce later denied that he had said 
Wilson `had it in the bag'. He believes `that was hyperbolic. I was skeptical about 
achieving a result. I was in favor of his taking a try at it. I think that's the 
distinction'. 149 Either way, Wilson was soon deflated when Cooper informed the 
Prime Minister that a message was about to come through from the White House. It 
arrived at about 10.30 pm and according to Cooper: `My heart fell as I saw it. We 
were in a brand new ballgame'. '5° 
The key aspect of the original Phase A-Phase B proposal was the US 
agreement to stop bombing first; the new terms reversed the order of events, now the 
North Vietnamese had to stop infiltration first and then the US would stop bombing. 
As Cooper later put it: 
The sequence of Phase A and Phase B had been reversed, and 
the whole formula had been distorted. In short what we would 
be saying to the North Vietnamese was that a bombing 
cessation would be directly conditional on their stopping 
infiltration -a proposition Hanoi had thrown back to us time 
and time again, and one that was completely inconsistent with 
Rusk's elaboration of his `Fourteen Points, ' as publicly released 
only a few days before. It was hard to believe that the 
Washington draftsmen realised the implications of their new 
formula. 151 
In addition to the change in tenses, the new text also included an additional change. 
Despite having assured the British that Washington would be happy with a private 
arrangement with Hanoi, the new package insisted on a public commitment. The text 
included the following (my emphasis): 
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A. The United States will order a cessation of bombing of North 
Vietnam as soon as they are assured that infiltration from North 
Vietnam to South Vietnam has stopped. This assurance can be 
communicated in secret if North Vietnam so wishes. 
B. Within a few days (with the period to be agreed with the two 
sides before the bombing stops) the United States will stop further 
augmenting their force in South Vietnam. The cessation of bombing 
of North Vietnam is an action which will be immediately apparent. 
This requires that the stoppage of infiltration becomes public very 
quickly thereafter. If Hanoi is unwilling to announce the stoppage 
of infiltration, the United States must do so at the time it stops 
augmentation of U. S. forces. In that case, Hanoi must not deny it. 
C. Any assurances from Hanoi can reach the United States direct, 
or through Soviet channels, or through the Soviet and British 
Governments. This is for North Vietnam to decide. 152 
Cooper doublechecked with Rostow that Washington understood that this was not 
just a change of tense, it was a complete reversal of the terms. And, if Wilson had 
already delivered a text to Kosygin, should the new one be substituted. Apparently 
by now both men had nearly lost their `cool' and Cooper was informed that the 
change in terms had come from the President, largely as a result of the North 
Vietnamese troop movements over the past few days. Cooper admitted that when he 
called Rostow he was `sore as hell' and said `Well, Jesus, how can you do this! You 
kept telling me to press the Phase A-Phase B, that is what Wilson was doing, the only 
Phase A-Phase BI knew was the one that was current. ' Rostow replied that he didn't 
`give a Goddamn' about either Cooper or Wilson `you damn well change it'. 153 
According to Cooper, Wilson and Brown were `incredulous and irate'. 154 This 
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action placed the British in a most embarrassing situation with Kosygin. Wilson had 
already delivered the written statement and was now in the position of having to 
hand Kosygin a revised text before he boarded his over-night train to Scotland which 
was due to depart at 11.35 pm from Euston station. As Kosygin had already left 
Claridge's Hotel and was on his way to the station, Wilson's Private Secretary, 
Michael Halls, was despatched to the station and duly delivered the letter to Kosygin 
as he boarded the train. The letter included an introductory sentence which stated 
this was a message received direct from the White House and could be taken now as 
`the authentic United States position on the subject'. '55 
Not surprisingly Wilson was incensed at Washington's change in policy at the 
last moment and wanted to know what had gone wrong.. He later wrote in his 
memoirs that: 
We were staggered ... No one could understand what had 
happened. I said that there could be only three explanations. 
One, which I was reluctant to believe, what that the White 
House had taken me - and hence Mr. Kosygin - for a ride. 
Two ... that the Washington hawks had staged a successful 
take-over. Three ... that the authorities were suffering 
from a degree of confusion about a possible and 
unfortunate juxtaposition of certain parts of their anatomy, 
one of which was their elbow. 156 
The Foreign Office put it in more diplomatic terms, `there was a state of unutterable, 
anatomical confusion in the higher part of the Administration. '"57 Cooper later learnt 
that the advisers who met to discuss Cooper's telegram were not Vietnam experts. 
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Bill Bundy, the specialist on Far Eastern affairs was not in attendance. Instead, it 
appears the decision was made by LBJ, Rusk and Rostow. 158 `They were addressing 
my draft as something that was kind of invented apparently in London, instead of 
being something that had been developed and manicured for about five months', 
Cooper explained. 159 Bruce's favoured hypothesis was also that there had been a 
breakdown of communication not only between London and Washington but also 
between key foreign policy advisors at the White House. 
Privately, Wilson believed there had been deliberate sabotage and clearly 
favoured his own second possible explanation of events. He later commented that, 
no degree of mental confusion in Washington ... could possibly 
be adduced in defence of such a fundamental change. It was a 
reversal of policy, and it had been deliberately taken just when 
there was a real chance - one thinks of Ambassador Bruce's 
words earlier that evening - of a settlement based on the 
prolongation of the Tet truce from the end of the week when it 
was due to end. ' 60 
Johnson, in his memoirs, insisted that Wilson had not received specific approval 
from Washington to deliver the first draft. 161 This was of course strictly speaking 
true. This does not, however, explain the textual change. Noticeably, in a meeting 
with Wilson during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in June of 1967, 
Johnson `did not try to deny' Wilson's belief that 'there had been a change of policy 
under pressure by their hawks'. 162 Rostow was labelled the chief culprit. Wilson 
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noted that `in terms of influence on his master, the more I saw of certain White 
House advisers the more I thought that Rasputin was a much-maligned man. '"63 
Brown also agreed that Rostow was the major problem in Washington: 
There were doveish officials in Washington who were trying 
to help, and hawkish officials, mostly nearer to the scene of 
events, who were trying to prevent the doves from helping. 
The Prime Minister's hot line to President Johnson was not as 
reliable as it ought to have been. I think that the fact of the 
matter was that Mr Johnson didn't really like the Prime 
Minister much, and the hot line from No. 10 that went 
allegedly directly to the President was inclined to go 
instead to Mr. Rostow. 1 64 
Rostow may well have encouraged Johnson to take a harder line with North Vietnam. 
As already noted, the White House had only reluctantly agreed to sanction Wilson's 
peace initiative with Kosygin. Moreover by early 1967 the President was being 
given relentlessly optimistic assessments of the state of the military campaign in 
Vietnam. Despite the appearance of a stalemate, the CIA reassured Johnson that US 
bombing was now having an effect on the North Vietnamese economy; the Agency 
was convinced that no serious concessions should being given to Hanoi as military 
pressure would shortly push them towards negotiations. And although the President 
was desperate for an end to the war, he genuinely felt the US had responded 
positively to every indication that the North Vietnamese were seeking peace, to no 
effect. As far as he was concerned, the Wilson-Kosygin talks might be good for the 
America's image as peaceseeker, but they did not appear to offer a realistic chance 
for peace 
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Of course, Wilson and Brown were unaware of Johnson's true feelings on the 
war and were, as far as they were concerned, receiving decidedly mixed signals from 
Washington. The Prime Minister was wrong, however, to discount entirely his 
unpalatable theory that he might have been taken for a ride by the White House. 
Wilson had not been part of the loop; he had not been kept fully up-to-date on latest 
development, particularly the change in tenses contained in Johnson's letter to Ho 
Chi Minh. The Americans were not fully behind his efforts. It is entirely possible 
therefore that the change of tense in the Phase A-Phase B proposal occurred partly 
because there had been some confusion in the White House due to the absence of 
Bill Bundy over the detail of previous texts, and that this coincided with a hardening 
of attitude towards the North Vietnamese by Johnson, who felt his own politically 
risky gesture of initiating a bombing pause had been abused by Hanoi. Because 
Washington was making no special efforts to co-operate with British peace 
initiatives and had its own peace feelers out to Hanoi, Johnson and his advisers were 
not particularly worried if Wilson was temporarily embarrassed in front of the 
Russians. 
Whatever the true explanation, Cooper was left to pick up the pieces. He 
describes the atmosphere at Downing Street that night as `gloomy and hostile'. As 
those assembled struggled to explain what had happened, Wilson and Brown turned 
their anger on one another. Cooper remembers that they 
just went at each other, it was just terrible. Brown accused 
Wilson of being too premature; and that time and time again 
during these discussions Wilson didn't inform Brown as to 
what was going on; Brown on at least three occasions that 
391 
night resigned as Foreign Minister. 165 
When Wilson took Brown into a private room to straighten things out, Cooper was 
asked to accompany them, almost as a witness. 166 The day's events had descended 
into farce. Brown later claimed that he thought it was a mistake to deliver the new 
version of Phase A-Phase B to Kosygin before he arrived in Scotland, after all there 
was nothing Kosygin could do with the message while he was on a train. Instead, he 
thought they should have used Kosygin's journey time to Edinburgh to try to 
persuade the Americans to change their minds. 167 
Wilson could not contain himself, called the White House and spoke to Walt 
Rostow. Cooper said that in the two decades of his diplomatic career he `had never 
seen anyone quite so angry' but that `Wilson kept himself very much under control as 
he explained how embarrassing and damaging the Washington message was. '168 
Cooper felt partly responsible for events, feeling that he had `somehow ... led Wilson 
astray'. He considered that his career might come to an end as a result of the day's 
events. 169 
They were all mad at Washington; they were mad at each 
other; they were angry at me; and I was angry at them; and 
I was angry at Washington -- more angry at Washington than 
anybody. It was a pretty rough night. 170 
Cooper called it `Black Friday'. 171 Bruce remembered that after the revised version 
had been delivered to Kosygin, Wilson `dictated and discussed with us a series of 
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four telegrams' he proposed sending to the President. One of the telegrams 
concerned `his now settled wish to go, with or without Kosygin, to Hanoi, if the 
discussions break down on Sunday. ' Bruce predicted this would `cause a violently 
unfavourable reaction in Washington'. The Prime Minister asked Bruce and Cooper 
to explain his arguments for such a visit. 172 
The following morning, Saturday II February, Cooper received a telegram 
from the White House explaining in more detail the reasoning behind the change in 
tenses. He later described this rationale as `contrived'. 173 The cable, apparently 
drafted by Bill Bundy, argued that the revised Phase A-Phase B was consistent with 
the details in Johnson's letter to Ho Chi Minh, dated 8 February, which of course 
neither Cooper nor Wilson was aware of. The telegram stressed the warnings 
Washington had delivered regarding North Vietnam's violation of the Tet truce. 
Cooper judged the telegram to be `a very tortured ex post facto rationalization' that 
was `drafted by Bill Bundy, who was attempting to pick up the pieces, not having 
been at the meeting on Friday night'. 174 Washington also forwarded the latest figures 
on the North Vietnamese troops movements. During the truce, up to 6pm on Friday, 
more than 2050 trucks had been spotted heading south, as compared to a daily 
average of 100 trucks in the pre-truce period. 175 
This telegram inflamed the situation in London. Wilson, Brown, Cooper and 
Bruce were all outraged at events. With Kosygin in Scotland, they had all day to 
reflect on matters and decide on a course of action for the final day of talks with the 
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Russians at Chequers on Sunday. Wilson had had high hopes for the talks; they now 
looked to be in ruin. He was convinced the Soviets would no longer believe he was 
in the confidence of the Americans and could certainly not `deliver' them to the 
negotiating table. Bruce recalls that Wilson instructed Paul Gore-Booth at the 
Foreign Office, `to chew us up' on the shift in American policy. Wilson also began 
using the `dissociation' word again. This time in relation to US plans to renew 
bombing in Vietnam while Kosygin was still in Britain. Once back at Grosvenor 
Square, Bruce and Cooper `indulged in an orgy of telephone conversations. ' 16 
Rusk rang twice regarding the bombing renewal decision and Rostow once `to 
deliver a lecture in defence of the controversial paper'. '77 
More worrying as far as Bruce was concerned was a call he took from Burke 
Trend. The Prime Minister was considering two possibilities: `a talk with Kosygin 
shortly after his return from Scotland tomorrow morning, if we could meanwhile 
ascertain from State whether they had modified their last position. He also said the 
PM was talking about a possible trip to Washington on Monday'. Bruce did `not 
think well of their proposal'. ] 78 Bruce also received a telephone call from George 
Brown `to report he was most unhappy over recent events, and intimated, to use his 
favourite word, the US had made a "bloody" mess of things'. Bruce sent a telegram 
to Dean and McNamara expressing his personal opinion that the political effects of a 
renewal of bombing before Kosygin left London would be severe, particularly the 
risk of alienating the Soviets. The experts in Washington met and after much 
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discussion agreed to extend the pause, although the decision would not be made 
public until Kosygin had left London. 179 
Later that evening, Wilson and Brown, and three advisers, met with Bruce and 
Cooper to discuss in detail what had happened, the latest telegrams from Washington 
and to consider the best way forward. This proved to be yet another stormy session, 
indeed Cooper remembers he thought they would be lucky to 
finish the night's work without some very ugly scenes between 
the British and the Americans, or among the British themselves. 
Ten years before, during the Suez crisis, I had had a ringside 
seat at a major Washington-London squabble. Once again I 
sensed Anglo-American relations dissolving before my eyes. 
I did not look forward to the hours ahead. 180 
Bruce remembers that he and Cooper `had two and half hours of rather rough 
handling'. '8' Bruce noted in his diary that Brown was more `vehement' than Wilson 
in his criticism of the US but thought `he was fatigued and perhaps somewhat 
inebriated'. 182 
The meeting was indeed lengthy, lasting just over three hours. Both parties 
outlined their version of events and Wilson and Bruce expressed three immediate 
concerns. First, the British were worried that the change in the text signalled a 
harder line from the United States. Secondly, they thought a resumption of US 
bombing would shock world opinion and further increase the British government's 
domestic difficulties, particularly if the story of the last few days' farrago came out. 
Wilson was worried that the Soviets might leak the news and argued that `The Soviet 
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Government would thereby make the British look fools and not knaves and make the 
Americans look knaves and not fools'. 183 And finally, the British were extremely 
angry that the United States had allowed them to misrepresent themselves to the 
Russians as being in the confidence of the Americans. Wilson stressed that he 
thought he had been operating with the full co-operation and encouragement of the 
Americans and had had Cooper's approval for the version of Phase A-Phase B that he 
had delivered to Kosygin. Since the events of the previous day `there was now a 
very serious implication in the fact that if we failed to deliver our friend, i. e., the 
United States, we would lose credibility and hence influence with the Russians'. 184 
The British also informed the Americans of the implications of these latest 
developments. One possible consequence might be partial or even total British 
dissociation from US policy in Vietnam. Brown was equally candid with Bruce and 
Cooper and admitted that although he `very anxious' that the word dissociation not 
be repeated, American action was pushing the British Government in that direction. 
Wilson agreed, admitting that if the United States had decided to resume bombing 
before Mr. Kosygin left London, `he would have been forced to dissociate'. He also 
revealed that before the Americans had arrived 
he had been discussing the possible direction of British policy 
with the Foreign Secretary. At that point he thought he had 
known where his duty lay. If the message which he knew as 
coming from Washington was not going to give him anything 
on Phase A of the two-phase package, and of course nothing 
on Phase B, he thought that the British would have to distance 
themselves somewhat from the United States and manifestly 
take a line more independent of their policy. He wondered 
whether the line to take with Mr. Kosygin was to advise him 
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not to assume that the British always agreed with United States 
policy. 185 
The Prime Minister stressed on a number of occasions, that the British should 
probably take a more independent line as this would help stabilize British public 
opinion. Either way Wilson believed that 
things might not ever be the same again. Trust had been 
broken. Naturally, even if there were an act of dissociation ... Anglo-American relations would recover. Nevertheless, 
neither side wanted another Suez. It was essential for the 
United States to put matters back on an even keel again. 
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Moreover, Wilson would `stand by' the first letter he had given Kosygin on Friday 
evening. 
In terms of peace negotiations, the Prime Minister pointed out that another 
consequence of the US change of mind might well be a loss of Russia's credibility 
with Hanoi. He also gave his frank opinion of the three choices he had available to 
him. He could say to Kosygin that he was after all not in the President's confidence; 
or he could tell him that the change was due to the Tet violations; or `he could say 
American policy was confused and that one member of the Administration was 
saying one thing and another was saying another thing'. 
Bruce and Cooper did their best to take the heat out of the situation at the 
same time as defending the US position. This was particularly difficult as neither 
approved of the White House's actions. Cooper valiantly put forward the line 
Washington expected of him and suggested he thought it credible that Kosygin 
would believe the change in tenses was due to North Vietnamese troop activity. He 
185 lbid 
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did, however, reveal that he personally thought the `the United States Administration 
had not kept the Prime Minister as fully and as rapidly informed as he would have 
hoped'. 186 Bruce tried to calm Wilson down by suggesting Kosygin's reaction might 
not be as bad as the Prime Minister feared. However, when the Ambassador 
wondered whether the difference between the two proposals was `very great', Wilson 
replied that if that was the case, `he was inclined to try to get Mr. Kosygin to accept 
the original text and then to press the American Administration to accept it as their 
policy'. 187 
The meeting moved on to discuss the tactics for the final day's meeting with 
Kosygin on Sunday. Brown and Wilson agreed that the best way forward was to 
raise the discrepancies in various messages with Kosygin, stress that the US change 
in policy had been brought on by the Tet violations but then `press hard for the Prime 
Minister's (7 p. m. ) version of the letter to Mr. Kosygin; if Mr. Kosygin accepted it, 
then to undertake to seek American acceptance of it'. In response to a question from 
Brown, Chester Cooper said it might be possible to secure a further suspension of the 
bombing if there was a `glimmer of hope' in the discussions. Wilson decided he 
would after all send a message to the President'. 188 
The meeting ended at 1.45 am and Wilson did not leave for Chequers until 
3.15 am. Nevertheless, he apparently woke `fresh and with a clear view'. 189 
If I could get nothing more reasonable to offer than the existing 
US attitude, I would put my own views as the British view and 
attempt to sell it to the US on the one hand and Mr. Kosygin on 
the other. Thereafter that would be the British Government's 
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definite proposal for the ending of the war. 190 
Wilson also suggested on Saturday that Chester Cooper go out to Chequers where a 
direct telephone link to the White House and Bruce at the Embassy would allow the 
Americans to be kept fully up-to-date with developments during the final day of the 
talks. The Americans agreed to this request and quickly reassured the British that no 
military action against North Vietnam would be taken until Kosygin had left. 
Washington also responded sharply to the suggestion that Wilson travel to 
Hanoi, they expressed their `appreciation' of the offer but said they felt `such a trip, 
in the light of the present situation, would not be desirable'. 191 
Having had some time to digest and reflect on Friday evening's events, 
Wilson finally sent the President two messages by private wire. The first one 
outlined the `hell of a situation' he was in for the final day of talks with Kosygin. 192 
He expressed his anguish over the change of tenses in the new text and reiterated his 
view that his own credibility with the Russians had been compromised and Kosygin 
may have lost the confidence of Hanoi as a result of the switch. He also informed 
Johnson that he intended to pursue the softer version, the one he had originally 
handed to Kosygin, and if it was accepted, he would try and press the President on 
the matter. He then said he hoped to get to a position where he and Kosygin, 
knowing the views of their respective friends, could find a solution to the conflict 
which they could then recommend, `like two solicitors seeking to settle a matter out 
of court, ad referendum to the two clients'. 193 Wilson's second message contained 
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his version of the `misunderstanding' that had taken place over the tenses, which was 
basically a defence of British actions. 
Johnson replied almost immediately. Wilson described the President's cable 
as `warm'. However, as Wilson himself admitted in his memoirs, there was some 
doubt over who drafted such memos. Often, it was Bundy or Katzenbach, so there 
was little genuine sentiment in this. Most space was dedicated to refuting many of 
Wilson's allegations and gently refusing his suggestions. In particular, Johnson did 
not believe the `the matter hangs on the tenses of verbs' as the Phase A-Phase B 
proposal had been on table since November and Hanoi had `shown no flicker of 
interest' in it. At the same, the North Vietnamese had continued their military build 
up. Neither did the President accept Wilson's view that the US position on Phase A- 
Phase B was inconsistent: 
We asked on February 7 for an `assured stoppage' of 
infiltration. In your version ... 
it was transmuted to an 
assurance that infiltration `will stop'. This, in our view, 
is a quite different matter. 194 
Johnson informed Wilson that Hanoi was likely to get in touch regarding the 
President's message to Ho Chi Minh at the conclusion of the present talks in London 
and suggested `there is importance ... 
in our staying together. We must not let them 
play one position off against another'. Wilson's notion of following his own line 
was not welcome and therefore the President concluded `I'm always glad to know 
that you are in my corner but I would have some difficulty, in view of my 
responsibilities and problems here, in giving anyone a power of attorney'. 195 
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Wilson vehemently denied that he wanted `a power of attorney' and pointed to 
the wording of his message, which had been `ad referendum'. 196 
The Final Days of the Talks - Sunday 12 February 
One of the main purposes of the final meeting between Wilson and Kosygin 
was to agree on the wording of a communique on the visit. It is clear, however, that 
Wilson was hoping that his last-ditch attempt to establish peace talks would be 
successful. 
The main complicating factor at this final meeting was the scheduled end to 
the Tet truce which would take place that day. Originally the bombing pause was 
planned to cover the Tet celebrations (3 days), but it had been extended largely at 
Wilson's request for another 24 hours. The British were anxious that they would be 
embarrassed in front of Kosygin if the bombing started while the Premier was still in 
London. 
Kosygin was due to arrive at Chequers for dinner at 6 pm. Earlier on Sunday 
morning Wilson had sent a cable to Johnson informing him that he would have one 
last try at proposing de-escalation. To meet the President's fear that the US cessation 
of bombing would be used by the North Vietnamese to rush troops into the 
demilitarized zone, he would propose that the 'two-way assurance' contain a specific 
timetable for the ending of DRV infiltration into the South. 197 Wilson was not 
asking for permission to put this plan forward to Kosygin, as he would take sole 
responsibility for it but would ask the President for his view if the Russian Premier 
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appeared interested. In the hope that the President would reply almost immediately 
to any such request, Cooper was duly ensconced in a private bedroom at Chequers 
shortly after lunch: An attic room that had in 1465 been used as a prison for Lady 
Mary Grey, sister of Jane, the room was ideal for Cooper's purposes as it was well 
away from the main proceedings and had a window that overlooked the courtyard to 
the front. Cooper would be able to see the comings and goings at Chequers. The 
stage was now sent for Act II of the farce. 
By Sunday afternoon Wilson was reportedly in a calmer frame of mind, 
having played a round of golf. Kosygin also apparently arrived in a relaxed mood 
after his visit to Scotland. During their first afternoon meeting the Soviet premier 
made no mention of the change in text that had occurred on Friday night, and also 
made it clear that he saw no point in pursuing the Trinh formula. A discussion of the 
communique brought some tension to the proceedings as Kosygin was loath to have 
any mention of Anglo-Soviet joint peace efforts; he was adamant that there be no 
publicity. The final signed statement was rather lengthy, covering the broad 
spectrum of the talks. However, it remained vague on Vietnam, acknowledging `a 
prolonged exchange of views' on the subject and agreeing `it was essential to 
achieve the earliest possible end' of the war. Both governments `confirmed their 
adherence to the principles of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962' and 
committed themselves to making `every possible effort with a view to achieving a 
settlement of the Vietnam problem, and will maintain contact to this end'. 198 
Washington quickly gave its approval to the communique, which was issued 
at 1200 London time 13 February following Kosygin's departure. Washington was 
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in emergency session on and off throughout the day and into the evening. However, 
although it was earlier in Washington than in London and as time wore on Bruce 
remembers `we found the officials at home becoming testier and testier, especially 
when confronted by a request from Wilson and George Brown, which was refused, to 
extend further the bombing pause. We had some rather angry interchanges with Walt 
Rostow about this'. 199 
At around 5 o'clock, having sat around for hours thinking, Cooper had a 
`brainstorm'. When Burke Trend came up to Cooper's room for a chat and a drink, 
Cooper tried his plans out on him. Cooper felt that as the day's events were going 
`reasonably well' it was worth trying to `salvage something of value'. 200 It was felt 
that the White House's concern about NVA troop movements, could be dealt with by 
an assurance from Hanoi that it would keep its forces north of the 17th parallel in 
exchange for an extension to the current bombing pause. Once that commitment was 
in place `there would be diplomatic elbowroom to explore further steps that might 
lead to talks, even negotiations'. 201 Trend thought the proposal was worth trying and 
took it down to Wilson who was still in talks with Kosygin. Having learnt a lesson 
from Friday's events, the note stressed that the Prime Minister shouldn't mentioned it 
to Kosygin before Washington had approved the idea. Wilson agreed to it. Cooper 
was quickly in contact by phone to Benjamin Read at the State Department who 
thought the proposal `sounded eminently reasonable. ' He agreed to forward it to 
Walt Rostow at the White House and let Cooper know the White House's decision as 
soon as possible. 
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Cooper, well aware that Kosygin would leave Chequers shortly after dinner, 
became impatient as hours went by with no response from Washington. He made 
two further calls to Ben Read and one to Walt Rostow, and was assured that the 
President and member of the National Security Council were examining the proposal 
carefully and would let him know the outcome shortly. Wilson, in the meantime, 
was sending notes to Cooper asking for the approval so that he could present the new 
proposal to Kosygin before he left. Wilson recalls that he tried to stall Kosygin's 
departure by engaging him in a filibuster conversation on subjects ranging from the 
Common Market to geology, a subject in which Kosygin's had a personal. 202 
It was now after ten o'clock and after signing the communiques in the Great 
Parlour, Kosygin prepared to leave. Cooper was told to expect an answer shortly and 
the Prime Minister was to try to delay Kosygin's departure. Still, no answer came. 
Cooper tried one last ditch attempt to get an answer out of the White House. To 
prove that he was not lying when he said Kosygin was about to leave, Cooper took 
drastic action: `In utter desperation ... I dangled the telephone as far out of the 
window as I could get it so that he could hear the sound of the roaring motors. '203 
Rostov then told Cooper that Wilson should inform Kosygin that an 
important message may come through after he had returned to Claridge's. At this 
point, the American and British delegations thought they were `in the clover. Wilson 
came up, Brown came up; there was a lot of hooch. And it was great -- we thought 
we'd really pulled a rabbit out of the hat'. 204 
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Once back at Downing Street, a message came through from the President to 
the Prime Minister. The Americans had agreed that they would not resume the 
bombing of North Vietnam, if before 10 a. m. Monday morning (British time) the 
North Vietnamese had given an assurance (directly or through the Russians) that they 
would stop the movement of troops and supplies into South Vietnam from that 
time. 205 As Cooper said, 
It was an impossible deadline. Wilson would have to discuss 
the proposition with Kosygin, Kosygin would have to send the 
message to Hanoi, Hanoi would have to consider it and then 
transmit a reply. It seemed inconceivable, however efficient 
and well-intentioned all parties involved were, that a response 
could be received within the ten hours at our disposal. 206 
By the time Wilson had received the message, had the proposal typed up on Downing 
Street paper, and got over to Claridge's to deliver it to Kosygin, it was 1.00 am and 
so in effect there were only nine hours in which to respond. 
Wilson later reflected that Johnson's decision seemed almost for domestic 
consumption. In order to justify the imminent resumption of bombing, the President 
stressed that the Phase A-Phase B offer had been outstanding for three months and 
there had as yet been no reply, and reminded the Prime Minister that as President he 
had responsibilities to US troops, South Vietnam and to the allies. As if to soften 
the blow, Johnson engaged in diplomatic flattery: 
Nevertheless, you have worked nobly this week to bring about 
what all humanity wants: A decisive move towards peace. It 
is an effort that will be long remembered. I feel a responsibility 
to give you this further chance to make that effort bear fruit. We 
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will go more than half way. I am prepared to go the last mile in 
this week's particular effort; although none of us can regard a 
failure tonight as the end of the road. 207 
Cooper immediately got on the phone to Rostow to complain about the tightness of 
the deadline. Rostow was `by no means friendly' and commented to the effect that 
`we've had about enough out of you guy'. 208 At the same time, Wilson raced over to 
Claridge's to pass the message on to Kosygin. Not surprisingly, the Russian premier 
was alarmed at the American ultimatum. After a few minutes of arguing about the 
nature of the message and the unreasonable deadline, Kosygin said he would pass the 
message on to Moscow to pass to Hanoi. According to Wilson, Kosygin had begun 
writing the draft in his presence. American intelligence confirmed that Kosygin had 
indeed transmitted the proposal via Moscow almost as soon as Wilson left. Wilson 
also told Kosygin that he would request more time from the Americans and indeed 
on returning to Downing Street he cabled a request that the bombing suspension be 
extended for a further 24 hours. After `an awful lot of expenditure of energy' from 
the Americans and British in London, Washington relented and added an extra six 
hours to the deadline to 1600 hours (London time). The President informed the 
Prime Minister of this news and again stressed that, 
in making this decision I bore in mind Moscow's and Hanoi's 
problems of transmittal two ways. But I also was conscious of 
the fact that they have had the possibility of responding to 
essentially this message for the 3 months since we gave it to the 
Poles and you gave it to the Russians; and the 5 days since it 
was transmitted direct to Hanoi and also given by you to 
Kosygin.... If there is any interest in some such A-B 
proposition, there had - and still is - been ample time for them 
either to agree or come back with a counter-proposal. 
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Johnson acknowledged Wilson's `gallant last minute effort'. 209 The discussions in 
Washington regarding these additional few hours are particularly revelatory. Wilson 
was correct in his assessment of the hawks and doves. McNamara was against 
extending the deadline, arguing that Wilson had already had two bombing extensions 
and that to `give them' a third was volunteering something for no obvious reason. 
Vice-President, Hubert Humphrey, disagreed with the `hawks' believing it was worth 
the risk because this was the first time the Soviets had `been in like this'. 210 It was 
also acknowledged that any short-time extension was in fact a political decision, and 
that a few hours difference would not make much difference militarily. Bundy felt 
that the US had `gone more notches'. Rostow believed there was `danger' in the 
Russians coming back with something concrete. 21 That is, what if the Russians 
came back with a `modified' no from Hanoi. Would the US be put in a position of 
having to compromise its position further? 
On their way to Gatwick airport where Kosygin was due to depart for 
Moscow at 11.15 am, the Russian Premier informed Wilson that he had passed on 
the message to Hanoi. Wilson told him of the six hours extension but Kosygin was 
not impressed. There was no official reply from Hanoi by 4.00 pm (London time) 
and a few hours later bombing restarted. Hanoi Radio did, however, broadcast a 
reply to a message to Ho Chi Minh from Pope Paul VI expressing the hope for an 
early peaceful solution to the war in Vietnam. The reply came just 30 minutes before 
209 Telegram from Walt Rostow to Bruce, 13 February 1967 in Herring, Secret Diplomacy 
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the end of the US deadline and as usual castigated US imperialists and demanded an 
end to their aggression. 212 
By the time Kosygin left London, Anglo-American relations were in a parlous 
state. Not surprisingly, a post-mortem was necessary to discover what went wrong 
and why. 
Aftermath 
The immediate concern in the days after the Kosygin visit was for secrecy. 
By early on 13 February the Press on both sides of the Atlantic were running 
speculative news stories on the reasons behind the bombing extension. Not 
surprisingly, Kosygin's presence in London led journalists to link the two events but 
the extension of the bombing pause was explained as being connected to Kosygin's 
presence in London and no other reason. The Americans were once more worried 
that the Wilson government might not keep quiet. For a number of reasons, the peace 
proposals had to be kept secret. The Americans stressed to their ambassadors in 
Britain and the Soviet Union that the `British must realize that [the] Soviets went out 
on a very long limb, and that any exposure of [the] serious discussions in fact carried 
on could do serious and indeed irreparable harm to future Soviet role'. 213 The State 
Department added that `it goes without saying that British silence is imperative 
whatever they think of [the] positions we put forward or [the] timing of our 
resumption'. 214 
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They were right to be worried. Wilson was not yet able to contain his anger 
and disappointment at the failure to establish talks. On 13 February he addressed the 
House of Commons on the Kosygin visit. 215 The following day he faced questions in 
the House and clarified the previous day's comments. 216 He said he believed there 
were moments when the conditions to secure a peace settlement `could have been 
very near'. 217 He also revealed that there had been a plan to end the war, saying 
there is an initiative, there is a plan - that I can't tell the 
House about - which could bring peace tomorrow and 
requires a very, very small movement to activate all the 
complicated machinery which would bring us to peace 
negotiations. 218 
He explained the failure to secure such a plan in terms of a lack of trust and 
confidence on the part of both the Americans and the North Vietnamese in relation to 
one another. He did, however, place particular emphasis on the activities of North 
Vietnamese troops during the To truce. This criticism drew a sharp response from 
Wilson's left-wing opponents. They demanded to know who had provided 
information on the southward movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies. 
When the Prime Minister refused to reveal his sources, cries of `Was it the 
Americans? ' were heard. As the New York Times commented, this implied 
Washington could not be trusted. 219 On the resumption of bombing, nearly 50 
Labour MPs signed a telegram to President Johnson deploring his decision. 220 
Shortly afterwards 100 MPs signed a petition condemning the renewal of bombing. 
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Despite Wilson's comments being interpreted in his own country as pro- 
American, Washington felt, with some justification, that Wilson was in fact referring 
unfavourably to American intransigence when he spoke of the need for `a very, very 
small movement' to bring about peace. Journalists and MPs were intrigued by 
Wilson's comments on machinery and plans. Wilson also made a ministerial 
broadcast on television on the evening of 14 February in which he repeated that 
peace in Vietnam `was almost within our grasp' at the weekend. He explained that 
`one single act of trust could have achieved it'. 221 
Wilson's statements caused much annoyance in Washington. Kaiser at the 
American Embassy in London met with Michael Palliser on 17 February to voice the 
Administration's `gravest concern'. Kaiser told Palliser that the telegram instructing 
him to speak on this issue `had been couched in very tough language indeed'. 222 The 
suggestion that peace was `very near' and that there was a `secret plan' upset 
Washington for two reasons. First, the Johnson administration did not believe such 
comments were accurate as Hanoi had not shown the slightest interest in this or other 
approaches to them. Second, `whatever the facts' such public discussions put the 
Americans `on the spot' with their allies and was causing them `considerable 
embarrassment at home'. 223 
In the United States it encouraged the `doves' to step up 
pressure on the Administration to stop the bombing, and 
generally to get out of the war; while it brought all the 
`hawks' circling in with cries of outrage at the prospect of a 
negotiation and demands for a full revelation of what the 
Administration was up to. The whole debate became thereby 
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impassioned and the President's task of steering a judicious 
middle course - already appallingly difficult - was made 
even more so. Moreover, your remarks had caused the 
Ambassadors of all America's allies in the war ... to ask 
in 
peremptory fashion what the US Government was doing 
behind their backs. 224 
Palliser defended the British position. He understood the US anxiety on this 
issue but felt the Prime Minister would have found it difficult `to make so effective a 
case for the US and British positions without saying the things he did in public. ' He 
also pointed out that the Prime Minister's `backgrounder' to the newspaper 
correspondents on Monday evening had helped to secure positive press coverage for 
the US on Tuesday. 225 
Palliser told Kaiser - and later reported back to Wilson - that in his opinion 
however inconvenient this fact might be for the Administration, 
they must accept that the British Government could not best 
help them simply by an absolute toeing of the American line; 
the political pressures were too strong for this, even if it 
otherwise seemed right, which in present circumstances I 
thought it did not. 226 
Palliser also made it clear that the tone of the Prime Minister's instructions had also 
been very firm and he was to leave Kaiser `in no doubt of the strength' of Wilson's 
`feelings about the conduct of last week's affairs and of your dis-satisfaction at the 
way in which virtually three days had been lost through what seemed, on the most 
charitable interpretation, inexplicable muddle and confusion'. Palliser then reassured 
Kaiser that the Prime Minister had no intention of embarrassing the President but 
224 OW/MP Minute on Anglo American Relations over Vietnam, Secret, 17 February 1967, PREM 13/1918, PRO 
225 Telegram from Kaiser to Rusk, 17 February 1967 in Herring, Secret Diplomacy, p. 481 
226 Palliser to Prime Minister, 17 February 1967, PREM 13/1918, 'Anglo-American Relations over Vietnam' 
411 
`there could of course be no question' of the Prime Minister retracting anything he 
had already said. The Prime Minister endorsed Palliser's comments in private. 227 
Kaiser reported back to Rusk that, 
while Palliser was obviously genuine in expressing his 
understanding of the nature of our problems, he also made 
it clear that the PM was more bullish about the significance 
of last week than we were. Palliser stressed on several 
occasions the `dramatic' change in Kosygin's attitude in 
contrast to last July when the PM visited Moscow and even 
as late as November when Brown was there .... It 
is also 
the firm conviction of the British that Kosygin did transmit 
our last proposal to Hanoi and very possibly with the 
recommendations that `they give it serious consideration. '228 
London and Washington therefore interpreted the actions of the Russians and North 
Vietnamese differently. Palliser argued that rather than taking such a negative stance 
on any public discussions of the possibilities for peace, it might be desirable to allow 
a `ray of hope to pierce the otherwise gloomy scene'. 229 Moreover, the British had to 
stress their own major political problem over Vietnam. 
It was now clear that the Kosygin episode required delicate handling if a full- 
blown rift was not to develop. The British could not easily forget the events that 
occurred during Kosygin's visit. The Prime Minister, in particular, was not able to 
move on; relations with the Johnson administration had been irrevocably damaged. 
The Prime Minister suggested he visit Washington to discuss matters personally with 
the President. Over a month later, Kaiser was still reporting back to Washington that 
it was `apparent that Wilson and Brown do a lot of churning over the Kosygin visit 
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and may still have some scars from our having given the Phase A/Phase B formula to 
the Poles in November without telling Brown'. 230 
Walt Rostow was despatched later in the month to try to smooth over the 
difficulties caused by the breakdown in communications between the transatlantic 
partners. Given his prominent role in events, however, he was probably not the most 
appropriate person to smooth the waters. He was also of the opinion that in many 
ways the Americans had been too co-operative with Wilson, considering the Prime 
Minister had explored the A-B formula verbally on his own. 231 Prior to the meeting, 
Rostow had been informed by Palliser that the Prime Minister would `wish to 
explore pretty firmly ... the apparent inconsistencies and 
fumblings during the 
Kosygin visit'. 232 Rostow said that he would welcome the chance to discuss this. He 
also reported that the President had wanted to support Wilson throughout the 
Kosygin visit because he believed in the sincerity of the Prime Minister's hopes for 
the peace not because he believed there would be a successful outcome. 
Indeed, the President was coming increasingly to feel that 
mediation in the conflict, whether between the United States 
and North Vietnam, or between the United States and the 
Soviet Union (acting as agent for North Vietnam) was 
becoming counter-productive. 
Not only was there little sight that Hanoi was interested in negotiating, but the 
various mediation efforts `tended to create confusion and misunderstanding amongst 
world opinion'. 233 Bill Jordan, a Senior Staff Member of the National Security 
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Council also told Rostow, that if Wilson returned to his idea of coming to 
Washington, then he knew how to handle it. 234 This meant, 'not now Harold'. 
On 25 February Rostow met with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. 
He reported back to Rusk and Johnson that he began the two-hour meeting by 
expressing US appreciation for British efforts during the Kosygin visit. However, it 
soon became clear to Rostow that, as expected, `the main point of his interview with 
me was to get off his chest his frustrations with the week with Kosygin'. Wilson 
argued that there had been a `breakdown in communications', that the Americans 
hadn't objected to his formulation of the Phase A-Phase B formula on Tuesday but 
then `overtook' his Friday proposal. He also felt that the `final effort to redress the 
situation inevitably assumed the form of an ultimatum'. Wilson was adamant that 
the problem of communication had to be cleared up. 
Rostow did not argue with Wilson in any real sense, except to say that 
Washington had not expected the message to be delivered on Friday until the Prime 
Minister had heard from the Americans. As Rostow put it, `I let him use my 
presence to unload his feelings rather than put them on paper to Washington'. 235 
Rostow commented that `beneath it all was a rankling that we did not cut him in fully 
on the direct channel'. 236 While Wilson agreed with Rostow that Hanoi appeared to 
regard negotiations as `defeat', he stressed that the importance of Kosygin's visit was 
that this was the first time the Soviets had been `ready to move'. 237 Rostow 
summarised Wilson's position. 
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His problem with Viet-Nam is clear: he has a quite strong 
anti-Viet-Nam wing in the Labor Party; bombing the North 
is more widely unpopular in Britain; and Wilson feels he 
must keep moving in a peace posture or the basis for over- 
all support of the U. S. position will slip away from him. 
We shall be hearing from him about his problems with 
`escalation', I would guess. 238 
Rostow told the President that he left `pretty indelibly' three points. First, that the 
President had responsibilities to over 500,000 US servicemen and to `our fighting 
allies'. Second, that there was a danger to the Johnson administration's political base 
at home from pursuing peace moves that failed. And finally, that there was also a 
danger from `panmunjom-type' negotiations, that is in engaging in pointless talk for 
talk's sake, if the other side was not interested in ending the war by non-military 
means and US soldiers were dying the meantime. 239 
The British record of this meeting paints a somewhat different picture. 240 
Wilson's forthright comments conveyed his continuing anger over the events during 
Kosygin's visit. He addressed numerous British concerns including the failure of 
Washington to fully brief them over the Polish affair, the fact that despite Cooper's 
presence during the Kosygin talks and the `wise advice' of Ambassador Bruce, the 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had faced the embarrassment of having to 
withdraw a proposal on 10 February in order to substitute a `more restrictive' one. 
This had led to the waste of two days' time and the final US offer had been viewed 
by Mr. Kosgyin `with some justification' as an ultimatum. Rostow, according to this 
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record, said although he was grateful for Wilson's frankness, `he was inclined to 
question the extent of misunderstanding or breakdown in communications suggested 
by the Prime Minister' and `in any case President Johnson was becoming 
increasingly sceptical of the possibilities of effective mediation' and felt the `best 
prospect for the future might well lie more in direct contacts' with Hanoi. Rostow 
thought that opinion in Washington `was now fairly firm that progress by mutual de- 
escalation was unlikely and that they would have to concentrate on "looking towards 
the end of the road"'. 241 This comment infuriated Wilson who saw it as affirmation 
that, 
he and the Foreign Secretary had been allowed to discuss the 
problem with Mr. Kosygin on a somewhat false premise - 
since all the propositions they had put to Kosygin with the 
approval and encouragement, as they understood it, of the 
U. S. Government, had hinged around the prospect of 
mutual de-escalation. If this was not to be the American 
policy he found it difficult to see why he had not been told 
so before. 242 
Rostow vehemently denied that Washington had been insincere on this point. He 
did, however, go on to explain in detail Johnson's main concerns over his 
Presidency. Internally, the war on poverty and the struggle for black civil rights 
dominated his objectives; externally, resistance to aggression in Vietnam was his 
main consideration. He explained that the President was aware that neither of his 
campaigns `was likely to yield an early dividend of political popularity; and he was 
facing up realistically to the possibility of a defeat in the 1968 election. However, 
believing he could still win, the President `recognised that his handling of the 
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Vietnam war could be a crucial factor'. To illustrate his point, Rostow referred to a 
recent Newsweek article by Louis Harris which had summarised the latest opinion 
polls. 
The President had been struck, because he had independently 
reached the same conclusion himself, by a point made in this 
article that whenever the American peoples' hopes for a 
quick end to the war were aroused, only to be dashed shortly 
afterwards, the President's personal popularity fell heavily. 
The President had concluded that, if he were to handle the 
war in such a way as to retain the confidence of the middle 
of the road majority of American opinion, his public position 
had to achieve a balance between readiness to negotiate and 
determination to prosecute the war with firmness but 
moderation. 243 
Wilson commented that although he supported Johnson personally and understood 
his preoccupation with Vietnam, too much reliance should not be placed on such 
polls, `they tended to fluctuate; and in any case a Government had to base its policies 
on something more solid than the polls'. 244 To illustrate his point, he said that even 
though a majority of the British public opposed the war in Vietnam and the British 
government's support for the Americans, there would be no change of policy on their 
part. He did, however, expect domestic pressure to increase if the hawks in 
Washington had their way and the war was further intensified. 
Wilson said that `he could not conceal ... that during the weekend February 
11/12 he had been gravely concerned about the future relationship between London 
and Washington'. He thought that this should have been made clear from his 
messages to Washington and Bruce's reports, and would have been even more 
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apparent had he not refrained from sending a third message that he had drafted. He 
also admitted that the present meeting had done little to reassure him. He than 
reminded Rostow that 
on a previous occasion, where there had been a similar and 
apparently major failure of communications between London 
and Washington, President Kennedy had arranged for a detailed 
inquiry to be made. 
He was talking about the 1962 Skybolt affair, but Rostow was `non-committal' on 
the idea of an investigation. This unsubtle hint did, however, indicate how seriously 
Wilson viewed events. Wilson then pressed for another meeting with the President 
`fairly soon'. Rostow said that he had been instructed to invite Mr. Wilson to 
Washington after his visit in June to `Expo 67' in Canada. Wilson said he would 
have preferred an earlier meeting but understood the timetabling difficulties. 
The meeting with Rostow had done little to heal the wounds. And, as the US 
further escalated the war, British domestic difficulties did indeed increase. The 
British public and press continued to turn against the war. As a consequence, the 
British government asked Rusk if a prominent American, possibly Vice-President 
Humphrey or Ambassador Goldberg, might visit the United Kingdom to help fight 
the propaganda battle. 245 It was proposed that any US delegation could come under 
the cover of other business, and then present the US case before small groups of 
journalists, politicians and academics. Although the US was at first worried that the 
British request and subterfuge might come to light, and therefore the impact of such 
a visit be substantially weakened, Rusk eventually agreed that Bill Bundy could visit 
245 Telegram from Rusk to Bruce, 13 March 1967, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 210, File; UK, Vol. X, Cables, 1/67- 
4/67, LBJL 
418 
later in the month. It was even suggested that perhaps the Under-Secretary Ball and 
Rusk himself might stop over in London early in April. Bundy visited London 
between 20-22 March and `completed ... the most effective and useful 
job of 
expounding' American policy in Vietnam. He met with MPs, newspapers editors 
and journalists, the Foreign Secretary and other Foreign Office officials, trade union 
leaders and the head of BBC public affairs. Kaiser reported back to Rusk that Bundy 
had done `a superb job ... 
he has been candid, eloquent, and persuasive. I am sure 
that he has shaken a lot of the critics and persuaded a lot of the doubtful'. The 
British were `extremely pleased' with Bundy's performance. 246 
Another visitor was Hubert Humphrey, who saw Wilson at Chequers on 
Sunday 2 April on his way back from a tour of Europe. After dinner, the Prime 
Minister raised the issue of Vietnam. 247 Wilson continued to worry the Americans, 
especially as he told Humphrey that 
he thought the key to peace lay through the Soviet Union and 
the key to the Soviet Union lay with Britain. He felt that he 
had a real opportunity to act as middleman between the US and 
USSR to reach a negotiated settlement. In fact, he had been 
considering the possibility of moving more toward the middle, 
between the two nations, on Vietnamese policy. If he did this, 
he wanted us to understand that he was doing so in the interests 
of peace and not because of any lack of friendship or loyalty 
to the US. 
Not surprisingly, Humphrey said that this change by Wilson would be misunderstood 
in the United States and that `it might result in increased pressure from `hawks' for 
unilateral and strong US action to crush North Vietnam'. 248 He also warned Wilson 
246 Ibid 
247 Cable from the Vice President to the President and the Secretary, 4 April 1967, David Bruce diaries 
248 Ibid 
419 
that any change in the UK's position `would jeopardize his relationship with the 
President' and he should therefore think carefully about it. 249 
In the meantime, the diplomatic arguments over the Kosygin visit continued at 
the highest level. Wilson continued to pursue the matter via a stream of cables to the 
President. He was encouraged in this by the publication of President Johnson's 
exchanges with Ho Chi Minh. 250 By early April, however, Patrick Dean, the British 
Ambassador in Washington, felt the matter should not be pushed further as it was 
unlikely to pay dividends. 251 
Long-term Impact of Sunflower 
A number of questions were raised by the failure of the Wilson-Kosygin 
initiative. Did Wilson exaggerate how `close' they came to peace? In his memoirs 
Wilson wrote that `a historic opportunity had been missed'. 252 He also said this 
during a television interview some two years after the event: `I believe, we got very 
near ... then the whole thing was dashed away'. He believed that a further 48-hour 
suspension of the bombing might have been crucial in encouraging a response from 
Hanoi. 253 This judgement is difficult to argue with; an extension might have been 
crucial. As we have seen, there are several reasons to believe the Soviets were 
willing to play the role of mediators. However, there were clear limits on how far 
they would go in this respect. Moscow wanted peace in Vietnam but not at the risk 
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of being portrayed as a tool of the US. It is much more difficult to ascertain whether 
Hanoi was receptive to Soviet mediation and/or the proposal. The National Security 
Agency reported that on 13 February the North Vietnamese transmitted two 
messages from Hanoi to Moscow. It is however highly unlikely that Hanoi would 
have accepted the amended Phase A-Phase B proposal due to its conditional nature. 
What is important here, however, is the fact that Wilson `felt' that Washington had 
bungled a unique opportunity. and had made the British, and more particularly 
himself, look foolish into the bargain. 
If it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about the potential efficacy of 
the Phase A-Phase B proposal as a catalyst for peace, what does the Wilson-Kosygin 
episode tell us about Anglo-American relations by early 1967? The most obvious 
conclusion is that relations at the highest levels were nowhere near as intimate as 
Wilson liked to claim or, indeed, believed. Johnson admitted that although he was in 
touch with Wilson by cable and via third parties, he did not speak to Wilson on the 
telephone at any point during the Wilson-Kosygin talks. 254 And as William Bundy 
argued, the failure of this peace initiative had `great significance as a source of 
lasting distrust and feeling of misunderstanding on both sides, between the President 
and Wilson. If they were not too well off before, they were infinitely worse after 
this'. 255 
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The fiasco of the Wilson-Kosygin peace initiative was soon overshadowed as 
Anglo-American relations came under further strain in more fundamental ways. By 
November 1967 the pound sterling was devalued and just two months later the 
Wilson government announced Britain's withdrawal East of Suez. 
In June 1967 Wilson's visited Washington again. Although the fallout from 
the Kosygin visit overshadowed proceedings, this did not prevent Wilson from being 
`formally' received, including a welcoming ceremony with military honours. This 
led one of Wilson's critics, Tony Benn to describe the Prime Minister as being 
received `with all the trumpets appropriate for a weak foreign head of state who has 
to be buttered up so that he can carry the can for American foreign policy'. 256 
Although this trip was largely concerned with Britain's role East of Suez, 
Wilson remained preoccupied with Vietnam due to increasingly vociferous attacks 
on his government's still broadly pro-American policy on that issue. By this stage, 
Wilson main's concern was over the possibility that the US might escalate the war 
even further, and perhaps even invade the North. In April, Johnson had authorised 
bombing raids against power transformers, ammunition dumps and other targets near 
Hanoi and Haiphong. And, as many outside of Washington suspected, Walt Rostow 
was now advocating a full-scale invasion of the North. Johnson had taken a middle 
course between the advocates of increased air action and those who argued for a 
reduction in the bombing to the South only. Instead, the President ordered a halt to 
air attacks on targets within ten miles of Hanoi. 
When Wilson met with Johnson on the morning of 2 June the President 
categorically denied the rumours of an invasion. The Prime Minister was reassured 
256 Tony Benn Diaries, 1 June 1967, p. 501 
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to hear this, quoting Kosygin on the dangers of Chinese intervention should America 
go this far. Johnson said he was well aware of this risk and had no intention of 
courting a third world war by invading the North. 257 Little more of substance was 
said on Vietnam, apart from Wilson repetition of his belief that there had been `a 
serious failure of communication between the British and American Government' 
and that the Soviets had claimed to have been in touch with Hanoi. 258 Johnson 
repeated that neither Kosygin nor Gromyko had `delivered' the North Vietnamese, 
and doubted they ever had the power to do so. The Prime Minister said the lesson to 
be learnt `appeared to be that, if any other chance of establishing contact with Hanoi 
occurred, the American Government should deal direct with the Soviet Government 
or invoke our [British] assistance rather than using Poles, Hungarians or other 
unreliable intermediaries'. 259 Ironically, Wilson still saw himself as a possible honest 
broker. 26o 
Devaluation of the Pound - November 1967 
Having still not recovered from the Kosygin episode and British talks of 
dissociation, Anglo-American relations faced another crisis point in November of 
1967. Sterling was in trouble again but this time the Americans were not prepared to 
bail it out. On 8 November the Governor of the Bank of England informed the 
257 Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States of America at the White 
House on the Morning of Friday, 2nd June, 1967, Confidential Annex, Visit of the Prime Minister to Canada and the 
United States, 1-3 June 1967, PREM 13/1919, PRO 
258 Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and Hi s Advisers and the President of the united States and His 
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259 Ibid 
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Americans that massive US financial help was required to save the pound. Although 
both James Callaghan and Roy Jenkins were resigned to devaluation, Wilson still 
believed he could rescue the situation with another trip to Washington and a personal 
appeal to the President. He could now play hardball with Johnson, arguing that if 
Britain didn't receive financial assistance to help the pound, he would have to 
withdraw British forces from East of Suez immediately. When Wilson suggested via 
David Bruce that he should visit the President two days later, however he had little 
choice but to mask the real reason for his visit, instead saying he wanted to discuss 
Vietnam, amongst other things. 261 
While sterling was uppermost in Wilson's mind, the Vietnam excuse was not 
entirely fabrication. The Labour Government's difficulties went from bad to worse. 
At the Labour Party Conference in Scarborough 2-6 October, the Government was 
defeated on a resolution on Vietnam. 262 Wilson personally felt the brunt of the 
growing opposition to the Vietnam war at the end of October when he was in 
Cambridge to speaking to a Labour party meeting. His car was stopped by egg- 
throwing and chanting anti-war demonstrators and badly damaged. Wilson and his 
wife Mary were jostled and manhandled by the crowd and a policeman was seriously 
injured. 263 On 8 November, Wilson had met with a Parliamentary Labour Party that 
was extremely angry over Vietnam, particularly the government's failure to dissociate 
itself from the latest waves of bombing of civilian parts of Hanoi and Haiphong. 
Bruce told Rusk, acting on material from an important Labour Party informant, that 
261 Wilson, Labour Government, p. 574 
262 Report of the 66th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, Scarborough, 2-6 October 1967, Transport House, Smith 
Square, London, SWI 
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the opposition to the Prime Minister's policy on Vietnam now came from all sections 
of the Party, including the right and centre. 264 
Johnson, however, was not prepared to receive Wilson on this pretext lest 
there be yet more speculation regarding possible peace moves or further rifts 
between Britain and America on the subject. Instead, Sir Patrick Dean, the British 
Ambassador delivered Wilson's appeal for financial help. By 13 November, the 
Americans had replied in the negative, as Wilson put it `with reluctance they would 
have to see us go down'. 265 Despite some last minutes signs that Washington was 
wavering, on 15 November it was recognised that there were `no serious signs of a 
cheque book' from the Americans. The decision to devalue was then taken. On 18 
November the pound sterling was devalued from $2.80 to $2.40. Although a 
substantial devaluation, the Americans correctly judged that it was not large enough 
to have a serious impact on the dollar. 
Although prepared to offer limited financial aid, Washington was now 
prepared to `think the unthinkable'. It had its own financial problems. The Vietnam 
war was costing $20 billion per year by 1967 and the budget deficit had reach $10 
billion for that fiscal year. 266 To help deal with this burden, Johnson had reluctantly 
acknowledged that Americans couldn't afford guns and butter, and had introduced a 
10 percent surcharge on individual and corporate taxes. This contributed to 
Johnson's difficulties in securing favourable public opinion. Those regarding the 
commitment to Vietnam as a `mistake' rose to 46%. 267 Johnson's own popularity 
rating decreased as the anti-war movement continued to grow in numbers and public 
264 Cable from Bruce to Rusk, 8 November 1967 in David Bruce diaries 
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visibility. As well as continuing Congressional pressure, elements of the media also 
began to question US involvement in Vietnam, mostly noticeably Life magazine 
whose editor, Hedley Donovan, argued the conflict was no longer `worth 
winning'. 268 Even worse, as far as Johnson was concerned, there was increasing 
dissent within his own cabinet. Robert McNamara increasingly questioned the 
validity of American's military campaign, particularly the effectiveness of bombing 
North Vietnam. In May McNamara and assistant secretary of defence, John 
McNaughton challenged NSAM-28 which provided the justification for the 
American war in Vietnam: `we seek an independent non-Communist South 
Vietnam'. They argued that US war aims should be more limited: `only to see that 
the people of South Vietnam are permitted to determine their own future'. Johnson 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were outraged at the proposed softening in America's 
position. The President believed McNamara had turned `dovish' on him and, by 
November he had been appointed President of the World Bank. 269 
The East of Suez Decision - January 1968 
After devaluation came the most damaging blow to the `special relationship'. 
On 10 January 1968, George Brown met with Dean Rusk and informed him that on 
Tuesday, 16 January, Her Majesty's Government would announce its plans to 
withdraw all forces from the Far East by 31 March 1971 (except Hong Kong) and to 
withdraw all forces from the Persian Gulf by the same date. 270 The decision was 
268 Karnow, Vietnam, p. 503 
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made to ensure the success of the devaluation of the pound. Although Brown 
admitted that the decision had for all practical purposes been made, it still had to be 
confirmed by the Cabinet on 12 January and he said he would report the views of the 
US Government. Rusk engaged in some last minute statescraft, using both emotive 
and strategic arguments to try to influence the British. 
Rusk's entreaties were quickly followed by a last-minute personal appeal from 
the President. Johnson flattered Wilson for his courage in bearing the financial 
burdens so far but continued 
I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay upon learning this 
profoundly discouraging news. If these steps are taken, they 
will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, 
with all that means for the future safety and health of the free 
world. The structure of peacekeeping will be shaken to its 
foundations. Our own capability and political will could be 
gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts alone. 271 
He urged Wilson and his colleagues to review the alternatives before taking such 
`irrevocable steps'. Johnson knew, however, that his efforts were futile. The 
announcement to withdraw East of Suez was made as part of a statement on sizeable 
budget cuts in government spending on 16 January 1968 and was endorsed by the 
Cabinet and Parliament. The military cuts resulted in a reduction of 75,000 military 
personnel and 80,000 civilians. Britain also cancelled its order for 50 US F-111 
long-range reconnaissance aircraft, the F-111s. As the CIA put it: `By making such 
defence cuts, Britain has underlined the fact that it now considers itself a European 
rather than a world power'. 272 British newspapers were quick to recognise that the 
271 Cable from President to Prime Minister, 12 January 1968, David Bruce diaries, Mss5: 1 B8303: 63 
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military retrenchment was `a blow to the Americans, morally if not materially, to the 
US at a time when its troops were fighting in Asia. ' And they speculated that 
although Johnson probably had `great sympathy for Wilson's grave dilemma', the US 
resented the timing and extent of the withdrawal. This was an accurate reading of 
the situation. 
The Times commented on 18 January: 
The basis of Wilson's foreign policy was an understanding with 
the U. S. that Britain supported American actions in Viet-Nam 
and maintained troops in the Far East in return for a close 
relationship with the U. S. and American support for the pound. 
That world commitment has now been dropped; the one element 
that remains is British support for the U. S. on Viet-Nam. That 
support is purely diplomatic and probably hypocritical. 273 
Despite the fact that the war became more unpopular in Britain, Wilson continued his 
support for the US in Vietnam until he left office. 
Wilson's Final Visit to the Johnson White House -8 February 1968 
In early February 1968 Wilson arrived at the Johnson White House for the 
final time. When the Prime Minister had expressed his desire to see Johnson the 
previous December for a `short communication', Johnson had scribbled his response 
on a memorandum informing him of the requests: `I'll see Wilson if he can keep shut 
up about Cuba and Viet Nam. '274 On his arrival the band played `The Road to 
Mandalay'. The Prime Minister masked his embarrassment at this ironic choice of 
welcoming music by later saying that he liked the tune. It was probably no mistake 
273 The Times, 18 January 1968 
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that it was played. The Johnson White House used this visit to reiterate `distress at 
the UK's accelerated withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf' and 
urged in the case of Southeast Asia `that the UK concert with the countries of the 
area to promote regional security arrangements prior to the British departure'. 275 
Wilson, still with an eye on his domestic audience, also made comments on 
Vietnam that must have finally consigned him to the growing ranks of opponents of 
the war, who Johnson now saw as traitors. In response to up-beat and supportive 
comments from the President including the phrase `The American people are backing 
Britain', Wilson launched into a lengthy speech on Vietnam. The Tet Offensive, a 
mighty blow to all those who believed the war was being won, had been underway 
since 31 January. Although couched in ostensibly friendly and supportive language, 
Wilson warned, 
I have said a hundred times that this problem will never be 
solved by a military solution, which I see is one of the lessons 
of the last few days -a determined resistance to see that a 
military solution is not imposed on the people of Vietnam. 276 
He then talked about calls for `dissociation' in his own country and explained that he 
would have done so had he thought it would result in the peace. He had, however, 
been `in a position to know a good deal about the history of negotiations and 
consultations' and these had all resulted in failure. But this did not mean `we were 
wrong, all of us here, to try, and to go on trying'. 277 With the President desperately 
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trying to rally support for the US redoubled military action in the wake of the Tet 
setback, Johnson must have found it intolerable to listen to Wilson's final effort to 
cast himself as a peacebroker. 
The End of the Special Relationship? 
By May 1967 the US Embassy in Britain judged the 'special relationship' to be 
'little more than sentimental terminology'. 278 Rusk agreed with this assessment a year 
later, 
The special relationship the UK has with us is less important 
to them now because the British have less interest in 
maintaining a world role. Operationally, the U. S. and U. K. 
are working on fewer real problems. The concept of 
Atlantic cooperation could replace the special relationship. 
Close bilateral relations with the British, however, will 
certainly continue. 279 
At the same time Bruce argued that `Britain's future role is almost surely that of a 
middle sized though outward looking European power. '280 He judged that `while the 
special US-UK relationship is diminishing, no early dramatic changes are likely, and 
a substantial relationship will endure based on the practical recognition of mutual 
interest. Despite everything that had happened over the last few years, Bruce was still 
wise enough to recognise that, 
It would be a mistake to over react to these changed 
278 Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, 8 May 1967, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 211, File: UK, Vol. XI, Memos, 4/67-6/67, 
LBJL 
279 Summary Notes of the 587th NSC Meeting, 5 June 1968 in NSF, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab. 69,6/5/68, 
Current Issues Affecting US/UK Relations, LBJL 
280 Telegram from Bruce to Rusk, Annual Assessment on Britain, Spring 1968,1 June 1968, NSF, Country File, Europe 
& USSR, UK, Vol. XIII, memos, 1/68-7/69, Box 211, LBJL 
430 
circumstances and write off the UK as a US ally and a 
significant force in the world. Even in her reduced 
circumstances, Britain remains the European power most 
engaged in world affairs... Britain has, therefore, 
international prestige and influence which, though 
diminished, still matter. The fact is, wherever one strikes 
the balance on this arrangement of tangible and intangible 
assets, Britain remains the most likeminded and most useful 
of US allies in world affairs. 281 
By June 1970 both Wilson had left high office, their reputations forever stained by 
their involvement with Vietnam, and yet the two statesman remained in contact with 
one another. Their relationship, much like the Anglo-American relationship during 
this period, was damaged but not destroyed. 
281 Ibid 
431 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the protracted nature of the tension between the United States and 
Great Britain over Vietnam, Anglo-American relations survived it, even if by the end 
of 1968 they were substantially weaker than they had been four years earlier. 
Transatlantic relations were not, however, unchanged by the disagreements over 
Vietnam. Disagreements over the war exacerbated the more fundamental problems 
facing the Anglo-American relationship, most significantly the weakness of sterling 
and Britain's plan to scale down its worldwide military commitments. 
The war's impact on the substance of policy-making between the two 
countries cannot be denied. Implicitly at least, Vietnam was an underlying factor in 
negotiations over sterling. While there can be no doubt that the British decision to 
withdraw from East of Suez was the major factor in explaining the cooling of 
transatlantic relations, the sheer length of the war, its personal significance to the 
President, and the war's unpopularity in Britain meant it exacted an obvious toll on 
Anglo-American relations. 
The bi-lateral relationship between the United States and Great Britain was 
greatly affected by the war in Vietnam. Traditional mutual suspicions of each other 
in the South East Asian region deepened as the war escalated. Britain felt it was 
being asked to support an unpopular war without being fully convinced of either the 
justification for US involvement in Vietnam or the military strategy and tactics 
employed by the Americans. Moreover, the Labour Government resented not being 
kept fully informed of events when its support of US policy in Vietnam was so 
politically sensitive at home. Washington, on the other hand, felt British obligations 
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under the South East Asian Treaty Organization agreement were being flouted, that 
the Labour government might withdraw completely from its military role in the Far 
East, and was not fully confident that Britain would adequately represent US 
interests during the peace talks. 
Consequently, the period 1964-68 saw the United States and Great Britain 
trying to manage one another over Vietnam. The British continued to attempt to 
restrain the Americans in the area, believing there were dangers of an American 
over-reaction to the communist threat in Vietnam. When J. E. Cable became Head of 
the South East Asia department of the British Foreign Office late in 1963, a new 
assessment of the situation in Vietnam was made. The SEA department became 
convinced that a military solution to the Vietnam War was impossible, without 
risking a confrontation with either the Soviets or the Chinese, and that the US would 
ultimately face ignominious defeat. As a result, the British government was 
encouraged to promote peace negotiations on the grounds that a compromise 
settlement ought to be preferable to the risks involved in escalation. However, the 
rationale behind this policy was never fully explained to the Americans. Elements 
within the Foreign Office were either more optimistic about the chances of an 
outright US victory than their counterparts in the SEA department, or felt it was too 
risky to jeopardize other areas of close co-operation with the United States by being 
too honest over Vietnam. As a result, Wilson and his foreign secretaries tended to 
receive cautious advice from the Foreign Office, as well as from the British 
Ambassador in Washington, Patrick Dean. Although the British would have loved to 
have given the Americans the benefit of their wisdom, the time was never right for 
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the British to give such blunt advice. Whether it would have been heeded in any 
case, is a moot point. 
US decision-making on Vietnam was nevertheless periodically affected by the 
British. British suggestions of bombing pauses or extensions to them had to be taken 
seriously by Washington, especially when they were combined with wider 
international pressure to give Hanoi a chance to respond to peace initiatives. World 
opinion was important in the propaganda war and as such, the Johnson 
administration had to appear to be making strenous efforts for a peaceful solution to 
the Vietnam conflict. It was therefore necessary to ensure that the British stayed in 
broad support of US policy on Vietnam. The Johnson administration understood 
Wilson's domestic political difficulties over Vietnam, and made some effort to allow 
the Prime Minister to portray his relations with the Americans as closer, or at least 
more significant, than they actually were. For this reason, the British were 
sometimes informed of US actions in advance, most notably over plans to bomb POL 
targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. This occasional placation of the British did not 
mean, however, that the Wilson government was routinely extended this courtesy. 
Usually, Wilson had to request forcefully that he be briefed on immediate events and 
on US thinking on Vietnam; the Johnson administration rarely volunteered such 
intimate consultation. The lack of a British military commitment to Vietnam meant 
that the Wilson Government was always going to be peripheral to American policy 
formation for the duration of the conflict. 
However, this did not prevent the US using the British as a `sounding board', 
often trying ideas out on them during meetings and private discussions. At this 
level, at least, a degree of co-operation between the nations was preserved. Indeed, 
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apart from one qualified act of dissociation over the POL bombings, Wilson 
provided staunch public support for Johnson on Vietnam. He regularly condemned 
Viet Cong and NLF attacks on the Americans, denounced Hanoi for its 
intransigence, praised Johnson for his attempts to find peace and his moderation in 
the military war, and consistently supported US objectives in Vietnam. And for the 
most part, prior to the 1966 dissociation, the White House recognised that the 
British Labour Government was providing the firmest verbal support of all its major 
allies. Still, this was not enough to prove British loyalty, especially to an 
increasingly embattled and paranoid President who valued this characteristic above 
all others. The public act of dissociation condemned Wilson to the ranks of other 
critics in LBJ's mind; he was now a suspicious and unreliable character. As the 
Prime Minister and his closest advisors suspected, this act of independence severely 
undermined London's influence in Washington. This may partly explain why, 
although the US had promised to keep British well informed of events in order that 
the Wilson government could fully support the Americans, Washington was not 
always candid with the British. In fact, the US made minimal effort in this area and 
ultimately used the British. The US deliberately led the British to believe that it was 
genuine in its support of their peace efforts, only for the charade to be revealed in a 
humiliating manner during the February 1967 Wilson-Kosygin peace initiative. 
This initiative, as with those that came before it, have been too easily judged as 
`gimmicks'. This is too harsh an assessment. While the United States and Great 
Britain never had high hopes that peace would flow directly from these initiatives, 
both governments were aware that they might help to convey the latest US 
bargaining position and gain a clearer picture of Moscow's and Hanoi's thinking. 
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The United States worked hard to maintain British support, especially in 
public. Although the Johnson administration only occasionally pressed the British 
directly for material help in Vietnam, privately the desire for a military commitment 
was ever-present. When it failed to materialise, Britain's reliability as an ally was 
questioned by many within the US State Department, Congress and the White House. 
Despite recognizing Wilson's domestic constraints where Vietnam was concerned, 
Johnson, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow, all felt that Wilson did not 
do enough to support the United States in a practical sense and were angered by the 
British government's attempts to distance itself from American tactics in Vietnam. 
The President sensed, probably correctly, that the unpopularity of the war in Britain 
served as a convenient excuse for Harold Wilson's relative detachment from the war 
effort and immersion in the peace effort. The argument that Britain was over- 
stretched military also had little validity as far as a token presence in Vietnam was 
concerned. In Johnson's mind, if Wilson had really believed in the American cause 
in Vietnam, then surely a token military force would have been manageable 
politically. This belief was probably confirmed for Johnson after Wilson's 
parliamentary majority rose substantially in April 1966; the Prime Minister no longer 
had the excuse that controversy over Vietnam threatened the survival of his 
government but still no troops were forthcoming. 
In the final analysis Vietnam affected Johnson's judgement in most matters 
and Anglo-American relations were no exception. Lyndon Johnson's personal 
obsession with the war is starkly apparent in the communications between Great 
Britain and the United States. The President and his close advisers regularly stressed 
the personal commitment to the battle, and the domestic ramifications of it, 
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especially after the July 1965 decision to Americanize the conflict. This personal 
dimension inevitably led to difficulties in the personal and working relationship 
between Wilson and Johnson. Given the nature and difficulty of understanding any 
relationship between human beings - never mind between politicians of such 
complexity as Wilson and Johnson - it is difficult to comment on the relationship 
between the two statesmen with any certainty, let alone evaluate its impact on policy 
decisions. The evidence at times appears contradictory but in many ways it merely 
reflects the fact that the relationship between the President and the Prime Minister 
was neither simple nor static, but was multi-dimensional with distinct peaks and 
troughs. There were periods, usually after one of Wilson's visits to Washington, 
when the relationship seemed to flourish, but the possibility of a close, working 
relationship developing into a cordial personal one, ended in July 1966 with Wilson's 
dissociation decision. The President was convinced that the Prime Minister acted 
purely out of domestic concerns and firmly believed that Britain had reneged on its 
SEATO commitments; Wilson was beginning to question LBJ's conduct of the 
Vietnam war. This incident soured relations and the chances of a meaningful 
friendship developing were greatly reduced. The debacle surrounding the Wilson- 
Kosygin peace initiative the following year effectively ended any intimacy between 
the President and the Prime Minister. Philip Kaiser observed that the relationship 
between President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson 'had its ups and downs' and 
that, at best, they developed a'shaky rapport. " This appears to be the most accurate 
assessment of an ambiguous partnership. 
I Kaiser, p. 209 & 230 
437 
There was no personal chemistry or ideological common ground between 
Wilson and Johnson. Those who served in both the Kennedy and the Johnson 
administrations acknowledge that the special relationship lost its emotional charge 
during the Johnson years. If compared with the earlier relationships between the 
heads of the US and the UK, say with Roosevelt-Churchill, Eisenhower-Macmillan 
and Macmillan-Kennedy, and with the later relationships between Reagan and 
Thatcher, and the one between Clinton and Blair, the Wilson-Johnson relationship 
was indeed cool. Given Johnson's obsession with Vietnam, it could be argued that 
any British prime minister who took such unpopular decisions as staying out of 
Vietnam and devolving Britain's defence role would have had difficulty establishing 
a close personal relationship with any American President. Moreover, Johnson's own 
problems of paranoia and self-esteem - his fixation over leaks and his demands for 
complete loyalty from colleagues and allies - would equally have caused any prime 
minister problems. And, with Wilson's domestic difficulties over sterling and 
Vietnam, it is hard to see how he could have done more to ensure a close personal 
relationship. He could have stayed out of peace negotiations and could have said less 
on the whole issue of Vietnam, but in so doing would have risked an internal split in 
his own party. And, while never explicitly linked, Wilson was aware that his 
diplomatic support on Vietnam helped in negotiations over sterling 
So how are we to assess Harold Wilson's performance with regard to both 
Vietnam and the broader issue of Anglo-American foreign policy of which it was 
such an integral part? However much Wilson felt humiliated by the Americans' lack 
of trust and candöur, and frustrated by the war, ultimately he survived the balancing 
act on Vietnam, and managed to avoided devaluation until a more propitious time. 
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Wilson was a skilful pragmatist, who Johnson and many of his advisers may well 
have felt got the better of him. Wilson, who suffered castigation at the time - and 
indeed since - for his support of America's war in Vietnam, has to be given some 
credit for his skilful handling of persistent US pressure for a deeper British 
involvement, particularly a token military force. And the Prime Minister did offer 
more advice and criticism of American tactics in private than many of his critics 
suspected. The advice was, however, circumspect; the criticism muted. Perhaps, 
ultimately, Wilson had a failure of courage where Vietnam was concerned. He was 
probably unwise to have firmly fixed his colours to the Vietnam mast so early on his 
tenure in office. On coming to office in October of 1964, just one month before the 
Johnson presidential landslide, the British Prime Minister could have signalled a 
change in Vietnam policy from his predecessors without necessarily jeopardizing 
wider relations with the Americans. At this stage, there were no US ground troops in 
Vietnam, the President had not yet fully committed himself to the fight and Britain 
could have taken a more neutral stance on the conflict. That is not to deny, however, 
that the stakes were high; clearly, this would have been a gamble. Johnson was 
notoriously unpredictable and could have reacted so badly to such an act of perceived 
disloyalty that he might have taken extreme steps, particularly relating to financial 
help to Britain, although given the obvious links between sterling and the dollar, 
America's own vital interests would probably have dictated against such action. 
What was more likely, and perhaps to Wilson even more frightening, was a public 
Presidential snub to the British. Johnson may not have received Wilson at the White 
House so often, and thus jeopardised the image of Britain as a world power whose 
opinion still counted, and Wilson's own self-image as a statesman whose counsel 
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mattered. Wilson never considered such an alternative, perhaps unable to 
contemplate risking such a breach. Instead, he conducted, very skillfully, the 
balancing act of doing the minimum to keep the Americans on side, but at the same 
time managing to keep his own backbenchers just about at bay. Nevertheless, 
Wilson's exaggerated public claims for his role as `honest broker' meant he faced 
humiliation at the hands of the Americans. His support for an unpopular and cruel 
war, left his personal reputation tarnished and the Labour Government's morally 
suspect. 
Of the two equally astute and experienced politicians, Wilson probably came 
out on top, although the ledger is almost reconciled. Britain's economic situation 
dictated that eventually sterling had to be devalued and Britain's role East of Suez 
prematurely ended. Through the 'understandings' reached with the Americans during 
1965 Wilson was able to postpone the inevitable, particularly where the defence 
review was concerned. His achievement was to avoid both decisions until he was in 
a strong enough domestic position to take them and weather the political fall-out. 
Wilson was able to exploit doubts about the war within the Johnson administration 
and within-the American nation as a whole. They might not have cared about British 
opinions but they did desperately need British support for propaganda purposes at 
least. 
Although LBJ and Wilson were central to the debate over Britain and 
Vietnam, the skills of mediation and the wise guidance of key officials was also vital 
in preventing a breakdown in the relationship between the President and the Prime 
Minister. Michael Palliser and Walt Rostow would probably take much of the credit 
but the fact that disputes on Vietnam did not lead to a lasting breach in Anglo- 
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American relations is also partly testimony to the decisive role of the two 
Ambassadors. Both David Bruce in London and Patrick Dean in Washington helped 
establish the spring 1965 understanding that remained firmly in place until the late 
summer of 1966, and were generally instrumental in maintaining cordiality and 
cooperation at most levels of diplomacy. Both men were respected, and their advice 
heeded, by Johnson and Wilson. They may have helped Wilson achieve something 
approximating his vision of a 'close' relationship with Americans, for the 
Wilson/Johnson years could hardly be deemed 'special'. 
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